

Ethics

Controversies in Military Ethics & Security Policy

and Armed Forces

Issue 2016/1

Global Warriors? German Soldiers and the Value of *Innere Führung*

Professional Soldiers and Citizens in Uniform: Some Thoughts on *Innere Führung* from a Transatlantic Perspective
Donald Abenheim, Carolyn C. Halladay

Ethics versus Efficiency – What Military Leadership Can Learn from Business
Detlef Aufderheide

Voluntary Instead of Compulsory Military Service – Young People Working for the Common Good
Angelika Dörfler-Dierken

***Innere Führung* and Civil Protection – Keyword "Mission-Type Tactics"**
Dirk Freudenberg

What's the Matter with *Innere Führung*?
Uwe Hartmann

***Innere Führung* and Global Integral Competence**
Bernd Küstner, Kazuma Matoba

Integrity, Moral Courage and *Innere Führung*
Peter Olsthoorn

Leadership in Multinational Military Organizations – the Example of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
Gregor Richter

Bundeswehr Without Cohesion. Negative Developments in *Innere Führung*
Elmar Wiesendahl

***Innere Führung* – Leadership Culture in Camouflage**
Enno Bernzen, Dirk Peddinghaus, Robert Sieger

Special: The Case of the *Bundeswehr* – Who Serves Germany?

Types of Soldiers in Germany
Rabea Haß

Female Soldiers as Superiors
Gerhard Kümmel

Gertrud Maria Vaske (Chief Editor) interviewing:

- **The Future of the *Bundeswehr* and its Advocate**
Hans-Peter Bartels (Commissioner for the German Armed Forces)
- **The Young Generation and the German Navy**
Thomas von Buttlar (Navy Command / Human Resources)
- **The Soldier's Life – What Should Soldiers and Their Families Expect?**
Peter Wendl (Theologian / Family Therapist)

Editorial

“Innere Führung – admired, ridiculed, praised to the skies, rejected. Sometimes it sounds as if different parties were saying the same thing, except each is standing on different banks of a river.” That is how the former commander of the Leadership Development and Civic Education Center (*Zentrum Innere Führung, ZInFü*) in Koblenz, General Jürgen Weigt, summarizes the current debate on *Innere Führung*.

Innere Führung – from the beginning, it has played a dominant role in the *Bundeswehr*, where it provides the foundation for serving as a soldier. The fathers of the German armed forces wanted to learn from history. *Innere Führung* characterizes the self-image of the German soldier, and is intended as a guiding principle for leadership in this special profession. Prompted recently by the book *Armee im Aufbruch* (the title can be translated as “Armed Forces on the Move”), new discussions and debates have arisen in various sections of the armed forces, society, and the military chaplaincy, questioning whether this concept is still in step with the times. In connection with the new White Paper for the German armed forces, there has also been controversy over what the soldier of the future should be: what qualities and characteristics do soldiers need to have so that they can deal with the completely changed security situation and task structure?


The discussion about *Innere Führung* has been going on for a long time. Back in 2005, the German bishops, in their text *Soldaten als Diener des Friedens* (“Soldiers as Servers of Peace”), declared: “On closer inspection, it can be seen that especially critically trained soldiers with a deeper and more effective understanding of their task are better suited to meeting the complex challenges, and resisting the temptations

associated with daily contact with violence and the use of force.”

Can human dignity, freedom, peace, justice, equality, solidarity, and democracy even exist in an armed conflict? In view of the increasing threat, what type of soldier does international politics need? The new edition of the e-journal considers these questions in a variety of ways. It also explores the focus topic: who serves Germany, now and in the future? This question provides a great deal of material for further discussions which we hope that this new edition will stimulate. The aim of the e-journal is not to settle a controversy, but rather to initiate further debate.

“Global Warriors? Soldiers and the Value of *Innere Führung*” – with this special theme for the new edition of the “Ethics and Armed Forces” e-journal, we wish to follow and contribute to the international debate.

I would like to thank everybody who has contributed to this online publication – the insightful authors, the vigilant coeditors, and especially the highly dedicated editorial team here in Hamburg.



Heinrich Dierkes
Deputy director of zebis

Professional Soldiers and Citizens in Uniform: Some Thoughts on *Innere Führung* from a Transatlantic Perspective

Donald Abenheim and Carolyn C. Halladay

Innere Führung is not outdated

Innere Führung should remain the professional code of all German soldiers especially at a time of upheaval in the German nation, on the European continent, and beyond. The record of leadership, command, morale, ethics, and obedience among the soldiers of the Western alliance since September 11, 2001, has become ensnared in various civil-military interpretations of how soldiers have managed irregular warfare and counterinsurgency campaigns now and in the past. This debate gives rise to the well-meaning, if frequently facile, arguments by some who, in the face of jihadist violence and “hybrid war,” would junk *Innere Führung* as a nostalgic absurdity. Instead, the times call for more, not less, *Innere Führung*, adapted and modernized to continue the German legacy of soldiers in democracy among young combat veterans unsure of their place in state and society in the wake of their experience of irregular warfare in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

For anyone familiar with the history of the *Bundeswehr* and its almost forgotten origins, the story of *Innere Führung* comprises the accounts of its critics and the misunderstandings that either consciously or unconsciously surround this ideal of soldierly professionalism in the FRG. These core principles of command, obedience, and ethics rightly emphasize the remarkable trinity of political purpose, constitutional essentials, and soldierly command and discipline in the blast of fighting, anger, and hatred native to war and political violence in its variety.

The citizen in uniform and the military professional – a German-American comparison, why bother?

German military professionalism forms a unique case in its civil-military aspect as well as its ethical refinement that can be better understood by comparison to other nations and across the history of the *Bundeswehr* itself. The German institutions at arms of command, obedience, and morale have evolved from the trinity of the people, the government, and the army, itself, which are poorly served by tendentious polemics, military romanticism, and cultural pessimism.

Although German and American soldiers no longer serve together in the depth and breadth of the Cold War, this professional bond endures, albeit in altered form, despite the vogue of anti-Americanism prevailing on German talk shows and in *Alternative für Deutschland* campaign umbrage. It has been present in SFOR and ISAF campaigns and is undergoing a revival with NATO’s Article V response on the eastern border of the alliance with the rapid reaction VJTF. Today the chief of staff at the US Army Europe in Wiesbaden is a senior German officer, while the very best German officers still attend training and education in the professional military education of the US armed forces.

Constitution, militia, and the regulars

The story of the soldier in America and their

ideals of command have long existed between the constitutional pole of the militia man-at-arms (and now also woman-at arms), on the one hand, and the regular soldier as heir to the European dynastic tradition of arms, on the other. Since the rise of the all-volunteer force in the early 1970s, the latter ideal of the professional has predominated in the self-image of the American soldier and the practice of command. This doctrine of the professional soldier has also become internalized in American society, while the heritage of the citizen soldier as a product of conscription has faded in its attraction without this widely shared rite of citizenship, service, and obedience.

The American birthright of the citizen-at-arms owes much to the heritage of medieval England, where the impact of the wars of religion and the Enlightenment transformed this institution within a national army and also led the authors of the US constitution to embrace it. In this respect, the militia, that is, today's National Guard, has long formed the heart of the US military. Since the American Civil War, it has been subject to much greater federal control than in its earlier iterations. The tradition of the citizen-at-arms, and an American version of the citizen in uniform, is, in this sense, the original American ideal of the soldier.

The competing model – of an elite corps of soldierly professionals – was founded in the US Military Academy in the 19th century and refined in line with the growth of the military during the 20th century in the age of total war. This now-legendary place was originally patterned after the model of an early 19th-century French military school for applied military engineering and siege warfare. An ample dose of management science was then added to this foundation in the 20th century. The professionalization, specialization, and self-differentiation of the US military began, and the tension between the citizen soldier and the military professional that describes these divergent developments

thus arose.

Duty, honor, country

Nowhere is this professional ideal of “Duty, Honor, Country” better codified than in Samuel Huntington’s still widely cited volume of the mid-20th century, “The Soldier and the State.” Based on how West Point imagines itself as the thin gray line between order and anarchy, the volume contains an interpretation of the ethos of the professional soldier in a democracy with Prussian overtones. Most significantly, the core of US soldierly professionalism resides in exemplary conservative social and political values. The regular American soldier should embrace a strictly neutral posture toward partisan politics and arm themselves against the weakening influences of pluralist society. The soldier, in turn, demands of civilian political authority that the cabinet and the legislature provide specialized military forces with a kind of depoliticized professional dominion. This arena of the professional soldier should be untrammelled by too many civilians and their ceaseless disorder, so as to preclude the politicization of the soldier, as the well as to prevent the pollution of this realm by hedonism, materialism, and pacifism. Although this formulation is 60 years old, it more than coincides with aspects of the contemporary debate in Germany about how, in the view of critics, *Innere Führung* has gone *kaputt* while German soldiers have defended the nation on the Hindu Kush.

Contemporary conflict and idea of the “stab in the back”

Irregular warfare as waged by Western democracies in distant lands, nonetheless, harbors an inherent danger for which *Innere Führung*, as the core of a soldierly code, offers an excellent defense: the danger of the blowback when the distant battlefield comes home to the detriment of society and the constitution in the face of domestic turmoil as well as the rise of fringe

political movements hostile to the fundamentals of German politics and society as they have existed in peace and security for decades.

All too common, particularly among disgruntled ex-soldiers and nervous civilians, is the civil-military syndrome in which internal conflict, radical ideology, and lack of an obvious front line deeply burden conventions of military action, even when such action concerns security building in the face of variously hostile local populations. The “stab in the back” myth has been the response to this phenomenon in such democracies as France, Great Britain, and the United States. It also has a particularly – and particularly unfortunate – role in Germany’s early and embattled mass politics in the age of total war.

The “stab in the back” has no place in today’s German military. *Innere Führung*, with its emphasis on the primacy of constitutionally validated statecraft and a code of command and obedience anchored in constitutional norms, shows its enduring strength in just this circumstance.

At the same time, even the most peace-minded society must react with a disciplined measure of understanding and support for the soldier’s need for the sense that their service is not demonized for domestic political advantage or simply ignored in the pursuit of profit or pleasure. Slogans about civil society and a superior German moral political culture are so easily voiced, but they may not dominate the public discussion to the exclusion of any gradations of debate or otherwise exacerbate the tendency of soldiers to see themselves as ignored and shunted aside for the glories of lifestyle and ecological excellence.

Drones, computers, anger, and hatred in warfare

Has the need to defend democracy with soldiers grounded in duties and rights of the Western democracies become any less urgent in the face of special warfare irregulars without collar

patches amid a barrage of digital chaos and psychological operations of special refinement? Have the principles of an army in a democracy been eradicated by those blood-thirsty men and women with their black flag of death who want nothing else but to destroy the rule of law and replace it with an orgy of pseudo-religious violence? Can the ballistic progress of weapons from crossbow to H-bomb and now to UAVs/drones and the digital grand slam of Stuxnet eclipse the human element in war altogether? How will this process eclipse and/or eradicate the essentials of human genius, character, intellect, and discipline in the soldier? These imponderables of machines and society confront German and American soldiers, and how they answer these questions also derives from a shared experience of ideas, government, military institutions, weapons, and combat.

Weapons in their variety are always tools wielded by human beings. The human element remains constant and dominant. Men and women-at-arms will always be compelled to grapple with the actual forces of real war described by Clausewitz: chance, political purpose, and the combination of anger and hatred in the use of force on a limited or unlimited scale to some coherent end. Via the forces of acceleration and compression, the digital age has augmented the dynamic of anger and hatred in human affairs in a manner that should cause anyone interested in the ideals of the soldier to pause and reflect with great care. As Carl Schmitt noted with a frightening brilliance in an earlier crisis that warns our epoch, technology cannot erase or neutralize conflicts that are inherent to society and politics. The reality of artificially intelligent machines in combat hardly upends war as a political process or that genius and friction remain features of conflict which should adhere to some coherent, limited political goal.

The fata morgana of science-fiction conflict only waged by computers, without the need for

a conventional army, cannot mask the incontrovertible fact that the contemporary transformation of irredentist and revanchist warfare as well as the revival of paramilitary formations in Europe itself are changing the face of organized violence in ways poorly apprehended by technology-first partisans in the self-image of soldiers. One response, as visible in the revival of total defense doctrines, is an armed citizenry in northern Europe, and the realization that the lack of a mobilization base on the traditional pattern in Western armies, to include that of the United States, constitutes a significant problem of escalation dominance in the snarling maw of great power conflict. What are the implications of this startling and unforeseen process as concerns the ideal of the citizen in uniform and the role of men and women with arms in contemporary conflict?

All these things in their dizzying variety argue for the revitalization of *Innere Führung* as an ideal and practice of the integration of the soldier into democracy at home and in the Euro-Atlantic world. This requirement is especially urgent as a variety of new foes of this order have embarked on a violent and persuasive campaign to junk the post-1945 system in Europe and beyond with catastrophic consequences. We in the United States would do well to emulate many of the principles of *Innere Führung* in the ongoing life of the US soldier, whether a professional or a citizen one. As part of *Innere Führung*, the education of officers and soldiers as well as defense civilians remains an imperative not only for the requirements of professional excellence, but for effective democratic civil military relations in the higher aspects of conflict and defense institutions. Ignorance forms no basis to make the kind of subtle comparison of the respective record of the soldier, command, and society in allied nations as attempted in this essay.

The critics of *Innere Führung* in this writer's country as well as among NATO and EU allies,

who see this institution of integration, command, obedience, and morale as either irrelevant or outdated, are making an old mistake from the 1950s and 1960s that has lost none of its harmful nature in the present century. Those who hold in their hands the levers and pullies of security and defense must answer this old error with clarity – and refute it, not the least because Germany's role in the 21st century assigns special meaning to the nature of power in all its facets, even in a nation that celebrates the primacy of civil power. Members of society cannot blindly neglect this requirement and hope to keep enjoying healthy and peaceful civil-military relations. This society has the most to gain from “rediscovering” *Innere Führung* – and the most to lose from failing to understand its enduring relevance to Germany, both today and tomorrow.

The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors alone; they do not represent the position of the US government and should not be construed as such.



Donald Abenheim has been a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, since 1985 with a focus on German and Austrian military history as well as defense policy and armed forces in a democracy. He secured a National Fellowship at the Hoover Institution in 1988, where he later became a research fellow

from 2004 until 2012. He founded the Center for Civil Military Relations with colleagues in 1993 as part of NATO enlargement in central and eastern Europe. Abenheim has supervised various master's theses written by Bundeswehr officers and published by the Carola Hartmann Miles Verlag in the so-called Monterey Series, including the works of Dr. Uwe Hartmann and Dr. Sven Lange. He is a member of the Clausewitz Society in Hamburg. His publications include "Reforging the Iron Cross" (Princeton University Press, 1988/2014) and "Bundeswehr und Tradition" (Oldenbourg, 1989). His forthcoming work from the ZMSBw/Potsdam is entitled: „Rettet den Staatsbürger in Uniform! Gedanken über Soldaten und Politik“.



Carolyn C. Halladay is a senior lecturer in the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. A historian and a lawyer, Halladay's academic focus is contemporary central Europe. Before joining NPS, she was a lecturer in history at Pennsylvania State Erie, The Behrend College. She has also taught history and

international relations at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. She has worked as a research analyst in the Office of the Historian, US Department of State, and as a federal tax prosecutor in the US Department of Justice, in addition to legal assignments in the US Departments of Defense and Transportation. Halladay is a member of the District of Columbia Bar. Her degrees include an MA in International Policy (1992), an MA and a PhD in Modern European History (University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994, and 1997), and a JD (Stanford University, 2002).

Ethics versus Efficiency – What Military Leadership Can Learn from Business

Detlef Aufderheide

In a democratic order, leadership ethics – as ethics, not as a management tool – is not primarily concerned with efficiency, but rather with the dignity and rights of those who are led. Leadership always means hierarchy and therefore superordination and subordination. Because of this, not only in the military but also in business, it is said that conflicts of goals and values occur time and again between the basic values of the democratic order and the hierarchical organization geared to efficiency. This leads to insistent questioning of the meaning of success-oriented, hierarchically organized activity.

These tensions take on particular significance in view of changed conditions in the employment market. When it comes to recruiting the next generation (“recruitment” is a term frequently used in business, too), it is becoming increasingly clear that from the strategic perspective, sustainable success and the observance of fundamental ethical principles in practice must go hand in hand if young people are to be convinced. This article aims to outline the conditions under which this is possible without internal contradictions, using some examples.

Fundamental values – specific decision-making situations: clearing up a misunderstanding

How can we measure the ethical quality of decisions made by leaders? To simply demonstrate their efficiency is not enough. But what is the situation when it comes to implementing ethical standards and leadership principles in an ever more complex world? At this point, it is

worth calling to mind the basic model of justification and application which is established in ethics.

This model distinguishes the (general) justification for ethical standards from their (specific) application via implementation in specific recommendations for decisions. Applied ethics or practical philosophy was for a long time understood to mean ethics applied directly and specifically: according to this understanding, well-founded ethical standards – such as human dignity, liberty, justice, democracy – were to be directly transferred to the application level in the form of specific yet at the same time generally valid, indeed rigorous recommendations for decisions. This would bring about ethically desirable results. Even today, much scholarly discourse on applied ethics is influenced by this thinking. Figure 1 illustrates this idea:




Figure 1

Under the complex conditions of the modern age, however, the cause-effect relationship between the decision and its consequences has irretrievably broken down. In the early days of the market economy, a boss might have known all of his subordinates and had a direct influence on the market

outcome. Even in the premodern environment, this influence might have been relatively easy to observe. But deeply layered, anonymously collaborative international processes have now made this impossible – and probably not even desirable. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly difficult and often impossible in the international competitive arena to bring about a particular desired outcome – such as protecting the environment – solely by means of decisions taken by individual actors. Transferred to the armed forces, we see that an increasingly more complex environment with new security demands entails challenges of a different nature than those of the second half of the last century. But what follows from this? Do external circumstances force the enterprise – or more generally, the organization – to abandon its values and give up its fundamental principles so that it doesn't fall behind or even fall prey to the competition? In the military context, a similar question can be asked for the basic principles and values of *Innere Führung*, which – using the language of economics – also appear to be under competitive pressure.

Some business ethicists tend to be skeptical about the normative powers of enterprises. According to them, the conditions for action and its consequences can no longer be influenced. This complexity has an effect on the available decision alternatives, which ultimately calls the ethical standard itself into question. In this respect, leaders are forced to abandon important basic values. Put simply, this would mean that the inability to implement a standard actually has a negative impact on its validity. The arrow pointing from the bottom to the top in figure 2 illustrates this idea:

(Suspended) validity of the ethical standard



*Adverse application conditions:
"cannot be implemented"*

Figure 2

Recent business ethics research considers this conclusion to be premature. It is true that under

complex external conditions, the traditional notion of a direct influence extending from the justification of a standard to its application, i.e. from the standard to a recommendation for action (on this point, see figure 1), would be naive and bound to fail. However, well-founded standards are not obsolete simply because they – temporarily or still – run into difficulties in implementation. At the same time, recent research is certainly guided by a conventional understanding of entrepreneurship: is it not the outstanding feature of successful leadership and entrepreneurial thought and action to respond flexibly and with foresight to new challenges, to shape developments proactively, and to search for innovations? Indeed, "being a leader" has always meant responding to setbacks not with resignation, but with innovation.

What is true for the innovative search for new markets, products, and processes is no less applicable to sophisticated, ethically reflected leadership. It is important to constantly readjust one's own standards and values to changing conditions, and to work out and implement necessary adaptations for the specific decision from the interplay of basic values and the respective circumstances – e.g. time and resource scarcity, or the competitive environment.

In my opinion, this should also be the case for *Innere Führung*. Changed circumstances are seen as a leadership task – not as a reason to abandon basic principles, but to strengthen them instead. Specific decisions may change and frequently need to be adapted very quickly, but the well-founded guiding principle can be maintained and protected. Figure 3 illustrates this train of thought. It is fundamentally based on the principle of a classical syllogism, according to which specific conclusions are drawn only from the interaction between normative premises and boundary conditions.

Basic ethical principle / ethical standard



*Application conditions
(e.g. time scarcity)*



*Specific recommendation
for action or decision*

Figure 3

Seen in this light, the various normative premises of *Innere Führung* in no way stand in tension with one another. For Graf von Baudissin and other founding fathers of *Innere Führung*, the soldier has always and quite self-evidently been regarded as a “free man, good citizen, and full soldier.” Thus, the specific challenge in the individual case does not call into question the principle as such. Instead, it asks how it can best be put into practice in the future, in the best sense of “How can we get this done?,” rather than “Why can’t this work?” This context of basic principles and specific recommendations, of justification and application, can be explained using the following example.

Leadership styles and leadership ethics: ethics taken seriously

If we look at management literature and the prevalent differentiation of basic principles of leadership based on leadership styles, then we initially find a confusingly large number of relevant publications, hypotheses and at times fanciful typifications. On closer inspection, however, in the context that is of interest to us here, we can make a broad – but therefore helpful – simplification, and distinguish two basic types: authoritative and participative leadership styles.

With the authoritative leadership style, there is a clear division of tasks between the superior and subordinates: superiors decide and control, while employees carry out and are controlled. The relationship between the two

is usually rather distant. Decisions tend to be taken quickly. In contrast, the participative leadership style is characterized by employees being involved in the decision-making process, and decisions are regularly delegated to them. External control is sometimes replaced by self-control, and the relationship is less distant. At times it seems more like a partnership (on an equal basis). Decisions tend to take more time because of the principles involved.

Of course, there are extreme forms and variants of these leadership styles. An extreme authoritative form is the despotic style: it tolerates no contradiction, its manner is overbearing, and it imposes arbitrary punishments. Subordinates fear the despotic leader. Another variant of the authoritative style is patriarchal leadership. In distinction to the despotic type, patriarchal leaders feel responsible for the people they lead. They like them and act almost as a father or mother would toward their children (the Greco-Latin root means “the founder of the family”). In the patriarchal leader, the right and the duty to lead are united with the duty of care. Subordinates often treat this leader with honest respect. Specific behavior and attitudes therefore produce significant advantages, but in the concept itself, the person who is led remains fixed in their role. As a result, potential remains unused.

Comparison of leadership styles – and the ethical dimension

Are there any significant differences – e.g. cultural differences – between the United States and (continental) Europe with regard to the prevalence of authoritative and participative leadership styles? A number of studies would appear to suggest that there are. In the overall picture, however, there are indications that in times of rapid economic transformation (keyword “Internet”), regional or cultural differences tend to be less important than differences between industries. Plus there is the fact that “older,”

generally more conservative enterprises are in any case now also moving toward more participative leadership styles and methods.

Against this backdrop, we ask: what about the specific ethical dimension? Doesn't the participative almost perfectly symbolize the democratic, and doesn't authoritative mean authoritarian, undemocratic, and despotic? From the business ethics perspective, this simplification is inaccurate. The situation is no doubt similar in the military. Deciding on a particular basic principle – in this case, the participative leadership style – does not automatically result in particular leadership methods and recommendations for action in the specific situation. This too would be a misunderstanding of the relationship between fundamental values, circumstances, and specific decisions. The participative leadership style in particular – also as an expression of sovereignty – can and should make use of specific decision-making processes and structures in which the leadership level, as a matter of course, makes the decision and takes the responsibility. It is not the whether but the how that counts, as long as the fundamental principle and self-image are not mixed up with the specific situation.

Starting from the basic principle and a decision in favor of the participative style, in case of doubt one should apply the rule of thumb: allow as much participation as possible and decide as little as necessary the authoritative way. As little as necessary, but not less than necessary, and especially not when external conditions such as time pressure or acute risks demand swift and responsible leadership action.

Not least, it is an ethical imperative not to demand too much of people who are led by others. Especially at lower decision-making levels and for less complex activities in any enterprise or organization, those who are led have every right to expect decisions and responsibility for those decisions to be taken by those who

are their superiors and are generally paid more for doing so.

Thus, we would be well advised to refrain from using openly evaluative attributes here such as “authoritarian” or “cooperative,” because they can cause or reinforce mental blocks. One need only consider that an ethically reflected leader who is presently “authoritative” is still perfectly capable of seeing his or her subordinates as bearers of human dignity and – of course – also relies on cooperation (what else, might one ask?). It is just that cooperation involves clearly specified role assignments. Rather than being an end in itself, it is due to the circumstances or the current boundary conditions.

A provisional conclusion

From an ethical point of view, it is often believed that the relationship between ethics and efficiency in military leadership and in business involves quasi-natural and insurmountable tensions. In line with this thought, the leader is forced to take one side or the other, thereby giving up one or the other to a greater or lesser extent. As explained above, this is by no means the case. On closer and particularly more recent inspection, economically reflected business ethics research provides a series of connections between business and the military. In the present article, we have attempted to sketch out several of these to give a general overview of the subject at hand.



Detlef Aufderheide is Professor of Business Ethics and Strategic Management at SiB School of International Business, Bremen City University of Applied Sciences. Previously he was the inaugural occupant of the Dr. Jürgen Meyer Foundation Chair in International Business Ethics at HSBA Hamburg School of Business

Administration (university of the Hamburg business community). After completing a degree in economics, Aufderheide earned his doctorate in economic and business ethics at the University of Münster, supervised by Professor Jochen Schumann. He was subsequently invited to conduct a research fellowship at the Center for Study of Public Choice in Fairfax, Virginia, under the supervision of Professor James M. Buchanan. Aufderheide has authored, co-authored and (co-)edited numerous publications on economic and business ethics as well as new institutional economics and regulatory policy.

Voluntary Instead of Compulsory Military Service – Young People Working for the Common Good

Angelika Dörfler-Dierken

There is a widespread opinion that young people today are an indecisive generation concerned only with their personal benefit, that they prioritize family and friends over work, and that they like to meet demands with a refusal to cooperate, because they are mollycoddled by their parents. And yet little evidence can be found to support this view – either in quantitative empirical research or if we look at the commitments that young people take up. Criticism of today's young generation is far more a reflection of the critic's viewpoint than a fair assessment of the young people themselves. In this article, I report on a number of studies, looking at whether they can tell us why most young people, when they leave school, turn to other areas of activity than those in the German armed forces (*Bundeswehr*).

Shell Youth Study 2015

Shell Youth Studies have been conducted for many decades. Young people (currently those between 12 and 25 years of age in eastern Germany, and those aged between 14 and 25 in western Germany) are asked about their values and attitudes, and about their life goals and what they perceive as threats.¹

In the horizon of values of young people, it is striking that they simultaneously emphasize duty and acceptance values, on the one hand, and self-fulfillment values, on the other. Over the last five years, agreement with the item "Respect society and order" has increased from 81 to 84 percent, with the item "Help the

socially disadvantaged and marginal groups" from 58 to 60 percent, and with "Be politically active" from 23 to 32 percent. Whereas respect for society and order can be classed as a duty value, helping and political involvement can be interpreted as self-fulfillment values.

Ever more young people are "doers" (31 percent of young men, 32 percent of young women). The number of "idealists" among both sexes is increasing (30 percent of young women, 20 percent of young men). The number of "materialists" among both sexes fell in recent years (24 percent of young men, 14 percent of young women), as did the number of "procrastinators" (25 percent of young men, 24 percent of young women). To the "doers" as much as to the "idealists", both diligence and ambition – again, these are duty and acceptance values – as well as imagination and creativity – self-fulfillment values – are particularly important. Both groups want to help the socially disadvantaged.

The Shell Youth Study asked several questions about the respondents' jobs. It turns out that job satisfaction is particularly dependent on soft factors that are linked to the meaningfulness of one's own actions. While job security is particularly important to 71 percent of young people, 58 percent want to contribute their own ideas in their working environment. The young generation's dual value orientation can be seen in these two statements, too: while they are committed to the existing work system, they are also focused on self-fulfillment. These are closely followed by agreement with the item

“Opportunities to do something meaningful.”

When asked what they are afraid of, young people mainly fear terrorist attacks (73 percent) and a possible war in Europe (62 percent). Given this expression of fears, it is noticeable that only few young people hold the use of military force in high regard (questions did not specifically mention the *Bundeswehr*). Most young people are by no means certain that military force is helpful in what they currently experience as a confusing world. Thus, 49 percent agreed with the item “Military intervention only makes things worse”, whereas 19 percent disagreed with this item (24 percent partially agreed/disagreed). 41 percent do not want to “Make a military contribution to ending wars in the world,” whereas 29 percent can envisage doing so (23 percent partially agreed/disagreed).

If one wanted to appeal to this generation of young people and persuade them to join the *Bundeswehr*, then one should, above all, discuss the meaning of military service and make them aware of it. It is scarcely possible to attract this generation with material incentives, a work–family balance, or special opportunities for promotion. This generation’s main interest is their perceived self-efficacy. Self-efficacy is achieved by someone who contributes their ideas to a greater whole which is interpreted as being meaningful. The military is obviously not seen as being such a context. No doubt this has something to do with the fact that the focus of military action has moved away from national defense in the genuine sense – approval of this is very high among the German population² – toward the deployment of soldiers in remote parts of the world. It is understandable that many young people do not regard the *Bundeswehr*’s deployment in Afghanistan as a success, particularly since even hard-won, secured territory was recaptured by the Taliban. The young generation’s skepticism about the military is therefore entirely comprehensible.

And yet, as the Shell Youth Study also shows, military skepticism can by no means be equated with political skepticism. On the contrary. Politics is not so remote to the young people of today as it was to the previous generation. The authors of the Shell Youth Study even identify a “trend reversal in political interest”: interest in politics increased from 30 percent in 2002 to 41 percent in 2015 (although during the 1980s, it stood at just over 50 percent).

Volunteering by young people

As can be seen from the boom in volunteer opportunities of all kinds and their immense popularity in Germany, young people are highly willing to engage in socially desirable, political, helping, or environmental activities. Volunteer services of this kind have existed for nearly 60 years. To begin with, the voluntary social year (*Freiwilliges Soziales Jahr, FSJ*) was invented by Christian groups. It was young men’s duty to do military service, while women would volunteer for charity work. Then increasing numbers of recognized conscientious objectors did alternative civilian service in various public welfare projects, in the churches, and, from 1990, in environmental projects. The abolition of compulsory military service and therefore alternative civilian service as well, effective July 1, 2011, was taken by politicians, legislators and charities as an opportunity to establish a broader basis for volunteering in Germany. Every year, the new Federal Volunteers Service (*Bundesfreiwilligendienst, BFD*) and the various youth volunteer services attract several tens of thousands of young people.

Volunteers generally receive no more than pocket money throughout their assignment. What is most important for participants in these programs, according to the volunteers themselves, is the opportunity for personal development (as well as the need to bridge a period of time). Apart from educational events offered for their own development, volunteers

are also required to attend political education events. Anyone who serves as a volunteer contributes to the common good and actively shapes the community. Such civic engagement by young people in every case underlines the taking on of responsibility toward the community.³ The *Bundeswehr* does not offer young people any similar opportunities for identification with the meaning of the organization and their own action within it, and it does not offer courses in personal development or political education (although a certain number of hours are provided for political education in the context of *Innere Führung*). The *Bundeswehr* only rarely invites civic engagement, or development engagement, even though the idea of the common defense of democratic civil society and of the liberal way of life would suggest that it should.

Young people and the *Bundeswehr*

According to press information, there are difficulties finding suitable young people to fill the 12,500 places that are available each year on the voluntary military service (*Freiwilliger Wehrdienst, FWD*) program – with officer candidates in addition to this.

Why the lack of interest in volunteering in the *Bundeswehr*? It cannot be that young people are currently in such single-minded pursuit of their career with another employer that they do not have time for such a commitment. After all, every year tens of thousands of young people have time for voluntary work. The lack of interest is more likely explained by the *Bundeswehr*'s image, which has changed profoundly in several respects in recent years: the deterrent force, to be deployed (in the worst-case scenario) in defense of the homeland, has become an internationally operating combat force, fighting alongside its allies against terrorists. And the second fundamental change is that compulsory military service for all young men was suspended in 2011 and is not likely to be rein-

troduced anytime soon. These two changes give the *Bundeswehr* a new public image, and make it appear in a whole new light to young people. Anyone who now volunteers to join the *Bundeswehr* basically agrees with its working principles (command and obedience) as well as overseas deployments. Anyone who wishes to join the voluntary military service program for more than 12 months has to sign a contract stating that they are willing to take part in an overseas deployment (without being able to opt out of a particular deployment location). But since the opinion prevails among young people that the use of military force does not have positive consequences, there is no reason for them to choose to volunteer in the military. Although the authors of the Shell Youth Study have observed an increased interest in politics among respondents, this does not appear to benefit the *Bundeswehr*. It would appear that in the eyes of young people, it lacks that which is particularly important to them – in other words, the possibility for self-efficacy and hence the experience of meaning.

A 2012 survey of volunteers in the FWD program found that almost half of respondents complained that their military service lacked meaning.⁴ Self-fulfillment and personal development are not values that young people associate with working in the *Bundeswehr*. On the contrary, the *Bundeswehr* tends to construct the profile and image of its soldiers in terms of weapons (e.g. regular firing practice, the use of weapons as a unique feature of the *Bundeswehr*), whose collectively organized use is supposed to produce positive effects. Similar arguments are made by military sociologists and historians⁵ who essentially do not want to take sufficient account of the Copernican revolution that the guiding principle of *Innere Führung* represents for the *Bundeswehr*. Instead, they emphasize the straight line between the elimination of the enemy by soldiers of the *Wehrmacht* and those of the *Bundeswehr*. Because the use of lethal force is a focal point of public debate, because “combat

deployments” and “task forces” are discussed, and because these actions have no discernible success, respondents in the Shell Youth Study have their doubts about making such a commitment.

Bundeswehr campaigns aggressively advertise that service pay is two to three times higher than the pay received by those who complete a voluntary social or environmental year. But since there tends to be a low proportion of materialists among young people, many are likely to feel that this advertising does not appeal to them. Although *Bundeswehr* brochures also advertise the “strong team” that new soldiers will temporarily work in, and expressly welcome “personal commitment,” everyone knows that lower-ranking soldiers are the ones who have to do what other people order them to do. In the brochures for the voluntary military service program, one searches in vain for any formulation that corrects or undermines the expectation of joining a strictly hierarchical organization.

Does this outcome of the comparison of voluntary military service with other volunteer programs indicate a negative social development – or is it perhaps a credit to young people in Germany? Despite constant media reports about youth violence, and ever-increasing reports about the self-radicalization of young people who become suicide attackers and jihadists, to most young people, the idea of countering terrorist violence with military force is an alien one. This skepticism about violence unites them with large sections of German society, with their parents and grandparents. Although young people state that they fear war and terror, they do not want to counter either with military means.

Nevertheless, Germany’s civilian-oriented society needs soldiers for its defense. Ultimately, “society and order” should be respected, and – here we can again refer to the Shell Youth Study – this is an opinion that most young people share. Starting from this observation, the

responsibilities of soldiers in the *Bundeswehr* should be discussed publicly in more detail as part of a proactive debate on meaning. It is not enough to put old wine in new bottles and post new claims for the advertising campaigns.

1 Cf. the results at <http://s01.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell-new/local/country/deu/downloads/pdf/shell-jugendstudie-2015-zusammenfassung-de.pdf> und <http://s06.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell-new/local/country/deu/downloads/pdf/shell-jugendstudie-2015-infografiken.pdf> (PDF accessed February 29, 2016) Charts available at: <http://s07.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell-new/local/country/deu/downloads/pdf/erwartungen-an-die-berufstatigkeit.pdf>; <http://s01.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell-new/local/country/deu/downloads/pdf/aussagen-zur-rolle-deutschlands-in-der-welt.pdf>.

2 Biehl, Heiko, and Giegerich, Bastian (2011), “Wozu sind Streitkräfte da? Einstellungen zu militärischen Aufgaben,” in: *Strategische Kulturen in Europa. Die Bürger Europas und ihre Streitkräfte. Ergebnisse der Bevölkerungsbefragungen in acht europäischen Ländern 2010 des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Bundeswehr* (eds. Heiko Biehl et al.), Forschungsbericht 96, Strausberg, pp. 59–73, here p. 61.

3 The German Bundestag’s Study Commission on the “Future of Civic Activities” explains the “intrinsic meaning” of civic engagement as follows: “Civic engagement is a form of activity that, as compared to other activities such as gainful employment, has its own logic of action. The core of an ‘intrinsic meaning’ of civic engagement lies in the particular form of activity and motivational factors.” In: *Bericht der Enquete-Kommission “Zukunft des Bürgerschaftlichen Engagements”. Bürgerschaftliches Engagement: auf dem Weg in eine zukunftsfähige Bürgergesellschaft*. Deutscher Bundestag. 14. Wahlperiode. Drucksache 14/8900. June 3, 2002, p. 38. Persons aged 27 and over can participate in the Federal Volunteers Service.

4 Kramer, Robert (2014), *Evaluation des Freiwilligen Wehrdienstes. Ergebnisse der Zweitebefragung der Freiwilligen Wehrdienst Leistenden mit Dienst Eintritt im Zeitraum von Juli 2011 bis April 2012*. (Forschungsbericht 108). April, 2014, pp. 12, 21, 23 ff.

5 Apelt, Maja (2006), “Militärische Sozialisation,” in: *Militär und Sozialwissenschaft* (ed. Sven Bernhard Gareis and Paul Klein), 2nd edition, Wiesbaden, pp. 26–39, here p. 26, and Nägler, Frank (2010), *Der gewollte Soldat und sein Wandel. Personelle Rüstung und Innere Führung in den Aufbaujahren der Bundeswehr 1956 bis 1964/65* (Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräfte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 9), Munich.



Angelika Dörfler-Dierken is project manager for the subject area “Innere Führung – Ethics – Military Chaplaincy” in research field IV “Security Policy and Armed Forces” at the Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the German Armed Forces (Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr,

ZMSBw). From an ethical, historical and social science perspective, she deals with current issues that are of concern to soldiers – with regard to their professional self-image, their integration into society, and their implementation of the guiding principle of the “citizen in uniform” in a democratic society and culture. She also investigates issues that result from the contradiction between the use of military force and German soldiers’ commitment to serving peace in the world. Dörfler-Dierken teaches at the University of Potsdam and at the University of Hamburg. She has numerous publications to her name.

Innere Führung and Civil Protection – Keyword “Mission-Type Tactics”

Dirk Freudenberg

Leadership ethics under deployment conditions

When seen alongside the main lines of discussion concerning “New Wars” and “post-heroic societies” which are increasingly loss-averse and, at the same time, concerned with avoiding losses on the enemy’s side, the discussion about *Innere Führung* (leadership development and civic education) and its reception in other organizational cultures initially appears to be of rather marginal importance. On closer examination, however, it can be seen that with the emergence of “hybrid threats” in Europe, the blurring of the boundaries between internal and external security, especially in light of the terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, as well as the threat of terrorist attacks in Germany, a discussion, about leadership philosophies – including those of the authorities and the non-police emergency response organizations – is in order. In this discussion there are certain considerations which call into question the deployment of armed forces overseas in accordance with the population-centered approach in the fight against irregular forces as part of the Networked Security Approach or Comprehensive Approach. At the core of these considerations is the same problem with which members of the non-police emergency response services are also increasingly confronted when they are, in some cases, specifically targeted for attack while carrying out their emergency response missions. They must deliberate, in terms of leadership ethics, what can reasonably be expected of one’s own forces and what is justifiable with regard to the individual on the opposing side. In oth-

er words, under what security-threat circumstances is the required deployment of one’s own forces (still) appropriate? For armed forces on overseas deployments, this specifically concerns the question of the extent to which soldiers should have to open themselves up to attack without being able to effectively fight the enemy themselves, so that the population-centered approach and the winning of “hearts and minds” can still succeed. This is an ethical question which highlights the tension between leadership responsibility and the duty of care of military leaders towards those they lead, on the one hand, and responsibility with regards to the militarily justifiable deployment of weapons, on the other. At the same time, the problem goes beyond the essential question at the core of military service: the giving and taking of life. It is also about more than just the usual balancing of military considerations of mission fulfillment and the risks to one’s own deployed forces. Especially in the United States, in connection with current manifestations of armed conflicts and increased exposure, the associated dangers which the population-centered approach necessarily entails are being questioned and the approach as such is up for renegotiation.¹ On the part of the military, one cause for such criticism is the perception that, in case of doubt, the supposedly safe kinetic implementation of the mission through the offensive use of deadly force has to take a back seat. This could be the case even if, as a result, directly or indirectly, one’s own forces could be placed in danger if a kinetic operation clashes with the principles of the population-centered approach. Kinetic operations are military combat operations to secure or stabilize an area.

This increased danger finds expression firstly in the rules of engagement (ROE) but also in counterinsurgency principles with special consideration of “hearts and minds” as set out in doctrines and rules for counterinsurgency such as FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency for the US Army and US Marine Corps. However, in the criticism expressed here, the extent to which it has been correctly understood whether tactical action can have a strategic impact especially in counterinsurgency missions and the extent to which strategic intentions may also lead to failure could be brought into question.² This tension could be resolved with the aid of mission-type tactics. If the leaders on the tactical level pose themselves precisely this problem and, with this in mind, bring about an outcome in their decision-making which takes into account the reciprocal relationship between the purpose on the political level and the military intention on the tactical level. Mission-type tactics should lead them to decisions which correspond to the task at hand and the intentions of the higher-level leadership and which make the purpose and associated risks comprehensible and transparent to the subordinate forces. It is notable that the American leadership regulations both for counterinsurgency operations and for deployments against hybrid threats also take “mission-type tactics” into account.

Mission-type tactics as the core of German leadership thinking

For the original civil protection organizations in Germany, i.e. fire services, aid organizations, disaster relief organizations, and the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief (*Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk, THW*), there is no codification that equals the concept of *Innere Führung* in the German armed forces (*Bundeswehr*). The same is true for the federal and state police forces. The reason for this can be found in the history of the *Bundeswehr* and its establishment in a democracy emerging from the tradition of the German armed forces after the

Second World War. Nevertheless, in the other police and non-police emergency response organizations, there are organizational cultures, and in each case an inner structure, in which problems and core issues of *Innere Führung* – which is the proven Bundeswehr leadership concept – are of current relevance. Moreover, there is strong interest in this concept in other countries, specifically in its core area which also particularly includes what are known as “mission-type tactics” (*Auftragstaktik*), that is, “leading by mission” (*Führen mit Auftrag*).³ In principle, leadership thinking in the German emergency response authorities at the operational/tactical level is the same. Thus, in these actors’ organizational cultures, factors such as independence, initiative, ability, and trust have their respective importance. For the *Bundeswehr*, especially for the ground troops, leading by mission is regarded as the highest principle. This also applies to deployment abroad.⁴ This principle is not undisputed – at least as far as everyday leadership practice is concerned. In reality, its application and expression is always the product of an individual leadership style and leadership behavior. In contrast, as well as “mission-type tactics,” the police forces also recognize the principle of “detailed-order tactics” (*Befehlstaktik*), which is a rigid form of command that leaves subordinates no room for maneuver when carrying out their orders. The civil protection organizations have also adopted “mission-type tactics” in their service regulations. In modern deployment scenarios, all actors in the national security architecture face similar questions – albeit in different contexts and different dimensions – which concern the respective leadership philosophies and are therefore also of ethical relevance.

Leadership ethics of civilian task forces under hybrid threat conditions

The case of a hybrid threat or an asymmetric attack, possibly even carried out in the form

of several or multiple follow-up attacks, could indeed have consequences for the organizational cultures of actors in the non-military, non-police emergency response services in the context of the five pillars of national security architecture. The concept of hybrid threats is based on the increased complexity, illimitability, and diversity of threats. The main characteristic underlying the concept of hybrid threats is the combined and orchestrated – and often covert – use of military and non-military means by state and non-state actors to achieve political objectives.⁵ The repertoire of actors who operate in such a way ranges from conventional and unconventional warfare to organized crime, propaganda, disinformation, operations in cyberspace, the instrumentalization of the protest potential of minority groups in society, and terrorist attacks.⁵ Scenarios previously only experienced in remote crisis and war zones may become a reality locally and may occur with hitherto unknown patterns of injury and destroyed infrastructure. Today, members of fire services, emergency medical services, disaster relief organizations, and aid organizations – on the margins or at the center of “demonstrations” – are increasingly finding themselves confronted with actors who are either violent or prepared to use violence. For these actors, the deployed police forces are no longer the sole object of their propensity to violence, as they also often identify members of the non-police emergency response services as representatives of the state and therefore meet them with hostility. This culminates in having a massive effect on their lives, health, and operating resources. Thus, civilian task forces are no longer regarded by perpetrators as neutral institutions with a humanitarian mission. Instead they stand for the state and are attacked as representatives of the “system.” At the same time, it can be assumed that the perpetrators have recognized the importance of a functioning assistance and emergency response system – as well as the psychological importance of its existence and the necessity of it in times of cri-

sis. This makes members of these organizations significant as a target; no distinctions are made and no consideration is shown. Events of this kind have considerable impact on the self-image of the task forces, who (for the most part) joined these organizations as volunteers and see themselves as “neutral helpers” but who are now treated with hostility as they carry out their aid and rescue work. That task forces are no longer necessarily viewed as helpers and instead may experience hostile treatment to the point of being physically harmed is a fact that stands in diametric opposition to the basic helping attitude of the emergency responders who expect recognition, not rejection. Thus, ethical and moral issues are raised which have a fundamental impact on the inner structure of emergency response organizations. This paradigm shift affects the core of the inner mindset, self-confidence, and professional self-image of emergency responders – “profession” here being used in the sense not of a main occupation but of a calling or vocation, which is closer to the original meaning of the word. It is particularly unreasonable to expect emergency responders – especially volunteers – to expose themselves to additional intentional threats beyond the imminent dangers of their ordinary emergency response missions.

Consequences for the mission and the inner structure

In light of this, the leaders and personnel of civilian relief and emergency services are confronted with an issue that opens up a new dimension and should be recognized in the leadership and decision-making process. In the future, it will be necessary in some circumstances to take hybrid threat situations and direct attacks on civilian task forces into account in operational planning and tactical deployment. Furthermore, there should be a response to these new challenges during the training phase. At the same time, this means that there is a need for a fundamental analysis of these “tough” deploy-

ment situations, and individual self-perceptions as well as attitudes to deployment should be able to adapt to such scenarios. Under such deployment conditions, the assistance and rescue mission now also involves acting in an insecure environment, ensuring personal safety and protection against third parties. This again means that, in some circumstances, fulfilling the original mission may have to take second place. In concrete terms, this means that in the future, in the event of an explosion, it can no longer necessarily be assumed that it is an accident which can be dealt with according to the principles of the civilian emergency services. Instead, it may now be the case that the event and damage are the result of an attack. Hence it is questionable whether and when (if at all) emergency responders can gain access to the incident site and the injured persons if it is not clear whether or not it is a multiple attack. It may be necessary to decide whether emergency responders should swiftly advance to the incident site and to the injured, and, ignoring the injuries and condition of the victims, rescue them from the danger zone so that necessary emergency medical treatment can be given in a secure environment. That this course of action is not ideal for the patients and may even be harmful to them is just as obvious as the fact that emergency responders are exposed to very high threat in such a scenario. As a result, the burden of responsibility on leaders increases. Under these conditions, leaders are required to a greater extent than previously to weigh up whether and under what conditions and with what stipulations they deploy personnel to rescue other people. The task forces under their command, in turn, need to be able to trust these decisions. These changes inevitably have impact on the inner structure of these organizations, as they concern the key elements of mission-type tactics: independence, initiative, ability, and trust. These are all also key elements of *Innere Führung*. Thus, when it comes to shaping the inner structure of civilian emergency response organizations, the *Innere Führung* of

the German armed forces may provide helpful and constructive guidance.

1 Soares, Luis A. (2014): *Winning Hearts and Minds: The Injustice of Humanizing War*, Leipzig.

2 Freudenberg, Dirk (2016): *Counterinsurgency als Phase zur Überwindung schwacher Staatlichkeit und zur Etablierung einer stabilen Nachkriegsordnung*, Berlin.

3 Freudenberg, Dirk (2005): *Militärische Führungsphilosophien und Führungskonzeptionen ausgewählter NATO- und WEU-Staaten im Vergleich*, Wiesbaden.

4 Freudenberg, Dirk (2014): *Auftragstaktik und Innere Führung. Feststellungen und Anmerkungen zur Frage nach Bedeutung und Verhältnis des inneren Gefüges und der Auftragstaktik unter den Bedingungen des Einsatzes der Deutschen Bundeswehr*, Berlin.

5 Tamminga, Oliver (2015): "Zum Umgang mit hybriden Bedrohungen," in: *SWP-Aktuell* 92, Berlin, p. 1.



Dirk Freudenberg is a political scientist. For several years, he was a senior consultant and operations manager at a consultancy firm for crisis and security management. Since 2002, he has been a lecturer at the Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning, and Civil Protection at the German Federal Office of

Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance. He currently works at the department for Strategic Management and Leadership, Emergency Preparedness and Planning, Educational Principles, and Quality Management.. Freudenberg participated in the Manfred Wörner Seminar at the German Armed Forces Office and in the Security Policy Seminar at the German Federal Academy for Security Policy. As Lieutenant Colonel in the parachute regiment, he was deployed overseas several times (KFOR 1999, ISAF 2004, and 2011/12). In 2015, Freudenberg completed a further overseas deployment as part of a German Federal Police delegation – the German Police Project Team (GPPT) – to advise and train the Afghan deputy interior minister and the Strategy and Policy department.

What's the Matter with *Innere Führung*?

Uwe Hartmann

While still upheld in official statements as the leadership philosophy of the German armed forces (*Bundeswehr*), in public opinion and off the record *Innere Führung* is not infrequently dismissed as an outdated model. Does it face the same fate as compulsory military service?

Innere Führung – or “leadership development and civic education” – has been widely regarded as the trademark of the *Bundeswehr* during its 60-year history. After German reunification, *Innere Führung* was even spoken of as a global export hit. And yet, it was never the universally beloved child of the armed forces. There was often fierce controversy over its principles and what they mean with regard to troops’ readiness for duty.

What is the situation today? Many soldiers have heard about *Innere Führung* at some point; some are familiar with it; many have no idea what it is. It should really be expected of the next generation of leaders that they would take a lively interest in the leadership philosophy of the *Bundeswehr*. However, sharp criticism has come from the ranks of younger officers, culminating in the verdict that this philosophy has become obsolete. In the best case, they say, it is a relict from times long past.

How did it happen that a leadership philosophy which regards itself as a dynamic concept now sparks hardly any interest in its continued development? Did the guardians of *Innere Führung* take their task too seriously, making it an inviolable but ultimately ever less convincing ideology? Is it even perhaps an instance of politically correct hyper-morality with no relevance to soldiers’ real environment? These are questions that hit the core of *Innere Führung* hard. First of all, it is therefore worth clarifying

a few fundamental points.

Organizations need a leadership philosophy

It is indisputable that the *Bundeswehr* needs a leadership philosophy. Organizations have a leadership (or management) culture and they expect their members to have a self-image that satisfies the desired values and norms. As the scandal over car emissions tampering (“Dieselgate”) demonstrated, human misconduct can inflict considerable harm on an organization. There have been scandals in the German armed forces, too, such as the pictures of skulls from Afghanistan or the pretend rapes in the Coesfeld. Armed forces, like businesses, usually respond to such incidents with changes in their leadership culture and an increased focus on ethical education.

While they share some common features, there are differences between armed forces and civilian organizations which are reflected in the respective leadership philosophies. Owing to the nature of war, soldiers must be prepared to use force as part of their politically legitimized mandate. The demands placed on their sense of responsibility are correspondingly high. To ensure constant control by policy-makers as well as the execution of orders even in dangerous and uncertain situations, the principle of command and obedience applies. This produces tensions which individuals experience in their various roles as soldier, citizen, or family member. Further potential for conflict arises from civil-military relations, the integration of soldiers into post-heroic civil societies, and the leadership behavior of superiors. This is true of all armies in the Western world.

What is special about *Innere Führung*?

Like the leadership philosophies in other armies, *Innere Führung* is also characterized by specific national features. Some of its principles can only be understood in light of German history prior to 1945 as well as German politics and society in the aftermath of the Second World War.

At the beginning of the 1950s, the concept of *Innere Führung* was devised for the new armed forces which the young Federal Republic of Germany assembled to defend Western Europe against the Soviet Union. The team in charge, headed by Wolf Graf von Baudissin, was in search for a dialogue with the public. At the time, the majority of Germans were against rearmament. Former soldiers of the *Wehrmacht* had to be motivated to help establish the new armed forces. A willingness to communicate, both internally and externally, remains a key characteristic of *Innere Führung* to this day. In this case, talks are not subject to the principle of command and obedience. Instead, discussions should take place in a spirit of partnership and on an equal basis, regardless of the rank and status of dialog partners. When it comes to questions about their self-image, soldiers in a sense enter an area of freedom that lies beyond the realm of the military hierarchy. All dialog partners are encouraged to participate with informed opinions, i.e. opinions based on scientific evidence and political education. Neither idle talk nor political correctness satisfies these requirements.

Leadership philosophies also draw lessons from history. In Germany after 1945, this learning resulted in a radical break. The *Reichswehr* as a state within a state and the *Wehrmacht* as the instrument of a criminal regime were insufficient as models for an army in a democracy. The impact on the *Bundeswehr*'s sense of tradition was particularly severe as broad periods and numerous actors in German history were

excluded because they were part of an inappropriate heritage. In contrast, the armies of many allies could look back on an unbroken tradition.

Another key difference when comparing *Innere Führung* to the leadership philosophies of allies consists in the primacy of conscience. The trauma of the *Wehrmacht*'s ensnarement in a war of extermination explains why a legal obligation was placed on soldiers of the *Bundeswehr* to consider whether orders and instructions are legal and lawful, and whether they are compatible with their conscience. This sets a high moral standard for every individual. By recognizing resistance against Nazism as a line of tradition, this standard was entrenched in the centre of the soldier's self-image and also communicated externally as a moral commitment.

Moreover, the way in which superiors treated the soldiers under their command had to be different than the leadership behavior that was reflected in caricatures of Prussian-German armies prior to 1945. Degrading and inhumane treatment is just as impermissible as moral cowardice. Education in responsibility and the encouragement of thoughtful obedience became the foremost task of every superior. Mission-type tactics (*Auftragstaktik*), or as it is called today, leading by mission (*Führen mit Auftrag*), was therefore an integral part of *Innere Führung* from the beginning. This leadership principle, which was introduced back in the 19th century, meant carrying out orders independently, solely on the basis of defined objectives and with the resources provided. Independence required deviating from orders if the situation had fundamentally changed and it was not possible to consult with superiors. However, this handed-down leadership principle was expanded by *Innere Führung* in that leading by mission was understood not just purely in military terms but also politically. It was supposed to be not simply a matter of carrying out a military order in the most effective way possible, but also of considering beforehand whether the

likely outcome of one's action in fact served the political purpose. In this way, the soldier came to share responsibility for the political objectives that were to be achieved. The concept of leading by mission or mission-type tactics was therefore expanded to become leading with a politically justified mission, a "mission strategy." Politics is therefore an indispensable element of soldierly professionalism. Herein lies the actual, deeper meaning of the concept of the "citizen in uniform." *Innere Führung* therefore places extremely high demands on the intellect and character of soldiers of all ranks.

The historical justification for *Innere Führung* based on the experiences of the Weimar Republic and the Nazi dictatorship is becoming much less relevant, especially for younger generations. They tend to look ahead to the new challenges. Hence greater attention focuses on the concept of conflict or war which incidentally played an extremely important role in the development phase of *Innere Führung*.

The concept of war in *Innere Führung*

Baudissin and his staff observed that modern wars are not a continuation of the Second World War. They developed a more complex understanding of conflict, for which they used the term "permanent war of world citizens" (*permanenter Weltbürgerkrieg*). This concept of war emphasized the temporally and regionally unbounded political and ideological character of modern conflicts whose objectives could be found in the hearts and minds of citizens in and out of uniform. Battles and skirmishes are, according to Baudissin, "... now only one part of an intellectual warfare that attacks all territories, which knows no fundamental differences between war and peace."

Not only the democratic system of the still-young Federal Republic of Germany and the lessons from history, but also the concept of war demanded a clear political justification for

the *Bundeswehr's* mission, the deep integration of society and the armed forces, and dignified treatment of people. This was intended as a way of increasing the resilience of politics, society and the armed forces for the ideological confrontation with the Soviet communism at the time. Only through political strength, social cohesion, and political education of all citizens, among whom soldiers form the "spearhead," would it be possible in the long run to preserve peace and motivate the opponent in the competition of systems to change his views.

Thus, *Innere Führung* also placed an emphasis on "soft power" because the concept of war required this as a compliment to purely military strike power. Accordingly, the 1957 *Innere Führung* manual states: "In our situation of rebuilding the armed forces, the only legitimate question is: how can the German armed forces in the middle of the 20th century be organized as an instrument of maximum effectiveness?" Military effectiveness, however, was based on (socio-)political and ethical conditions which needed to be created and made permanent via *Innere Führung* in light of the (also intellectual) warfare being perpetrated by the former Soviet Union.

Given the new challenges, especially those resulting from hybrid warfare, this concept is more current than ever. Actors who operate in a hybrid manner use complex hybrid military forms which they orchestrate, for example, by means of propaganda and economic pressure, by stirring up social tensions, and by prompting refugee movements. To fend off their attacks requires self-confident advocacy of the liberal values of an open, enlightened society, the solidarity of citizens in and out of uniform, and policies which justify the strategies to defend against threats, and which, for this purpose, seek a dialogue with the people. In this way, a country's overall resilience increases and its resilience towards hybrid threats as well.

Innere Führung reloaded

Critics of *Innere Führung* often focus their arguments on survival in war and combat. They use simple concepts of war. Yet a return to pure military professionalism would be a capitulation before the complexity of new types of conflicts.

Some critical statements are characterized more by prejudices than by extensive consideration of the numerous issues in the wide field of *Innere Führung*. There is a persistent prejudice which says that *Innere Führung* means making soldiers soft and weakening their discipline. However, reading just a few pages of the *Innere Führung* manual shows what enormous demands it places on soldiers. Given the complex security-policy challenges which could lead to a crisis with the character of a global catastrophe, it says that soldiers should continue with their development on a permanent basis. Anyone who travels this hard road sets their inner compass. This allows them to act professionally with confidence and self-assurance even if there is ambiguity and uncertainty in the political and military realm.

As a construct, *Innere Führung* is not easy to understand. However, this has to do with the nature of its subject, namely armed force. Reading, reflection, and discussions in the spirit of partnership are essential for a comprehensive understanding of *Innere Führung* and for its continued creative development. Suitable conditions should be put in place for this purpose in education and training facilities and among the troops.

Innere Führung is close to the reality of war and deployment as it draws on conclusions from the analysis of the nature of conflict. This has a direct impact on the effectiveness of the troops. At the same time, it looks not only to the *Bundeswehr* for input but also to politics and society. *Innere Führung* is therefore most certainly a critical leadership philosophy. In return,

however, soldiers of all ranks are required to show more civil courage. Here it becomes clear that *Innere Führung* is not an autonomously acting matrix in the background. It is that what we are and what we as individuals make of it.

Establishing a more robust framework for military service requires a concerted effort on the part of the state, society, and the armed forces. Ongoing underfunding, legitimization deficits, disinterest, and excessive regulations geared towards establishing peace conditions all impair the reaction speed and flexibility of the armed forces in complex conflicts. *Innere Führung* forms an overarching platform for critical, constructive debates and holistic solutions. This requires a new culture of dialogue which fosters trust and committed interest. Questions of self-image also require clarification: does the concept of civil society imply an exclusion of the soldier? Why does the citizen in uniform, despite the desire for esteem, find it so difficult to talk about their profession in public? The primacy of politics should also find expression through politicians explaining the political dimension of the soldier's profession. Superiors should take care not to exaggerate their personal understanding of *Innere Führung* as a general moral standard, making it immune from criticism. To foster understanding, to strive to find shared beliefs, to think through alternatives – all of this would be much truer to the spirit of *Innere Führung*.



Uwe Hartmann is colonel in the general staff (Oberst im Generalstabsdienst) and head of section in the German Army Command (Kommando Heer, Kdo H) in Strausberg. He works on topics relating to the operational management of land forces. Previously, he completed a one-year study course at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylv-

nia. As co-editor of the *Innere Führung* yearbook, he deals with questions of the relationship between politics, society, and the armed forces. He also publishes on topics including strategy issues, the nature of war and conflict, hybrid warfare, and the Prussian general and philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz.

Innere Führung and Global Integral Competence

Bernd Küstner, Kazuma Matoba

Innere Führung and globalization: intercultural competence in the German armed forces

Particularly in today's globalized environment, it is important to have an awareness about one's own heritage and about different society-specific leadership cultures. Deployments no longer only take place under the command of a single nation. Working together requires cooperation between nations and mutual understanding.

Resolute Support has a multinational environment. The mentor team of the 209th Corps comprises around 60 NCOs and officers from 12 nations who have to bridge their cultural differences in order to fulfill a common mission. Among them are "only" five German soldiers. This heterogeneous group, spanning different ranks and country borders, has one task: to advise the Afghan National Army in northern Afghanistan.

From the German perspective, intercultural competence (ICC) requires an understanding of *Innere Führung* and putting it into practice. In terms of human dignity, the core philosophy of *Innere Führung* (leadership development and civic education) was devised in such a way that, even today, it can form an essential part of the intercultural competence of the German armed forces (*Bundeswehr*). Back then, albeit unconsciously, the conditions were created for ICC. Mutual tolerance and accepting as well as respecting the other's culture are the basis for communication and a guarantee of success. One does not need to be on an over-

seas deployment to apply intercultural competence. Respect and tolerance are required in Germany, too. Superiors in particular are called upon to permit and promote pluralism. Military leaders are "leaders, educators, and trainers" who have a high level of competence in soft skills such as tolerance, empathy, and the ability to communicate, and they should be able to foster these skills. These requirements are not limited to leaders – they apply to all members of the armed forces.

To assist superiors in the promotion of ICC, a wide variety of courses are available at the Center for Innere Führung (*Zentrum Innere Führung, ZInFü*) and at the German Federal Armed Forces Command and Staff College (*Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr*). In day-to-day military life, however, other areas of training are dealt with more urgently. *Innere Führung* or ICC is usually of secondary importance.

ICC is a mandatory part of training and planning for deployments. This training includes courses in regional studies and more general information, but is limited to the practical rules of conduct for the respective country and culture. Yet this is not the same thing as intercultural competence. ICC is not simply a list of dos and don'ts!

The German Armed Forces should adapt themselves to a more multinational context with the associated intercultural competencies. ICC is and will be the everyday tool kit of every soldier, especially superiors, during deployments.

***Innere Führung* and postmodernity: diversity competence among leaders**

The *Bundeswehr*'s system of values, like that of society, is subject to constant change, and therefore should always be discussed in the current spirit of the times. Thus, *Innere Führung* is also constantly changing. Particularly as a result of deployments in recent years, and especially since the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, *Innere Führung* has been a topic of discussion. The question has to be asked of whether it is still in keeping with the times, and whether, in an unchanged form, it measures up to present-day requirements. The internationalization of missions, the multinational nature of staffs, and the placing of other nations' troops under German command in their home country are causing the military world to grow together, while compelling an adaptation of *Innere Führung*.

Despite all discussions in society and in the military, *Innere Führung* still remains the basis for action because values such as human dignity, freedom, peace, justice, equality, solidarity, and democracy are timeless. At the same time, a balancing act needs to be performed between maintaining the core values of *Innere Führung* and adapting to society's current needs.

This changing of needs should also be reflected in the corresponding regulations. Dörfler-Dierken and Kramer (2013) highlight a discrepancy in the distribution of and knowledge about *Innere Führung* in the armed forces. There is a clear difference between the rank groups which shows the importance of *Innere Führung* with regard to the understanding of military service in day-to-day life and during deployments. This different understanding and interpretation of *Innere Führung* may lead to misconceptions in leadership behavior. At the same time, one runs the risk of losing the beneficial effects of successful cooperation, or rather of not being able to generate such effects in the first place.

It is precisely the diversity of the armed forces, the wealth of all kinds of different aspects, which gives the *Bundeswehr* the decisive advantage in future deployments. This diversity is characterized particularly by *Innere Führung* in practice and by ICC that is not directed solely at one's own self. A global view of the problems should be the goal.

During future *Bundeswehr* deployments, there will be a greater need for diversity management skills, especially if the *Bundeswehr* expands its mandate to train foreign armed forces or in the case of training missions that are based on a "postwar conflict." Effective peace consolidation is only possible in cooperation with the host country or partner nations. This requires systematic thinking as a world citizen.

Global integral competence – a possible contribution to the evolution of *Innere Führung*

The November 2015 terror attacks in Paris were viewed by society's conservative wing as a confirmation of the "Clash of Civilizations" hypothesis that was put forward in 1996 by US political scientist Samuel Huntington. Many academic writers have warned against his reductionist definition of culture, which is also still dominant in the theory and practice of intercultural training (e.g. cultural standard and cultural dimension), and they have criticized the illusion of the singularity of identity. A person should be regarded as an individual with many affiliations or as a member of many different groups. In intercultural interaction, one should recognize one's own multiple identity, and at the same time recognize and acknowledge the identity of others so as to avoid ascribing and further entrenching a single cultural identity.

A postmodern concept of ICC should enable leaders in the *Bundeswehr* to recognize their multiple social identity and furthermore to discover their personal identity. The learning pro-

cess in any such formation of identity is a transformative learning process, in which “learning as change” takes place as described by Gregory Bateson (1972).

His multilevel model of learning provides a theoretical foundation for the new concept of intercultural training which postulates that the reconstruction of identity is possible through “awareness transformation” at a higher level of learning. This “awareness transformation” takes place consciously and unconsciously in the intercultural context. However, it can still be fostered more efficiently via intercultural training prior to soldiers’ overseas deployment by suspending cultural factors in behavior, skills, beliefs, and identities. The role of science is to develop specific training approaches to promote “diversity management competence,” i.e. the ability to perceive one’s own and others’ diversity of identities as integral parts of the system as a whole and to establish a solid foundation for peace consolidation in postwar regions.

Future training in *Innere Führung*, in particular, should seek to further enhance the capabilities of the armed forces, especially of leaders, for successful peace consolidation. The concept of *Innere Führung* focuses on the person and their ability to exert influence on conflicts and peace. Members of the armed forces need to influence people on different levels of society in order to contribute to peace consolidation and ultimately initiate a transformation of the system.

To state this theory in more detail, the concept of *Innere Führung* can be combined or expanded with Wilber’s “Integral Theory” (2007). In particular, the quadrant model of his integral theory will be considered here as it can serve as an important addition to the concept of *Innere Führung*. The quadrant model makes it possible to understand interpersonal events in an integrated and comprehensive manner and therefore multiplies the possibilities for action. It

presents us with a basic model for considering both the paradigms and the specific learning fields and learning levels. The meaning of the individual quadrants is explained briefly below.

According to Wilber (2007), events can be experienced individually and collectively, while phenomena can be perceived subjectively (interior perspective) and objectively (exterior perspective). Using these dimensions, Wilber defines the quadrant model as depicted in figure 1:




Figure 1: Ken Wilber’s integral theory (own diagram following Wilbur [2007: 71])

Upper-left quadrant – Interior individual perspective – “I”

This quadrant contains individual and subjective perceptions, that is, the individual’s own awareness. These are one’s own feelings, intentions, and sensations which are perceived consciously or unconsciously. In dialog and exchange with other people, we obtain new knowledge about ourselves. In particular, identity, self-reflection, and personality development are part of this quadrant.

Lower-left quadrant – Interior collective perspective – “We”

This quadrant consists of a consensus of politics, family, school, and work. It comprises values, norms, role models, and cultural conven-

tions that influence the individual and society – sometimes consciously, but mainly unconsciously. The awareness of the community and the impact of collective conventions can be found here. From the educational perspective, ethic-moral education is located in this quadrant. The interior collective perspective determines social and intercultural competence and is therefore crucial in intercultural dialog.

Upper-right quadrant – Exterior individual perspective – “It”

In this quadrant, people’s opinions and behaviors are objectively viewed from the outside. What the individual feels or thinks is not relevant here. It is about creating objectivity and comparability. Scientific measurement methods make this possible. Measurable values would be, for example, information about a conflict, understanding of the law, school education, and negotiation and analysis skills. “It” therefore represents the scientific field.

Lower-right quadrant – Exterior collective perspective – “Its”

This perspective consists of the exterior, visible behavior of systems of all kinds. This implies educational, state, and economic systems as well as the global ecological system. Other factors such as infrastructure also play a role. How does a system behave outwardly and what do the communication processes look like?

These four quadrants are four different perspectives from which one can gain a comprehensive and integrated view of people, society, and the world. In the global perspective, this approach of multiple perspectives is called “global integral competence.” The term describes the attribute of a subject capable of acting and shaping their own personality and the global environment. Global integral competence results from bringing these four perspectives into balance, and recognizing the self and others in a causal relationship within a big system.

“It”: Becoming aware of our neuronal perception of the world and our attribution of meaning, with the goal of pushing the boundaries and developing new meaning and possibilities for action.

“I”: Recognizing one’s own complex system of plural identity, developing a coherent identity, and expanding options and scope for action.

“We”: Recognizing individual potentials for developing a new culture by suspending prejudices/assumptions and developing competence for dialogical communication, i.e. listening.

“Its”: Recognizing that we stick together by means of an implicit system and differentiate ourselves from each other by means of an explicit system.

For example, a mentor in the German armed forces in Afghanistan should perceive their Afghan trainees without prejudice via the “It” and “I” perspective. Via the “We” perspective, they should be capable of developing a trusting relationship with their trainee, in which a new, appropriate leadership culture emerges. Beyond the differentiated institutional functions such as trainer–trainee, they should recognize that they and their trainees are integral parts of a global system.

Global integral competence is a broad term that comprises a bundle of self, social, and system competencies that are vital for modern human resources development in the armed forces. The theoretical development of this concept can be tied in with the contemporary evolution of *Innere Führung*, as it needs to adapt in the context of globalization and integration to international structures.

References:

Bateson, Gregory (1972): *Step to an ecology of mind*, Chicago.

Dörfler-Dieken, Angelika and Kramer, Robert (2014): *Innere Führung in Zahlen: Streitkräftebefragung 2013*, Berlin.

Huntington, Samuel (1996): *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York.

Wilber, Ken (2007): *Integrale Vision*, Munich.



Bernd Küstner joined the German armed forces in 2000 as an officer candidate in the former armored reconnaissance corps (Panzeraufklärungstruppe). Following his training as an officer, and after studying educational science at Universität der Bundeswehr München, he served as a platoon leader, Kompanieeinsatzoffizier, and staff officer. Küstner currently works as a team leader in military training support. His three overseas deployments to date – in 2011, 2013, and 2015 – have taken him to Afghanistan.



Kazuma Matoba studied and gained his doctorate in communication science in Tokyo and Duisburg. Following his habilitation at Witten/Herdecke University, he worked as a lecturer at various German and international universities. Alongside his academic activities, he is active around the world as a coach in intercultural communication and peace consolidation. He has been teaching and undertaking research at the Faculty of Human Sciences at Universität der Bundeswehr München since 2014.

Integrity, Moral Courage and *Innere Führung*

Peter Olsthoorn

The aim of this paper is to examine the usefulness of the somewhat related notions of integrity, moral courage, and *Innere Führung* (the leadership concept used by the German military) as a means of making military personnel behave ethically. Of these three notions, integrity is mentioned most often within military organizations, and the largest part of what follows is therefore devoted to a description of what integrity is, and what the drawbacks of this notion are for the military. This will lead us to conclude that integrity in its most common meaning is too vague and subjective to be of much use to the military. It is because of these drawbacks that this paper looks into moral courage and *Innere Führung* as possible alternatives for integrity.

What is integrity?

Integrity is the virtue that makes that we do the right thing in spite of being tempted otherwise, even when there are no witnesses present. No wonder that most militaries list it as an important virtue: also in war, morality cannot be a matter of not being found out. Regrettably, however, integrity as a term has acquired so many meanings today that it has come to signify everything and nothing. The term has a rather restricted meaning in most organizations, however, which define it negatively, stipulating the things an employee should not do, such as accepting gifts above a certain value, or taking office supplies home. Although most organizations use this narrow definition of integrity, most people will think that this is not what integrity is really about.

Integrity has a wider meaning outside that organizational context, although it is somewhat hard to pin down. It can stand for “wholeness,” which goes back to the ancient idea (the Latin *integer* means “whole” or “complete”) that virtues are related; someone who has the virtue of courage needs the attendant virtues of wisdom and temperance to guide that courage. Others see integrity as being consistent over time, and expect us to stick to our principles under pressure. Some, finally, simply use integrity as a synonym for being ethical, and hold that we possess integrity to the extent that we live moral lives. Clearly, this definition is so general that it does not help us understand what integrity is really about.

This proliferation of meanings makes judging someone’s integrity somewhat arbitrary; it all depends on what one chooses the term to signify. We can circumvent that problem, and most other semantic concerns, by seeking the meaning of the term in its use, and staying close to the everyday understanding of the term. If we do so, we can take integrity to mean something like acting on one’s own values and principles, as this is what most people consider integrity to be. This definition locates integrity somewhere between the narrow definition of integrity as conforming to organizational rules, and the all-too-wide definition that equates it with ethical behavior.

Can we live by personal moral principles?

There are some problems with integrity in this common-sense meaning, however. To begin

with, everything depends on the values and principles someone actually adheres to. Malevolent dictators, mobsters, and terrorists can all claim to possess integrity without being contradictory as long as they live by their own principles. This evidently means that the above-mentioned use of the term integrity as synonymous with being ethical is misguided; if we ask our colleagues or friends to be persons of integrity, we should always specify that we do so assuming that their personal principles are good – an altogether rather unsatisfying construction.

Just as worrying is that we cannot know to what extent those who claim to follow their own moral compass – “I only do what feels right/ what my conscience tells me/makes it possible for me to look at myself in the mirror” – are actually doing so. Although sincerely believing that they are following an innate moral rule, how can they possibly know whether they are really doing so? Could they not be deceiving themselves? In that aspect, the followers of such rules somewhat resemble Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe who, alone on his island, used an improvised calendar to keep track of what day it was, and named the native he befriended Friday, because he thought it was on a Friday that they had met. But Crusoe could not know whether Thursday or Monday would have been a more appropriate name, and in fact Crusoe learned that he had missed a day or two after his rescue. Two centuries after Defoe, Ludwig Wittgenstein (not an often-cited philosopher in military ethics) argued that there are three possibilities when people claim to follow a private rule: 1) they are indeed following a rule and do so consistently; 2) they follow a rule, but are not entirely consistent; 3) they claim to follow a rule but their judgments are in reality completely random. The problem here is that it is impossible to know for both the rule followers and their audience which of the three alternatives we are dealing with. According to Wittgenstein (and many others), this shows that we cannot have a private language. But his argument also

has implications for those who claim to live by personal moral rules. We can only consistently follow a rule, moral or otherwise, if there is a public that can tell us whether we are in the right or in the wrong.

Finally, integrity is not always a moral motive – insofar as it emphasizes good intentions at the neglect of taking consequences into account. In that case, integrity is more about the ability to look oneself in the mirror, and a certain self-image, than anything else. To give an example: unconditional pacifism, although highly principled, is perhaps above all about demonstrating good intentions (and hence is unsuited for policymakers, who have to take the outcomes of their decisions into account, too).

Integrity in the military

We already mentioned that most militaries consider integrity an important virtue, and include it on their list of virtues and values. The imprecision in writing about integrity is widespread, however. Within the military, we come across both the very narrow definition of integrity as abiding to all relevant regulation and the very wide definition that equates integrity with being ethical, while the notion of integrity as wholeness underlies the view of some that a good soldier is a good person in all walks of life. To most military personnel, though, integrity means that which it means to most of us – namely, upholding your personal values and principles.

However, not surprisingly, most military organizations that list integrity as a virtue see it as upholding organizational values, and thus not as something that is about one’s own values and principles. Any other way is impossible, as it would clearly be inconsistent to include integrity as living according to one’s own values in a list of values that all military personnel must adhere to. But if members of the military do see integrity as the upholding of personal values,

even if their organization defines integrity differently, this could pose a problem.

Evidently, acting on one's own principles is not a problem if these principles are compatible with what the military wants, but this is obviously not always the case. How much room there is in a military organization for upholding one's personal values and principles is consequently a thorny matter. On the one hand, soldiers are often seen as professionals who should have considerable leeway in their decision-making: in a recent handbook on military ethics, we read that "in any situation where law and ethics set different standards, a member of the military profession will follow the higher standard, inevitably the one required by ethics."¹ But on the other hand, we can all see how militaries struggle with conscientious objectors, whistleblowers and soldiers refusing orders that (they think) are unethical, and overall military organizations offer a somewhat hostile environment for acting on personal principles if these conflict with organizational views. By nature more collectivistic than individualistic, militaries foster cohesion and group loyalty, and it is probably this emphasis on loyalty that explains why soldiers who act on their own values sometimes end up as martyrs for a good cause rather than as moral exemplars for their organization.

A famous example of some time ago is Hugh Thompson, Jr., the helicopter pilot who tried to stop his fellow US soldiers from killing Vietnamese villagers in My Lai in 1969 and was afterwards the victim of an orchestrated smear campaign. More recently, Joe Darby, the sergeant who in January 2004 went to the US Army Criminal Investigation Command with the Abu Ghraib pictures, had to live in protective custody after Defense Secretary Rumsfeld made his name public. Now, most of us will (rightfully) think it a blessing to have principled people like Thompson and Darby within the military. But we have also seen that integrity is intrinsically subjective, and there are of course examples of sol-

diers who were clearly in the wrong when they acted from personnel principles (and at least some conscientious objectors fall under that heading). So, yes, there is a need for something that induces us to do the right thing, even when there is considerable pressure to choose the wrong course of action, but integrity is not the ideal candidate to perform that role. Although many militaries see it as an important virtue, integrity is in its most common meaning overwhelmingly vague and subjective. It is a good thing therefore that there are other candidates.

Moral courage and *Innere Führung*.

One candidate is the notion of moral courage, the ability to withstand the unfavorable opinion of friends and colleagues – if that is what doing what is right requires. As such, moral courage is an important subspecies of courage because we need people who blow the whistle if necessary, or correct a colleague when they think them in the wrong. On first sight, moral courage is somewhat akin to integrity; both expect us to uphold our principles when others disagree. But there is a difference: moral courage by definition furthers some moral principle, while this is not necessarily the case with integrity – considering that a steadfast mobster could also claim to possess that good quality. Although we could say that such a man or woman possesses integrity, we cannot maintain that they are morally courageous.

Some classic examples of integrity have in fact been motivated by principles and values that were not very personal at all, and were therefore actually instances of moral courage. The aforementioned My Lai hero Hugh Thompson, for instance, did not act on strictly personal values that were at odds with societal or professional values, but on ideas about what his country and organization should stand for (and perhaps once stood for). Thompson later stated in a lecture on moral courage that the soldiers involved in the massacre "were not mili-

tary people,” and thus made clear that it was a military – and hence not a personal – ethos that was guiding him.² So moral courage is a virtue that would suit the military better than integrity. The only argument against it is that it is not always clear which moral principles are supposed to inspire moral courage. Such principles can be organizational, societal, or perhaps even individual – in that latter case, moral courage could suffer from the same subjectivity as integrity does.

But what, then, about the concept of *Innere Führung* of the German military? Is there a built-in subjectivity in that notion, too? At first sight, one might think so – to most people unfamiliar with the concept the term itself suggests that it is a notion more similar to integrity than to moral courage. “Inner guidance” sounds as if it is something resembling an internal moral compass, and thus something in which values external to a person (such as professional or societal values) do not play much of a role. However, this is not what the concept (as I understand it) is meant to denote. One of the ideas behind *Innere Führung* is that soldiers should disobey orders that are manifestly unethical; they are expected to think for themselves. But that does not mean that anything goes; the values that should guide that independent thinking are clearly societal, and members of the German military are to actively defend, out of personal conviction, values such as human dignity, freedom, justice, equality, and democracy.³ In fact, the whole purpose of *Innere Führung*, and the notion of the citizen in uniform that it underpins, is to bring the military in alignment with civil society. One of its stated principles is the realization of constitutional and social values in the armed forces.⁴ It is thus a lot less subjective than integrity as it is commonly understood; one could say that it can fulfill the role often designated for integrity, without having its manifest shortcomings. In the end, *Innere Führung* has an advantage over moral courage, too, as it is more clear where the moral princi-

ples that underpin it are located – namely, in larger society. The only ambiguity lies in the fact that it asks military personnel to “sharpen their conscience” in order to be able to distinguish right from wrong.⁵ Should the just mentioned societal values not guide them in making that distinction?

Conclusion

A paramount quality of most definitions of integrity is their imprecision; possessing integrity is often seen as identical to being ethical. This very broad view on integrity is widespread and has possibly contributed to integrity being one of the most used moral terms in the military. In a more specific meaning, integrity requires of us that we live according to our own personal values and principles. We have seen that integrity in this meaning is fraught with problems, with its overall vagueness and being much too subjective among the more important ones. However, we also see that sometimes being principled is what is called for. Without expecting soldiers to be men or women of principle to at least some extent, they could hide behind the fact that they were just doing as others did. One could say that their integrity is tested when it is plain what is the right thing to do, yet with considerable pressure to choose the wrong course of action. Especially when no one is around, or when those around are letting their moral standards go, sticking to your principles is the laudable thing to do – as long as your principles are morally sound, that is. The question is whether these principles should be truly personal principles, or internalized societal or professional principles. As we have seen in the above, the latter seems to be the more promising option. That makes both the concepts of moral courage and *Innere Führung* better ways of making soldiers behave morally than integrity – with *Innere Führung* probably being the most appropriate of the two, as it is grounded in widely accepted societal values.

- [illegible]

A portrait of Peter Olsthoorn, a man with short brown hair and a slight beard, wearing a blue button-down shirt. He is looking directly at the camera with a neutral expression. The background is a soft-focus outdoor scene with green foliage.

Peter Olsthoorn is associate professor in military leadership and ethics at the Netherlands Defence Academy. Besides leadership and ethics, he teaches on armed forces and society, war and media, and on ethics and fundamental rights in the European Joint Master's in Strategic Border Management. His research is mainly on topics such as military virtues, military medical ethics, and the ethics of border guarding. Among his publications are "Honor in Political and Moral Philosophy" (2015) and "Military Ethics and Virtues: An Interdisciplinary Approach for the 21st Century" (2010).

Leadership in Multinational Organizations – the Example of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)

Gregor Richter

In all areas of modern working life, whether in business, public administration, or military alliances, there appears to be an agreement that the leadership style of managers not only affects the working behavior and motivation of employees, but also has an indirect impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization as a whole. A large part of international leadership research is concerned with investigating the degree to which leaders involve those they lead in decision-making processes. What is actually being decided on – e.g. operational processes, appointments, or future strategic market orientation – is not important in the first instance. In the German armed forces (*Bundeswehr*), there are clear regulations concerning the extent of participation in decision-making. The Joint Service Regulation (*Zentrale Dienstvorschrift, ZDv*) for the management philosophy of the *Bundeswehr*, called *Innere Führung* (leadership development and civic education), unmistakably calls upon the military leader: “I lead as a partner. I make use of the skills and abilities of my soldiers and involve them whenever possible in the decision-making process.” (ZDv A-2600/1, p. 27). Some findings from research into leadership styles at a specific type of organization – the multinational military headquarters – are presented and discussed below. In part, they can be transferred to leadership in military organizations in general.

Research into leadership styles

In the academic literature on leadership, the degree of involvement in decision-making processes is often thought of as a continuum from

a more directive to more participative leadership style.¹ It is assumed that leaders cultivate a particular (individual) leadership style. For a social-science investigation of leadership styles, a four-way typology has proven expedient and has formed the basis for many questionnaire surveys: authoritarian, paternalistic, participative, and democratic leadership styles. If a leader takes decisions quickly, communicates these directly and straightforwardly to their employees, and then expects these instructions to be carried out loyally and without criticism, one speaks of an authoritarian leadership style. If a leader generally takes decisions alone, but attempts to explain the rationale of their decision and responds to questions from their subordinates, then they would be called paternalistic. Participation in decision-making occurs when employees are consulted and the pros and cons are weighed up together before a decision is finally taken by the leader. The democratic leadership style always requires a discussion with the team, in which arguments are exchanged and ultimately the majority opinion is the binding basis for the decision-making. In the fourth management style, the superior plays a role more like that of a moderator.

State of research on multinational military organizations

Which of these four leadership styles is preferred by those who are led, and what impact, if any at all, does leadership style have? In recent years, at the former Social Sciences Institute of the German Armed Forces (*Sozialwissenschaftliches*

Institut der Bundeswehr; until 2012) and currently at the German Armed Forces Center for Military History and Social Sciences (*Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, ZMSBw*), a number of multinational units and headquarters of NATO and EU missions have been examined. Alongside a range of questions concerning deepened military cooperation² between the nations involved from the point of view of military and defense policy as well as organizational culture, the researchers have always also taken an interest in the topic of “leadership style.” At three selected headquarters that were studied using the same method (a standardized survey) and identical questionnaire wordings (firstly, SHAPE, the military headquarters of NATO near Mons, Belgium; secondly, MNHQ/SE, the headquarters of the EU ALTHEA mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and thirdly, HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps, the headquarters of the joint German-Dutch corps in Münster), the findings were consistent: staff members at all three headquarters most frequently preferred the participative leadership style (cf. figure 1).




Figure 1: A comparison of preferred leadership styles (sources: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 2014³, Multinational Headquarters South-East 2006⁴, Headquarters 1st German/Netherlands Corps 2005⁵). Figures in percent.

Studies to date have yielded a number of other interesting findings: (i) Patterns of preference for a given leadership style differ between nations – for example, national (military) cultures are apparently reflected in the leadership culture as well; (ii) The preferred leadership style is dependent on the military hierarchy: the higher the rank, the higher the preference for participative and democratic leadership

styles; (iii) The leadership style that soldiers observe in their direct superior does not always necessarily match their preferred leadership style. This will be discussed further below; (iv) If one compares the three examples considered in figure 1, it appears that the participative style is preferred mainly in headquarters with a political and strategic orientation (such as is the case with SHAPE), whereas in headquarters such as the ALTHEA mission (i.e. in the theater of operations and in direct proximity to operational military tasks), there are relatively more supporters of the paternalistic and authoritarian leadership styles. To put it in military sociology terms, “cold” organizations carrying out – as it were – basic bureaucratic tasks can allow themselves a higher degree of participation in decision-making, while in “hot” organizations in the vicinity of operational activities and possibly also close to the fighting, there is a greater preference for a conventional model of command and obedience. This fourth statement should be regarded as a provisional finding and, because of its far-reaching implications, should certainly be validated in studies involving other headquarters.

Impact of leadership style?

One concern of the SHAPE study was to close previous research gaps. Previous studies had not focused on the consequences that the observed and desired leadership styles have on the organization’s effectiveness. Even if the participative leadership style appears to those who are led to be the ideal leadership style, is its universal application actually beneficial to the performance of the team and the organization as a whole?

At the time of the survey in the fall of 2014, the multinational staff of SHAPE comprised around 800 mainly military employees from all NATO member countries. The response rate was a pleasing 44 percent. Figure 2 shows that by a narrow majority of 53 percent (green cases), the

leadership style that the respondent observed in their direct superior matched their own preferred leadership style. When there is a mismatch at the individual level, a clear preference for more participation can be seen. A not inconsiderable proportion of 27 percent in total, who stated that they were led in a paternalistic (15 percent) or authoritarian (12 percent) way, would prefer a participative style in their direct superior. This concludes the desired/actual comparison.

		Preferred superior			
		authoritarian	paternalistic	participative	democratic
Real superior	authoritarian	3	4	12	0
	paternalistic	1	8	15	1
	participative	2	6	39	1
	democratic	0	2	4	3

Figure 2: Comparison of preferred and actual leadership styles (source: own survey at SHAPE, 2014). Congruent cases are shown in green, incongruent cases in yellow and red. Figures in percent.

Further statistical analysis showed, remarkably, that for the assessment in the questionnaire about whether SHAPE is an efficient organization, it makes no difference whether the actual leadership style matches the preferred leadership style. One might have expected that staff members who, for example, have a paternalistic superior, but would like to be led participatively, would rate the performance of SHAPE lower than their colleagues whose wishes corresponded with reality. Yet this was not the case. Similarly, no statistically significant differences in the responses could be found between the 53 percent of congruent cases and the 47 percent of incongruent cases, if one takes mission clarity as the dependent variable, i.e. the extent to which a staff member has a clear understanding of SHAPE's mission and the organizational goals of the NATO headquarters. Above all, it was astonishing that there is no relationship between leadership style and job satisfaction. In accordance with the state of research in businesses and public organizations, one might have expected that persons who find their ideal boss reflected in their actual boss would show

greater satisfaction than their “non-matching” colleagues. This, too, was not the case. To sum up the results in a nutshell: leadership style does not matter!

Conclusion and outlook

The NATO military headquarters is a rather atypical form of organization. It stands at the top of what is currently the largest and most powerful military alliance in the world. Mainly staff officers from the 28 member nations work at the headquarters in a multinational and multicultural context. In accordance with the state of research on other forms of organization, however, it is also true for SHAPE that superiors do not actively involve the employees and soldiers under their command in decision-making processes to the extent which those who are led believe should be the case. Nevertheless, the study indicates that – at least in this specific form of organization – the significance of leadership style, perhaps also the importance of leadership in general, is apparently not as great as one would have assumed for military organizations. In an organizational culture designed around coordination and consensus between 28 nations, such as that of SHAPE, the microrelation of “leader-led,” while it certainly does not retreat entirely into the background, nevertheless apparently plays a rather secondary role in the everyday process of decision-making in and between the departments. But even without demonstrable objective impacts at the organizational level or on the effectiveness of military headquarters, the requirement for a participative leadership culture – as is also formulated in the German armed forces' Joint Service Regulation on *Innere Führung* – remains indispensable from the point of view of leadership ethics, and should be put into practice in everyday operational routines, not least in the military.

1 Bass, Bernhard M. (1990): *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership. Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*, 3rd ed., New York/London, pp. 436–471.

2 Gareis, Sven Bernhard (2016): "Multinationalität als militärsoziologisches Forschungsgebiet," in: Dörfler-Dierken, Angelika and Kümmel, Gerhard (eds.): *Am Puls der Bundeswehr. Militärsoziologie in Deutschland zwischen Wissenschaft, Politik, Bundeswehr und Gesellschaft*, Wiesbaden, pp. 169–188.

3 Biehl, Heiko, Moelker, René, Richter, Gregor, and Soeters, Joe (2015): *OCS – Study on SHAPE's Organizational Culture*, April 2015 (unpublished report).

4 Santero, Manuel Casas and Navarro, Eulogio Sánchez (2006): "Leadership in Mission Althea 2006–2007," in: Leonhard, Nina et al. (eds.): *Military Cooperation in Multinational Missions: The Case of EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (SOWI-Forum International, vol. 28), Strausberg, pp. 161–190.

5 Vom Hagen, Ulrich (2006): "Communitate Valemus – The Relevance of Professional Trust, Collective Drills and Skills, and Task Cohesion within Integrated Multinationality," in: Vom Hagen, Ulrich, Moelker, René, and Soeters, Joe (eds.): *Cultural Interoperability. Ten Years of Research into Cooperation in the First German-Netherlands Corps* (SOWI-Forum International, vol. 27), Breda and Strausberg, pp. 53–95.



Gregor Richter is a project manager at the Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the German Armed Forces (Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, ZMSBw) in Potsdam and an associate lecturer at the University of Potsdam. He studied sociology, statistics, and economics at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München and received a doctorate in social policy from Universität der Bundeswehr München. His current work and research interests focus on the field of empirical personnel, and organizational research, and military sociology. Together with Professor Eva-Maria Kern, he recently edited the book *"Streitkräftemanagement. Neue Planungs- und Steuerungsinstrumente in der Bundeswehr."*

Bundeswehr Without Cohesion.

Negative Developments in Innere Führung

Elmar Wiesendahl

The *Bundeswehr* has had two lives. In its first life, it was a territorial defense army. Its purpose was to prevent war and it served as a deterrent against the communist threat. Then, following the end of the East–West conflict and the reunification of Germany in 1990, it began its second life as an international combat and crisis intervention force. The expansion of its *raison d'être* and range of tasks was not the only new aspect. To complete its realignment, the *Bundeswehr's* capabilities, structure, equipment, arms, and personnel strength underwent a fundamental transformation process. The result was an “army of a new nature.” Only the guiding concept of *Innere Führung* with the “citizen in uniform” remained unchanged. That is, as a compass, an intellectual superstructure was implanted in the new *Bundeswehr* that was designed for the now obsolete conditions of rearmament, the East–West conflict, and a territorial defense army.

It is clear that this assertion is extremely controversial. What is at stake is no less than the political and social position of the armed forces, as well as the morals, attitudes, and professional self-image of soldiers. This article takes a critical look at what this means for the inner state of the *Bundeswehr* as a combat force and what consequences this has for the spiritual and mental orientation of soldiers on deployment.

Old Innere Führung for a new combat force

Transforming the *Bundeswehr* into an international combat force was primarily an elite project legitimized by the argument that reunified

Germany had to give up its culture of restraint and “break the military taboo” (Chancellor Schröder) to take on international responsibility. However, following participation in the Kosovo War and the provision of relatively large numbers of troops for Bosnia and Herzegovina – as well as a number of smaller overseas deployments – the military and political disaster in Afghanistan resulted in an about-face culminating in the refusal in 2011 by Merkel's coalition government to take part in the air war against Libya. In 2014, at the elite level, the argument which had been abandoned for a while was taken up again: namely, that in line with “greater international responsibility,” Germany should assume a “more active role.” The *Bundeswehr's* participation in international military interventions should become a regularity.

This no longer has anything to do with the *Bundeswehr's* original purpose and self-image as a territorial defense army. The civil-military relationship between the *Bundeswehr* and society has thus fundamentally changed as a result of its transformation into a combat force. While previously the *Bundeswehr* was still an “army in the people” in solidarity with the population, its reorientation meant it had been taken over by the state. It is now a military instrument of the state for pursuing the foreign-policy interests of the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet there is another significant factor to consider: the abolition of compulsory military service and the creation of a heavily scaled-down volunteer army severed the link between the combat-force soldier and the defense motive based on notions of citizenship and fatherland as well as solidarity with society.

Important, too, is the fact that this new army is sent on deployments beyond its own country – far from home. In distant crisis areas, combat-force soldiers risk life and limb without finding the desired esteem and recognition among the population at home. Instead, they are met with benign indifference. It weighs heavily on soldiers to get so little moral support and recognition from the public at home for their overseas deployments. With a self-image as a “citizen in uniform,” identification with this post-heroic peace society, far removed from the military, is something that can no longer be assumed to be unproblematic.

Is the guiding principle of *Innere Führung* still in step with the times?

The old guiding concept of *Innere Führung* was developed under different circumstances, in a different period, and in response to different challenges. So the question has long since been raised, by the new situation described above, as to whether it is still in step with the times, and whether it should be adapted for the new combat force. At first, military and political leaders thought that *Innere Führung* needed to be modified for the new combat force, and in the 2003 framework provisions for the *Bundeswehr* they expressly announced plans for its further development. But a short time later, with the 2006 White Paper for the German armed forces, there was a turnaround, and it was declared that *Innere Führung* had “proven itself during operations as well.” The leadership of the *Bundeswehr* has not deviated from this statement since.

Accordingly, the 2008 revision of Joint Service Regulation (*Zentrale Dienstvorschrift, ZDv*) 10/1 “*Innere Führung*” left everything as it was. However, it imposed a normative overload on combat-force soldiers, by decreeing in section 301 that “through *Innere Führung*, the values and norms of the Basic Law are realised.” And this is expressed as a guiding principle for individual soldiers as follows (section 106): they “accom-

plish their mission when, out of personal conviction, they actively defend human dignity, freedom, peace, justice, equality, solidarity, and democracy as the guiding values of our country.”

How such an abstract system of values is supposed to take binding effect during deployments is anybody’s guess. And yet how easily it can be undermined in everyday operations is clearly visible. The way in which the political and military leadership of the *Bundeswehr* dealt with misconduct by Oberst i. G. Klein on September 4, 2009, is a good example. On that date, ignoring the rules of engagement, he called in air strikes against a tanker truck that was stuck in a river bed near Kunduz in northern Afghanistan. In addition to a number of Taliban fighters, the bombardment killed around one hundred innocent civilians. Instead of critically examining the disaster, at least for a moment, in light of the principles of *Innere Führung*, everybody who was anybody in the *Bundeswehr* did their utmost to prevent any moral questioning of the misconduct. The message was that during deployments soldiers are bound to make moral mistakes, which have to be accepted.

The *Bundeswehr* did not question the continued existence of the old *Innere Führung*. However, it concluded from the new expansion of the tasks of combat-force soldiers that these could no longer remain exclusively combatants and classical experts in the use of force. Therefore, following the Swiss General Gustav Däniker, the *Bundeswehr* expanded the requirements and role profile of the combat-force soldier. For this reason, the 2006 White Paper for the German armed forces states that the soldier, in addition to the role of the combatant, must also fulfill the role of the “helper, mediator, and conciliator.”

This role set, expanded with police and civilian components, corresponds to the “miles protector” (Däniker) or to a “military law enforcer” (Haltiner) and has far-reaching consequences

for a modern professional understanding and the identity of the today's combat-force soldier. However, this fact is not given further attention. The relation of the "hybrid" soldier with his multiple role set and the "citizen in uniform" also remains unclear. So there is no question of a guiding principle that measures up to the requirements of the "combat-force soldier" and gives this concept a meaning.

A search for identity between "Athens" and "Sparta"

Because the fundamental structural change in the *Bundeswehr* was not followed by any discernible change in its guiding culture, *Innere Führung*, which had fallen out of time, found itself in a precarious situation contributing to the undermining of its meaning and to its striking loss of status in the *Bundeswehr*. Far away from the reality of deployment and any practical relevance, it is tending towards becoming a hollow incantation. As a result, soldiers are left on their own when it comes to their search for identity and dealing with their deployment experiences. With regard to the demand for meaning and guidance, for "Generation Deployment," *Innere Führung* has become an irrelevant relic. The official guiding culture from the top and the actual organizational culture experienced at the bottom are drifting apart.

In this unstable situation of fermentation and self-discovery, undirected identity-forming processes have been underway for some time, leading to a controversy over two rival schools of thought: Sparta and Athens (Wiesendahl, 2010). The two schools differ in their image of the reality of deployment and in their understanding of identity and the model of the "soldier on deployment," with which they believe the *Bundeswehr* should respond to its new role as a crisis intervention force.

Representatives of the "Athens" school of thought, who are mostly based in the military

leadership, assume a picture of deployment that is determined by the new range of tasks of global security planning, crisis prevention, and crisis stabilization, and which goes far beyond previous interstate wars. Hence expertise in the use of force is no longer sufficient, especially not for a strategy of networked security. It is incumbent on the combat force to create a secure environment for political and civilian partners. This requires a "miles protector" with political and moral powers of judgment, intercultural competence, and a firm ethical foundation. This so-called "miles protector" corresponds to the model of the politically educated, active, politically and socially, integrated citizen and soldier (Seiffert, 2005: 42).

In contrast, adherents of the "Sparta" school of thought, who are strongly represented in the armed forces, see the reality of deployment through the lens of combat. It is primarily a question of the battle and of operations management on a small scale. This touches on the essential core of the military – namely, the preparation and implementation of firefights in order to take down an enemy in combat. Armed forces prove themselves in combat. The new multifaceted operational spectrum from crisis preparedness to post-crisis management and "post-conflict peace building" is left unaccounted for.

Morally, the combat-force soldier becomes a fighter through eternal soldierly values. With Sparta and the "miles bellicus," the sense of civic duty – as a source of meaning and driving force for the military and the soldier's fighting – is lost. Priority goes to the military craft, to upbringing or raising, and formation of character, less so to professional capacity to reflect and political education. According to this way of thinking, to integrate oneself into a society tending towards decadence constitutes a potential danger for soldiers – as they might fall prey to the progressive decline of values, consumerism, and individualism. The elements of

this approach have recently all been brought together in the publication *Armee im Aufbruch* (Armed Forces on the Move).

It is obvious that Sparta is following a remilitarization and de-civilianization tendency of the *Bundeswehr* combat force. With its cult of the fighter, elitist special morality for soldiers, homogeneous community of views and anti-societal siege mentality, it has nothing more to do with the principles of the official *Innere Führung*.

Outlook

The *Bundeswehr* is a pluralist social structure. In its mentality, in the thoughts, feelings, and actions of its soldiers, it is not on the march to Sparta. However, a “Generation Combat Mission” has returned from Afghanistan – Bosnia and Kosovo are not so problematic – with a damaged “core of motivation and identity” (Anja Seiffert). With 55 fallen and many more war-disabled soldiers resulting from a militarily “failed” and politically misguided, illusionary mission, they stuck their neck out but are not rewarded accordingly by society. Instead, they are met with benign indifference and disinterest. The fact that “Generation Deployment” is not given recognition may yet give rise to a military tendency towards introversion and a siege mentality via which the professional army self-referentially withdraws from society.

So far, it remains unclear in what direction the *Bundeswehr*’s meaningful self-image will develop. At any rate, the obsolete *Innere Führung* is subject to a collapse of credibility that makes it a “relic” in the eyes of combat-force soldiers with regard to its meaning. Based on the civilian, the “citizen in uniform” is a stranger among them. Yet no remedy can be expected from the Sparta-inspired ideological exaggeration, mystification, and glorification of the military. Sparta does not measure up to the reality of deployment, and it would not be accepted well in civil society.

The heads of the armed forces, in their role as a source of inspiration at the top, should initiate a reform debate in order to counter the gradual decline of *Innere Führung*. Yet they have blocked this for themselves by asserting that *Innere Führung* has proven itself and with their “carry-on-as-before” attitude. In this way, they are also avoiding the minefield, and, on the part of both the minister and the inspector general, they are allowing things to drift along. The last thing they want is a factional struggle over the spirit and soul of the armed forces, which then spills over into the outside world. They want an army that does not kick up a fuss and submissively takes part in the aimed-for increased number of deployments. This would actually accommodate adherents of Sparta in the *Bundeswehr*, because it would be a matter of putting the military to the test, which, in their understanding, constitutes the very purpose of the *Bundeswehr*. However, what is intended as a contribution by the *Bundeswehr* to international crisis missions makes it into an army of “wimps,” contrary to its “essential core,” if it is to be limited to logistical, training, educational, and medical support activities.

The military and political leadership faces the task of adapting the model of the citizen in uniform to the challenges of deployment reality. And, for them, there will be no getting around a normative unencumbering of the military service’s bedrock of values. How the “armed forces in a democracy” and “armed forces for peace” stand in relationship to combat force should be credibly demonstrated. Above all, the top brass of the *Bundeswehr* should show their colors by stating that, for the self-image of the armed forces, they will not accept Sparta with its misguided model of the fighter.

References

- Baudissin, Wolf Graf von (1970): *Soldat für den Frieden. Entwürfe für eine zeitgemäße Bundeswehr*, Munich.
- Bohnert, Marcel, and Reitstetter, Lucas J. (eds.) 2014: *Armee*

im Aufbruch. Zur Gedankenwelt junger Offiziere in den Kampftruppen der Bundeswehr, Berlin.

Seiffert, Anja (2005): *Soldat und Zukunft. Wirkungen und Folgen von Auslandseinsätzen auf das soldatische Selbstverständnis*, Berlin.

Wiesendahl, Elmar (ed.) 2007: *Innere Führung für das 21. Jahrhundert. Die Bundeswehr und das Erbe Baudissins*, Paderborn.

Wiesendahl, Elmar (2010): *Athen oder Sparta. Bundeswehr quo vadis?* (WIFIS-AKTUELL), Bremen.



Elmar Wiesendahl is a specialist in sociology and political sciences. He was Professor of Political Science at Universität der Bundeswehr München for many years. In 2006, he moved to the German Federal Armed Forces Command and Staff College (Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr) in Hamburg, becoming a director and head

of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. Since 2010, he has been executive director of the Agency for Political Strategy (Agentur für politische Strategie, APOS) in Hamburg. Wiesendahl has researched and published widely on the development of political parties. He also deals with questions of political strategy development and the selection and qualification of elites. His military sociology interests focus on *Innere Führung* in the German armed forces and on the development of the civil-military relationship.

Innere Führung – Leadership Culture in Camouflage

Enno Bernzen, Dirk Peddinghaus, Robert Sieger

No commercial enterprise would brag about a leadership culture that has been applied for well over 60 years in (almost) unchanged form, and still with full conviction. The German armed forces (*Bundeswehr*) see things differently – and rightly so. Since 1953, the self-image and leadership culture of the *Bundeswehr* have largely been defined by the term *Innere Führung* which can be translated as “leadership development and civic education.” Admittedly, it does not sound very modern and hip.

In the German armed forces, the concept of *Innere Führung* is the guiding principle for leadership and for dealing with one another. The goal of applying *Innere Führung* is to reconcile the functional conditions of operational armed forces with the liberal principles of a democratic constitutional state. It is notable that as long ago as 1947, one of the fathers of *Innere Führung*, the future Lieutenant General Wolf Graf von Baudissin, wrote that the potential new German armed forces should present themselves as an organization that “serves humanity, recognizes its primacy, and grants it opportunities for development.”¹

Today, corporate cultures are considered to be key competitive advantages in civilian enterprises, and they have a major impact on permanent improvements in productivity, quality, and hence in the respective output. It is certainly difficult to measure or compare the output of the *Bundeswehr*. However, it can be assumed that the production of security – or to put it another way, the fulfillment of tasks assigned by the German Basic Law (*Grundgesetz, GG*) and the German Bundestag, as well as the integra-

tion of the armed forces into society – can be regarded as equivalent to products and services. To quote the former President of Germany, Gustav Heinemann, “peace is the emergency.”

So does *Innere Führung* – the leadership culture in camouflage – meet the requirements of a combat force in the 21st century? And, not least, does it also meet modern leadership requirements? With regard to the output, is *Innere Führung* one of the main “force multipliers”? “Peace” as the output, job satisfaction among soldiers, personnel turnover, the number of complaints about management style, and the public image? No doubt all of the above influence the effectiveness and assessment of a leadership culture, but the essential and possibly even decisive assessment standard remains the individual person: the soldier. *Innere Führung* is the basic requirement for everything that soldiers do. It is an obligation to be met by every soldier, regardless of rank, official position, or mission. It was always thought of as socialization, as active shaping, and hence “raising” to become a responsible citizen in uniform, who is bound by the common good and does not share a vision of the state within a state.

Soldiers of the *Bundeswehr* therefore each decide for themselves, in a very personal way, whether *Innere Führung* is just a set phrase or whether it happens to them every day in whatever form – in other words, whether it is an integral part of their professional lives. In terms of its approach, the validity of *Innere Führung* is timeless. Nevertheless, its development should continue on a regular basis, in dialogue with

others, and in consideration of the circumstances. It is all the more important, therefore, to protect and preserve this concept and to shape it in such a way that it can be practiced and experienced on an everyday basis. Leadership culture in camouflage – *Innere Führung* – is more than simply an approach to leadership. At least for the German armed forces, it describes the identity of a responsible and constructively critical soldier in the 21st century.

An outdated model or indispensable leadership philosophy?

And yet, for all its good points, criticism of *Innere Führung* has never fallen completely silent over the last 60 years.² And that is a good thing. After all, giving serious consideration to the meaning of military service forms part of the essential nature of *Innere Führung*. In the early days of the *Bundeswehr*, society was critical of rearmament, while military criticism was often directed at the “business model of *Innere Führung*” itself, at the citizen in uniform.

Discussions became highly controversial in the 1960/70s. There were those, such as the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces (*Wehrbeauftragter des Deutschen Bundestages*), who perceived tendencies for the German armed forces to become a “state within a state.” Others, meanwhile, such as the then-Chief of the Army (*Inspekteur des Heeres*), Lieutenant General Albert Schnez (in his “Schnez Study” of 1969) criticized the concept of *Innere Führung* as being too heavy on theory and essentially counterproductive to the military’s effectiveness. This, in turn, prompted a backlash from the authors of “Leutnant 70.” They formulated nine key points, considered excessive at the time, which caused the pendulum to swing in completely the opposite direction: fundamental codetermination or participation, the open questioning of superiors’ decisions and leadership behavior, and a strict separation of work and leisure time. In fact, these are themes which the

Bundeswehr has now itself embraced: coaching for top-level personnel, participation rights and obligations, work–family balance, and not to forget the Soldiers’ Working Time Ordinance (*Soldatenarbeitszeitverordnung*). In response to “Leutnant 70,” the authors of “Hauptleute von Unna” were more in line with Schnez. All of this took place against the backdrop of a deepening Cold War between East and West, which in the perception of many could have turned into a hot war.

Did the discussions do any harm? Quite the contrary. They helped to further spell out the concept of *Innere Führung* and sharpen the understanding of it. In addition, many important documents were produced as a result of this debate about the content of *Innere Führung*. These included the endorsement in the 1970 White Paper for the German armed forces, the guidelines for *Innere Führung* (*Hilfen für die Innere Führung*) in 1972, and the regulation for civic education (*Vorschrift zur Politischen Bildung*) in 1973, to name but a few. Then, in the 1980s, the debate flared up again. Human chains and Easter marches during the arms race debate and hostile criticism such as “soldiers are murderers” once again triggered a discussion about the role and meaning of the German armed forces and their anchoring in society. The *Bundeswehr* withstood all of this – not least because of the concepts on which it is founded. The meaningfulness of soldiers’ own actions and the conviction that they were faithfully serving their country made this possible. With German reunification in 1990 and the “Army of Unity,” the *Bundeswehr* proved again in the 1990s that the basic idea of *Innere Führung* bears up. Standards, values, a conception of statehood, human dignity, and a clear vision of what it means to be a soldier of the Federal Republic of Germany – together this paved the way for the “all-German” armed forces. And because the *Bundeswehr* was a conscript army at the time, this became the driving force of German unity.

The development of the “army for deployment” into an “army in deployment” more than 25 years ago again aroused criticism from those who felt that *Innere Führung* and a combat force were mutually exclusive. *Innere Führung* is like a fabric softener, they said, and so it is unsuitable for survival in battle. But once again, no evidence could be found. Of course, combat situations are fundamentally different from the situation at home during routine duties – but this does not apply to leadership principles, respect for human dignity, or to responsibility for one’s own actions and inaction in a changing political context. This is underlined not least by the fact that in more than 25 years of deployment for peace and security, no member of the *Bundeswehr* has been prosecuted before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague or convicted of crimes under the law of war.

All the same, the suspension of compulsory military service, the transition to volunteer armed forces, and a peace dividend (i.e. a cut in defense spending) to be delivered continuously over two decades raise new questions. Professionalization, shortage management, and depoliticization of the military were keywords along with the greater integration of women into the armed forces, the personal appearance of soldiers in times of tattoos and body piercings, and the question of how civic education can be implemented in a volunteer army. In this context, the discussion recently initiated by officers studying at the Helmut Schmidt University (*Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg*) in their book *Armee im Aufbruch* (Armed Forces on the Move) is both essential and valuable: essential, because *Innere Führung* is intended to be dynamic, as it must, with its immovable core, constantly readjust to the challenges of the times; and valuable, because it is precisely the critical discourse that shows the very great extent to which the German armed forces put *Innere Führung* into practice. No clicking of heels and a loud “yes sir!” – come what may. Instead, the responsible fulfillment of duty in the ser-

vice of our country. And that includes the great support that the *Bundeswehr* is providing in the refugee relief effort. Whether in the Mediterranean or here in Germany, the concept of *Innere Führung* stands firm. The challenge remains of putting it into practice in everyday military life.

In 1982, Graf von Baudissin – the father of *Innere Führung* – defined its general sense as follows: “*Innere Führung* is military leadership with special consideration of the individual and social aspects of the person.” This leadership philosophy is what clearly distinguishes us from other armed forces around the world, and it is the envy of other armies of the world.

Export hit for others

Many other countries are therefore interested in this “German way,” and in taking part in lively discussions about it. At Strausberg, near Berlin, the external affairs office of the Leadership Development and Civic Education Center (*Zentrum Innere Führung, ZInFü*), has facilitated a dialogue of this kind since 1994 with seminars in Germany and other countries. The discursive core of this a dialogue always includes the question of the extent to which the concept of *Innere Führung* is transferable to the armed forces of other nations. Can *Innere Führung* be an export hit for others?

The basic and in some respects sobering message from many expert discussions is always the same: the success of *Innere Führung* as the management philosophy of the *Bundeswehr* does not rest on any single element. Instead, it is based on linking the ten key areas of *Innere Führung*³, the democratic inclusion of the German armed forces, and social acceptance.

When giving serious consideration to whether *Innere Führung* can serve as an export hit for others, whether it is transferable in the international context to other nations’ armed forces, the “danger” lurks at the beginning of the dis-

cussion. Anyone who fails to recognize that the historical derivation of *Innere Führung* in Germany cannot simply serve as a blueprint for other countries is committing an intercultural error. Every country has its own history, culture, roots, its very own pride, and its own opinion about the role, meaning, and integration of armed forces. Each country therefore needs to develop its own answers.

Especially for countries whose culture differs greatly from our own, it is a matter of discovering things in common and spurring interest in a leadership culture that for many people requires a new way of thinking. What is not needed is a German “master” of the subject who proclaims the “only” truth. Instead, through talks and discussions, we aim to find a way to apply relevant elements of the *Innere Führung* concept to the respective historical and cultural situation in the other country. Thus, the starting point is always to find some common ground: “Human dignity shall be inviolable.” This guiding principle of our constitution provides a good foundation for a common understanding of the values and standards on which the principle of *Innere Führung* is based. It quickly becomes clear, however, that this statement, which we regard as universal, may be interpreted differently in other cultural milieus and may not even meet with undivided acceptance.

So the question of whether *Innere Führung* can indeed be an “export item” cannot simply be answered “yes” or “no.” A better answer is “to a greater or lesser extent.” “To a greater extent,” the more ideas about the role and importance of armed forces in a democracy and the underlying conception of man are similar. “To a lesser extent,” the greater the differences in these matters. But, in any case, the question of transferability is the starting point for a hopefully constructive and also interesting discussion. Only by reflecting on our leadership principles in light of the respective other historical development and culture is it possible for the spark

to catch and stimulate thought.

Innere Führung lives by being a role model. Consequently, the many German soldiers in international staffs, in mixed units, and during deployments assume a special intermediary role. What use would fruitful discussions be if German superiors did not put their own leadership principle into practice on a daily basis? Ultimately, the fire of *Innere Führung* should burn in each of us, if the spark is to ignite the same lasting enthusiasm in others.

1 Wolf Graf von Baudissin (2014), *Grundwert: Frieden in Politik- Strategie-Führung von Streitkräften* (ed. Claus von Rosen), Berlin, p. 51.

2 Reeb, Hans-Joachim (2015), “60 Jahre Innere Führung: das Wesensmerkmal der Bundeswehr im Lauf der Geschichte,” in: *Zeitschrift für die Innere Führung*: if.-59, vol. 4, pp. 23–30.

3 The ten key areas according to Joint Service Regulation (Zentraler Dienstvorschrift, ZDv) A 2600-1 (formerly ZDv 10/1): civic education, leadership, law and military discipline, compatibility of family and duty, information activities, training and the organization of military duty, pastoral care and the practice of religion, organization and personnel management, medical care, welfare and recreation.

Written by a team of authors at the Leadership Development and Civic Education Center of the German armed forces: **Colonel Enno Bernzen**, conceptual design and development department, **Captain Dirk Peddinghaus**, head of the international cooperation department, and **Colonel (General Staff) Robert Sieger**, leadership department. The views expressed here represent the personal opinions of the authors.

The Leadership Development and Civic Education Center (Zentrum Innere Führung, ZInFü) is a competence center tasked with constantly developing and adapting the concept of *Innere Führung*, and following ministerial guidelines for its formation in the German armed forces (Bundeswehr). The center's responsibilities therefore include preparing the concept for practical implementation and communicating its content. There are ten key areas integral to the concept, with focuses on leadership, civic education, law and military order. It contributes to making the guiding principle of the "citizen in uniform" practicable and viable within the Bundeswehr, and visible externally.

With its products and activities, the Leadership Development and Civic Education Center reaches around 12,000 people in the military and government every year. Essential elements of current leadership training comprise coaching top-level personnel and leadership in military organizations.

The Case of the *Bundeswehr* – Who Serves Germany?

Something has changed. You used to see them much more often, the young men in uniform. They would travel on long-distance trains on the weekends, and almost everyone knew a soldier in their family. Today you mostly encounter the *Bundeswehr* on television news, in reports from Mali and Afghanistan, or about disaster relief efforts. The *Bundeswehr* used to be much more strongly integrated into society, and the concept of *Innere Führung* envisages closeness to everyday civilian life.

In the future, it is not only the equipment that will be renewed. The individual soldier is also coming under scrutiny. But do soldiers feel socialized? And what image does the German public actually have of German soldiers? In the United States, people are proud of their fighters and defenders. But what about here, in this country? Improving the reputation of soldiers is another goal of the *Bundeswehr* and the German Federal Ministry of Defense. The philosophy of the democratic German armed forces is regarded as a beacon and role model for many countries, and it is good to know that we have the concept of *Innere Führung* in the *Bundeswehr* in Germany. Nevertheless, the *Bundeswehr* has serious problems when it comes to recruiting young people. Unfortunately, not even *Innere Führung* can provide the answers here.

Enough personnel need to be recruited. Attempts are being made to tweak various parameters. Working hours were recently changed. Many employment criteria have been relaxed, advertising budgets increased, and, despite criticism, the targeted search in schools for suitable young applicants continues. The

percentage of women has risen over the years, yet among the troops, acceptance of women has actually fallen. A lot of money is flowing into leadership coaching and advanced training, as the system needs top leaders and managers who can not only identify problems but also deal with them in a solution-oriented way. The pressure is rising. For years, the *Bundeswehr* has attempted to become more family-friendly, while at the same time there are more overseas deployments.

Who serves Germany, and what does the country need more of in the future? “Ethics and Armed Forces” gives answers to very critical questions, while always considering members of the German armed forces and their families. I hope you enjoy reading this “Ethics and Armed Forces” special.



Gertrud Maria Vaske

Gertrud Maria Vaske

Editor in chief

“Ethics and Armed Forces”

Types of Soldiers in Germany¹

Rabea Haß

The end of compulsory military service

The *Bundeswehr* is one of the most important public organizations in Germany. With around 280,000 employees, it is among the largest employers in the country. For several years, it has been going through the most extensive structural reform in its history. Its realignment with the goal of becoming an “effective and modern” *Bundeswehr* gained fresh impetus in the fall of 2010, in a surprise move by the then-defense minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg. In a departure from the government’s coalition agreement, he decided to end compulsory military service with effect from July 1, 2011. He was following the recommendations of the Structural Commission headed by Frank-Jürgen Weise which found that “compulsory military service in the current form [...]” was “no longer justified.” This assessment was based mainly on the grounds of security policy: the threat had changed, it was argued, and this required a restructuring of the defense army to create a combat force with a completely new and significantly expanded range of tasks.

Unlike its European neighbors and NATO partners, however, Germany did not convert the *Bundeswehr* into a purely professional army. Instead it introduced a voluntary military service program (*Freiwilliger Wehrdienst*, FWD) as an instrument that draws upon the central ideas of compulsory military service.

This article considers the questions of who the FWD program is targeted at, and what motives and expectations volunteers have when they join the *Bundeswehr*. Following on from this is an analysis of what this means for the organizational culture of the *Bundeswehr*, especially

for the concept of the citizen in uniform.

Volunteer members of the armed forces as citizens in uniform?

The end of compulsory military service represented a profound break in the tradition and self-image of the *Bundeswehr* as compulsory military service had been regarded as the foundation of specific features of its organizational culture – such as the principle of *Innere Führung* or the concept of the citizen in uniform. In 2011, after almost 55 years of compulsory military service, the *Bundeswehr* for the first time began to recruit its next generation of soldiers entirely on a voluntary basis. Consequently, it is not only the recruitment process itself that requires significant adjustment. The self-evident process of exchange between the general population (or at least some sections of the male population) and the *Bundeswehr*, which compulsory military service had ensured for decades, suddenly ceased. As a result, impacts on the civil-military relationship can be expected – for instance, due to the weakening of traditional societal bonds.

Not least as a way of continuing to foster this civil-military exchange and integrating the greatest possible variety of social milieus or strata into the *Bundeswehr*, the voluntary military service (FWD) program was introduced at the suggestion of the Structural Commission. This program was intended to enable young people in particular to become acquainted with the *Bundeswehr* institution, without immediately having to sign up for a period of several years as a longer- or shorter-service professional soldier. The Commission views the FWD program as an offer “that reconciles personal, professional, social, and security-

policy interests [...] Our society needs a culture of voluntary participation.” Only German citizens can participate in the FWD program, so unlike the Federal Volunteers Service (*Bundesfreiwilligendienst, BFD*), which was introduced as a replacement for alternative civilian service (*Zivildienst*), it is not open to foreigners. The (mostly) young people who sign up for FWD do so for a period of seven to 23 months. The first six months are a probationary period during which the contract can be cancelled by either side without giving notice. Volunteers who sign up for a period of 12 or more months are required to declare their willingness in principle to take part in overseas deployments. This marks a fundamental difference between present-day volunteers and former compulsory conscripts. The latter were excluded from overseas deployments and were only required to commit to overseas deployment if they subsequently – and voluntarily – extended their service.

Before being accepted, much the same as during the era of compulsory military service, the young men and women go through a medical examination and a selection procedure which tests their physical, psychological, and cognitive abilities. The stated goal is that at any given time, between 5,000 and 15,000 volunteers will support the *Bundeswehr*. But who is serving Germany?

On the data basis and methodology of the study

In this study, this question is answered on the basis of an empirical survey. Between July 2012 and August 2013, 26 *Bundeswehr* FWD-program volunteers at two locations were each interviewed three times. The qualitative interviews were concerned with volunteers’ self-image, motivation, expectations, and experiences, as well as their attitudes to overseas deployments, the principles of *Innere Führung*, and political education. The study is designed in such a way

that it can shed light on complex questions and interpretative frameworks based on a small number of selected cases. Depth of focus in the analysis is the priority, rather than its representativeness or the quantification of results. As the sample is sufficiently diverse, it can still provide an initial theory-like generalization that goes beyond individual observations; and, as a form of grounded theory, medium-range theoretical insights can be derived from the data.

The investigation shows that very different types can be found among the volunteers. FWD volunteers have various motives for joining the armed forces and therefore have different expectations. They adopt very different roles in the structure of the organizational culture. The study identifies three main types which are presented below²: ego-tacticians, conformists, and ideal soldiers.

Three types of volunteers in the *Bundeswehr*

Type 1: Ego-tacticians are primarily concerned with their personal benefit and they identify with the *Bundeswehr* only to a limited extent. They choose voluntary military service more for strategic reasons than non-material reasons. Extrinsic motives such as good pay or acquiring physical fitness are paramount. They therefore represent an attitude prevalent in their generation which prioritizes self-fulfillment and individualization while at the same time desiring financial security. They show little loyalty towards their employer and have a very low threshold when it comes to quitting the armed forces; yet they bring developments in civil society into the *Bundeswehr*. Mostly well-educated and with many alternative options, they belong to that group of people – judging by the experiences of volunteer armies in other countries – who are most difficult for professional armies to recruit, and who probably would not have joined the *Bundeswehr* via other forms of service (e.g. as a regular soldier).

If one considers the contribution made by volunteers to the civil-military relationship, an important function can be attributed to ego-tacticians: they critically question procedures and routines and may therefore contribute to a valuable exchange between the civilian and military spheres – provided that their voices are heard in the organization. A skeptical attitude can be beneficial, especially for the civil-military relationship and may ensure that civilian and military values do not drift further apart. In other words, ego-tacticians may function as an important corrective within the *Bundeswehr* and advance to the status of a democratic supervisory authority in the system because they question procedures and orders. At the same time, they embody like no other type the value orientation of the younger generation and confront the *Bundeswehr* with demands for self-fulfillment and personal development as well as the question of the meaning of one's own actions.

Type 2: Conformists are the easiest type to cater for in the current organizational culture of the *Bundeswehr*. They are loyal to their employer and often volunteer for military service out of a sense of duty, without having any great expectations for their time in the armed forces. They frequently perceive the *Bundeswehr* as being virtually a normal employer and therefore share the professional view of being a soldier that corresponds to Moskos's occupation model. However, this type finds it difficult to assume responsibility. In their loyalty, they sometimes show almost blind obedience, which is problematic for the understanding of a citizen in uniform. Planning security, settled social conditions, and family cohesion are particularly important for conformists. In this regard, first of all, solid, reliable pay plays an important role as it positively shapes the basic attitude towards the *Bundeswehr* and makes it seem like an attractive employer. Secondly, a strong sense of family and a high personal need for security are often a reason why this type does not take

on a longer-term commitment, according to findings from the interviews. The personal sacrifices and possible negative repercussions on their private life would be too great as a result of frequent relocation with transfers and potential overseas deployments.

Type 3: Ideal soldiers identify extensively with the values and goals of the *Bundeswehr*; for them, an overseas deployment is definitely part of being a soldier. Of all types, they come closest to the ideal of the *Bundeswehr*'s organizational self-portrayal in the campaign that was developed for the FWD program: "We. Serve. Germany." ("Wir. Dienen. Deutschland."). For this reason, they are called ideal soldiers in this typology. They are highly motivated and have sophisticated ideas about what makes a "proper" soldier. However, their clear expectations – with regard to the organization and their fellow soldiers – face limitations in reality. Hence, for some functions which are ascribed to voluntary military service, such as its integrative force, they are sometimes counter-productive because of their high expectations of the job. For example, they cannot understand why their fellow soldiers would choose the FWD program as a kind of well-paid gap year.

This type shows that over-identification can have a negative impact on the civil-military relationship. As a result of the strong identification with their environment and the internalization of military hierarchy structures, civilian values and authorities lose significance in some cases. This conflicts with the concepts of *Innere Führung* and the citizen in uniform. This type's extensive identification with the *Bundeswehr* is largely due to a strong sense of distinction from civilians.

What do these types mean for the organizational culture?

The three different types show that the *Bundeswehr* is succeeding in attracting different

groups of people. These include people who would not have joined the *Bundeswehr* either via compulsory military service (e.g. women) or via a career as a longer- or shorter-service professional soldier. Thus, the FWD program, designed to be a “flexible taster course,” is attracting new target groups. With its specific framework, it also appeals to different groups than the conventional career options (i.e. the longer-/shorter-service professional soldier) of professional armies.

All three types have one thing in common: they strive for virtues such as discipline, reliability, and stamina, and their personal material security is important to them. While striving for such virtues may seem surprising at first glance, the current Shell and Sinus youth study shows that precisely these values continue to be very important to young people – at least when they come from particular milieus, namely the conservative-bourgeois, the materialist-hedonist, or the adaptive-pragmatic ones.

But aside from these common values, the three types have heterogeneous expectations of military service which the *Bundeswehr* does not meet with a standardized training procedure. The different approaches to military service lead to a mutual lack of understanding among fellow soldiers. While some find that the physical and mental stresses are at the limit of acceptability, for example, others feel that even the general basic training is not challenging enough and they miss the “real” military. Yet the *Bundeswehr* is not set up to cater to individual needs. This is a shortcoming of the organizational culture which all volunteer types are dissatisfied with. Socialization mechanisms are designed for leveling, not for developing personalities. The integrative effect which the former compulsory military service had via soldiers’ common obligation to serve is no longer present in the volunteer model and this creates new challenges for the culture of the *Bundeswehr*.

That the sense of identification of many volunteers declines precisely in their own unit is an indication that volunteers are not deterred by the training units and activities which are felt to be typical of the military, nor by the supposed harshness and excessive physical demands, but instead are disillusioned by boredom, a lack of challenge, and broken promises in their own units. However, volunteers deal with this shortcoming in different ways. Conformists prefer agreeable conditions (planning security, solid pay) over a fulfilling job and therefore accept a lack of meaningfulness in their military service. Yet for ego-tacticians and ideal soldiers, the question of meaning and self-efficacy is a high priority and may become even more important to subsequent generations of volunteers. If many young people from the pragmatic Generation Y (i.e. those born between 1980 and 1999, which includes all of the interviewees), which the 2010 Shell Youth Study reported as showing a “decrease in ideologically shaped attitudes and an increase in pragmatic attitudes,” are still satisfied with acceptable general conditions, this attitude will probably change among subsequent cohorts. The 2015 Shell Youth Study reports that Generation R which stands for “relaxed” (i.e. those born between 2000 and 2015) shows a much greater willingness to experiment and a desire to contribute to social change. This coming generation, in particular, may question the meaning of military service to an even greater extent than current volunteers as their own self-efficacy is, to them, an important part of their lives.

Thus, in the years ahead, the *Bundeswehr* may lose precisely those volunteers who, while being difficult for the organization to cater to, would of the three identified types best correspond to its guiding concepts, namely *Innere Führung* and the ideal of the citizen in uniform.

1 This article is based on the results of my dissertation submitted at the Institute for Sociology at Goethe University Frankfurt. See Haß, Rabea (2015): *Der Freiwillige Wehrdienst in der Bundeswehr. Ein Beitrag zur kritischen Militärsoziologie*, Wiesbaden.

2 In my dissertation, the findings are presented in a much more differentiated form, and the main types, for example, are each divided into two subtypes. These differentiations have been omitted here, as it is only possible to summarize the key findings in abridged form in this publication format.



Rabea Haß is a project manager and one of the creative minds behind the Kitchen on the Run initiative. From 2011 to 2014, she conducted research at the Hertie School of Governance and at Heidelberg University on the topics of civic engagement, impact assessment in the non-profit sector, and volunteerism. She gained her

doctorate at the Institute for Sociology at Goethe University Frankfurt, with a thesis on the voluntary military service program (Freiwilliger Wehrdienst, FWD) in the German armed forces. Having worked e.g. for the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief (Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk, THW) earlier in her career, she has extensive experience in crisis and conflict management.

Female Soldiers as Superiors

Gerhard Kümmel

As the percentage of women in Western armed forces grows, the topic of women in leadership and superior positions in the military is becoming increasingly virulent. Both within the military and in politics and society in modern Western democracies, it is a highly controversial issue. Positions fluctuate between “Yes, We Can,” on the one hand, and “White Men Can’t Jump” (to be modified accordingly), on the other, to cite a catchy political slogan and a familiar movie title respectively.

This article focuses on two questions, in particular, that have considerable relevance for the subject at hand:

(1) Do women lead in the armed forces? Put differently, to what extent are they active as military leaders and superiors?

(2) How do women lead? In other words, are there differences in the ways that women perform the roles of military superiors compared to men?

These two questions are examined below in two separate sections, mainly with regard to the German armed forces (*Bundeswehr*).

Do women lead?

Since 2001, when the *Bundeswehr* became fully open to women, the percentage of female soldiers has increased considerably. When the German armed forces only employed female soldiers in the areas of medical service and military music, they made up well under two percent of the total. This percentage is now more than five times higher. According to the *Bundeswehr*’s website, out of a current total of 178,573 military personnel, there are now 19,480 female soldiers,

which works out to 10.9 percent (as of the end of January 2016).

Most of these women – 39.3 percent – work in the area of medical service. This is followed at a considerable distance by the Joint Support Service (*Streitkräftebasis, SKB*) with 18.6 percent, and the army with 17.3 percent. A further 10.8 percent of women are in the air force, while 7.3 percent of women are in the navy. Finally, 6.6 percent of women serve in the German Federal Ministry of Defense (*Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, BMVg*) or in other areas. With regard to status groupings, women participating in the voluntary military service program (*Freiwilliger Wehrdienst, FWD*) make up the smallest group. Only 6.4 of women are FWD-program volunteers. In contrast, around four out of five women (81.7 percent) are shorter-service professional soldiers (*Zeitsoldatinnen*) and roughly one in every nine (11.0 percent) is a longer-service professional soldier (*Berufssoldatin*). In terms of rank groupings, more than half of women hold a non-commissioned officer (NCO) rank. Thus, 37 percent of women are NCOs with *portepée* and a further 18 percent are NCOs without *portepée*. Just under one-quarter of the women (24.8 percent) are officers. 20.2 percent of women hold other ranks. (Percentages calculated based on data from the *Bundeswehr* website as of the end of 2015).

In light of the above, it can be observed first of all that women take on various superior and leadership roles in the military to differing degrees and with varying scope according to their various ranks. But do they do this to a similar extent to their male fellow soldiers?

Dr. Hans-Peter Bartels, Parliamentary Commissioner for the German Armed Forces (*Wehrbeauftragter des Deutschen Bundestages*), has

his doubts. In his latest annual report, he complains that women make up only 4.4 percent of longer-service professional soldiers and he adds: “Women are still significantly under-represented in leadership positions in the *Bundeswehr*.”¹ In the top group of generals, the proportion of women is lower still. Among more than 200 generals in the *Bundeswehr*, there are currently only two women which means that the percentage of female soldiers in this group comes to just under one percent. Based on complaints received by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the German Armed Forces and his troop visits, he suspects that the reasons for this are firstly possible discrimination against women when it comes to promotions, and, secondly, the difficulties of balancing family life and career with the result that women – far more frequently than men – do not apply to become longer-service professional soldiers. In addition, it seems that women are less often able to tick one particular box on the checklist for military careers: the overseas deployment (see table 1).

The search for reasons for the described circumstances is still underway. The German defense minister, Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, has explicitly made it her goal to smooth the way for women to reach top positions in the military. In mid-2015, an “equal opportunities staff unit” (*Stabselement Chancengerechtigkeit*) was formed within the German Federal Ministry of Defense. According to the annual report by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, which was mentioned above, this unit is tasked “with the overarching management and coordination of the establishment of equal career opportunities between the sexes.” Under the direction of a female medical staff officer (*Oberstärztin*), the first step is to produce a situational overview. This has been ongoing since May 2015 and mainly involves collecting valid data. Based on the situational overview, a causal analysis will be carried out which will allow the development of equal opportunities measures and initiatives.”³ Thus, the message to the public, to policy-makers and to the armed forces is: we are investigating the causes

Table 1: Percentage of women among the personnel of German operational contingents²

Operation	Theater of Operations	Strength	Of which women	%
Resolute Support	Afghanistan, Uzbekistan	895	75	8.4
KFOR	Kosovo	660	69	10.5
UNMISS	South Sudan	15	0	0
UNAMID	Sudan	8	1	12.5
UNIFIL	Lebanon	116	6	5.2
EUTM Mali	Mali	198	17	8.6
MINUSMA	Senegal, Mali	219	10	4.6
Atalanta	Horn of Africa	123	8	6.5
EUTM SOM	Somalia	9	1	11.1
Operation Sophia	Mediterranean	275	23	8.4
Anti-IS Mission (Counter Daesh)	Middle East	486	23	4.7
Training Support Iraq	Northern Iraq	113	7	6.2
UNMIL	Liberia	3	0	0
TOTAL		3,120	240	7.7

and then, based on the analysis of causes, we will do something substantial.

Do women lead differently?

Even if women are currently under-represented in military superior and leadership roles in the *Bundeswehr*, a number of female soldiers have risen to superior and leadership roles over the course of time. Hence the question of a gender comparison between the way in which these roles are performed can be raised. The findings of a survey by the *Bundeswehr* Center for Military History and Social Sciences (*Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr*, ZMSBw) can be used for this purpose. Its data basis comprises almost 1,800 questionnaires returned by male soldiers and over 3,000 questionnaires returned by female soldiers.⁴ One section dealt with the assessment of superiors' behavior in a gender comparison (see table 2).

The general pattern of responses that underlies these items appears to be that both male and female soldiers very frequently state that a particular behavior or characteristic of superiors applies equally to female and male superiors. The response "Applies to both [sexes]" forms the largest group in each case for most of the items. This is true for:

- "Criticizes subordinates in the presence of others"
- "Praises subordinates for good performance"
- "Rejects proposals for changes"
- "Encourages weaker personnel to perform better"
- "Helps with personal problems"
- "Takes responsibility for subordinates and their actions"
- "Creates a relaxed mood in talks with subordinates"
- "Inspires subordinates through their dedication"

- "Involves subordinates in important decisions"
- "Reacts positively to subordinates' own ideas"
- "Is interested in subordinates' personal well-being"
- "Adapts tasks according to individual capabilities."

The second response pattern that can be seen in the data is that there is a tendency to ascribe good characteristics and behavior patterns of superiors to superiors of one's own sex, whereas there is a preference for attributing negative characteristics and behavior patterns to superiors of the opposite sex. This applies to the positive characteristic descriptions for:

- "Praises subordinates for good performance"
- "Encourages weaker personnel to perform better"
- "Helps with personal problems"
- "Creates a relaxed mood in talks with subordinates"
- "Involves subordinates in important decisions"
- "Reacts positively to subordinates' own ideas"
- "Is interested in subordinates' personal well-being"
- "Adapts tasks according to individual capabilities."

Among the negative characterizations, this applies to both of the following:

- "Rejects proposals for changes"
- "Changes tasks without consultation."

However, the following items are interesting exceptions:

- "Takes responsibility for subordinates and their actions"
- "Harasses subordinates who make a

Table 2: Assessment of the behavior of superiors in a gender comparison (in percent)

	Applies more to men	Applies to both	Applies more to women	Applies to neither
Criticizes subordinates in the presence of others				
Women	23.4	26.6	17.5	32.3
Men	18.6	33.0	18.3	30.1
Praises subordinates for good performance				
Women	14.9	54.0	22.5	8.6
Men	19.2	53.7	16.1	11.0
Rejects proposals for changes				
Women	20.3	22.3	14.3	43.1
Men	15.2	28.2	23.5	33.1
Encourages weaker personnel to perform better				
Women	14.2	49.0	24.9	11.9
Men	27.0	47.8	9.6	15.7
Changes tasks without consultation				
Women	21.2	20.6	13.1	45.2
Men	11.1	29.3	21.6	38.0
Helps with personal problems				
Women	9.9	54.4	28.0	7.7
Men	17.4	57.6	14.9	10.1
Takes responsibility for subordinates and their actions				
Women	17.0	57.8	13.2	11.9
Men	33.3	47.3	6.2	13.2
Harasses subordinates who make a mistake				
Women	15.3	7.5	7.9	69.3
Men	10.6	9.5	7.7	72.3
Creates a relaxed mood in talks with subordinates				
Women	16.6	47.4	23.4	12.7
Men	22.2	46.8	19.8	11.3
Inspires subordinates through their dedication				
Women	16.4	46.5	13.9	23.1
Men	28.3	36.0	7.0	28.6
Involves subordinates in important decisions				
Women	10.0	49.9	16.1	24.0
Men	19.6	45.2	9.4	25.8
Reacts positively to subordinates' own ideas				
Women	11.1	64.9	16.0	8.0
Men	20.1	63.4	8.0	8.6
Is interested in subordinates' personal well-being				
Women	10.1	53.8	25.6	10.6
Men	15.3	57.0	13.2	14.5
Adapts tasks according to individual capabilities				
Women	10.8	52.2	12.9	24.1
Men	21.8	44.6	5.1	28.5
Is unforgiving				
Women	14.7	14.3	22.2	48.8
Men	9.4	17.7	29.6	43.3

mistake”

- “Inspires subordinates through their dedication”
- “Fails to adopt an appropriate conversational tone”
- “Is unforgiving.”

With the first characterization mentioned, “Takes responsibility for subordinates and their actions,” women break the pattern as they more frequently state that this characteristic applies more to a male superior than that it tends to apply to a superior of their own sex. Looking at the item “Harasses subordinates who make a mistake,” men and women more frequently say that this applies more to a male superior. The character description “Inspires subordinates through their dedication” is more frequently said by women to apply more to male superiors in a gender comparison. For the item “Is unforgiving,” both male and female soldiers ascribe this characteristic more to female superiors.

Overall, the survey results sometimes reflect common stereotypes, yet these initial empirical findings in no way indicate serious differences in the ways that male and female soldiers shape their superior and leadership roles. The leadership style described by both sexes can be summarized as “participation: as far as possible; leadership: when necessary.” Thus, the rising number of women who are military superiors in the *Bundeswehr* is not likely to lead to the deep-seated change in the *Bundeswehr* that is feared by some and hoped for by others.

Concluding remarks

Particularly since the complete opening up of the *Bundeswehr* in 2001, increasing numbers of women are serving as soldiers in the *Bundeswehr*. With the corresponding lead time, they are increasingly reaching superior and leadership positions in the military. The little empirical data that exists so far does not indicate that female soldiers perform these roles in a

fundamentally different way than male soldiers. However, women are still under-represented in these military leadership positions. A causal analysis is underway.

The *Bundeswehr* is a state institution and as such, it is required to comply with the German Basic Law (*Grundgesetz, GG*) to the letter. It is therefore obligated to reduce and eliminate discrimination within its ranks. Thus, in contrast to the private sector, where according to current media reports women on average earn one-fifth less than men, in the armed forces, for example, there is no gender-based difference in pay. With regard to the under-representation of women in superior and leadership positions in the military, especially in top positions, however, equal opportunities – to use the name of the new staff unit in the German Federal Ministry of Defense – could be somewhat more difficult to establish than in the monetary area with regard to pay. One of the findings of the study by the *Bundeswehr* Center for Military History and Social Sciences (*ZMSBw*) mentioned above was that the proportion of male soldiers who are of the opinion that women are unsuited to superior positions in the military increased from 15 percent in 2005 to more than 22 percent in 2011.⁵ One can therefore eagerly await both the results of the causal analysis and the measures derived from this by the German Federal Ministry of Defense.

1 *Unterrichtung durch den Wehrbeauftragten. Jahresbericht 2015* (57th report). Deutscher Bundestag, 18. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 18/7250, January 26, 2016. Berlin, p. 62.

2 Percentage of women calculated based on data from the *Bundeswehr's* website. As at the end of February 2016. Source: <http://www.bundeswehr.de>.

3 *Unterrichtung durch den Wehrbeauftragten. Jahresbericht 2015* (57th report). Deutscher Bundestag, 18. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 18/7250, January 26, 2016. Berlin, p. 62.

4 Kümmel, Gerhard (2014), *Truppenbild ohne Dame? Eine sozialwissenschaftliche Begleituntersuchung zum aktuellen Stand der Integration von Frauen in die Bundeswehr*. Gutachten 1/2014. Potsdam: Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr (ZMSBw), pp. 40ff.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 26.



Gerhard Kümmel is a political scientist. He gained his doctorate under the supervision of Professor Wilfried von Bredow at Philipps-Universität Marburg. In the fall of 1997, he joined the Social Sciences Institute of the German Armed Forces (SOWI) in Marburg as a research associate. Following the merger of SOWI with the

Military History Research Office of the German Armed Forces, he is currently head of the "Transformation of the armed forces" project area in the military sociology research field at the Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the German Armed Forces in Potsdam, and in charge of the project "Women in the armed forces." His most recent publications include, together with Angelika Dörfler-Dierken (ed.): "Am Puls der Bundeswehr. Militärsoziologie in Deutschland zwischen Wissenschaft, Politik, Bundeswehr und Gesellschaft" (2016) and, together with Phil C. Langer (ed.): "Wir sind Bundeswehr. Wie viel Vielfalt benötigen/vertragen die Streitkräfte?" (2015).

The Future of the *Bundeswehr* and its Advocate

An interview with Hans-Peter Bartels by Gertrud Maria Vaske



Hans-Peter Bartels has been Parliamentary Commissioner for the German Armed Forces since 2015. He studied political science, sociology, and ethnology at the Christian-Albrechts-University in Kiel and obtained his PhD in 1988. He joined the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in 1979 and has been a member of the German Bundestag since 1998 – most recently as Chairman of the Defense Committee. Bartels is also a member of the SPD's Commission on Basic Values.

Threats are becoming more global, more hybrid, and as a result they seem to be moving closer. A total of 130 billion euros will be spent on upgrading equipment and facilities over the next few years. The 1.5 million soldiers in the 28 EU Member States should be sufficient for defense purposes, seeing that defending the Alliance is now once again one of the real-world tasks of the German armed forces (*Bundeswehr*), ever since the Russia-Ukraine conflict. At the moment, we still have around 177,000 soldiers. What's wrong with the armed forces in this country – the numbers of applicants are continually falling. Why do you think this is?

The *Bundeswehr*'s staffing problems at the moment are mainly due to its failure to fill the serious skills gap, such as in IT and the area of medical services. The constant increase in tasks will lead to further overstretching of an already strained workforce. For this reason, the German defense ministry is currently consider-

ing increasing the number of personnel in the *Bundeswehr*.

You have been in office for more than a year now. *Innere Führung* is attested as being an exemplary concept, even in other countries. Despite this, complaints received from soldiers show that almost 1,000 out of 4,000 (according to the 2015 report) – i.e. around 24 percent – are concerned with issues of leadership and “military order.” The White Paper for the German armed forces is currently being revised. In your opinion, should the concept of *Innere Führung* also be revised?

First of all, it would be a mistake to assume that the statistics you mention relate solely to events concerning the core area of *Innere Führung*. The fact is that the almost 1,000 cases in this category also include all investigations relating to accidents involving soldiers, problems with compensation for overtime, and issues concerning the outward appearance. The number of complaints from soldiers relating to the core area of *Innere Führung* stood at just under 400 in 2015.

The basic concept of *Innere Führung* is the requirement that every soldier should have a standard of their own for right and wrong, for good and evil. No ideology can replace our conscience, nor can any religion. That is the idea of the concept of *Innere Führung* – and this idea is timeless. So there is no need for a fundamental revision – also because, as it says on the very first page of the corresponding Joint Service Regulation (*Zentrale Dienstvorschrift*), *Innere Führung* is subject to the need for a continual process of further development.

As a “soldiers’ advocate,” to what extent do you help soldiers with these issues?

Every soldier has the right to appeal to me individually and directly, without going through official channels. Consequently, the complaints that I receive on a daily basis cover a wide range of professional, personal, or social problems in everyday military life. They concern issues of leadership, personnel management, welfare, and increasingly the work-family balance as well. The soldier’s allegation – and incidentally they will not be disadvantaged in any way by submitting a complaint – is then examined in each case with regard to infringements of the soldier’s basic rights or violations of the principles of *Innere Führung*. In many cases, the end result of this process – if the soldier’s complaint was justified – is that they can be helped.

We have a female Federal Chancellor and a female defense minister, and for the last 15 years women have served in the Bundeswehr and now make up a little over ten percent of all personnel. Yet acceptance of women in the Bundeswehr is demonstrably falling. Why? More acceptance of women, family-friendliness, and compatibility with the profession – to what extent is more support required here? What form could this take?

A study published in January 2014, called *Truppbild ohne Dame*, noted a “clouding of the integration climate,” and concluded that greater efforts were required to integrate women into the armed forces. It is particularly notable that in this survey, a third of the soldiers were of the opinion that the *Bundeswehr* lost fighting strength because of women.

This prejudice – and it is nothing other than a prejudice – needs to be combated resolutely. In particular, I do not share the reservation that women’s supposed lack of physical strength leads to a loss of combat strength in the armed forces and could have lethal consequences

during deployments. In the military, physical strength alone is not the decisive factor. What also counts is the mental constitution, strong leadership, and not least technical skills.

Since the armed forces were completely opened up to women, things have changed somewhat with regard to equal opportunities, but women are still under-represented in many areas – especially among the combat troops and in leadership positions. To change this, there is not just one possible formula. Instead, it is necessary to think in all directions. The ability to balance family and career is an important factor in making the *Bundeswehr* more attractive to women. But it is also important that women in the armed forces should have the same career opportunities as men.

Some key initiatives in this regard have now been taken by the leadership. But we still have a long way to go. In the future, we will also need to give more attention to why so few women apply to become a longer-service professional soldier, even though they meet the relevant criteria. The difficulty of balancing family and career is no doubt an important consideration here, but the overall atmosphere and conversational tone is often still a factor, too.

The penultimate working report stated that the Bundeswehr can be an attractive employer for female soldiers of all ranks, if equal opportunities are put into practice. Have they been put into practice now? What is needed in the system?

The defense ministry has initiated some important changes in this respect. These include – to name but a few – systematic investigations of assessments and potential career barriers for women in all career and status groups, as well as agreements on objectives to identify female medical officers in senior physician roles and for their targeted assignment and further training with a view to training competitive candi-

dates for clinical department heads. These are important approaches and they constitute the right way, but the goal is still a long way off.

For a long time, it has been an aim to increase the attractiveness of military service and improve the work–family balance. Is there a shortage of the right managerial personnel who also want and support this?

Some of the measures introduced with the attractiveness agenda serve to improve the balance between military service and family or private life. This topic is still of particular importance to soldiers, especially with regard to the difficulties associated with assignments far from home. The keyword here is “commuter army.” We should aim to ensure that career planning, including training and courses and the associated assignment orders and transfers, are more geared to the needs of the people concerned at the respective stages of their lives than has previously been the case. This requires better communication as well as greater transparency and reliability of planning.

In your view, are strict rules – such as the 41-hour week – more likely to be helpful or unhelpful when it comes to employer efficiency and employee satisfaction?

The Soldiers’ Working Time Ordinance (*Soldatenarbeitszeitverordnung*), which came into force on January 1, 2016, represents a cultural change for the *Bundeswehr* in dealing with working hours. For the first time, the normal working week for soldiers during routine duties is limited to 41 hours. However, many soldiers will have to accept that in the future, because of less overtime, their financial compensation for working more hours will be significantly reduced – e.g. because they no longer perform guard duty. The crunch is still being felt everywhere. Practice will show whether and when the goal of the new working time model is achieved to the full extent and to the soldiers’ satisfaction. At

the moment, we are still struggling with many uncertainties. This is partly due to information deficits. Incidentally, the restriction on working hours will inevitably mean that more personnel are needed. Then they will have to actually be available to the *Bundeswehr*!

The increase in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) cases, the additional burden resulting from overseas deployments, but also from dealing with the refugee situation – what is your advice to soldiers, as an advocate, with regard to the work–life balance? What do soldiers simply have to put up with?

Never before has the *Bundeswehr* been faced with such an abundance of different tasks and missions. To meet these challenges, the armed forces need motivated soldiers who are able to work under pressure. The limit is reached when soldiers are constantly overworked. This is particularly true for assignments where there is a lack of specialists. The skills shortage especially affects the careers of non-commissioned officers in the general special service (*Feldwebel des allgemeinen Fachdienstes*) and specialist non-commissioned officers in technical, information technology, and medical service assignments.

States of exhaustion and burnouts among soldiers who have a particularly heavy workload are now becoming a cause for concern. We therefore need to ask whether the current number of personnel is still adequate given the *Bundeswehr*’s expanded range of tasks. I think the defense minister is wise to consider reviewing the personnel concept at this time. In view of the military’s task, achieving a work–life balance in the *Bundeswehr* is likely to remain a big challenge in the future as well.

The *Bundeswehr* is working on many improvements. What has improved greatly for soldiers over the last year, and what do policy-makers need to improve urgently for

soldiers here in Germany, as a top priority in 2016?

As I said earlier, with regard to the balance between military service and family or private life, there have been a number of good decisions in recent years: an extension of opportunities for part-time work, longer periods of time in one post or at one location, and fewer transfers are all steps in the right direction.

Further progress has also been achieved with regard to facilities for soldiers to communicate with family, partners, and friends during deployments. There has been some improvement in dealing with PTSD, too. The topic of war injuries and trauma is also getting more public attention today. As a result, stigmatization and fear of contact have decreased. Plus there are improvements in early detection, such as screening processes. Finally, the pooling of responsibilities for military service injury compensation procedures (*Wehrdienstbeschädigungsverfahren*) in the German Federal Office for Human Resource Management of the German Armed Forces (*Bundesamt für das Personalmanagement der Bundeswehr, BAPersBw*) has been a success: the socio-medical evaluation and the decision concerning the military service injury compensation procedure is now carried out by one authority. Yet the procedures need to finally become quicker, too.

Of course, the attractiveness of the armed forces also includes making sure that they are fully equipped. If you can't do your job because the equipment you are supposed to use for training and exercises isn't there, the job isn't attractive. This is also a matter of health and life. If equipment for training and exercises is not available at home, this can have dangerous consequences during deployments. We need to start improving equipment and facilities now. We also urgently need to increase the number of personnel in the *Bundeswehr*. 185,000 soldiers are not enough, especially since there are

currently only 177,000. The overworking of individual areas that are particularly in demand in the air force, the medical service, and the navy is no longer acceptable, as it harms soldiers' motivation and unnecessarily limits German security policy options.

And, as already discussed, I am also concerned about the new Soldiers' Working Time Ordinance. If it is to be a success, it requires a rapid reaction to known problems. Soldiers need legal certainty, confidence in their actions, and practical everyday-life solutions that actually work in their field.

The Young Generation and the German Navy

An interview with Thomas von Buttlar by Gertrud Maria Vaske



Thomas von Buttlar has been personnel sub-division head in the Navy Command (Marinekommando, MarKdo) in Rostock since 2013. He joined the navy in July 1977. After officer training and studying aerospace technology at Universität der Bundeswehr München, he found his military home in the fast attack craft force, where he completed leadership assignments as captain of the “S50 Panther” fast attack craft, deputy commander of the 7th fast attack craft squadron (7. Schnellbootgeschwader) and commander of the 2nd fast attack craft squadron (2. Schnellbootgeschwader). Following naval staff training, he served in varying assignments in the field of human resources and in leadership/deployment. His last assignment was as head of the reorientation unit in the German Federal Ministry of Defense (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, BMVg).

Herr von Buttlar, the navy is recruiting young people. What is the current personnel situation in the navy?

On the whole, the situation is not bad in the navy. However, we are extremely concerned in the technical fields. Especially electronics engineers, electricians, and IT specialists, where we currently don't have enough applicants.

The number of applicants is falling. Why is this? What do you think?

The navy is somewhat special as far as recruiting young people is concerned. It is only deployed

on the coast. We don't have the barracks in southern Germany, where lots of young people live, who could then become interested in joining the navy. The navy isn't something they even think about, and that makes it especially difficult for us to recruit young people.

Why is the navy worse affected than the air force or the army?

Well, the reason is the following: young people today naturally take a careful look at what's on offer, but for the most part they want to work very close to home. It's simply that the navy is not in southern Germany, but on the coast. And that makes things difficult. But we do find that if we are able to interest people in the navy and bring them to the coast and they spend a day with us, then more than half of these young people will actually write an application.

What specifically does the navy offer young people? What is particularly attractive?

The navy is a unique world. As you know, 70 percent of the Earth's surface is water, and simply to experience this dimension in all its aspects is what really sets the navy apart. It's not just the unique nature and weather phenomena. In particular, it is the camaraderie on board a ship that one experiences in the navy, this working and living together in close proximity, which is very challenging, but it is also something extraordinarily special.

Working in the navy is also very stressful at the moment. What strains could be minimized?

The people who come to us know that seafaring is very strenuous and that it is very demanding. It is not so much the duration of stress that is criticized as its unpredictability. In other words, plans are always changing at short notice. Going to sea is brought forward, or returning to the home port is delayed, because another mission comes along. This is what really bothers people, and we realize that we have some work to do here.

So you're saying that planning and predictability could be improved. Is being in the navy really a dream job?

Well I have been in the navy for nearly 40 years, and I have not been bored for even a single day. Of course, it depends on what your idea of a dream job is. But it is a career that is immensely varied, highly challenging, and also very satisfying. So in this respect, I can answer "yes."

What are the essential qualities an applicant should possess?

The desire to work in a team is extremely important. Nothing on board can be done alone. Everyone depends on everyone else. The captain is just as reliant on the youngest seaman as the other way around. Everyone has several functions on board. Team spirit, camaraderie, taking responsibility for others – these are the most important qualities that one should have on board. And of course you also need to be tenacious when things take longer than expected, in heavy seas, or when the task is difficult. And indeed there are certainly some deployments that are not so easy. A good helping of courage and endurance is always needed.

Which deployments aren't so easy?

Let's return to the dimension of the sea and the fact that it covers 70 percent of the Earth's surface. The sea is really the lifeblood of the economy. 90 percent of the goods that we import into

Germany arrive by sea, and for all the good that the sea brings, there is of course another, darker side. This includes piracy, which our soldiers experience around the Horn of Africa, but also refugees – most recently in the southern Mediterranean and in the Aegean. These are highly emotive scenarios, and they demand a lot from our sailors who have to deal with them.

In this job, is there any way to achieve a balance between family and work?

One should be entirely honest about this. Seafaring and family are not really compatible. They are mutually exclusive. That is the case in the armed forces, and also in civilian seafaring. But what is important is precisely the balance between work and family. For instance, are there times when I could devote more attention to family life? Especially alternating between time at sea and time on land or in port – here it's important to have a reasonable balance. And also alternating between an on board assignment and a land assignment. Once again, here too, predictability is extremely important. In other words, can I rely on getting home for the start of the school holidays? Will I be home for Christmas? Will I be at home for a particular occasion such as birthdays or special family days? That is highly important. And conversely, the family can make arrangements if they know in advance that you're not home at a particular time. It's not nice, but at least you can prepare for it. And you know that afterwards you'll be back home as planned.

Improvements in the working time model – what is good about the multiple crew concept, and what is not so good?

We are in the process of implementing the multiple crew model. The new weapons systems that we are getting – the F125-class frigates, which just had their first test voyage – will be the first to fully implement this multiple crew

concept. We will have eight crews for four ships. That means we can leave the ship in the theater of operations. The crews then fly in and complete the changeover there. This certainly improves predictability, as no matter what happens in the theater of operations and regardless of the deployment location, we can change the crew at a fixed time, and we can keep to this. And we hope that as a result we will also reduce the overall workload for the crew – i.e. days at sea. But that's still some way into the future. What we are already doing at the moment is changing crews on the minesweepers, on the fast attack craft, and in submarines. And this is actually proving popular with crews as we save a lot of time, we don't spend the transit time at sea, and predictability is greatly improved.

How do young sailors view *Innere Führung*?

For our young sailors, *Innere Führung* is really only as good as the example that their superiors set. Of course one can learn *Innere Führung* and its principles in the lecture theatre, but essentially it comes down to setting an example and putting it into practice. That is absolutely vital. So here the superiors play a particularly important role.

***Innere Führung* and current challenges – is it being put into practice now more than ever? That is, is it needed more than ever now?**

I think so. It is being put into practice as much as ever, but it is also needed more and more. Because of the various tasks that we have – the whole range from combat missions to humanitarian missions – we basically need the full set of equipment that *Innere Führung* provides. And this needs to be used appropriately. It is not a matter of one part or other being especially important, but it is rather the overall concept that makes *Innere Führung* what it is, and it is this overall concept that needs to be applied.

The term “*Innere Führung*” sounds good. What aspect about it do you believe is particularly useful for the navy?

Innere Führung is really timeless in two respects. Timeless in the sense that it is independent of the form of military service, whether a conscript army or volunteer army or professional army, and also of the tasks that we have. So in this respect, the whole of *Innere Führung* in all its parts is important for the navy, too. There is not somehow one particular main focus – the entire spectrum is important and should be applied. But timeless also means that superiors should always have time for their subordinates. With the new regulation of working hours for soldiers, which also applies to those in superior positions, we must be careful that the practice of *Innere Führung* does not become victim to a time clock.

Challenges such as refugee movements and observing rest periods – to what extent does *Innere Führung* particularly help sailors in the navy?

It is particularly helpful here. *Innere Führung* provides the ethical framework, the moral values. It helps members of the armed forces to decide, in any situation, what is particularly important to them in that situation. For a sailor, it is very clear that if someone is in distress at sea, there is no question that one should help them and rescue them. That is completely irrespective of one's own regulated working hours or perhaps the feeling that one could do with some rest. Human life is the priority here, and therefore in such circumstances *Innere Führung* is an extremely important source of advice and, of course, of inner certainty as well.

Captain Thomas von Buttlar, thank you very much for this interview.

The Soldier's Life – What Should Soldiers and Their Families Expect?

An interview with Peter Wendl by Gertrud Maria Vaske



Peter Wendl holds a degree in theology and works as a therapist for individuals, couples, and families. As a research project manager at the Center for Marriage and Family Studies at the Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, he has been researching the impacts of long-distance relationships, overseas deployments, and relocations on partnerships and families for 16 years. Under the direction of the Catholic military chaplaincy, he has conducted more than 250 multiday events involving more than 3,000 families. Most of these have been pre- and post-deployment seminars together with family members. In the context of the partnership between ZFG and the Catholic Military Episcopate, his publications include: "Gelingende Fern-Beziehung. Entfernt zusammen wachsen" (2015), "Soldat im Einsatz – Partnerschaft im Einsatz. Praxis und Arbeitsbuch für Paare und Familien in Auslandseinsatz und Wochenendbeziehungen" (2014) and "Zusammen schaffen wir das! Informationen und Hilfen für Eltern, Kitas und Schulen rund um Auslandseinsatz und Wochenendbeziehung" (2016).

time for family units to settle back down again as the duration of the separation itself. The second level of challenges comprises physical threats. These include bodily danger scenarios (fear of being wounded, killed, etc.). A third level consists of fears relating to the phenomena of psychological (mental) hazards. This means the possibility of experiences which are not easy to deal with, and could result in a longer-term strain on the psyche.

It is not common for soldiers in Germany to have to deal with death during overseas deployments. Nevertheless, certain topics are becoming more controversial, such as the number of German soldiers with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In your opinion, what should a member of the armed forces definitely expect during an overseas deployment, and what are they (routinely) prepared for?

What kinds of stress do soldiers usually encounter during an overseas deployment?

Our work shows that soldiers' families have to cope with particular fears. One of the social fears is the long time spent away from home. Firstly, there are the challenges of being in a long-distance relationship and of being away from loved ones and friends at home. Being apart from children is particularly difficult, but so is missing one's familiar environment and trusted surroundings. Added to this are the various degrees of soldiers' mobility. The deployment does not automatically end when returning home. As a rule of thumb, the family system requires roughly the same amount of

Research into psychological resilience, mental fitness, the ability to cope with stress, and salutogenesis attempts to explain when and how people subject to particular stresses can be preventively prepared – and how they can ideally be supported in a specific emergency. Despite significant progress, we are still in the very early stages when it comes to scientifically explaining the conditions. The fact is that thousands of soldiers have been confronted with extreme borderline situations that cannot be integrated straightforwardly into everyday life at home using conventional coping strategies. As examples, I will just mention the combat missions in Afghanistan, and the entirely different types of challenges currently faced by fellow members

of the armed forces in the navy when dealing with the refugee situation. Day after day, on their warships in the Mediterranean, they are dealing with unending human suffering and death. It is very difficult to prepare oneself for stresses of this kind – and yet it is essential to do so. At the very least, possible scenarios should be considered and prepared for, and particular situations and experiences should be discussed together. Ultimately, however, the individual case always becomes unpredictable when the scenario occurs in conjunction with specific human fate. This is where *Innere Führung*, the military chaplaincy, the whole psychosocial network, family support, and all bodies involved in preparation and follow-up work for soldiers play a key role, including the soldiers' social environment.

To answer your question more specifically: soldiers are prepared in particular – and this should come as no surprise – for “military challenges.” But this preparation should also directly include all psychosocial challenges for partnerships, education, health, etc. There is certainly still much to do here, even though much progress has been made. Before and after an overseas deployment, it takes time and requires space to work through things with the troops, with family members, and it especially takes time alone with oneself. As with any job in a “greedy” institution – namely, one that makes demands on the whole person (I would venture a comparison with police officers, fire and emergency service workers, or doctors) – it is not possible to prepare for every experience. But any experience can be followed up. That should be a key standard if we value the people who are entrusted to us.

PTSD means that the psychological stress disorder may not occur until years later. At that point, sufferers should immediately be taken seriously. They should be able to access competence centers and drop-in centers unbureaucratically and quickly – and not have to seek them out.

What are the biggest challenges for the family before, during, and after a soldier's overseas deployment?

The challenges differ greatly. The stresses experienced by a single person can be very different from those that a young family or a mature couple close to retirement have to put up with. Children experience the absence of their father or mother in ways that vary greatly between individuals, and they go through much more emotion than older family members who can rationally understand the situation. Some smaller children, for example, ask if it is their “fault” that daddy or mommy is away for so long. Others don't even have a strong concept of time yet that would enable them to be clear in their own minds about how long their parent will be away. Age-appropriate preparation is required here.

Next to the specific absence of a partner because of deployments, fear and stressful preparation time of course also play a role. In addition, the after-effects continue to be felt until the experiences have largely been dealt with. In fact, families first have to learn – with greater or lesser difficulty – to live their everyday lives without the absent person. After they return, everyone involved has to learn to make room for the returnee again. Hardly any couple or any family can simply continue after the deployment in the same way they did before. That is normal. But it is also a fundamental opportunity to revitalize any relationship. To do this, however, perhaps we should distance ourselves a little from socially romanticized notions that everyday life and love are a matter of course.

What can the family do?

My key advice here is: don't keep your thoughts and feelings from each other. Openly discuss fears and needs, expectations and difficulties. Make sure your bonds are strong, and talk, talk, talk. Take children's fears seriously, and answer

their questions honestly. Incidentally, the unpleasant questions about possible dangers can be answered honestly, and age-appropriately, without causing panic – if it is made clear that there are dangers, but that daddy or mommy is very well prepared.

The proportion of women in the German armed forces currently stands at just over ten percent. What is your experience of female soldiers – do they deal with challenges differently, and how?

First of all, I would like to speak from personal experience: in the 15 years that I have worked in this field, my experience is that female soldiers are definitely a great asset. The challenges for a female soldier are very similar. However, one difference, for example, is that because of absences (mobility requirements such as overseas deployments), a guilty conscience towards children and the family can play a greater role than for male soldiers. This is tangible especially when children are very young. Achieving a specific work-family balance is usually more complicated and more emotional for women with children. In other respects, the mechanisms and conditions are similar, regardless of gender.

Separations in military relationships are not uncommon. What can these couples do to help their partnership?

Ultimately, like other relationships, military relationships fail because of unsuccessful communication between the partners. Above all, it is essential to make sure, time and again, that you have what is referred to as “partner knowledge.” It is natural that expectations and fears about life together change. Questions of meaning also change over the course of life. But to know and understand how these conditions have changed, and to take steps in the right direction with regard to relationship planning, will be critical in determining whether both part-

ners and children feel that they are involved in the decision-making. Military families – perhaps more than other families and couples – need to constantly review and develop their future plans together. There is no lifelong certainty or resolve. Human expectations and dislikes change in this professional context.

The conditions of the military profession demand a special vigilance for one another. It is important that the employer should provide support, along with all pastoral and welfare bodies and institutions. In the military as elsewhere, success cannot be guaranteed. But there is always a big chance of having a fulfilling lifelong partnership!

The Bundeswehr has recruitment problems. Last year, less than 10,000 out of 12,500 places on the voluntary military service (*Freiwilliger Wehrdienst*) program were filled. One contributing factor is the difficulty of balancing a career in the Bundeswehr with family life. In your view, what can the Bundeswehr do to improve this? And what should applicants be clear about?

Without a doubt, the conditions are special. The military profession per se is not really family friendly. Everyone involved knows this. Nevertheless, every day I see fulfilled and happy military families. And it can be said that the general conditions have improved greatly over the last 20 years, as far as the central issues are concerned. At the same time, of course, there is still a lot of work to be done. And yet ultimately there is always one key aspect that determines whether an individual soldier feels, on a personal level, that their situation is family friendly: the possibility of being dynamically involved in shaping the key events and transitions in (family) life. Of course, it is obvious that the military profession sets natural and clear limits in this regard. But such an opportunity for involvement is definitely not a utopia. I find that the vast majority of soldiers are highly motivated people

who are aware of the dangers and stresses. But the advantages and positive aspects of the military profession are ultimately decisive for many soldiers with their families. It is the major events and turning points in life, and not infrequently the personally challenging times, for which military families desire opportunities for responsible involvement and flexibility.

Dr. Wendl, thank you for this candid interview.

Imprint



The e-journal “Ethics and Armed Forces” (ISSN 2199-4137) is a free-of-charge, non-commercial, digital publication containing journalistic and editorial content.

It is produced by

Zentrum für ethische Bildung in den
Streitkräften – zebis
Herrengraben 4
20459 Hamburg
Germany

Director of zebis: Dr. Veronika Bock

Editorial team

Gertrud Maria Vaske, Chief Editor
Dr. Iris Höger, Editor
Hannah Nicklas, Editor

Contact

Phone: +49 (0)40 67 08 59-51
Fax: +49 (0)40 67 08 59-30
E-mail: info@ethicsandarmedforces.com

**Person responsible for content
pursuant to section 55 (2) of the German
Interstate Broadcasting Agreement
(Rundfunkstaatsvertrag, RStV):**

Gertrud Maria Vaske
Herrengraben 4
20459 Hamburg
Germany

**Service provider as the legal entity of
Zentrum für ethische Bildung in den
Streitkräften – zebis:**

Katholische Soldatenseelsorge (KS)

Legal form

Public-law institution

Supervision

Catholic military bishop for the German armed
forces (Bundeswehr)
Am Weidendamm 2
10117 Berlin
Germany

Authorized board of directors of KS:

Leitender Militärdekan Msgr. Wolfgang Schilk
Am Weidendamm 2
10117 Berlin, Germany

Diplom-Kaufmann Wolfgang Wurmb
Am Weidendamm 2
10117 Berlin, Germany

Contact KS

Phone: +49 (0)30 20617-500
Fax: +49 (0)30 20617-599
E-Mail: Info@Katholische-Soldatenseelsorge.de

Date of release: Juny 15 2016

Special thanks to zebis guest student Kay
White for assistance with this issue.