


**Adversity is a school of wisdom:
Experimental evidence on cooperative protection
against stochastic losses**

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Is Adversity a School of Wisdom?

Experimental Evidence on Cooperative Protection Against Stochastic Losses*

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Abstract

We investigate the dynamics of voluntary cooperation to either reduce the size or the probability of stochastic losses. For variants of a repeated four-person prisoner's dilemma game, we show that cooperation is larger and more stable when it affects the probability rather than the size of the adverse event. We provide crucial insights on behavioral adaptation: defecting players are more likely to switch to cooperation after experiencing an adverse event, while existing cooperation is reinforced when the losses do not occur. This behavior is consistent with simple learning dynamics based on ex post evaluations of the chosen strategy.

Keywords: ex post rationality, experiment, cooperation, repeated prisoner's dilemma, regret learning, stochastic damages

JEL codes: C92, H41, Q54

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1 Introduction

Protection against common stochastic losses is an apparent challenge for societies. Important contemporary examples within the environmental realm range from actions towards preventing forest fires, oil spills or nuclear accidents to preparing for extreme events triggered by climate change. Beyond this field, protecting public security against terror, aviation security, or international cooperation against pandemic diseases, for example, show similar features. The way how societies deal with such stochastic damages changes over time. Importantly, the experience of an actual damage event may trigger behavioral responses. At the individual level, the occurrence of a damage appears to increase protective actions (e.g., Meyer, 2012). At the societal level, Birkland (2006) interprets accidents, naturally occurring disasters or deliberately caused catastrophes as “focusing events” (see Kingdon, 1995) that may induce increased attention to a policy problem and thereby possibly trigger policy changes. Given that many environmental problems display stochastic occurrences of damage events, it is crucial to better understand both the behavioral drivers for individuals and groups when facing such stochastic damage as well as the behavioral reactions after experiencing such events.

Two qualitatively different channels can be distinguished through which actions may impact future damage events: first, they may impact the *size* of damages while potentially leaving the probability of an adverse event unaffected (e.g., preparing for earthquakes, adaptation for climate change). Second, they may change the *probability* that adverse events occur and thereby may fully prevent a damage event from happening (e.g., forest fire prevention, mitigation of climate change, aviation security). In this paper we investigate how the availability of these two channels affects voluntary cooperation on the protection against stochastic losses. We thereby concentrate on a voluntary cooperation setting as protective actions against probabilistic losses often require the cooperation of members of communities. We are particularly interested in the evolution of behavior over time, that is, how experiencing adverse events affects subsequent decisions. Although problems of repeated cooperation to reduce probabilistic losses are common place, there is surprisingly little known about how people actually behave when facing this type of challenges.

For these purposes, we provide experimental evidence within variants of a repeated n -person prisoner dilemma game with stochastic payoffs: subjects may (indefinitely) repeatedly choose to invest in protective actions which benefit the entire group. In the short run (one-shot), subjects have incentives to free-ride on the investments of others, while the (indefinitely) repeated interaction will allow for positive cooperation levels sustained in subgame-perfect equilibria. Specifically, we compare a setting where individual cooperation reduces the size of

certain damages (*CertDam*) with settings in which cooperation either reduces the size (*DamRed*) of a damage that occurs with a given probability or reduces the probability of damages of fixed size (*ProbRed*). Expected payoffs conditional on the number of cooperators in the group are held constant across treatments.

Our experimental results show significant differences between cooperation rates in *CertDam* and *DamRed* versus *ProbRed*: subjects are more likely to cooperate to reduce the probability of the all-or-nothing damage, rather than to marginally reduce the size of a certain or stochastic damage. These differences between treatments get more pronounced over time. When cooperation reduces the probability of an adverse event, cooperation remains rather stable over the series of interactions. In sharp contrast, cooperation rates decline over time when cooperation reduces the size of a certain damage or a stochastic damage that occurs with fixed probability.

In line with our motivating examples and the (German) proverb which inspired the title of our paper¹, we demonstrate that experiencing adverse events in treatments with stochastic damages is of particular importance for the dynamics of individual behavior: (i) non-cooperating players are more likely to switch to cooperation following a damage event. This tendency is particularly strong in *ProbRed*. (ii) The occurrence of damages makes it less likely for cooperating players to continue cooperation. In other words, the absence of the damage reinforces existing individual cooperation. Players therefore appear to assess their actions from an ex post perspective when deciding about future actions. As such, we demonstrate that our findings on cooperation rates and their dynamics deviate from predictions based on expected utility maximization in conventional game theoretic equilibrium concepts. Rather, the treatment differences and the dynamics of decisions are largely consistent with combinations of behavioral motives of anticipated regret (e.g., Loomes and Sugden, 1988; Zehlenberg, 1999; Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay, 2007) and evolutionary learning dynamics which link back to notions of ex post regret (e.g., Selten and Chmura, 2008; Chmura et al., 2012).

With our findings, we thereby both identify differences in voluntary cooperation on damage reduction versus probability reduction, but also contribute to the understanding of cooperation decisions in a dynamic context. We show a differentiated behavioral response to damage events, even when their occurrence does not reveal any further information on the future likelihood of adverse events.

Our experiment relates to several different strands of theoretical and experimental literature. The incentive structure is similar to studies on policy instruments for dealing with non-point source pollution (e.g., Segerson, 1988; Miceli and Segerson, 2007; Barrett, 2011) where fines can only be put on ambient pollution levels. Here, fines are triggered based on the group rather than individual

¹The German proverb reads “Aus Schaden wird man klug” which literally translates into “Failure makes smart”.

behavior.² Our setting also relates to recent experimental research on threshold public good games (e.g., Milinski et al., 2008; Tavoni et al., 2011): in our *ProbRed* treatment, damages are avoided if an ex ante unknown threshold of cooperating players is reached. Dannenberg et al. (2014) consider settings with commonly known horizons but unknown thresholds which differ from our study as we consider indefinitely repeated games in which cooperation could be sustained as an equilibrium.

Our paper also relates to the literature on “self-insurance” and “self-protection”: following the seminal article by Ehrlich and Becker (1972), the function of protective and preventive actions as complements or substitutes for market insurance are analyzed at the individual level for purely private goods (Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1985; Jullien et al., 1999; Briys and Schlesinger, 1990)³ or related to some forms of externalities (Muermann and Kunreuther, 2008). Lohse et al. (2012) theoretically investigate a public good structure where actions either reduce the size or the probability of a loss, but do not explore how behavior in the two cases may differ.⁴ Focusing completely on loss prevention, Keser and Montmarquette (2008) analyze individual contributions that reduce the risk of correlated public losses. They show that contributions decrease in initial loss probability and with ambiguity (in comparison to risk), while they increase with endowment. Likewise, Dickinson (1998) compares public good games with probabilistic and certain gains from contributions and finds that risk decreases contributions. None of these paper provides a comparison of protective and preventive behavior in group settings nor considers the dynamics of behavior in repeated interactions. With our paper, we therefore enrich the existing literature not only by comparing the effectiveness of preventive vs. protective measures in voluntary interactions, but also by explicitly considering the determinants of the evolution of cooperative

²Similarly, incentives for cooperative behavior in groups have been discussed in the context of industrial organization and team production (e.g., Holmstrom, 1982; Rasmussen, 1987; Varian, 1990). This mostly theoretical literature considers typically the threat of group penalties to prevent shirking of group members in one-shot rather than repeated settings, whereas participants in our setting may choose to cooperate to avoid being potentially penalized by increased free-riding of other group members in the consecutive periods.

³For a setting of a single decision maker, Friesen (2012) shows by building on Becker’s (1968) theory of crime that risk-averse participants are deterred more by an increase in fine than by an increase in the probability of being caught which leads to an identical expected fine. When translating the model to our setting, one would expect that cooperation is highest in the damage size reduction setting and lower in the probability reduction, exactly the opposite of our findings.

⁴Most of the papers use independent risks (uncorrelated realization of the loss), which makes sense when assuming an insurance market in the private good case and represents examples like individual risks like theft, rape and murder linked to public security or the individual benefits from cancer research. Muermann and Kunreuther (2008) have started to analyze partly correlated risks. In our setting, we are interested in fully correlated risks, which do better capture the incentive structure of our guiding examples within the realm of environmental problems.

behavior over time in light of experiencing the damage events.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the experimental setting: after describing the game in section 2.1, we derive predictions in section 2.2, before detailing the experimental design in section 2.3. Experimental results are presented in section 3 and a behavioral model consistent with the observed behavior is presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.

2 Experimental Design and Predictions

2.1 Experimental Treatments

The starting point of our setting is a repeatedly played simultaneous move four-person prisoners' dilemma ($n = 4$). At the beginning of each period, each player is endowed with E tokens. At the end of each period, a damage of D tokens occurs with probability p and reduces the endowment of each player. Damages are fully correlated across the four players; that is, either all players or no player within a group incur the damage in a given period and damages are independent over time⁵. With their decisions, players may reduce either the size or the probability of the damage, depending on the treatment.

For this purpose, each player is asked before the damage realizes, whether she wants to cooperate or defect.⁶ The action of individual i in period t is, therefore, the binary contribution choice $q_i^t \in \{0, 1\}$ with $q_i^t = 1$ being cooperative and $q_i^t = 0$ being defective. Cooperation costs the individual player c tokens. The sum of cooperators in a group and period is denoted by $Q^t = \sum_{j=1}^n q_j^t = q_i^t + Q_{-i}^t$. The potential damage, $D^{Treat}(Q^t)$, and the probability of its occurrence, $p^{Treat}(Q^t)$, depend on the total cooperation level and differ between treatments ($Treat$). With this, the general payoff structure of individual i in period t for a certain treatment condition is given by

$$\pi_{i,t}(q_i^t, Q_{-i}^t, s^t) = E - cq_i^t - s^t D^{Treat}(Q^t) \quad (1)$$

where $s^t \in \{0, 1\}$ reflects the state of nature where the damage has ($s^t = 1$) or has not ($s^t = 0$) occurred, and c being the individual cost for cooperation.

In the experiment, we differentiate between three treatments which are calibrated to guarantee equivalence in expected damages, that is, $p^{Treat}(Q^t)D^{Treat}(Q^t)$ is equivalent for all treatments.

⁵For simplicity reasons in the experiment, we do not introduce the structure of a stock pollutant in this paper.

⁶In the experiment, we use neutral wording; the exact wording is “take/not take an action”.

In the first treatment, hereafter denoted as *DamRed*, each player's cooperation leads to a reduction of the initial damage D_0 by the amount d , while the initial probability is kept constant at p_0 . That is, we have $D^{DamRed}(Q^t) = D_0 - dQ^t$ and $p^{DamRed}(Q^t) \equiv p_0$. In the second treatment, hereafter denoted as *ProbRed*, cooperation leads to a reduction of the initial probability of the damage p_0 by the amount x for each cooperation decision ($p^{ProbRed}(Q^t) = p_0 - xQ^t$) while its level is fixed at $D^{ProbRed}(Q^t) \equiv D_0$. Equivalence of the expected payoffs is guaranteed by setting $dp_0 = xD_0$ which leads to expected damages in both treatments being given by $p_0(D_0 - dQ) = (p_0 - xQ)D_0$. In the third treatment, denoted as *CertDam*, expected damages occur with certainty: $D^{CertDam}(Q^t) = p_0D_0 - p_0dQ^t$ and $p^{CertDam}(Q^t) = 1$.

In order to guarantee the prisoners' dilemma structure, we assume $np_0d > c > p_0d$ and $nxD_0 > c > xD_0$. In other words, cooperation is socially beneficial in terms of expected payoffs, but does not pay off individually. Further, we assume that even full cooperation ($Q^t = n$) does not reduce the damage nor its probability to zero ($p_0 - nx > 0$, $D_0 - nd > 0$).

In our experiment, players at the end of each period get information about their own cooperation decision q_i^t , the resulting cost they incurred, and the total level of cooperation Q^t . They also get to know whether the damage event occurred or not and are informed about their individual payoff. With this information, players in *CertDam* and *DamRed* can calculate the payoff that they would have received if they had changed their own decision. This is different in *ProbRed*: for example after observing a damage event, a defecting player cannot know if the damage also would have occurred if she individually had cooperated. Conversely when no damage occurred, a cooperating player does not know if she was pivotal in preventing the damage event. In order to control for the impact of players' being informed about their marginal impact on the payoff, we introduce a fourth treatment condition *ProbRed*⁺ which is identical with *ProbRed* in the mapping of cooperation into probability and damage, but gives players additional feedback after each period: players are informed whether the damage would have occurred if zero, one, two, three, or all four players had cooperated. Therefore, *ProbRed*⁺ increases the subjects' awareness about their decision's marginal impact on the payoff. Table 1 summarizes the damage and probability functions as well as the resulting expected damages for all treatments.

In all treatment conditions our setting mimics infinite play. For this purpose, we apply the random stopping rule for supergames (e.g., Bò and Fréchette, 2011). In our experiment, the number of supergames is not known to the players. At the beginning of each supergame, players are randomly re-matched into new groups. Each supergame consists of several periods of the game described above. A supergame has a publicly known termination probability δ after each period. That is, after each period, the supergame terminates with probability δ , and a

Treatment	$D^{Treat}(Q^t)$	$p^{Treat}(Q^t)$	$D^{Treat}(Q^t) p^{Treat}(Q^t)$
<i>CertDam</i>	$p_0 D_0 - p_0 d Q^t$	1	$p_0(D_0 - d Q^t)$
<i>DamRed</i>	$D_0 - d Q^t$	p_0	$p_0(D_0 - d Q^t)$
<i>ProbRed</i>	D_0	$p_0 - x Q^t$	$(p_0 - x Q^t) D_0$
<i>ProbRed⁺</i>	D_0	$p_0 - x Q^t$	$(p_0 - x Q^t) D_0$

Table 1: Summary of damage size $D^{Treat}(Q^t)$ and damage probability $p^{Treat}(Q^t)$ for the respective treatments *ProbRed*, *ProbRed⁺*, *DamRed*, and *CertDam*.

new supergame starts in new randomly re-matched groups, whereas with probability $1 - \delta$ the supergame continues in the same group constellation. Playing in changing group compositions across supergames allows us to generate more observations per subject to better account for potential learning behavior. While players cannot predict the termination of the specific supergame, the random draws determining the lengths of the supergames are taken once and applied to all sessions and treatments.

Bò and Fréchette (2011) provide evidence suggesting that the existence of a cooperative equilibrium may be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for persistent cooperation or even cooperation levels which increase with experience. In Appendix A, we show that the minimum number of risk-neutral cooperating players in a cooperative subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is given by

$$Q \geq Q^{min} = \frac{c}{p_0 d (1 - \delta)} + \frac{\delta}{1 - \delta} \quad (2)$$

The proof rests on the assumption that $Q \leq n$ players follow a modified grim trigger strategy: they cooperate as long as at least $Q - 1$ other players cooperate, otherwise they defect in all subsequent periods. The remaining $n - Q$ players always defect.⁷

As we want to give sustained cooperation a good chance, we choose the parameter in our experiment in a way that cooperative equilibria exist. Specifically, we set the parameters as follows: termination probability $\delta = 0.2$, initial damage

⁷This modified grim-trigger strategy calls for infinite punishment following a unilateral defection. It thereby introduces the highest costs possible for the deviation. As a consequence, the analysis of grim-trigger shows us the least restrictive condition for cooperative equilibria to exist. Naturally, the multiplicity of equilibria may motivate further discussions on equilibrium selection. While not being the focus of the paper, we note that the equilibrium which supports $Q = 4$ is not “renegotiation proof” as – following the defection of one player – the remaining three players collectively would not have an incentive to follow through with the punishment as it lowers their payoffs, while the cooperation of these three players can still be supported by the modified grim trigger strategies.

probability $p_0 = 0.5$, probability reduction $x = 0.1$, initial damage size $D_0 = 20$, damage reduction $d = 4$, initial endowment $E = 25$ and cost $c = 5$. This allows for cooperative subgame perfect equilibria in which three or four risk neutral players cooperate ($Q \geq Q^{min} = 2.875$).

2.2 Predictions

It is obvious that the game has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which *all* players *always* defect: as in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game, no player individually has an incentive to cooperate. The parameters were set to allow for cooperative equilibria in which $Q \geq Q^{min} = 2.875$ risk neutral players cooperate. Naturally, the equilibria for risk neutral players do not differ between treatments as all treatments are identical in the mapping of cooperation decisions into expected payoffs.⁸ Differences may occur if subjects are risk-averse or risk-loving.

Intuitively, one may expect levels of cooperation to be higher in *DamRed* than in *ProbRed* for risk-averse subjects: while the expected utility of a player for $Q = 0$ is identical in the two treatments ($p = p_0, D = D_0$), it is larger in *DamRed* than in *ProbRed* and *ProbRed*⁺ if $Q > 0$.⁹ This suggests that the willingness to (collectively) cooperate among risk-averse players is higher in *DamRed* than in *ProbRed* and *ProbRed*⁺. For risk-lovers, the opposite relationship would hold.

In order to study the stability of cooperation under different risk attitudes, we again concentrate on modified grim trigger strategies that have been introduced above. We model CARA risk-attitudes by $\sum_t \mathbb{E}[u_i(\pi_i^t)]$ where $u_i(\pi) = \pi^{1-\sigma}/(1-\sigma)$. Figure 1 depicts the minimal cooperation level Q^{min} needed in the respective treatments to make cooperation attractive for a subject of a given level of risk aversion σ .¹⁰ We see that all of the curves collapse for risk-neutral players ($\sigma = 0$) for which we again obtain $Q^{min} = 2.875$. It can be seen that for risk-averse decision-makers ($\sigma > 0$) the threshold Q^{min} is lowest for *DamRed*, while for risk-lovers ($\sigma < 0$) *CertDam* mostly leads to the smallest Q^{min} .

For *DamRed*, the threshold Q^{min} is decreasing in σ . More risk averse players are thus willing to be part of a smaller subset of Q cooperating players, while very risk seeking players are not even willing to cooperate if everyone else cooperates. That is, more risk-averse players are more likely to cooperate. For *CertDam*, we

⁸Note, however, that the stochastic damage treatments could allow for additional strategies where players condition their actions or changes of actions on the occurrence of a damage event. However, there is no intuitive way to select between different possible equilibria.

⁹This can be seen from $(p_0 - xQ)u_i(E - D_0 - cq_i) + (1 - p_0 + xQ)u_i(E - cq_i) \geq p_0u_i(E - D_0 + dQ - cq_i) + (1 - p_0)u_i(E - cq_i)$ which holds due to the concavity of $u_i(\cdot)$ for risk-averse players. As such that (collective) cooperation is more beneficial. This argument follows an analysis of individual decision making by Friesen (2012).

¹⁰The conditions that are used for the simulations are given in Appendix A.

observe that cooperation is rather insensitive to risk attitudes. For *ProbRed*, we obtain a U-shaped relationship between Q^{min} and σ in Figure 1. Intuitively, neither highly risk-averse nor highly risk-loving subjects are predicted to cooperate: if a subject is extremely risk-averse, she concentrates on the minimum payoff. As cooperation can not prevent the damage for sure, this minimum payoff is larger if the subject defects as then cooperation costs are saved. Conversely, an extremely risk-loving subject essentially only counts with the maximum payoff (i.e., the damage not occurring), and again has no incentives to spend the costs of cooperation. As such, only players with intermediate levels of risk aversion may cooperate for any given threshold level Q^{min} . Note that for $Q^{min} = 2$ this set is empty, while for $Q^{min} = 3$ it is fully contained in the set of potentially cooperating players under *CertDam*. As such, we predict cooperation rates to be lower in *ProbRed* than in *CertDam* if players behave as expected utility maximizers. Cooperative equilibria with 2 players cooperating may only exist for *DamRed*.

Prediction 1. (*Equilibrium Prediction*)

- (a) *The likelihood to cooperate increases with players' degree of risk aversion in DamRed, it is relatively insensitive to risk aversion in CertDam. In ProbRed, only players with intermediate levels of risk aversion may choose to cooperate.*
- (b) *Sustained cooperation of two players is most likely in DamRed. Cooperation of three or four players is most likely in CertDam.*

The former discussion relied on subgame perfect equilibria where individuals' strategies condition their actions in each period only on group members' behavior in the previous periods. However, even if they additionally conditioned on the presence of a damage event, the conclusions for the minimal number of cooperating players would not change. Furthermore, no clear prediction based on subgame perfect equilibria can be made on how the occurrence of a damage affects future actions. However, while for one-shot or finite interactions, convincing evidence exists that standard (selfish) preferences as used above cannot fully describe individual behavior in dilemma situations, the indefinitely repeated game structure allows for cooperative equilibria. As such, it is an open question how well these predictions perform.

We therefore take an explorative approach when presenting our results in section 3 and first contrast them with the predictions based on subgame perfect Nash equilibria as derived above. In section 4, we then will present a behavioral model will prove better able to accommodate our results.




Figure 1: *Minimal cooperation level Q^{\min} required to stabilize cooperation as a function of risk aversion σ for CRRA preferences ($u(\pi) = \pi^{1-\sigma}/(1-\sigma)$). Parameters as used in experiment ($\delta = 0.2$, $p_0 = 0.5$, $x = 0.1$, $D_0 = 20$, $d = 4$, $E = 25$, $c = 5$).*

2.3 Experimental Procedure

In total, we ran 12 experimental sessions between January and March 2014 at the Experimental Laboratory of the School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Hamburg. Three sessions were conducted for each of the treatment conditions that we described in Section 2.1. A total of 280 students from the University of Hamburg participated in the experiment, with a maximum of 24 and a minimum of 16 subjects per session. Median age was 24 years, 53% were female participants.

We applied the same sequence of periods and supergames across all sessions and treatments which we randomly determined by the computer prior to the first experimental session. Overall, all participants played seven supergames (participants did not know the total number of supergames beforehand), the supergames consisted of 5, 3, 7, 4, 7, 3 and 5 periods, respectively. We organized the rematching at the end of each supergame such that two new groups were randomly formed from a matching unit of 8 participants which remained constant for the entire duration of the session. This gave us 9 independent observations in *ProbRed*, *DamRed*, and *CertDam*, as well as 8 independent observations in *ProbRed*⁺.

After the main experiment, we assessed participants' risk preferences following Eckel and Grossman (2008) and Dave et al. (2010) with an average payoff of 38 Cent (minimum 2 Cent, maximum 70 Cent), before adding some brief questions regarding the socio-demographic characteristics of our participants (e.g., gender, age, and years of study).

During the experiment, participants played for Taler, at the end of the experiment, the sum of the payoffs in all rounds were converted into Euros at an exchange rate of 1 Taler for 1 Euro-Cent and paid out privately. Subjects earned an average of 10.50 Euro in the repeated prisoners' dilemma part, with a maximum of 12.70 Euro and a minimum of 8.25 Euro. Each session lasted for about 60 minutes. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), recruitment took place with hroot (Bock et al., 2014). The instructions (translated from German to English) can be found in the Appendix; the decision screen (including instructions) for the risk assessment task is shown in Figure 5 at the end of the Appendix.

3 Results

We structure our discussion of the results by first considering average treatment differences, before explicitly exploring the individual adaptation dynamics after damage events.

3.1 Average Treatment Differences




Figure 2: Mean cooperation frequency per period by treatment.

Figure 2 shows the mean cooperation rates per period and treatment. Table 2 summarizes the average cooperation rates across all periods as well as for the first and last periods of the supergames. It is immediately seen that cooperation rates in *ProbRed* and *ProbRed+* are substantially higher than in *DamRed* and *CertDam*. Overall, cooperation rates across all periods are 59% in *ProbRed*, 54% in *ProbRed+*, 38% in *DamRed*, and 26% in *CertDam*. More specifically, cooperation rates in *ProbRed* and *ProbRed+* are significantly larger than in *CertDam* ($p < 0.01$)¹¹ and *DamRed* ($p < 0.05$). No significant difference exists between *ProbRed* and *ProbRed+*. These results are largely robust to concentrating on the first or the last periods of supergames as is displayed in Table 2. We therefore formulate our first result:

Result 1. *Cooperation rates are larger when cooperation affects the probability of a damage event (*ProbRed* and *ProbRed+*) rather than affecting the size of a stochastic damage (*DamRed*) or when it leads to a certain damage reduction (*CertDam*).*

Result 1 is not consistent with our predictions based on SPNE predictions as derived for expected utility maximizers. In fact, we find no significant im-

¹¹Throughout the paper and unless specified otherwise, statistical significance is assessed by two-sided Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank sum tests relying on matching unit averages.

	all periods	first periods	last periods
(1) <i>CertDam</i>	.26	.43	.20
(2) <i>DamRed</i>	.38	.47	.36
(3) <i>ProbRed</i>	.59	.66	.57
(4) <i>ProbRed</i> ⁺	.54	.60	.51
tests	(3),(4) > ** (2)	(3) > ** (2)	(3) > ** (2)
	(3),(4) > *** (1)	(4) > * (2)	(4) > * (2)
	(3),(4) > *** (1)	(3),(4) > *** (1)	(3),(4) > *** (1)

Table 2: *Average cooperation rates by treatments over the entire experiment (left panel), over the first periods of all supergames (middle panel), and over the last periods of all supergames (right panel), tests refer to two-sided Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank sum tests, *** indicates significance at a $p < 0.01$ level, ** at a $p < 0.05$ level and * at a $p < 0.1$ level.*

part of risk aversion on cooperation decisions in any of the treatments: Table 3 reports results from both a regression analyzing decisions in the first period of the first supergame (left panel) as well as a random effect regression (errors are clustered at the matching group level) analyzing decisions in all periods and all supergames. Risk attitudes are measured by the lottery choice in the second part of the experiment. The variable *risk*, ranges from one to six, such that the lottery choice with larger numbers indicates more risk tolerance.¹² Estimated coefficients suggest that the behavior is not driven by the individual’s risk aversion.

The treatment differences reported in Result 1 qualitatively occur already in the very first period of the experiment: while 68% cooperate in *ProbRed*, 67% in *ProbRed*⁺, only 58% cooperate in *DamRed* and 53% in *CertDam*. At the individual level (since each subject provides an independent observation in the first period of the first supergame), the differences between *CertDam* and *ProbRed* ($p = 0.06$) and *ProbRed*⁺ ($p = 0.09$) are weakly significant based on two-sided Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank sum tests.¹³

The treatment differences are further strengthened over time as can be seen in Figure 3 which shows cooperation rates in the first period of the respective supergames. In contrast to our prediction 1(b), we find a negative trend of cooperation rates in the first periods of supergames in *DamRed* and *CertDam* (both $p = 0.05$, based on Cuzick’s non-parametric test for trends), while the negative trend is not significant for the probability reduction treatments ($p = 0.19$ and $p = 0.13$, respectively).

¹²Alternative specification which code risk attitudes as binary variable do not change any of the results.

¹³No significant differences occur when controlling for risk aversion (see Table 3).

	dependent variable: q_i^t	
	only first period	all periods
<i>DamRed</i>	.251 (.206)	.11 (.148)
<i>ProbRed</i>	.256 (.19)	.278 (.169)
<i>ProbRed</i> ⁺	.272 (.189)	.191 (.137)
<i>risk</i>	.04 (.033)	-.022 (.017)
<i>risk</i> × <i>DamRed</i>	-.053 (.048)	.006 (.03)
<i>risk</i> × <i>ProbRed</i>	-.029 (.048)	.016 (.039)
<i>risk</i> × <i>ProbRed</i> ⁺	-.036 (.047)	.024 (.029)
<i>constant</i>	.386*** (.13)	.339*** (.092)
<i>obs</i>	280	9520
<i>n</i>	280	280
F-test/Wald- χ^2 -test	.92	68***

Table 3: *Left panel: linear regression of cooperation behavior in the first period, right panel: random effects regression of cooperation behavior in all periods of the experiment; coefficients are reported along standard errors in parenthesis (errors are clustered at the matching group level); *** indicates significance at a $p < 0.01$ level, ** at a $p < 0.05$ level and * at a $p < 0.1$ level. obs reports the number of observations while n reports the number of subjects; models' fitness are assessed by F-test and Wald- χ^2 -tests.*




Figure 3: *Mean cooperation in the first period of all supergames across treatment conditions*

Table 4 reports further evidence for the cooperation trends based on a random-effects regression of the individual cooperation decision on the supergame (*supergame*, ranging from 1 to 7) and the period within a supergame (*period in supergame*, ranging from 1 to 7) as well as on dummies for the treatments and the corresponding interaction terms. We find negative time trends across supergames in *DamRed* and *CertDam*, and a significantly less negative trend in *ProbRed*⁺, while there is no significant trend in *ProbRed*.¹⁴ Negative time trends also occur within supergames in all treatments.¹⁵ The downward trend within supergames is largest in *CertDam*, significantly smaller in both *DamRed* and *ProbRed* and weakest in *ProbRed*⁺.

	dependent variable: q_i^t
<i>DamRed</i>	.06 (.071)
<i>ProbRed</i>	.147* (.078)
<i>ProbRed</i> ⁺	.099 (.08)
<i>supergame</i>	−.031*** (.006)
<i>supergame</i> × <i>DamRed</i>	−.004 (.01)
<i>supergame</i> × <i>ProbRed</i>	.02** (.009)
<i>supergame</i> × <i>ProbRed</i> ⁺	.01 (.008)
<i>period in supergame</i>	−.055*** (.007)
<i>period in supergame</i> × <i>DamRed</i>	.025*** (.009)
<i>period in supergame</i> × <i>ProbRed</i>	.033*** (.01)
<i>period in supergame</i> × <i>ProbRed</i> ⁺	.043*** (.008)
<i>constant</i>	.558*** (.057)
<i>obs</i>	9520
<i>n</i>	280
Wald-Chi ² -test	173***

Table 4: *Random-effects linear regression of time trends for individual cooperation decision q_i^t ; coefficients are reported along standard errors in parenthesis (errors are clustered at the matching group level); *** indicates significance at a $p < 0.01$ level, ** at a $p < 0.05$ level and * at a $p < 0.1$ level. obs reports the number of observation while n report the number of subjects; model’s fitness is assessed by a Wald-Chi²-test.*

Result 2. *Cooperation rates follow different time trends: the downward trend is strongest in *CertDam*, less strong in *DamRed* and least in *ProbRed*⁺ and *ProbRed*, both within and across supergames.*

¹⁴According to F-Tests, testing that *supergame* × *treatment* + *supergame* is statistically different from zero for all treatments at $p < 0.05$ except *ProbRed* ($p = 0.146$).

¹⁵According to F-Tests, testing that *period in supergame* × *treatment* + *period in supergame* is statistically different from zero for all treatments at $p < 0.05$.

Again, the slower average learning of defection in *ProbRed* and *ProbRed*⁺ than in *DamRed* and *CertDam* is not in line with Prediction 1(b) which was derived under the assumption that individuals only condition their behavior on observed cooperation decisions by others.

3.2 Dynamics of Individual Behavior

To gain further insights into the different time trends, we now investigate determinants of behavioral adjustments at the individual level. Given Prediction 1, we expect no systematic time trend within supergames. However, empirical and anecdotal evidence (e.g., Meyer, 2012; Birkland, 2006) suggests that individuals may condition their choice on the realization of damage events.

In a first step, we consider the conditional frequencies of $q_i^{t+1} = 1$ given q_i^t and the occurrence of the damage s^t . Table 5 summarizes the frequencies by treatment conditions as well as the significant differences based on nonparametric Mann-Whitney tests.

	damage in t : $s^t = 1$		no damage in t : $s^t = 0$	
	$q_i^t = 0$	$q_i^t = 1$	$q_i^t = 0$	$q_i^t = 1$
(1) <i>CertDam</i>	.13	.60	-	-
(2) <i>DamRed</i>	.16	.65	.17	.76
(3) <i>ProbRed</i>	.22	.79	.13	.90
(4) <i>ProbRed</i> ⁺	.23	.68	.31	.74
tests	(3),(4) > ** (1) (4) > ** (2)	(3) > *** (1),(2)	(4) > ** (2) (4) > *** (3)	(3) > *** (2),(3)

Table 5: Mean q_i^{t+1} given q_i^t and the occurrence of the damage s^t ; tests refer to two-sided Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank sum tests, *** indicates significance at a $p < 0.01$ level, ** at a $p < 0.05$ level and * at a $p < 0.1$ level.

Overall, it seems that the effect of probability reduction on cooperation is two-fold: it leads to more stable cooperation of those players who already cooperate (their frequency to choose $q_i^{t+1} = 1$ is about 15% higher in *ProbRed*), and it induces non-cooperating players to cooperate after a damage event occurred (the frequency to choose $q_i^{t+1} = 1$ is 6-10% higher in *ProbRed* and *ProbRed*⁺). That is to say, the “all-or-nothing” damage of *ProbRed* and *ProbRed*⁺ prevents players from choosing defection and additionally leads more defecting players to switch to cooperation.¹⁶

¹⁶Notice that there is also a surprising effect in *ProbRed*⁺ for non-cooperators if the damage did not occur: here, the frequency of cooperation in $t + 1$ is 14-18% higher than in the other

For a detailed analysis of individual learning in our game, we estimate a series of Arellano-Bond panel regressions, for each treatment condition separately.¹⁷ This allows us to analyze endogenous regressors (see Arellano and Bond, 1991): the dependent variable is q_i^{t+1} (i.e., the decision whether to cooperate or defect in the consecutive period). As explanatory variables, we use Q_{-i}^t (i.e., the number of cooperators except i in the current period), the occurrence of the damage in t (i.e., we compute a dummy variable s^t which is one if the damage occurred in t and zero otherwise; omitted in *CertDam*), q_i^t (i.e., the decision whether to cooperate or defect in the current period), and interaction terms $q_i^t \times s^t$, as well as $Q_{-i}^t \times s^t$. Furthermore, we control for the beginning of a new supergame (i.e., the dummy variable *newsupergame* is one in the first period of a new supergame and zero otherwise).

To access the additional information provided in *ProbRed*⁺, we additionally introduce a variable measuring the number of cooperators exceeding the necessary number to avoid the realization of the damage. That is, the variable $\Delta\text{cooperator}$ computes the difference between the actual players cooperating and the cooperators required by nature for the absence of the damage. $\Delta\text{cooperator}$ is zero if the number of cooperators just coincides with the number required to avoid the damage, it is negative if too few players cooperate to prevent the damage and is positive if even a smaller number of cooperators were necessary to prevent the damage. Hence, we test whether players coordinate their cooperation onto the sufficient number of cooperators in the previous period. Estimations for coefficients along standard errors in parenthesis are reported in Table 6.

The estimation results in Table 6 confirm our previous findings in Table 5. They indicate that cooperation is highly path dependent in all treatment conditions: if a player cooperates in period t , it is very likely that she cooperates in period $t + 1$ as well (significant positive marginal effect of q_i^t).

For all treatments, we also find evidence that subjects reciprocate on others' cooperation (significant positive coefficients for Q_{-i}^t). However, experiencing a damage event triggers also behavioral changes: non-cooperators are more likely to switch to cooperation following a damage event in both *ProbRed* and *DamRed* (significant positive coefficients for s^t). This effect seems to be dominated by the coordination of cooperation in *ProbRed*⁺. We further find significant negative coefficients for the interaction $q_i^t \times s^t$: a damage event typically reduces the likeli-

treatment conditions. While we are lacking a clear explanation, this finding may be driven by the additional information that these players receive relative to *ProbRed*. We control for this effect in our following analysis.

¹⁷Arellano-Bond is typically applied to continuous rather than discrete dependent variables. However, we are not aware of a fully consistent method which can both incorporate the lagged contribution variable as well as control for the interdependencies at the individual and matching unit level. Our results are, however, robust to alternative specifications like random effects probit model, or OLS regressions with individually clustered errors.

	dependent variable: q_i^{t+1}				
	<i>CertDam</i>	<i>DamRed</i>	<i>ProbRed</i>	<i>ProbRed⁺</i>	<i>ProbRed⁺</i>
q_i^t	.219*** (.022)	.368*** (.03)	.29*** (.027)	.066** (.028)	.094*** (.029)
Q_{-i}^t	.083*** (.012)	.043** (.016)	.028** (.013)	.06*** (.016)	.096*** (.018)
s^t		.106*** (.03)	.113** (.036)	.052 (.043)	-.086 (.055)
$q_i^t \times s^t$		-.395*** (.038)	-.26*** (.032)	-.183*** (.042)	-.190*** (.042)
$Q_{-i}^t \times s^t$.017 (.02)	.017 (.018)	.006 (.023)	-.001 (.023)
<i>newsupergame</i>	-.034* (.020)	-.005 (.020)	.011 (.016)	-.06*** (.022)	-.063*** (.021)
<i>Δcooperator</i>					-.041*** (.011)
<i>const</i>	.130*** (.012)	.194*** (.023)	.360*** (.029)	.406*** (.033)	.412*** (.033)
<i>obs</i>	2232	2232	2232	1984	1984
<i>n</i>	72	72	72	64	64
Wald- χ^2 -test	191***	183***	9841***	50***	63***

Table 6: Estimation results for an Arellano-Bond panel regressions with dependent variable q_i^{t+1} ; coefficients are reported along standard errors in parenthesis; *** indicates significance at a $p < 0.01$ level, ** at a $p < 0.05$ level and * at a $p < 0.1$ level. Standard errors are clustered at the matching group level. *obs* reports the number of observation while *n* reports the number of subjects; models' fitness are assessed by Wald- χ^2 -tests.

hood for cooperators to continue cooperation (or at least does lead to significantly smaller increases than found for defectors). In addition, the significant negative coefficient of $\Delta_{cooperator}$ suggests that players condition their cooperativeness on the number of cooperators needed to prevent the damages in the previous period: if there are more (less) players than needed to avoid the damage, the likelihood to cooperate decreases (increases).

Result 3. *In all treatment conditions with stochastic payoffs, the non-occurrence of the damage reinforces existing cooperation while the occurrence of a damage stimulates a strategy switch of players from defection to cooperation and from cooperation to defection.*

Result 3 showcases the importance of experienced damage events for behavioral adjustments: players condition their behavior (partly) on the occurrence of the random event. Their current strategies are reinforced after experiencing the absence of the damage.

4 Explaining the Behavioral Dynamics

Our results both on average behavior as well as overall and individual time trends stand in stark contrast to the predictions derived for subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. The reciprocal behavior points towards a behavioral motivation that has also been identified in many other games. However, conditioning behavior solely on other group members' actions, falls short of explaining the dynamics of decisions. Instead, the occurrence of the damage event itself has predictive power for behavioral changes. This is surprising from the perspective of a forward looking individual as random draws (conditional on cooperation decisions) are independent across periods.

There is, however, substantial evidence that players often assess the success of their previously chosen action *ex post* and adapt the strategy accordingly, i.e. players apply *ex post rationality* (cf. Selten and Stoecker, 1986). Several approaches follow this general evolutionary idea that actions that (would) have been successful in the past will be reinforced and dissatisfying actions will be weakened: reinforcement learning (e.g., Roth and Erev, 1995; Erev and Roth, 1998), experience-weighted attraction learning (e.g., Camerer and Ho, 1999; Ho et al., 2008), and impulse balance learning (e.g., Selten and Chmura, 2008; Chmura et al., 2012), to state the most prominent examples. To show in which way *ex post* rationality can explain our treatment differences, we will concentrate on impulse balance learning.

Formally, there is an initial attraction $A_{i,0}(q)$ of player i to play action $q \in \{0, 1\}$. Selten and Chmura (2008) assume that the attraction of action q evolves

according to

$$A_{i,t+1}(q) = A_{i,t}(q) + \max\{0, \pi_{i,t}(q, Q_{-i}^t, s^t(q)) - \pi_{i,t}(1-q, Q_{-i}^t, s^t(1-q))\}, \quad (3)$$

where $s^t(q)$ ($s^t(1-q)$) denotes the state of the damage event if action q ($1-q$) was chosen. That is, an action is reinforced if it would have or has been the better strategy. The probability of action q being played in period $t+1$ is simply its attraction relative to the sum of the attractions of both actions available to individual i :

$$P_{i,t+1}(q) = \frac{A_{i,t}(q)}{A_{i,t}(0) + A_{i,t}(1)}. \quad (4)$$

Note that the extent of reinforcement in (3) equals the payoff difference between both actions. In *CertDam* and *DamRed*, defection is a dominant strategy: the payoff difference to cooperation is 3 in *CertDam*, and 1 if a damage occurs or 5 if it does not (i.e., in expectations 3) in *DamRed*. As such, only defection is reinforced in *CertDam* and *DamRed* (on average by 3 per period). Impulse-balance learning would therefore explain cooperation to be phased out over time at a similar rate in *CertDam* and *DamRed*.¹⁸

$$\mathbb{E}[P_{i,t+1}(1)] = \frac{A_{i,0}(1)}{A_{i,0}(0) + 3t + A_{i,0}(1)} \rightarrow_{t \rightarrow \infty} 0. \quad (5)$$

In *ProbRed* and *ProbRed*⁺, however, player i may be pivotal in triggering the damage event. This happens with 10% probability¹⁹ and would lead to cooperation being the superior action (payoff difference $D_0 - c = 20 - 5 = 15$). With 90% probability, the player cannot affect the damage event in which case defection ex post would have been the better choice (payoff difference $c = 5$). If players behave according to the correct probability of having been pivotal, cooperation is therefore reinforced in 10% of the periods with a payoff difference of 15, while in the remaining 90% of the cases defection is reinforced by 5. Per period within a supergame, in expectation $A_{i,t}(0)$ grows by 4.5 and $A_{i,t}(1)$ by 1.5, such that the

¹⁸The alternative learning dynamics (e.g., Erev and Roth, 1995) lead to similar insights for *CertDam* and *DamRed* as Beggs (2005) shows that weakly dominated strategies (as cooperation in our case) are phased out over time. In *ProbRed* and *ProbRed*⁺, however, the likelihood of cooperation would also be predicted to converge to zero as defection is still dominant in expected payoff terms.

¹⁹Imagine the damage occurs when a random draw between 0 and 1 is smaller than $p(Q)$. The impact of one more individual cooperating on $p(Q)$ is -0.1 . The random draw determining the damage occurrence lies in this impact range with probability of 0.1. So the probability of the individual being pivotal in preventing the damage is 10%.

expected probability of cooperation after t periods is

$$\mathbb{E}[P_{i,t+1}(1)] = \frac{A_{i,0}(1) + 1.5t}{A_{i,0}(0) + A_{i,0}(1) + 6t} \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} 0.25. \quad (6)$$

Thus, impulse-balance learning would explain that cooperation is not phased out in the long run. Instead the likelihood of cooperation converges towards 25%. Note if a damage event occurs, cooperating players have (ex post) obviously chosen the wrong action, while they may have been right if no damage event occurs. Cooperating players should thus be more likely to switch towards defection after a damage event than when no damage occurred. Conversely, defecting players may have been wrong in their choice if a damage occurs, while the absence of the damage event proves that their defection was right. Defectors are therefore predicted to be more likely to cooperate following a damage event than when no damage occurred, which is exactly what we identified in our results. The described behavioral dynamics also explains that cooperators in *ProbRed* and *ProbRed*⁺ regret their action when a damage has occurred and are more likely to switch towards defection. It does not explain, however, the same behavioral change in *DamRed* where again cooperators are more likely to switch towards defection following a damage event. Overall, however, impulse balance learning appears to be able to explain many of our results: the adaptation of individual behavior crucially depends on the occurrence of the damage, but only indirectly on the strategies of other players (as they influence the occurrence of the damage).

While the described model of ex post rationality can explain *changes* in behavior over time, it is silent about the initial strategies (i.e. the initial attraction levels $A_i^0(q)$). The same logic of looking back to identify ex post regret, however, can also be applied ex ante, that is, when players anticipate regret (e.g., Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Zehlenberg, 1999; Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay, 2007). Again, defection is a dominant strategy in *CertDam* and in *DamRed*, while players in the probability reduction treatments must anticipate to regret having defected with 10% probability and a payoff difference of 15. As such, we may posit that individuals who apply ex post logic, will also anticipate such potential regret when making their first period choice. Such a model would explain why the frequency of cooperation even initially tends to be larger in *ProbRed* and *ProbRed*⁺ than in *CertDam* and in *DamRed*.

Naturally, individual behavior is probably best described by a combination of different behavioral drivers, i.e. a combination of ex post rationality and forward looking behavior as used in subgame perfect equilibria. However, we view this section as highlighting that ex post rationality can help in explaining individual cooperation decision in stochastic contexts.

5 Conclusion

This paper investigates determinants of cooperation in repeated social dilemmas with stochastic damages. Such stochastic damages are linked to many environmental problems reaching from attempts to prevent forest fires or oil spills to climate policy and hurricane prevention, but also to other challenges like public security protection against terror, or international health cooperation against pandemic diseases. We study the evolution of cooperation when the entire group benefits from individual cooperation while individual players have incentives to free-ride and may cooperate only due to (indefinitely) repeated interactions. With stochastic damages, players may take actions which either reduce the size of damages or reduce the probability that such adverse events occur.

Our results show that cooperation on probability reduction leads to significantly higher cooperation rates than cooperation on damage reduction. Specifically, the cooperation rates are sustained for probability reduction, whereas they decline for damage reduction as well as in a setting where damages are certain. The difference between the two settings can be explained by a learning dynamics which reinforces the ex post optimal action. Moreover, in line with our introductory discussion of natural disasters or accidents serving as “focussing events” (Kingdon, 1995; Birkland, 2006), we find that experiencing adverse events indeed lead to behavioral changes as players tend to revise their current strategies. However, adversity is not necessarily a school of wisdom: while non-cooperating players are more likely to switch towards cooperation following an adverse event, formerly cooperating players may rather switch towards defection.

Overall, our results may provide some optimistic view on the prospects of voluntary cooperation in dilemma situations: differently from situations where cooperation leads to (continuous) changes in the size of damages (or payoffs), more sustained cooperation can be expected if it may lead to a discrete payoff change as an adverse event may be prevented with some probability. Cautiously interpreting the results from our lab experiment in terms of our introductory examples, our findings suggest that shifting the public attention from activities which are likely to reduce the occurrence of extreme negative events (mitigation activities) to measures which reduce their impact (e.g., adaptation) may lead to declining chances for successful voluntary cooperation. More generally, our results may also guide the search for successful group incentives schemes when applied to specific policy contexts, for example, to non-point source pollution. As such, it is worthwhile to further investigate the robustness of our results in different natural settings.

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Appendix A: Derivation of conditions for cooperative equilibria

Derivation of condition (2):

It is obvious that the game has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which *all* players *always* defect: as in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma game, no player individually has an incentive to cooperate. To show the minimal requirement for sustained cooperation to exist, we rely on modified grim trigger strategies: we assume that a set of $Q \leq n$ players follow a modified grim trigger strategy: they cooperate as long as at least $Q - 1$ other players cooperate, otherwise they defect in all subsequent periods. The remaining $n - Q$ players always defect. This strategy can sustain cooperation as a subgame perfect equilibrium if

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (1 - \delta)^t [E - c - p_0(D_0 - dQ)] \\
 & \geq [E - p_0(D_0 - d(Q - 1))] + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} (1 - \delta)^t (E - p_0 D_0) \\
 \Leftrightarrow & \frac{1}{\delta} [E - c - p_0(D_0 - dQ)] \\
 & \geq [E - p_0(D_0 - d(Q - 1))] + \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} (E - p_0 D_0) \tag{7}
 \end{aligned}$$

Here, the left-hand side states the expected payoff of any cooperating player i if all Q players continue to cooperate forever. The first expression of the right hand side states the payoff of a deviator i in the period in which he deviates, while the second term states the expected continuation payoff if all players play defect, starting in the next period. Note that given the defection of other players, the deviating player does not have an incentive to return to cooperation. Therefore, if condition (7) is satisfied, Q players playing the modified grim trigger strategy and $n - Q$ players always defecting establishes a subgame perfect equilibrium.

Solving condition (7) for Q immediately leads to condition (2). \square

Derivation of conditions that are used in Figure 1:

We rewrite condition (7) for the different treatments to see when a player with $u_i(\pi) = \pi^{1-\sigma}/(1-\sigma)$ does not have an incentive to deviate from cooperation under the assumption that all other cooperating players play a modified grim trigger

strategy. For *CertDam* this is the case if:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{1}{\delta} [u_i(E - c - p_0(D_0 - dQ))] \\ & \geq [u_i(E - p_0(D_0 - d(Q - 1)))] + \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} u_i(E - p_0 D_0) \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

For *DamRed* this is the case if:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{1}{\delta} [p_0 u_i(E - c - (D_0 - dQ)) + (1 - p_0) u_i(E - c)] \\ & \geq [p_0 u_i(E - (D_0 - d(Q - 1))) + (1 - p_0) u_i(E)] \\ & + \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} [p_0 u_i(E - D_0) + (1 - p_0) u_i(E)] \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

while for *ProbRed* we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{1}{\delta} [(p_0 - xQ) u_i(E - c - D_0) + (1 - p_0 + xQ) u_i(E - c)] \\ & \geq [(p_0 - x(Q - 1)) u_i(E - D_0) + (1 - p_0 + x(Q - 1)) u_i(E)] \\ & + \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} [p_0 u_i(E - D_0) + (1 - p_0) u_i(E)] \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

For each of the treatments we can define $Q^{min}(\sigma)$ as the value of Q that satisfies the respective condition (8), (9) or (10) with equality. As an analytical solution proves impossible, Figure 1 displays the simulation results.

Appendix B: Experimental Instructions for the Dam-Red Treatment (English translation)

In the following, we report an English translations of the experimental instructions for the *DamRed* treatment.

General instructions for the participants

You are now taking part in an economic science experiment. If you carefully read the following instructions, you can - depending on your decisions - earn a not inconsiderable amount of money. Therefore, it is very important that you carefully read the following instructions.

The instructions that we gave you are solely meant for your private information. **During the experiment, communication is completely prohibited.** If you have any questions, please raise your hand out of the cabin. Someone will then come to you to answer your question. Violation of this rule leads to exclusion from the experiment and from all payments.

During the experiment we do not have Euro but Taler. Your total income will first be computed in Taler. The total amount of Taler that you earned during the experiment will be converted into Euro in the end, such that

$$100 \text{ Taler} = 1 \text{ Euro.}$$

At the end of the experiment you will be paid in cash the total amount of Taler that you earned (converted into Euro) plus 5 Euro for participation. We will conduct the payment such that no other participant will see your payment.

The experiment is divided into two parts. Here, we give the instructions for the 1st part. You will get the instructions for the 2nd part on your computer screen after the 1st part is finished. The two parts are not related with respect to their content.

Explanations for the 1st part of the experiment

The 1st part of the experiment is divided into **phases**. You do not know, however, how many phases there are in total. Each phase is divided into **rounds**. The number of rounds in a phase is random. After each round, the phase ends with a probability of 20%.

More concretely, this means that: after the first round there is a second round with a probability of 80% (which is on average in four cases out of five). So, with

a probability of 20% (which is on average in one case out of five) the phase ends after the first round. After the second round (if there is one) there is a third one with a probability of 80%. So, with a probability of 20%, the phase ends after the second round and so on...

At the beginning of each phase, participants are randomly assigned into groups of four. Thus, your group has three other members in addition to you. **During one phase, the constellation of the group remains unchanged. It only gets randomly rematched at the beginning of a new phase.**

Information on the structure of a round

All rounds in all phases are always structured in the exact same way. In the following we describe the structure of one round.

At the beginning of each round, every participant gets an **income** of 25 Taler.

At the end of each round, a **damage** might occur, which reduces the income by 20 Taler.

The damage occurs with a probability of 50% (which is on average in one of two rounds). For this, in each round, the computer randomly determines whether the damage occurs. The occurrence of the damage is only valid in the respective round and does not influence the probability of the next rounds. The occurrence of the damage is determined jointly for the whole group, such that either all or no group members suffer the damage.

All group members are able to reduce the potential damage through their decisions. **For this, at the beginning of each round, i.e. before the damage occurs, each group member has to decide whether it does or does not carry out a damage-reducing action** (see Figure 4 at the end of the instruction).

Each damage-reducing action costs the group member taking the action 5 Taler (independent of whether the damage occurs or not). Each damage-reducing action reduces the personal damage of **each** group member (not only of the group member taking the action) by 4 Taler. For you, personally, this means that each damage-reducing action that has been carried out in your group reduces your damage (if it occurs) by 4 Taler, independent of whether you have taken such an action yourself. **A damage-reducing action which you carry out costs you 5 Taler for sure. In return, you reduce your damage and the damage of each other group member by 4 Taler, if the damage occurs.**

The personal damage, if it occurs, amounts to **20 Taler** if no one in your group carried out an action, **16 Taler** if one person carried out an action, **12 Taler** if two persons took the action, **8 Taler** if three persons took the action and **4 Taler** if all group members took the action.

Your round income (in Taler) is calculated as follows

- If the damage **does not** occur and you **did not** take the damage-reducing action:

$$25$$

- If the damage **does not** occur and you did take the damage-reducing action:

$$25 - 5 = 20$$

- If the damage occurs and you **did not** take the damage-reducing action:

$$25 - 20 + 4 * [\text{sum of all damage-reducing actions in the group}],$$

- If the damage occurs and and you did take the damage-reducing action:

$$25 - 5 - 20 + 4 * [\text{sum of all damage-reducing actions in the group}],$$

4 examples:

The damage probability always is 50%.

- **You** and **one other** group member take a damage-reducing action in your group, the damage **does not** occur. Your round income is $25 - 5 = \mathbf{20}$ Taler.

- **Only you** take a damage-reducing action in your group, the damage occurs. Your round income is $25 - 5 - 20 + 4 * 1 = \mathbf{4}$ Taler.

- **You** and **two other** group members take a damage-reducing action, the damage occurs. Your round income is $25 - 5 - 20 + 4 * 3 = \mathbf{12}$ Taler.

- **Two other** group members take a damage-reducing action, but you do not, the damage occurs. Your round income is $25 - 20 + 4 * 2 = \mathbf{13}$ Taler.

At the end of a round, each participant receives information on whether he/she took an action him- or herself, how many other group members took an action, if the damage occurred and what the round income is. Then, a new round starts in the same group constellation or in a new group constellation if a new phase begins.

The **sum of all your round incomes** will be paid out to you in private at the end of the experiment.

Before the experiment starts, we would like to ask you to answer some control questions on the computer to make sure you understand the rules.




Figure 4: Decision screen for taking the action in a round in Part 1 of the experiment.

2. Teil des Experiments				
Gleich wird eine Münze geworfen. Bei jeder Möglichkeit hängen die Auszahlungen, die Sie erhalten können, von diesem Münzwurf ab. Klicken Sie am Bildschirm bitte an, für welche der 6 Möglichkeiten Sie sich entscheiden.				
Möglichkeiten	Münzwurf	Auszahlungen	Wahrscheinlichkeiten	Ihre Wahl
Möglichkeit 1	Kopf	28 Taler	50 %	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Zahl	28 Taler	50 %	
Möglichkeit 2	Kopf	24 Taler	50 %	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Zahl	36 Taler	50 %	
Möglichkeit 3	Kopf	20 Taler	50 %	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Zahl	44 Taler	50 %	
Möglichkeit 4	Kopf	16 Taler	50 %	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Zahl	52 Taler	50 %	
Möglichkeit 5	Kopf	12 Taler	50 %	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Zahl	60 Taler	50 %	
Möglichkeit 6	Kopf	2 Taler	50 %	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Zahl	70 Taler	50 %	

Figure 5: Decision screen for the risk-assessment task in Part 2 of the experiment.

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– Latest Contributions

2017:

Neuhofer, Sabine, Paetzel, Fabian, Schwaninger, Manuel and Traub, Stefan: Recognition of needs in a dictator game: Experimental evidence on information-sensitive giving behavior. Working Paper Nr. 2017-10. <http://bedarfsgerechtigkeit.hsu-hh.de/dropbox/wp/2017-10.pdf>

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Tepe, Markus, Lutz, Maximilian, Paetzel, Fabian and Lorenz, Jan: Leaky bucket in the lab. The effect of system inefficiency on voting on redistribution. Working Paper Nr. 2017-08. <http://bedarfsgerechtigkeit.hsu-hh.de/dropbox/wp/2017-08.pdf>

Pritzlaff-Scheele, Tanja and Zauchner, Patricia: Meeting Needs. An Experimental Study on Need-Based Justice and Inequality. Working Paper Nr. 2017-07. <http://bedarfsgerechtigkeit.hsu-hh.de/dropbox/wp/2017-07.pdf>

Paetzel, Fabian, Lorenz, Jan and Tepe, Markus: Transparency diminishes framing-effects in voting on redistribution: Some experimental evidence. Working Paper Nr. 2017-06. <http://bedarfsgerechtigkeit.hsu-hh.de/dropbox/wp/2017-06.pdf>

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
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2016:

Guo, Lisa, Trueblood, Jennifer S. and Diederich, Adele: Thinking Fast Increases Framing Effects in Risky Decision-making. Working Paper Nr. 2016-04. <http://bedarfsgerechtigkeit.hsu-hh.de/dropbox/wp/2016-04.pdf>

Paetzel, Fabian and Sausgruber, Rupert: Entitlements and loyalty in groups: An experimental study. Working Paper Nr. 2016-03. <http://bedarfsgerechtigkeit.hsu-hh.de/dropbox/wp/2016-03.pdf>

Nicklisch, Andreas, Grechenig, Kristoffel and Thöni, Christian: Information-sensitive Leviathans. Working Paper Nr. 2016-02. <http://bedarfsgerechtigkeit.hsu-hh.de/dropbox/wp/2016-02.pdf>



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