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Adrien Delafontaine

Hotels as Targets of Jihadist Terror: An Empirical Analysis of the Period from 1970 to 2016

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Contact: Hans-Georg Ehrhart, ehrhartatifsh.de

About the author

Adrien Delafontaine originally studied hospitality management at the École hôtelière de Lausanne. He has held various operational and administrative positions in the casino and hotel industries in Switzerland, England, Germany and the French West Indies.

In 2016, he received the degree of Master of Peace and Security Studies from the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy. He wrote his Master's thesis at ZEUS under the supervision of Dr Hans-Georg Ehrhart. The key results of this thesis are presented in the following working paper in an updated version that includes data from 2015 and 2016.

Contact: adrien.delafontaine.researchatgmail.com

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An Empirical Analysis of the Period from 1970 to 2016

Adrien Delafontaine

Abstract

Hotels are by their nature the ultimate soft targets. Because of their fixed locations, constant activity, and easy access, they are particularly desirable sites for terrorist activity. With this said, hotels are reluctant to take protective measures because they are constrained by the aim of making guests feel welcome. Hotel terrorism research has yet to address this challenge adequately; the literature contains only a handful of studies that actually rely on a database of hotel attacks. Where researchers have attended to this matter, their sample sizes have been meager, thus confirming Andrew Silke's criticism that terrorism research is flooded with studies based on small, quickly recorded databases.

Against the backdrop of the exploratory nature of current research, the present study is the first of its kind to use a large-N database to address this gap. The data are processed via an "empirical analytical" method in order to identify key patterns over time and across regions. The results are then divided into three parts: the first provides information about the evolution of terrorism from 1970 to 2016; the second identifies the countries of occurrence; and the third compares the degree of violence of jihadist and non-jihadist terrorist attacks. These key findings are summarized in the conclusion on page 28.

Keywords: Hotel, accommodation, lodging, hospitality industry, guest, soft target, security, jihad, Islamist violence, bombing, assault, threat, risk, attack, terrorism, terrorist, militants, Global Terrorism Database

Introduction

The particularly high level of risk to terrorism to which hotels are exposed makes them an important area of research in the field of terrorism studies. First, hotels are difficult to secure and easy to access (Paraskevas, 2011: 142; Pizam, 2010: 1 and Enz, 2009: 553). They are also favored by terrorists to the extent that hotel operators resist establishing proper protections for fear of disturbing guests (Clifton, 2012: XXV). Stratfor (2009: 4) argues that "the work" of terrorists is facilitated by the fixed location of hotels and their round-the-clock business cycles. Furthermore, the flow of people in and out of hotels and their public amenities can be used by potential terrorists as a cover. Ghazi (2015: 2) writes that hotels are soft targets because they have "[…] many public and multiple access points, parking lots, and [facilitate] encounters with strangers and foreigners […]. Moreover, it is often difficult to distinguish among guests, legitimate visitors, and people who are potential threats." Hotels thus offer many opportunities and areas of free movement (Ehrhart et al. 2013: 62) to terrorists.

Willis et al. (2007: 32) have compared the estimated fatality rates for a 272-kg bomb explosion (the most likely mode of attack) at various targets (207: 11). A ranking of the estimated casualties index was then established. Hotels are at the very top, followed distantly by central business district targets, rail stations, skyscrapers, and shopping malls. Hotels are thus particularly vulnerable.

Scholarly Relevance of the Work

According to Silke (2001: 3), research on terrorism is dominated by "integrators of literature" who use data produced by others. Silke further argues that this scarcity of primary research degrades the quality of the available studies, since only twenty percent of publications provide novel contributions to terrorism studies (2001: 8). He also mentions that descriptive statistics and databases are only used in fifteen and seven percent of research, respectively (2001: 6-10). Few hotel terrorism studies use attack databases. Paraskevas and Arendell (2007: 1561) cite twenty attacks on tourists between 2001 and 2006. Peter (2011) cites fifty attacks on hotels and restaurants between 2001 and 2011. The Institute of Finance & Management (2012: 4) cites seven attacks on hotels between 2002 and 2009. The paltry size of these samples supports Silke's claim (2001: 12) that the bulk of the literature is based on small, quickly recorded databases. Silke further notes the predominance of "fast-food research: quick, cheap, ready-to-hand and nutritionally dubious [studies]" (2012: 12). The present hotel terrorism study is the

first to use a sizeable database, which has been supplemented with primary research from January 1, 2016 to March 30, 2016.[1]

Central/Guiding Questions, Research Goals, Hypotheses

In light of the context described above, the present study addresses the following central questions: What is the "big picture" when it comes to the phenomenon of terrorist attacks on hotels? How frequent, and how violent, are jihadist terrorist attacks on hotels? In order to answer this question, the subsequent guiding questions are also raised: When and where have jihadist attacks on hotels occurred? What were their effects in terms of casualties? What is the difference between jihadist terrorism and non-jihadist terrorism?

To answer these questions, I will test the following hypotheses:

1. The rise of jihadist terrorism led to the first recorded increase in the number of attacks on hotels worldwide.

    Support hypothesis

    Attacks on hotels have increased since the attacks of September 2001 because of the ensuing securitization of other facilities, such as airports and embassies (Chan and Lam, 2012: 202; Peter, Poulston and Losekroot, 2014: 254; Stratfor, 2009: 7).

2. Jihadist terrorist attacks on hotels occur primarily in countries that host a significant number of tourists.

    Support hypothesis

    All hotels present the same degree of "softness" because they offer few physical hindrances to terrorists (Wernick and Von Glinow, 2012: 735) and have multiple access points (Bharwani and Mathews, 2012: 421; Ghazi, 2015: 2).

3. Jihadist terrorist attacks on hotels are on average more violent than non-jihadist terrorist attacks on hotels. These attacks result in a greater number of deaths and injuries.

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[1] When I was writing the thesis on which this report is based, the GTD data for 2015 had not yet been published, and I initially used primary research for 2015 (see Appendix Table 3).

Data Collection Methodology

Access to data for this study was problematic insofar as there are no available sources that specialize in terrorist attacks on hotels. Neither international corporate hotel associations nor international organizations provide such records. The data were isolated from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which systematically documents and codes 156,772 terrorist attacks from 1970 across 60 variables (Burstein, 2016). The GTD is not only the largest open-source database (LaFree, 2007: 198) but also the largest database of terrorist attacks on hotels, with 980 attacks recorded up to 2015.

Study Limitations

Silke (2001: 2) argues that terrorism is a difficult research topic because of the difficulty associated with collecting the relevant academic data. The following study faces five challenges in particular with regard to the GTD.

First, according to Wigle (in Sheehan 2011: 19), "Terrorism databases are viewed as living databases." Paull, Schmid, Wilkinson, and Reid (in Sheehan 2011: 19) suggest that "databases can be changed […] as the operational definition of terrorism is revised." Sheehan (2011: 37) indicates that the definition of "terrorism" in the GTD has changed over time. For the period from 1970 to 1997, "the data collected [at the time] by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service used the following definition of terrorism: the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." As Sheehan goes on to note,

> [f]or 1998-201[5], each incident had to be an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor. In addition, two of the following three criteria had to be met to be included.
>
> - The act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.
> - There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.
> - The act was outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.

Figure 1 shows that the change of definition artificially decreased the number of all terrorist attacks between 1997 and 1998. According to Behlendorf, Belur, and Kumar (2016: 143), the absence of a widely accepted definition has an impact on whether an event is considered an act

of "terrorism," which then affects the content of the dataset as such. I encountered this difficulty in my primary research for 2015 (see footnote 1 above). Does the attack in Aden on October 5, 2015 at the Qasr Hotel, which hosted members of the United Arab Emirates military, constitute terrorism, insurgency, or guerrilla warfare? The "hybridity" of hotels that are also temporary military installations is ignored. In the present study, the Qasr Hotel is thus treated like any other hotel.

Second, the literature does not provide criteria for determining whether a terrorist attack was perpetrated against a hotel. There are problematic cases in the empirical material. A good illustration of this is the terrorist attack in Lahore on February 18, 2015, which was reported on by the BBC (2015b). Was the hotel a target or merely collateral damage when a bomb exploded in a parking lot next to a police station? I decided not to include the attack in the dataset. If the hotel had been the target, the terrorist would certainly have placed the bomb closer to the hotel. Arbitrary decisions had to be taken. Indeed, the GTD faces the same issue. The Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar was bombed on September 6, 2009. Despite its being a hotel, the GTD identifies the targets as "International Organization[s] (peacekeeper, aid agency, compound)" and not the hotel per se. Due to time limitations, the present study does not identify problematic cases from among the 156,772 recorded attacks. Nevertheless, because of the small number of disputable cases found in the primary research, it is safe to assume that the results are not greatly impacted.

Third, the GTD (2015) relies on the media for its data. It indicates that "4,000,000 news articles and 25,000 news sources were reviewed to collect incident data from 1998 to 2014." Silke (2001: 5) and Behlendorf, Belur and Kumar (2016: 660) emphasize that media-based databases may be biased because of a discrepancy between instances of terrorism and the extent to which they are actually reported in the media. LaFree (2007: 188) argues that the new sources are "biased toward the most newsworthy forms of terrorism." Galtung and Ruge (in Behlendorf, Belur and Kumar, 2016) add that "relatively smaller attacks in distant nations may not reach a threshold for significance [as newsworthy events]." We can therefore assume that at least some hotel attacks in faraway nations have not been reported in the media relied on by the GTD. Behlendorf, Belur and Kumar (2016) argue that "[w]hen compared to official data sources, terrorist attacks within media-based datasets are disproportionately lethal and explosive, underrepresenting a considerable range of violent, politically based activity which meet their criteria for inclusion." Nevertheless, Behlendorf, Belur and Kumar (2016: 643) conclude that "[d]espite these problems, many have argued that newspaper sources remain a reasonably

complete and continuous source for data collection, assuming that the variance provided by press bias is stable within and across sources."

Fourth, the GTD lists events from 1970 onwards, but major hotel attacks occurred prior to this date. One of the most spectacular of these was the attack on the King David Hotel in 1946 (Hoffman, 1999: 48), which struck the headquarters of the civil British administration in Palestine (Barker, 2006). The attack killed ninety-one British citizens (Quillen, 2002) and was part of a growing Jewish insurgency in Mandatory Palestine that eventually forced the British to leave in 1948 (British forces in Palestine, 2013).

Finally, the GTD includes 396 attacks on hotels perpetrated by unknown groups for the period between 1970 and 2015. Among these, forty-five occurred in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, where the probability that the attacks were jihadist is high. Hence, the number of jihadist attacks is slightly underestimated as a result of gaps in the database.

State of Current Research

I have divided the research on hotel terrorism into four categories in order to identify a possible research gap.

The first category focuses on specific countries or geographic zones. Ritchie and Wang (2013) focus on how Australian accommodation managers perceive crisis planning. Ghazi (2015) investigates how guests in Egyptian hotels perceive security measures. Bharwani and Mathews (2012) identify the drivers of key risks for the Indian hotel industry, while Israeli, Mohsin and Kumar (2011) examine the crisis management practices of luxury hotels, as well as the practice in Israel (Reichel and Israeli, 2003). AlBattat and Som (2015), Sawalha, Jraisat and Al-Qudah (2013) assess potential sources of hotel emergencies in Jordan and the degree of hotels' preparedness. Peter, Poulston and Losekroot (2014) research the same phenomena in the context of New Zealand. Konar, Kumar and Hussain (2014) list factors that influence the terrorist threat to luxury hotels in Pakistan. Lebovich (2016) argues that the attacks on hotels in Bamako on November 20, 2015 and in Ouagadougou on January 15, 2016 are signs of a new strategy developed by Al-Qaeda in the Sahara-Sahel Region. Finally, Enz (2009) studies the security features of American hotels.

The second consists of case studies on terrorist attacks, e.g. the Mumbai attacks (Gunaratna, 2009; Jenkins, 2009; and Rabasa et al. 2009) and various attacks on Marriott Hotels (Gunaratna, 2011; Orlob, 2004 and Wernick and Von Glinow, 2012).

The third assesses the impact of terrorism on tourist flow. Ahlfeldt, Franke and Maennig (2015) and Baker (2014), for example, examine changes to tourism behavior following terrorist attacks. Henderson (2008) investigates the effect of the Bali bombing of 2002 on tourism in Southeast Asia. Henderson, et al. (2010) appraise the influence of terrorism on inbound tourism flow in Singapore. Llorca-Vivero (2008) analyses the consequences of terrorism for outbound tourism flow from the G-7 countries. Lin (2003) assesses the outcomes of the September 2001 attacks for the US hotel industry, and Stafford, Yu and Armoo (2002) assesses the same for Washington D.C.

The fourth category consists of research into how hotels might be made more secure. Cetron (2006) warns of infiltration by terrorists among staff and how to respond. Webster (2004: 24) argues that hotels should perform regular security audits. Hannon (2014: 30) stresses the importance of checking people and cars entering the hotel premises. This category also includes studies that provide crisis management guidelines. AlBattat and Som (2014, 2015) and Ritchie (2004), for example, develop guidelines for creating and implementing an emergency preparedness concept.

As this literature review reveals, what is lacking is an analysis of hotel terrorism that draws from a reliable database of hotel terrorist attacks (see "Scholarly Relevance of the Work"). An anecdote illustrates the difficulty of acquiring terrorism-related data. Jenkins (2009: 3) from the Rand Corporation writes (without citing any sources) that "in the past forty years [read: 1969-2009], fewer than five hundred hotel guests in the entire world have been killed by terrorists." Wernick and Von Glinow (2012: 738) initially cite Jenkins's figure (2009: 3) in what seems to be an early version[2] of an article they would later go on to publish. Wernick and Von Glinow omitted this sentence in the published version, which suggests that the data was perhaps unreliable (2012: 738). In addition, this figure of 500 (1969-2009) was compared against the database created for the present study: according to this database, 931 hotel guests were killed between 1970 and 2009. If scholars are to have access to widely accepted data, further research must be undertaken. This thesis is a step into terra incognita in the interest of shrinking the research gap in the field of hotel terrorism. The present study aims to provide a global picture of the risks faced by the hotel industry worldwide, offering quantitative data that can be drawn on by hotel terrorism researchers.

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[2] https://business.fiu.edu/centers/ryder/pdf/Reflections-On-The-Evolving-Terrorist-Threat.pdf, last accessed on December 26, 2016.

Key Terms

Important terms are defined in order to give basic interpretations necessary to understand the present paper.

Hotel

The term "hotel" is to be understood in terms of an "accommodation"; according to the Oxford English Dictionary (2016), it is "[a] room and provision for the reception of people, esp. with regard to sleeping, seating, or entertainment; living premises, lodgings." The types of accommodation included in the present study are ho(s)tels, motels, inns, holiday homes, vacations apartments, cottages, villas, resorts, bungalows and guest houses. Although all of these accommodations host a wide range of guests with heterogeneous backgrounds (e.g. tourists, business executives, migrant workers, and asylum seekers), I decided not to restrict the dataset based on the backgrounds of the guests. Asylum seeker hostels (*Flüchtlingsheime*) are included because hotels currently host many refugees. Berlin is currently housing 10,000 refugees in hotels (Oberhuber, 2016). Hotels that provide lodging for refugees therefore face threats similar to those faced by asylum seeker hostels. Refugee camps are not included because of the specific nature of their activity.

Terrorism

In the literature, consensus has yet to be reached on the definition of terrorism. Jongman (1988: 5) studies the frequencies of definitional elements among 109 definitions of terrorism. The most often recurring elements are "violence" (eighty-three percent), "political" (sixty-five percent), and "fear" (fifty-one percent). Based on Jongman's findings, Ganor (2002: 294) defines terrorism as "the intentional use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims." According to Krieger and Meierrieks (2011: 4), there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. Indeed, even those who engage in terrorism struggle to define it.

In *Inspire Magazine* (issue 5, 2011: 29), Al-Qaeda has stated that

> '[t]errorism' is an abstract word, and like many of the abstract words, it can carry a good or bad meaning according to the context, and what is added to it and what is attached to it. The word is an abstract term, which has neither positive nor negative meaning.

This interpretation mirrors the debate on the difference between terrorists and freedom fighters (Harz and Petersen, 2009). The original definition from Weimann and Von Knop (2008: 883) states that terrorism involves the production of theatrical behavior that is carefully rehearsed and meant to be seen by a large audience. Burstein (2016: 5) argues that the goal of religious terrorism is not political; it is to punish the enemies of God and to serve as a recruitment measure enabling the terrorist group to gain support from its own population. Finally, Ganor (2002: 304) argues that it is as difficult to define terrorism as it is to counter it. To deal with the empirical data, I rely on the definition of the GTD ("Study Limitations").

Jihadist terrorism

To identify the relevant jihadist groups and to verify the religious component in their ideologies, I referred to the website Trackingterrorism (2016a). I then checked these results against the smaller list of jihadist terrorist groups identified and classified by Burstein (2016: 19-21). Table 4 in the Appendix sorts terrorist groups that have attacked hotels into two categories: jihadist and non-jihadist. Jihadist groups consist of those groups whose motivations lie in Sunnism. My reason for excluding Shia groups concerns a key difference in the way Shia and Sunni Muslims conceive of jihad. The Shia believe that, in the absence of the twelfth Imam, only defensive jihad is permitted as a means of protecting Islam. In Sunni Islam, by contrast, offensive jihad is permitted (Alsumaih, 1998: 12). In the interest of saving space, a list of all jihadist terrorist groups can be provided upon request.

The GTD records some groups that are not strictly "groups" per se, such as Muslim extremists, fundamentalists, guerrillas, militants, rebels, and separatists. These groups are nevertheless considered to be jihadist because of their apparent religious foundations. The religiosity of a given group can be difficult to assess given the available information. When the name contains a religious reference but no other information is available, the group is considered to be jihadist (e.g. Jaish-e-Islam in Trackingterrorism, 2016b). In order to be considered jihadist, terrorist groups need to have religious motivation. There are groups made up of jihadist members that are not driven by religion. For instance, the agenda of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is Marxist-Leninist rather than Islamic, according to the Anti-Defamation League (2013). In the end, this classification of groups into jihadist and non-jihadist nevertheless oversimplifies the complex ideological variations among terrorist organizations.

Hybrid groups that are both secular and religious present a challenge for this study. Take Hamas, for instance. On the one hand, Hamas claims that "The movement's program is Islam" (Yale Law School, 2008). On the other hand, it also states that it struggles against "the Zionist invaders" (Yale Law School, 2008). According to Burstein (2016: 8), Hamas has a political grievance against Israel. The movement is thus not only religious but also political. Hamas is considered to be jihadist in the present research. Since Chechen rebels are presented as ethno-nationalists (Trackingterrorism, 2016c), I consider them non-jihadist. Nevertheless, their leader, Shamil Basayev, has claimed to be waging a "holy war" against Russia (Higgins, Chazan, and White, 2004). This study is limited by the complexity of assessing the level of religiosity of problematic groups that have both secular and religious agendas. Thus, the non-jihadist category contains some ambiguous cases that shall be dealt with by researchers in order to classify these groups in a way that reflects these differences.

Out of the 377 jihadist groups recorded by the GTD (2015), only forty-one have perpetrated one or more attacks against one or more hotels. A complete classification of each terrorist group recorded in the GTD as jihadist or non-jihadist is also available upon request (due to the sheer number of entries). For both classifications, I use the platform Trackingterrorism (2016a). For group selection, see above.

Results

The Evolution of Terrorism

Figure 1: Frequency of terrorist attacks worldwide   *Source: Author's graph, based on the GTD (2015)*

The graph illustrates the evolution of the frequency of terrorist attacks worldwide recorded by the GTD between 1970 and 2015. Altogether, 3,290 groups committed one or more attacks. Jihadist terrorist groups are also included in the count. At first, the figures steadily increased from 651 attacks in 1970 to a peak of 5,073 attacks in 1992. Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev, (2011: 319) argue that until 1979, attacks were undercounted in the GTD, which explains the sharp increase between 1978 and 1979. Part of the decline between 1992 and 1998 can be explained by the GTD's overcounting of incidents in the early nineties (Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev, 2011: 319). The figure then bottomed out from 1997 to 1998, with 933 recorded attacks. This decline is attributable to a change in the definition of terrorism used in the GTD (see "Study Limitations"), which meant that terrorist attacks had to meet more restrictive criteria in order to be recorded in the database. The numbers then slowly rose again until 2001, reaching 1,908 attacks.

Next, there was a slight decrease between 2001 and 2004. A significant rebound occurred between 2004 and 2008: the number climbed from 1,161 attacks in 2004 to 4,787 in 2008, which equaled a yearly increase of almost eighty percent. The figure remained steady for three years until 2011. The figure then shot up again to peak at 16,840 attacks in 2014, the highest number of attacks recorded in the GTD. This increase is attributable to the rise of Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and the so-called Islamic State (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015: 37-46). In 2015, the figure declined slightly to 14,806. Baumann and Jäckle (2015) also record the number of terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2011 with reference to the GTD. His findings are identical to mine, which suggests that the data have been correctly processed in Figure 1. With this understanding of the evolution of the frequency of terrorist attacks in hand, we can now turn to the matter of the frequency of jihadist attacks in particular.

Figure 2: Frequency of jihadist terrorist attacks worldwide   *Source: Author's graph, based on the GTD (2015)*

Figure 2 illustrates the significant increase in jihadist terrorist attacks worldwide between 1970 and 2015. Strikingly, the scale of 500 on the Y-axis seems to be too large for the data until the year 2004, and too small for 2015.

The first jihadist attack recorded in the GTD was perpetrated in 1973 in the United States by the Black Muslims. In 1971, the Black September Organization had already perpetrated its first attack. Nevertheless, the group is not taken into account because it was primarily motivated by the Palestinian cause rather than religion (Trackingterrorism, 2016d). The classification into jihadist and non-jihadist causes ambiguity; Hamas, for example, is considered jihadist even though it also focuses on Palestine (see "Key Terms"). Between 1973 and 1991, there were on average thirty-two attacks per year. The small peak in 1992 is due to two outliers: first, 180 attacks by The Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, and second, seventy-two attacks in Egypt by various perpetrators. The data for 1993 were lost (LaFree, 2007). The figure declined steadily until 1998. The number of attacks then increased from 1999 (108 attacks) to 2008 (777 attacks). Although this represents a small increase in absolute terms, it actually represents an increase of 619 percent. Bruce Hoffman (1993: 13) explains this increase by appealing to the symbolic shift of the new millennium, which further motivated religious terrorist groups. The graph shows that the figure then held stable until 2011. The period between 2011 and 2015 includes two sharp rises. From 2011 to 2012, the figure rose by 181 percent, from 853 to 2397 attacks. The count then shot up again by ninety-two percent between 2013 and 2014 before a moderate increase in 2015. The figures confirm the concerns expressed in the literature regarding the rise of terrorist attacks. First, it will be important to establish whether jihadist terrorist attacks on hotels also follow this upwards trend. Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of jihadist terrorist attacks on hotels. The timeframe is split into different colors, indicating different generations of jihadist terrorism in hotels: the first generation (in green), which was active up to the year 2000; the second generation (yellow), active from 2001 to 2010; and the third generation (orange), active from 2011 onwards.

Figure 3: Frequency of jihadist terrorist attacks in hotels worldwide

Source: Author's graph, based on the GTD (2015) and primary research (2016)[3]

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[3] Until March 30, 2016.

It is clear from the graph that there are three "generations" of jihadist attacks on hotels. Between 1983 (the year of the first recorded jihadist attack on a hotel) and 2000, there were at most three attacks on hotels per year, perpetrated by various groups in different locations. The first attack occurred in 1983 in Portland, Oregon, and was perpetrated by a Muslim sect. In 1992, Al-Qaeda attacked two hotels in Aden, which killed two guests and wounded five others. Over the next eight years, five attacks occurred in Algeria, Bangladesh, India, and Ethiopia. As mentioned above, the data for 1993 are missing (LaFree, 2007: 186). Until 2000, attacks on hotels followed an erratic pattern with relatively few attacks taking place. 2001 marked the beginning of the second generation of jihadist attacks. Between 2001 and 2010, there were two to five attacks per year. In 2001, one of the attacks occurred in April. The September 2001 attacks did not immediately lead to an increase in attacks on hotels. The peak in 2005 is due to three attacks that occurred on September 11 at three hotels in Jordan. The absence of attacks in 2006 remains unexplained. 2011 marks the passage to the third generation, which saw an increase in attacks. From 2011 to 2015, there were between eight and eighteen attacks on hotels per year. In 2011, the Abu Sayaf Group attacked three hotels in the Philippines. From 2012 to 2016, the attacks are split among the following fourteen countries: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen. Sixteen terrorist groups perpetrated these attacks. The wide range of countries and groups affected by these attacks shows that the targeting of hotels by jihadist extremists is a steadily growing phenomenon.

As the graph illustrates, the increase in terrorist attacks against hotels since 2001 follows approximately the same pattern as the global jihadist terrorism data presented in Figure 2. First, however, in the interest of situating jihadist attacks on hotels in the context of global terrorism against hotels more generally, Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate that attacks on hotels in fact peaked in the early nineties.

Non-jihadist terrorism in hotels worldwide: 1970-2015

Figure 4: Frequency of non-jihadist terrorist attacks in hotels worldwide   *Source: Author's graph, based on the GTD (2015)*

Figure 4 depicts the evolution of attacks on hotels between 1970 and 2015. The groups that are considered jihadist (see Appendix Table 4) are excluded from the dataset for this graph. On November 10, 1971, the Intercontinental Hotel in Amman was attacked by the Black September group, composed of dissidents within the Fatah of Yasser Arafat. As the group was not religiously driven (Trackingterrorism, 2016d), this attack appears on the graph. Interestingly enough, the group quickly began attacking hotels. Their first attack targeted an aircraft (August), and two oil facilities were later targeted (September). The group went on to target a hotel in November. In 1976, hotels in Aleppo and Amman were attacked, this time by the Abu Nidal Organization, which is also secular (Trackingterrorism, 2016e). There was an increase in attacks on hotels at the end of the seventies, reaching twenty-two attacks in 1980 before rapidly falling to two in 1982.

Attacks increased again until 1986, which peaked at thirty attacks. Fifteen of these were attributed to the Basque Fatherland and Freedom. The number of attacks on hotels declined to eight in 1989 and then skyrocketed in 1991 and 1992. Two outliers are responsible for this increase: In 1991, forty-one attacks were carried out by the Corsican National Liberation Front – Historic Channel. The movement was particularly active during this year. In 1992, seventy-two attacks were perpetrated in Germany by neo-Nazis against asylum seeker hostels (*Flüchtlingsheime*), which are considered hotels in this study ("Key Terms"). These two outliers will not be taken into account in Figure 6. The pattern is erratic in the period from 1994 to 1997, which saw a minimum of three and a maximum of seventeen attacks. The period from 1998 to 2015 was characterized by very few attacks, with on average 3.8 attacks per year on hotels worldwide. The next graph includes both jihadist and non-jihadist hotel attacks. Attacks with unknown perpetrators are included too.

Figure 5: Frequency of all terrorist attacks in hotels worldwide   *Source: Author's graph, based on the GTD (2015)*

Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of the frequency of terrorist attacks on hotels (jihadist, non-jihadist and unknown perpetrators) worldwide from 1970 to 2015. The phenomenon was rare until 1975, with at most seven attacks occurring in 1970. Attacks increased erratically until 1980, which saw a peak of thirty-one attacks, before declining to seven attacks in 1982. The figure then underwent a continuous rebound, peaking at forty attacks in 1986 before declining again until 1989. The attacks skyrocketed in 1991 and 1992, during which time 76 and 104 attacks took place, respectively. From 1994 to 1997, the figures follow an erratic pattern. The number of attacks then plateaued between 1998 and 2007. Between 2009 and 2015, there was on average twenty-nine attacks per year.

Figure 6 shows that the frequency of terrorist attacks on hotels after the September 2001 attacks remained almost constant. The widespread hypothesis that the number of attacks decreases "the further back we turn the clocks" is therefore partially valid. The decrease in the number of ethno-nationalist attacks on hotels was compensated by the increase in jihadist attacks. The shift from ethno-nationalist to jihadist terrorism is also confirmed by Bruce Hoffman (2006: 143). Both 1991 and 1992 are treated as outliers. To offset the impact of two phenomena that were limited in time and place, two years were smoothed: in 1991, the Corsican National Liberation Front – Historic Channel perpetrated 41 attacks, and neo-Nazis committed 72 attacks on refugee camps in Germany. If these outliers were to be considered in our statistics, we would record a decrease of almost thirty percent in the post-9/11 period.

Figure 6: Attacks per year in hotels: 1988-2001 and 2002-2015

Source: Author's graph, based on the GTD (2015)

Geographic Distribution of the Attacks

The subsequent graphs identify patterns in the geographic distribution of attacks.

Figure 7: Frequency of non-jihadist terrorist attacks in hotels worldwide

Source: Author's graph, based on the GTD (2015)

Figure 7 provides information on the locations of non-jihadist attacks on hotels. France experienced the highest number, with eighty attacks, followed by the United Kingdom, Germany and Spain. Almost sixty percent of non-jihadist attacks were perpetrated in these four countries. Most of these attacks were the work of the Corsican National Liberation Front – Historic Channel, the Irish Republican Army, neo-Nazi groups, and Basque Fatherland and Freedom. The remaining attacks are split among fifty-three countries, which shows that non-jihadist attacks on hotels are a geographically widespread phenomenon.

Figure 8: Frequency of jihadist terrorist attacks in hotels worldwide

Source: Author's graph, based on the GTD (2015) and primary research (2016)[4]

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[4] See footnote 3.

The bar chart illustrates the number of jihadist terrorist attacks on hotels per country from 1983 to March 30, 2016. In Somalia, the first jihadist attack occurred in 2010. Between 2010 and 2016, there have been fifteen attacks on Somali hotels, which puts Somalia at the top of the list when it comes to the number of hotel attacks. Afghanistan follows in second place, with thirteen attacks. The first occurred in 2002. In third position is Iraq, with eleven attacks. The first occurred in 2003. Attacks on hotels are thus relatively new to these three countries and are in response to what are perceived to be illegal and illegitimate military interventions by the United States and its allies (Baud, 2016). Attacks in these three countries grew rapidly in significance, coming to represent thirty-five percent of jihadist attacks on hotels since 1983 and twenty-three percent of all jihadist attacks on all targets since 1973.

These countries are all experiencing ongoing armed conflict (Uppsala University, 2013). Furthermore, none is included in the World Tourism rankings established by the World Bank (2014), which comprises 214 countries ranked according to tourist arrivals numbers. The second hypothesis, which assumes that jihadist terrorist attacks primarily occur in countries that are hosts to tourists, is thus invalid. While the literature emphasizes the extraordinary threat to hotels to justify the securitization of tourism (Lisle, 2013: 127), thirty-five percent of jihadist attacks are limited to these three war-torn areas (Uppsala University, 2013), which continue to face extreme general terrorist threat levels (Verisk Maplecroft, 2015). When it comes to fatalities caused by terrorist attacks, these three countries have the highest rate per 100,000 people in the world (Muggah, 2016). Attacks on hotels thus tend to be a spillover effect of violent conflict. It is assumed that in conflict areas, extreme political grievances, combined with a greater availability of areas of free movement (*Freiräume*) (Ehrhart et al. 2013: 62), increase the risk. Incidentally, there have been no recorded attacks on asylum seeker hostels in these three countries. There have, however, been attacks on refugee camps, but these are not included due to their specific nature (see "Key Terms").

The role played by hotels in these three countries also increases their risk. Hotels are seen as symbols of "Western culture": they are places in which men and woman mix freely and consume alcohol (Stratfor, 2009: 5). Furthermore, hotels are frequently hosts to Western journalists, NGO workers, foreign executives, and members of governments that "fraternize" with the West. Further research into whether these attacks are best described as "terrorist-" or "guerrilla-based" is greatly needed. These findings thus support Ghazi's claim (2015: 3) that while most of the research into hotel terrorism focuses on developed countries, more research should be done on emerging nations, where terrorism is actually more frequent. Indeed, hotels

in the West have a different status than non-Western hotels owing to the different backgrounds and nationalities of their guests – factors that make hotels in the West less attractive to terrorists as targets. Nevertheless, the increasing jihadist threat in North America and Europe will affect hotels too.

Mr. Kisaulu, General Manager of the Jazeera Hotel in Mogadishu, argues that the Jazeera is "highly protected" thanks to an intense security effort (personal communication, May 27, 2016). The Jazeera is not alone in being highly protected. Since there is no literature on the level of security of hotels that have been attacked in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, however, it would be unwise to construe them as hard targets. Hence, I here assume that when it comes to security, hotels differ with regards to the precise degree of their "softness." Although they were soft targets, thirty-five percent of attacked hotels had high levels of security, which contradicts the trend in the literature to obscure differences of security strength and to construct all hotels as soft targets full stop. The second support hypothesis according to which hotels are soft targets is thus partially invalid: the majority of hotels attacked by jihadist terrorists have undertaken major measures to reinforce security. The widespread view that hotels are soft targets thus obscures major differences at the level of hotel security.

Nevertheless, it is arguable that "hard" and "soft" status is in any case irrelevant. Two authors give examples of hotels that were attacked despite having been "fortified" along the lines of a hard target. Paraskevas (2011: 141) argues that the Europa Hotel in Belfast was attacked thirty-three times between 1972 and 1994, despite measures taken to protect it. Gunaratna (2011: 1) writes that the Islamabad Marriott Hotel was "the most protected hotel in the world" at the time of its bombing in 2008. Wernick and Von Glinow (2012: 739) argue that, at the time of the attack, the hotel boasted sixty on-duty officers, four sniffer dogs, sixty-two cameras (monitored by three agents), and metal detectors. Despite these measures, 56 people died and 256 were injured (Gunaratna, 2011: 3). Nevertheless, according to Qureshi (in Gunaratna 2011: 100), protection barriers prevented the explosive-loaded vehicle from exploding closer to the Marriott Hotel, which saved approximately 1,000 lives. Whether hotels can be hard targets is thus a difficult question that deserves further research. The present study asserts that current security measures do not prevent attacks from happening, although they may reduce the number of casualties. This will be further explained in "Recommendation."

Other countries have also experienced terrorist attacks on hotels. In decreasing order (with regards to the number of attacks in each), these include Egypt, Kenya, the Philippines, India, Nigeria, Thailand, Algeria, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan and Yemen. Each country faces

domestic armed conflict to a different degree (Uppsala University, 2013). The remaining eleven countries experienced one to two attacks. Geographically, they are located on various continents: seven in Africa, three in Asia, one in Europe, and one in North America.

Jihadist and Non-Jihadist Attacks: A Comparative Analysis

The third hypothesis assumes that jihadist terrorist attacks result in more casualties on average. The next table addresses this claim by comparing the degree of violence, which is measured by the number of people injured or killed in an attack. The first group covers jihadist attacks perpetrated by those groups selected in Table 4 in the Appendix. The second category covers non-jihadist attacks. As a control variable, the third group comprises all attacks (both jihadist and non-jihadist). Two different averages are shown for each category. First, the sub-category "all attacks" takes all attacks into consideration, even in cases where nobody was wounded or killed. Second, the sub-category "only attacks with victims" takes into account only those attacks in which at least one person was wounded or killed. These figures include attackers who were wounded or died as a result of the incident (GTD, 2015). The last column indicates the highest number of people wounded and killed in a terrorist attack.

Only jihadist terrorism in hotels 1983-2016[5]	All attacks	Only attacks with victims	Highest toll
Average wounded	18	25	400
Average killed	7	11	68
Only non-jihadist terrorism in hotels 1970-2015			
Average wounded	3	12	105
Average killed	0.7	4	30
All terrorism in hotels 1970-2015			
Average wounded	5	13	400
Average killed	1.5	5	68

Table 1: Comparative degree of violence in attacks on hotels

Source: Author's table, based on the GTD (2015) and primary research (2015-2016)

This table compares jihadist and non-jihadist attacks on hotels. The jihadist period began in 1983, when the first attack on a hotel was recorded (see Figure 3), and was extended to 2016 to gather more data. These attacks resulted on average in the wounding of eighteen people and the death of seven. When only attacks with victims are selected, the number of wounded reaches twenty-five, the number killed eleven. The deadliest attack occurred in the Taj Mahal and the Tower Hotel.[6] This attack was part of the November 2008 Mumbai attack. The death toll reached sixty-eight. The highest number of wounded (400 people) is held by an attack on March 31, 2012, thought to have been carried out by a Pattani terrorist group on the Lee Gardens Plaza Hotel in Thailand.

By comparison, non-jihadist attacks on hotels wounded on average three people and killed 0.7. When only attacks with victims are considered, these figures rise to twelve wounded and four killed. The attack with the highest casualty count in this category was committed by The Angels, who targeted the Regent of Manila Hotel and killed thirty people. The available information on this attack is limited. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam perpetrated an attack against the Galadari Hotel in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on October 15, 1997, wounding 105 people.

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[5] From January 1, 2015 to March 30, 2016: primary research.
[6] Considered by the GTD to be a single attack.

As the control variable "All terrorism in hotels 1970-2015" includes both jihadist and non-jihadist attacks, an accurate result should contain a figure that falls between the two groups. The verification is therefore successful.

According to these figures, jihadist attacks on hotels are more violent than non-jihadist attacks. If we restrict ourselves to attacks with victims, jihadist attacks result in twice as many people being wounded and almost three times more deaths than non-jihadist attacks. The database records ninety-six jihadist attacks on hotels. These findings are crosschecked by the table below, which covers not only attacks on hotels but also attacks on all other targets. This provides us with a larger sample size of 22,682 jihadist attacks.

Only jihadist terrorism 1970-2015	All attacks	Only attacks with victims	Highest toll
Average wounded	6	12	4000
Average killed	5	7	1500
All terrorism 1970-2015			
Average wounded	3	8	5500
Average killed	2	5	1500

Table 2: Comparative degree of violence - all attacks

Source: Author's table, based on the GTD (2015)

The table depicts an identical trend: jihadist terrorist attacks are more violent than the average found for "All terrorism 1970-2015," which includes attacks on hotels. Because of the larger sample size of 156,772 attacks, the control variable "All terrorism - excluding jihadist terrorism - 1970-2015" is not processed here.

In all jihadist attacks, there are on average six people wounded and five people killed. When only attacks with victims are taken in account, these figures increase to twelve wounded and seven killed. The 1998 bombing by Al-Qaeda of the United States Embassy in Nairobi, in which 4,000 people were injured, is the jihadist terrorist attack with the highest number of wounded. The so-called Islamic State killed 1,500 unarmed Iraqi army cadets who were being trained at Camp Speicher on June 12, 2014.[7]

Non-jihadist attacks wound on average three people and kill two. When only attacks with victims are taken into account, these figures reach eight wounded and five killed. The Tokyo

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[7] This massacre, which is considered by the GTD to be an act of terrorism, illustrates how difficult it is to define terrorism (see *"Key Terms"*).

subway sarin attack of 1995, which injured 5,500 people, wounded more people than any other terrorist attack (GTD, 2015). The figure of 1,500 dead represents the Camp Speicher massacre again. Overall, the data shows that jihadist terrorism is more violent than non-jihadist terrorism, thus validating the third hypothesis. I shall consider explanations for why jihadist terrorism is more violent.

Figure 9 shows the twenty-five countries with the highest average jihadist casualty counts. I want to verify whether the violence of jihadist terrorism can be explained by armed conflicts.

Figure 9: Comparative degree of jihadist terrorism across 25 countries

Source: Author's table, based on the GTD (2015)

In Figure 9, the casualties represent the sum of the averages of those wounded and those killed by jihadist terrorism. The data labels over the blue clusters indicate the number of attacks recorded by GTD (2015). Spain is not included in the graph because of a high average casualty figure (332) that resulted from the 2004 Madrid train bombings. Kuwait is also not included because a single attack is insufficient. The United Kingdom thus comes first, with eighty-four casualties. The outliers are the July 7, 2005 London bombings, which caused 840 casualties. The figure in Turkey reach seventy casualties on average per attack. In other countries, there were between thirty-seven (Uganda) and fifteen (Tajikistan) casualties. Interestingly enough, Iraq is ranked fifteenth. The figure does not permit the conclusion that armed conflicts increase casualty totals per incident.

Piazza (2009: 74) argues that religion-based terrorist attacks result in four times more casualties than ethno-nationalist-based terrorism. In the case of attacks on hotels, the difference is even higher, with a factor 6. Hoffman (1993: 3) also argues that secular and religious terrorist groups have different value systems and ways of justifying the attacks, which affects their levels of violence. Burstein (2016) compared the violence wrought by secular and religious terrorist organizations. This research shows that the more religious a terrorist group is, the deadlier its attack tactics and the more violent its patterns. There are three reasons for this. First, these groups view violence as having been ordered and sanctified by God. Second, religious terrorist groups do not seek popular support from the targeted society. Third, violent attacks are used as a "show" to promote recruitment among the terrorist group's home population. This is similar to the position articulated by Weimann and Von Knop (2008: 883), who view terrorism as a theatrical performance (see "Key Terms"). By comparison, secular terrorist groups avoid becoming too radical in order to maintain support from the community they represent.

Conclusion

The present hotel terrorism study is the first of its kind to use a large dataset. The data were obtained from both GTD (1970-2015) and primary research (2016).

This study supplies the field of hotel terrorism studies with essential findings. First, it shows that the number of all attacks (jihadist and non-jihadist) on hotels reached its peak in 1992, with 104 attacks. Furthermore, the securitization effort that followed the September 11, 2001 attacks did not lead to an increase in attacks on hotels: between 1988 and 2001, there were on average twenty attacks on hotels (jihadist and non-jihadist) per year, primarily perpetrated by ethno-nationalist groups in France, Spain and the United Kingdom. In the period from 2002 to 2015, the figure reached twenty-two attacks per year, primarily perpetrated by jihadist groups. The widespread hypothesis that the targeting of hotels in terrorist attacks is a recent phenomenon is thus invalid, since the number of attacks has remained almost constant.

Second, the three countries with the highest number of jihadist attacks are Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. None of these appear among the World Tourism rankings published by the World Bank (2014), which comprises 214 countries. Hence, jihadist terrorist attacks on hotels predominantly occur in war-torn countries. The second hypothesis, according to which jihadist terrorist attacks on hotels occur primarily in countries that host a significant number of tourists, is therefore also invalid. Furthermore, the support hypothesis according to which hotels are soft targets is only partially true. While the picture of hotels as soft targets is widespread in the

literature (see "Introduction"), this support hypothesis nevertheless obscures the extent to which some hotels are clearly "softer" than others. Nevertheless, two case studies show the difficulties faced by hotels when it comes to reaching hard target status. As Paraskevas (2011: 141) shows, the Europa Hotel in Belfast was attacked thirty-three times even though it was heavily protected. Gunaratna (2011: 1) writes that the Islamabad Marriott Hotel was seen as "the most protected hotel in the world" at the time of its bombing in 2008.

Third, jihadist attacks on hotels are more violent than their non-jihadist counterparts. On average, jihadist attacks on hotels resulted in the wounding of eighteen people and the death of seven. By comparison, non-jihadist attacks on hotels wounded three and killed 0.7. Against the idea that armed conflict plays an influential role, Burstein (2016: 3: 4) argues that the violence of the attacks under consideration depends on the "religiosity degree" of the perpetrating group, and this for three reasons. First, violence is seen to be ordered by God himself. Second, religious terrorist groups do not need to gain popular support from the targeted society. Popular grievance resulting from the violence is thus not important. Third, violent attacks produce strong images that serve to recruit terrorists.

Recommendation

Hotels will probably never reach hard target status. They will thus continue to be attacked, despite undertaking physical protective measures. There is therefore a gap in the literature insofar as the focus remains physical protection as a means of securing hotels (see "State of Current Research"). This approach has proven insufficient when it comes to preventing terrorist attacks on hotels. To close this gap, a more appropriate anti-terrorism strategy for hotels is an intelligence-led approach (Paraskevas, 2011: 140) that focuses on identifying terrorists who attempt reconnaissance around hotels (Orlob, 2004: 3). It is therefore recommended that hoteliers develop a counter-surveillance culture in their hotels as a means of detecting suspicious activities (Paraskevas, 2011: 151).

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Appendix

Primary Data Collection

Table 3: Primary research 2015-2016[8]

Name of hotel	Year	Month	Day	Country	City	Perpetrator	Type(s) of attack	Targets	Killed	Injured	Sources
The Syl Hotel	2015	1	22	Somalia	Mogadishu	Al-Shabaab	Bombing/ Explosion	Turkish delegates were preparing for a visit from their president (BBC, 2015a)	0	0	BBC (2015a) Reuters (2015)
The Corinthia Hotel Tripoli	2015	1	27	Libya	Tripoli	Islamic State	Bombing/ Explosion	Government officials, foreign diplomats, UN, and foreign companies	7	6	Faucon (2015) BBC (2015c) Jamieson et al. (2015ab) Stephen (2015)

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[8] See footnote 1.

Name of hotel	Year	Month	Day	Country	City	Perpetrator	Type(s) of attack	Targets	Killed	Injured	Sources
Central Hotel	2015	2	20	Somalia	Mogadishu	Al-Shabaab	Bombing/ Explosion	Government ministers and lawmakers	25	40	Botelho (2015) African Union (2015) Ibrahim (2015)
Makka al-Mukarama Hotel	2015	3	27	Somalia	Mogadishu	Al-Shabaab	Bombing/ Explosion	Government officials	17	28	BBC (2015d) Billow (2015) Guled (2015a)
Royal Hotel	2015	5	5	Iraq	Baghdad	Islamic State	Bombing/ Explosion	Iranian militia members	4	13	AFP (2015)

Name of hotel	Year	Month	Day	Country	City	Perpetrator	Type(s) of attack	Targets	Killed	Injured	Sources
The Park Palace Guest House	2015	5	13	Afghanistan	Kabul	Taliban	Armed assault	Foreigners	14	5	BBC (2015e) Mullen, Jethro, Popalzai and Massoud (2015)
Babylon Warwick Hotel	2015	5	28	Iraq	Baghdad	Islamic State	Bombing/ Explosion	Officials, aid workers, journalists, and Westerners	7	13	Dearden (2015) Shankar (2015) Warwick (2014)
Cristal Grand Ishtar	2015	5	28	Iraq	Baghdad	Islamic State	Bombing/ Explosion	Officials, aid workers, journalists, and Westerners	7	13	Dearden (2015 Google Maps (2015) Shankar (2015)

Name of hotel	Year	Month	Day	Country	City	Perpetrator	Type(s) of attack	Targets	Killed	Injured	Sources
Imperial Marhaba	2015	6	26	Tunisia	Sousse	Islamic State	Armed assault	Foreign tourists	38	39	BBC (2015f) Drury (2015) Le Monde (2015)
Weheliye Hotel	2015	7	10	Somalia	Mogadishu	Al-Shabaab	Bombing/ Explosion	Government officials	7	8	Aljazeera (2015a) Hiiraan (2015) Jayalakshmi (2015) The Guardian (2015)
Siyad Hotel	2015	7	10	Somalia	Mogadishu	Al-Shabaab	Bombing/ Explosion	Government officials	7	8	Aljazeera (2015a) Hiiraan (2015) Jayalakshmi (2015) The Guardian (2015)

Name of hotel	Year	Month	Day	Country	City	Perpetrator	Type(s) of attack	Targets	Killed	Injured	Sources
Jazeera Palace Hotel	2015	7	26	Somalia	Mogadishu	Al-Shabaab	Bombing/ Explosion	The hotel accommodated several embassies, including those of China, Qatar and Egypt	14	40	Associated Press (2016b) BBC (2015g, h and i)
Byblos Hotel	2015	8	7	Mali	Sevare	Al-Mura-bitoun, an Al-Qaeda-linked group	Armed assault	UN workers and Westerners	9	0	Aljazeera (2015b) BBC (2015j) France 24 (2015a)
Qasr Hotel	2015	10	5	Yemen	Aden	Islamic State	Bombing/ Explosion	Members of the United Arab Emirates military and Yemeni government officials	15	0	BBC (2015k) Mukhashaf (2015) Qalisi (2015)

Name of hotel	Year	Month	Day	Country	City	Perpetrator	Type(s) of attack	Targets	Killed	Injured	Sources
Sahafi Hotel	2015	11	1	Somalia	Mogadishu	Al-Shabaab	Bombing/ Explosion	Members of parliament, foreign visitors, journalists, and the general who led the 2011 offensive that drove al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu.	12	10	BBC (2015l) BNO News (2015) Deutsche Welle (2015) Guled (2015b)
Radisson Blu Hotel	2015	11	20	Mali	Bamako	Al-Mourabitoune with AQIM	Armed assault	Foreign businessmen and -women, UN staff, and airline crew	18	7	ABC.net (2015) BBC (2015m) France 24 (2015b) Nossiter and Searcy (2015)

Name of hotel	Year	Month	Day	Country	City	Perpetrator	Type(s) of attack	Targets	Killed	Injured	Sources
Swiss Inn Al Arish Hotel	2015	11	24	Egypt	Sinai	Islamic State	Bombing/ Explosion	The hotel was housing judges who were monitoring Egypt's parliamentary elections	3	17	Fahim (2015) Hashem (2015) Swiss Inn Hotels & Resorts (2015)
Three Pyramids Hotel	2016	1	7	Egypt	Cairo	Islamic State	Armed assault	Tourists	0	0	Dearden (2016a)
Bella Vista Hotel	2016	1	8	Egypt	Hurghada	Islamic State	Armed assault	Tourists	0	3	Dearden (2016b)

Name of hotel	Year	Month	Day	Country	City	Perpetrator	Type(s) of attack	Targets	Killed	Injured	Sources
Splendid and Yibi Hotel and Cappuccino Restaurant	2016	1	15	Burkina Faso	Ouaga-dougou	AQIM	Armed assault	UN workers, westerners, 18 nationalities among those killed	29	56	Charlton (2016)
The Syl Hotel	2016	2	26	Somalia	Mogadishu	Al-Shabaab	Bombing/ Explosion	Government officials, businessmen and -women	12	25	AFP (2016) Associated Press (2016)
L'Etoile du Sud	2016	3	13	Ivory Coast	Grand-Bassam	AQIM	Armed assault	Foreigners	15	33	Adélé (2016) Reuters (2016)

Total: 22 attacks identified in the primary research.

Classification of Terrorist Groups

Table 4: Classification of terrorist groups that attacked hotels

Group name	Jihadist	Non-jihadist	Comment
23rd of September Communist League		x	
Abdullah Azzam Brigades	x		
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades	x		Burstein (2016)
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)		x	
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	x		
Afghan War Veterans		x	
African National Congress (South Africa)		x	
Akhil Terai Mukti Morcha (ATMM)		x	
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade	x		
Albanian exiles		x	
Al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI)	x		
Al-Khobar		x	
All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF)		x	
Allah's Tigers	x		

Group name	Jihadist	Non-jihadist	Comment
Al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam Brigade (Those who Sign with Blood)	x		
Al-Nusrah Front	x		
Al-Qaida	x		Burstein (2016)
Al-Qaida in Iraq	x		Burstein (2016)
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	x		Burstein (2016)
Al-Shabaab	x		Burstein (2016)
Angels		x	
Angry Brigade (Italy)		x	
Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia)	x		
Anti-Government Demonstrators		x	
April 6th Liberation Movement		x	
Arab Liberation Army		x	
Armed Commandos of Liberation		x	
Armed Group for the Liberation of Guadeloupe (GLAG)		x	
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	x		Burstein (2016)
Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement (MIRA)		x	
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia		x	
Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)		x	

Group name	Jihadist	Non-jihadist	Comment
Baloch Liberation Tigers (BLT)		x	
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)		x	
Black Hand		x	
Black September		x	Secular group
Black September II		x	Secular group
Bodo Militants		x	
Boko Haram	x		
Canary Islands Independence Movement		x	
Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC)		x	
Charles Martel Group		x	
Chechen Rebels		x	
Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist)		x	
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)		x	
Coordination of the United Revolutionary Organization (CORU)		x	
Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC)		x	
Corsican National Liberation Front- Historic Channel		x	
Corsican Separatists		x	
Deccan Mujahideen	x		Burstein (2016)

Group name	Jihadist	Non-jihadist	Comment
Defenders of the Nation's Sovereignty		x	
Delta Group		x	
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)		x	
Dissident Republicans		x	
Earth Liberation Front (ELF)		x	
East Timorese Activists		x	
Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy (EMETIC)		x	
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)		x	
Free Revolutionaries Movement-The Giants		x	
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN)		x	
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)		x	
Guerrillas		x	
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)	x		"The Movement's programme is Islam" (Burstein, 2016: 8)
Haqqani Network	x		
Hezbollah		x	Shia group
Hizb-I-Islami	x		
Iparretarrak (IK)		x	

Group name	Jihadist	Non-jihadist	Comment
Iranian Extremists		x	
Iraqi National Congress (INC)		x	
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)		x	
Irish Republican Army (IRA)		x	
Irish Republican Extremists		x	
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain		x	Shia group
Islamic Mujahidin	x		Burstein (2016)
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)	x		
Jamaat-al-Fuqra	x		
Jamaat-E-Islami (Bangladesh)	x		
Jamaat-E-Islami (India/Pakistan)	x		
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)	x		
Jewish Defense League (JDL)		x	
Jund al-Khilafah (Tunisia)	x		
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)		x	
Karen National Union		x	
Kashmiri Militants	x		
Kuna Indians		x	

Group name	Jihadist	Non-jihadist	Comment
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK)		x	
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)		x	
Lebanese Terrorist Group		x	
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)		x	
Loyalist Volunteer Forces (LVF)		x	
Luis Boitel Commandos		x	
M-19 (Movement of April 19)		x	
Macheteros		x	
Mahdi Army		x	Shia group
Manuel Gonzales Patriotic Front		x	
Manuel Jose Arce Commando		x	
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)		x	
Maoists		x	
May 15 Organization for the Liberation of Palestine		x	
Montoneros (Argentina)		x	
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)	x		
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)	x		
Moslem Activists	x		

Group name	Jihadist	Non-jihadist	Comment
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) (Chile)		x	
Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR)		x	
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)		x	Shia group
Muslim Fundamentalists	x		
Narco-Terrorists		x	
National League for Democracy		x	
National Liberation Army (NLA) (Macedonia)		x	
National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN)		x	
National Liberation Front (FNL) (Burundi)		x	
National Movement Against the Mahgreb Invasion		x	
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)		x	
Neo-Nazi Group		x	
New People's Army (NPA)		x	
New World Liberation Front (NWLF)		x	
November 17 Revolutionary Organization (N17RO)		x	
Oglaigh na hEireann		x	
Opposition Group		x	
Orange Volunteers (OV)		x	

Group name	Jihadist	Non-jihadist	Comment
Other		x	
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)	x		
Palestinian Revolution Forces		x	Burstein (2016)
Palestinians		x	
Patriotic Moroccan Front		x	
Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)	x		Islamist movement in Thaïland, Burstein (2016)
People's Liberation Force		x	
People's Liberation Front (JVP)		x	
People's Revolutionary Militias (MRP)		x	
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)		x	
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola		x	
Proletarian Patrols		x	
Protestant Extremists		x	
Puerto Rican Nationalists		x	
Radicals		x	
Raul Ernesto Cruz Leon, Salvadorian		x	
Rebel Armed Forces of Guatemala (FAR)		x	
Red Cell		x	

Group name	Jihadist	Non-jihadist	Comment
Reform of the Armed Forces Movement		x	
Resistenza		x	
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)		x	
Revolutionary Internationalist Solidarity		x	
Revolutionary Nuclei		x	
Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)		x	
Revolutionary Perspective		x	
Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)	x		Islamic movement in Thailand
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)		x	
Salafia Jihadia	x		
Separatists		x	
Serbian guerrillas		x	
Shining Path (SL)		x	
Sikh Extremists		x	
Sinai Province of the Islamic State	x		
Somali Salvation Front (SSF)		x	
South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)		x	
Supporters of Joshua Nkomo		x	

Group name	Jihadist	Non-jihadist	Comment
Taliban	x		Burstein (2016)
Tamils		x	
Tawhid and Jihad	x		Burstein (2016)
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	x		Burstein (2016)
Terrorists		x	
Thai Islamic Militants	x		
The Extraditables		x	
The New Irish Republican Army		x	
Tripoli Province of the Islamic State	x		
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)		x	
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)		x	
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)		x	
Union Du People Corse		x	
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)		x	
Unknown		x	
White Extremists		x	
Zimbabwe Patriotic Front		x	