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Quo vadis **EU:** ***Force for Peace or Military Power?***

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Quo vadis EU:
Force for Peace or Military Power?
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The European Union (EU) is engaged in crisis management worldwide. According to its self-image, the EU acts as a *force for peace.* The Treaty on European Union (TEU) names its normative bases: peace, democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, and also the protection of fundamental freedoms–as well as the independence and integrity of the Union. The EU views itself as a global player whose capacity to act with regard to its peace and security policy must be improved in light of the challenges and threats of the 21st century. Others deplore the EU's military weakness and political disunity, especially in violent conflicts like that in Libya. It is nevertheless true that the Union contributes to the European and international blueprint for lasting peace in two ways. First, the EU is a project for peace that is directed inwards, in reaction to the demise of a Europe characterised by competition for power and nationalism. The EU's second contribution consists of promoting international stability on the basis of common values and interests. But will the EU do justice to this claim, that of being, as the European Council President Herman van Rompuy recently expressed, "the fatherland of peace"[1], externally, too? These questions shall be answered in three steps. First, the concept of a force for peace that is derived from the EU's self-image will be presented. Next, the perspective will be narrowed to the area of crisis management. The structures and instruments that were created for this purpose will be depicted, then the operations will be analysed and their effectiveness assessed. In conclusion, the issue will be addressed of whether the EU actually operates as a peace-compatible player in the sense of being a force for peace, and the challenges it faces.

A Force for Peace – An Approach for the EU?

The concept of the EU being a force for peace contrasts with that of a classical great or military power in that military instruments play a subordinate role. The concept is distinguished from the classical civilian power model of the 1970s insofar that coercive

[1] Speech at the University of Warsaw on 17th January 2011, p. 6, at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/118874.pdf.

instruments could be used in certain circumstances. According to the newer model, a force for peace neither would be an actor that exclusively uses civilian means nor would it conduct foreign and security policy in the style and with the means of a classical great power. The European Union would instead be a group player who realises its entire range of capacities in the framework of a *security governance* “through, with and in the EU”.[2] Therefore, an EU that is a force for peace would have to

- *first,* be normatively geared to cooperative security and peaceful change;
- *second,* clearly grant priority to preventive strategies without, however, excluding interventions using coercive means that are in compliance with the rules;
- *third,* dispose of the requisite civilian and military instruments for constructive conflict management and combine these conceptually, structurally and functionally in an integrated approach;
- *fourth,* work closely with social actors, expecially local stakeholders and non-governmental organisations; and
- *fifth,* maintain intensive cooperative relations with international and regional security organisations, especially the United Nations.

The conditions for being a force for peace are only fulfilled when all five criteria–that, to a certain extent, constitute a complex policy–apply. In contrast to the civilian- and military-power models, a force for peace does not only dispose of civilian and military power. On the contrary, its goal is keeping and restoring the peace in conformity with international law by means of a comprehensive security policy; it is therefore normatively and functionally committed. With respect to the co-determination of the international blueprint for lasting peace, this means that the EU must continue to adhere to its contractually defined goals and principles, and cultivate its concepts and capabilities with them in mind.

Civilian and Military Crisis Management

Of the five criteria mentioned above, the EU’s civilian and military crisis management–its structures, activities and effects–has priority here since it is a special characteristic of the EU

[2] Bernhard Rinke, Interne Security Governance als Herausforderung für die Europäische Union: Das Beispiel des zivil-militärischen EU-Krisenmanagements [Internal Security Governance as a Challenge for the European Union: The Example of the EU’s Civilian-Military Crisis Management], in: Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Martin Kahl, Security Governance in und für Europa. Konzepte, Akteure, Missionen [Security Governance In and For Europe. Concepts, Actors, Missions], Baden-Baden 2010, p. 93.

that is being developed very actively. However, it remains open to review whether the EU's civilian-military linkage is actually sharpening the EU's profile as a force for peace, or whether this serves the opposite purpose, such as what some identify as the EU's alleged militarisation.

Structures and Instruments of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

Over the years, the EU has developed new structures and instruments for crisis management that tend to enable an integrated approach and strengthen its role as a force for peace. The Treaty of Amsterdam established crisis management involving military means as one of the EU's remits. With the EU Treaty of Nice's Political and Security Committee (PSC), a centrepiece of crisis management was formed that is composed of permanent representatives of the Member States and a representative of the Commission. The PSC is supposed to monitor the international situation, deliver policy briefs regarding the CFSP/CSDP and supervise implementation of agreed measures. It furthermore exercises the political control and strategic direction of crisis-management operations.
A committee was established for civilian crisis management that is composed of representatives of all Member States, the Council Secretariat and the Commission. It is supposed to provide the PSC with information, formulate recommendations and circulate suggestions for civilian crisis-management operations. The Commission also disposes of civilian instruments for acute crisis management, including the possibility of financing temporary civilian measures for crisis management. The Military Committee is the highest military institution in the Council's political-military structure. Assisted by the Military Staff, it advises the PSC on all military questions. It provides early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for the execution of the Petersberg tasks, that is, humanitarian missions and evacuation measures, or peacekeeping measures and combat missions for crisis management, including measures to restore the peace, as well as–since the Treaty of Lisbon's entry into force–military consulting and stabilisation forces.
The Military Staff is a multinational department with some 200 personnel that has no strategic-operational management capability. These tasks are either assumed by NATO in compliance with the Berlin Plus agreement of 2003, that governs the Union's assured access to the Alliance's operational planning capabilities and the availability of the latter's chain of command for EU-led military operations, or the headquarters of a so-called *framework nation*. The latter is responsible for the leadership, administration and logistics of a national

headquarters with a multinational staff. At present, five States dispose of this management capability: Germany, France, Greece, Great Britain and Italy.

Since 2004 there has also been a civilian-military cell consisting of two components – a strategic planning unit with a staff of 16 and a permanent core of eight officers that forms the Operations Centre which could swell to a total of 89 persons. The Operations Centre has no standing headquarters; instead it is a headquarters that can be organised *ad hoc* to lead a joint task force of maximal 2,000 soldiers. It has been operational since January 2007. Other institutional innovations include establishing a civilian headquarters (*Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability*, CPCC) in 2008 and forming an integrated strategic planning unit (*Crisis Management Planning Directorate*, CMPD) in 2009.

Since 1st December 2010, most of these management units have been centralised in the new European External Action Service (EEAS). Added to that are the geographic and thematic departments, the coordinating committees and their affiliated working groups.[3] This new foreign and security-policy organisation is made up of experts from the Council Secretariat, the Commission and the national capitals. It will be directed by the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton**,** who has the right of initiative. She is simultaneously Vice President of the European Commission and responsible for coordinating the civilian and military aspects of crisis management. Furthermore, she is President of the Foreign Affairs Council and the European Defence Agency.

The CMPD is supposed to become the centrepiece of strategic planning for, and implementation of, crisis management. Therewith, one more civilian-military interface has been created–but strikingly, military officers or civilians with military background are disproportionately represented in it. Earlier considerations of creating a broader directorate for *peacebuilding* were blocked by British and French opposition. Trade, development and enlargement policy remain in the jurisdiction of the Commission, but could be included in formulating strategy though a coordinating committee. This possibility of accessing the Commission's financial instruments through implementation of the CFSP is described as the "centrepiece of the reform".[4]

It remains to be seen how the intergovernmental structures and the Commission's units will harmonise within the EEAS. The same applies to the view that the Treaty of Lisbon offers the

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[3] Cf. the provisional structure of the EEAS at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/eeas_prov_organisation_en.pdf.

[4] In the words of the EEAS Deputy General Secretary, Helga-Maria Schmid: EU-Außenpolitik nach Lissabon. Struktur und Wirkung [EU Foreign Policy after Lisbon. Structure and Impact], in: Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik [Journal for Foreign and Security Policy] (2010): 4, p. 462.

Union a "*once in a generation opportunity*" for a new foreign and security policy.[5] In any case, it is true that a better strategic orientation, as well as a more coherent use of various diplomatic, security, development and trade policy instruments are made possible through the revalorised position of the High Representative and the EEAS. This development will be supported on operational levels through the more than 130 EU embassies (officially referred to as 'delegations') also affiliated with the EEAS, that are also supposed to consider aspects of foreign, security, peace and human-rights policy. Decisive for the EU's development as a force for peace might finally be the degree to which it succeeds in linking short-notice crisis-management to long-term strategic goals using the new structures and instruments.

CSDP Operations: A Quantitative and Qualitative Evaluation

Since the beginning of the CSDP's operational phase, the EU has carried out 24 missions, ten of which have been completed. Six took, or are taking, place in the Balkans, three in the Eastern Neighbourhood, ten in Africa and five in the Middle East. Most of the missions are characterised by modest staffing levels (ten missions under 100, seven under 1,000) and their civilian character. Seven operations were military, none of which were in a *high-end* spectrum. Two of them were – or are – being carried out in Europe in accordance with the Berlin Plus agreement, the other five as autonomous operations in Africa. The quantitatively most extensive military operation was EUFOR Althea in Bosnia, that temporarily included 7.000 action forces. The most difficult autonomous operation regarding the theatre of operations was EUFOR Chad with 3,700 action forces. Aside from the *monitoring* missions in Aceh and Georgia, all civilian missions are basically missions to reform the security sector in the areas of military, police, border management and the rule of law. The most ambitious mission had some 1,700 active forces in Kosovo.
On the Guinea-Bissau mission, civilian and military staff worked under one mandate in one structure, with one mission leader. There had been previous civilian missions with plain-clothed military experts, such as the EUSEC RD Congo and the AMM in Aceh, mostly because of financial reasons. By and large, a tendency to more civilian-military overlapping can be observed. Nevertheless, it's a slow process that has not yet led to a complete interconnection – primarily because of different financing mechanisms, various bureaucratic

[5] Gérard Quille, The European External Action Service and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), in: Ettore Greco/Nicoletta Pirozzi/Stefano Silvestri (Eds.): EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making, Rome 2010, p. 66.

cultures and political barriers. Alongside the trend towards civilian-military integration, the following developments can be summarised:

- Globalisation of the range of the operations: Whilst five of the first six operations took place in Europe, of the next six, only one was in Europe and just four of the following twelve.
- Expansion of the array of the missions focussing on the lower range of the Petersberg tasks: The EU began with police and military missions, then expanded to missions supporting the rule of law and security sector reform, as well as border-control reinforcement and ceasefire monitoring.
- A growing number of interfaces: First the EU concentrated on improving the civilian military cooperation within the CFSP through the so-called *Civil Military Coordination*. Then interfaces to other EU institutions were supported. In the meantime, the EU has adopted the NATO terminology of a *Comprehensive Approach* and attempts to implement this ambition in the planning and execution of operations.
- Increasing readiness of third countries to participate: It has become normal meanwhile for forces from third countries to take part in EU-led operations, the most active among them being Norway, Canada, Turkey, Croatia and Switzerland. Participants like Russia (EUFOR Chad) and the USA (EULEX) are remarkable.
- Closer partnerships with international security organisations: Whilst the EU conducted two operations following the Berlin Plus agreement (Concordia, Althea), the cooperation with NATO on civilian missions in Kosovo and in Afghanistan, as well as in the civilan-military supporting actions AMIS II and Operation Atalanta, was informal. The UN and the African Union (AU) were involved – directly or indirectly – in all EU operations in Africa.
- Intensified operational cooperation with the United Nations: Following the joint declaration about crisis-management cooperation in 2003, cooperative structures were formed between the two organisations. At the UN’s request, the EU has also been militarily active in Africa four times. In two cases, it operated in the framework of a ‘bridging operation’ until UN blue helmets could again take over (Artemis, EUFOR Chad), once as a *stand-by force* to provide security for a UN peacekeeping mission (EUFOR RD Congo) and once as a UN-mandated maritime joint task force (EU NAVFOR Somalia).

- Cooperation with the local civil society: The EU increasingly works with local authorities and non-governmental organisations. Nevertheless, it is still far from implementing a truly collaborative process with the host country.
- Growing financial costs: Although it continues to grow, the CFSP budget is comparatively small. It is now a nominal EUR 300 million per year. The outlay for civilian CSDP missions – military operations are mostly paid by the troop providers – rose from EUR 44.2 million in 2004 to EUR 280.9 million in 2010. That corresponds to 0.2 percent of the EU's total budget of EUR 141.5 billion and seven percent of the budget for foreign relations which, at EUR 4.2 billion, makes up three percent of the EU's total budget. By 2013, CFSP expenses are planned to rise to EUR 409 million. However, in comparison to the planned EUR 2.7 billion for development and EUR 1.88 billion for neighbourhood policy, this sum still seems modest.

CSDP operations should contribute to more effectively countering the threats mentioned in the European security strategy – the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, state failure, regional instability, organised crime, online and energy security, climate change – and to supporting the Union's strategic goals.[6] A more complete approach to security with more emphasis on prevention, creating security in the immediate neighbourhood and supporting a world order based on effective multilateralism are all part of that. To satisfy the postulated comprehensive approach, the EU must complete its transition from declamatory to practical politics. It is not enough to postulate the connection of CFSP missions to longer-term development-policy activities, without making them operational – preferably right in the planning process. The credibility of the EU's widened interpretation of security and of CFSP operations will be damaged if the EU does not manage to move the proclaimed nexus of security and development from its (conceptual) head to its (operational) feet. That requires, however, incorporating short-term measures into a long-term security strategy that treats the roots of the problems and thereby more seriously considers development-policy concerns.

The Effects of CSDP Operations

[6] Bericht über die Umsetzung der Europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie – Sicherheit schaffen in einer Welt im Wandel [Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy—Creating Security in a Changing World], Brussels, 11th December 2008, pp. 407f., http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/DE/reports/104634.pdf.

Evaluating the EU as a force for peace requires analysis of the CSDP operations. If we look at the EU's self-assessment, unsurprisingly we find that all the operations within the framework of the CSDP are basically regarded as successes. There are three reasons for this: First, this new and politically sensitive policy must be as well 'sold' as possible. Second, the concrete mandates are often formulated so that failure is scarcely possible. Third, all operations took place in the lower area of the range of operations. If we measure the challenging political goals that individual missions should contribute to – such as bolstering peace in Africa or security in Afghanistan – the judgement will be more modest. There is often a gap between pompous political rhetoric and the mission leadership's specific assignment. It must be conceded, however, that the EU as an organisation is still learning. All operations pass through a *lessons-learnt* process. But this covers only the technical and tactical problems in implementation, not political-strategic questions.

There is external criticism of the effect of CSDP measures. Advocates of the great-power model say that the CSDP is of only limited value – or is by and large ineffective – because its military capacities are inadequate, or there is no clear willingness to employ military means. But if the focus is on the impact of a CSDP mission on the country of deployment, most host countries evaluate CSDP operations positively. Normally they call for more engagement, not less. Of course, the missions exhibit both successes and failures. This is illustrated in the military operation EU NAVFOR Somalia and the civilian mission EUMM Georgia, as well as the hybrid mission EU SSR Guinea-Bissau.

With its most recent operation, EU NAVFOR Somalia, the EU has shown for the first time that it also disposes of a maritime military dimension. This mission to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden, that began in 2008 and is mandated to run until 2012, is officially part of a comprehensive civilian-military approach. The Commission's activities in the areas of humanitarian assistance (EUR 200 million since 2006), security sector reform (EUR 13 million since 2003) and foreign aid (215 million, 2008–2013), as well as the EU *Training Mission* (EUTM), that has been operational since April 2010 are all part of this approach.[7] Both CSDP operations are based on a UN mandate. Whilst the approximately 1,400 action forces of a comprehensive naval operation are supposed to protect UN World Food Programme vessels and navigation off the coast of Somalia in particular, the EUTM's approximately 140 action forces contribute to strengthening the Somalian security sector by training Somali police forces in Uganda. Both operations are taking place in coordination with the UN and the African Union. This mission is in accordance with EU objectives and the AU

[7] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/101207 Fact sheet EUTM - version 6_EN.pdf

and EU's common strategy for Africa. That said, the results so far have been modest. Whilst EU NAVFOR Somalia has managed to protect the World Food Programme transports, neither it nor the other international naval forces in the region have been able to prevent the pirates from becoming stronger. Priority has been accorded to combatting the symptoms, not the causes. The EUTM, in turn, is supposed to support a transitional Somalian government that is totally disunited and only controls Mogadishu. The police training, limited to twelve months, has been extended to 2012. Thusfar, the results of the EUTM have been mixed. Some of the 'police' are said to have deserted to Islamist or other militias. The EU also has supported the AU's AMISOM peacekeeping troops stationed in Somalia with EUR 208 million from the European Development Fund. But despite all the diplomatic efforts to support the Djibouti Peace Process, nothing has changed in Somalia's desolate security situation. For this reason we must welcome, on the one hand, the fact that the EEAS is designing a comprehensive strategy for the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, the Council requested this strategy already for October 2010.

The ongoing EUMM in *Georgia* was established in September 2008 shortly after the Russo-Georgian War. The politically highly sensitive mission tasked with stabilising, normalising, confidence building and information acquisition is significant with regard to security policy. EUMM proves that the EU is able to respond to a crisis very rapidly, thereby contributing to de-escalation. Within two weeks after the Council's decision the EUMM was able to begin its work. Its accomplishment further shows the importance of strong-willed political leadership, in this case, that of the French Presidency. Finally, it also emphasises how Russia views the EU as a politically acceptable stabilising and intervening force, which was not the case of missions in Georgia run by the UN and the OSCE, whose mandates were not extended. But these findings cannot obscure the numerous difficulties: Faulty planning led to the mission being considerably larger than originally envisaged, and resources required for reconnaissance were not made available. Another challenge resulted from Russia and the (Georgian) provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – that Russia recognises as being independent – regarding the EUMM mission as applying only to the Georgian heartland. The breakaway provinces consider the EUMM to be biased because it calls for Georgia's territorial integrity. A further problem is the EU States' disunity regarding the strategic orientation of its Russian and Neighbourhood policy. All the same, the EU is substantially stronger, with more instruments in Georgia than in many other civilian missions, which indicates the greater political significance of this conflict in the EU's immediate neighbourhood.

In 2008 for the first time, a small integrated mission for security sector reform was positioned in *Guinea-Bissau*. An integrated approach including military, police and judicial teams created favourable preconditions for a successful operation in the small country. Yet the mission that was completed on 30th September 2010 must be judged as a failure. Only two-thirds of the 21 positions could be filled; material procurement proved sluggish; and the country's dramatically acute political situation prevented implementation of the targets. Finally, there was no political support for the undertaking on the part of international donors and the EU Member States, which indicates a lack of strategic interest. This case shows that an integrated approach alone does not automatically lead to success.

On the one hand, these three examples give a first impression of the variety and effectiveness of CSDP missions, whilst on the other hand they prove their weaknesses, problems and need for improvement. In addition, they illustrate how numerous parameters influence the effectiveness of the operations. Of greatest significance are the political context in the crisis area, the domestic political conditions in the sending states and their willingness to support the plan in a sustained manner. Another five main problem areas can be identified that affect the effectiveness of miliary and/or civilian operations:

1. A major problem is generating the forces. There are often insufficent numbers of readily available action forces and experts, especially in the civilian sector.
2. The financing is tricky. For military operations, the participating States have to bear the brunt of the costs. For civilian missions, the CSDP budget can be tapped, but the rather bureaucratic authorisation procedure hampers rapid action.
3. The tendency towards 'ad hockery' impedes careful planning. Although the EU has a permanent civilian headquarters, it has none for the military. If and when the planning department for crisis management will develop into a comprehensive civil-military strategic planning and conduct entity remains to be seen.
4. The analysis of the local situation and the operations logic that prevails there is inadequate. In addition, identification of appropriate local contact persons and clear operationalisation of *local ownership* are often lacking.
5. Jockeying for authority by various EU actors handicaps the effectiveness both on the political-strategic and on the operational levels. The European Diplomatic Service could make improvements here.

Despite this criticism, most of the CSDP operations – measured by the scanty means used – are relatively efficient in political terms. This especially goes for the scarcely noticed small civilian missions. But if we were to inquire if and to what extent the common goals were achieved in the host countries or regions, the findings would become very murky. Moreover, it must be stated: It is not the number of operations that is decisive, but rather their contribution to effectively defusing a crisis.

A Peace-Compatible Crisis Manager or a Traditional Military Power?

It should be noted that so far, the EU has had limited effect but nevertheless has been shown to be a crisis manager of a kind that is compatible with peace. It is a complex and therefore often sluggish institution that – especially with regards to security and defence policy – mostly acts as an agent for the Member States. It has taken action in CSDP operations on the basis of UN mandates, and only on approval of the government of the country involved. Could the EU still develop into a classical military power? That depends last not least on its quality as as an internataional actor. The EU's lack of statehood and the associated capacity to act mean that it cannot become a military power on the order of the USA or China. But the EU also has outgrown the status of a pure civilian power, and is therefore faced with the question of how and why it brings its civilian and military capacities to bear in a crisis situation.

There is plenty to be said for the EU being able to establish itself as a force for peace: First of all, in the last decade European defence budgets have tangibly decreased, and in view of the global financial and economic crisis they most likely will be inclined to continue to show a downward tendency. This increases the chances that the civilian and preventive aspects of crisis handling will be strengthened. Second, the Union must increasingly concern itself with the security concerns of its own continent and borders; accordingly, it must increase its coherency in order to be able to ensure the public good security. Third, the EU will increasingly be requested to act globally as a security policy player with specific civilian-military know-how – especially by the United Nations.

The most important concern, however, arises from Europe's transnational risks: More than ever before, the States of the Union are dependent on internal and international cooperation to safeguard their security. In the middle- and long-term, military means play a secondary, and civilian means a more important, role in coping with these dangers. It is becoming ever more

urgent to effectively departmentally and sectorially cross-link the various instruments for crisis management – at both the national and European levels.
Certainly, there is also much that argues against the EU's development as a force for peace. We need only mention the Member States' egoism and the policymakers' affinity for pursuing the traditional logic of political action. The return of France into NATO's military command in 2009 and the British-French agreement on increased military cooperation in November 2010 might also result in weakening the CSDP. With the development of the CSDP and a comprehensive security approach, the EU (and with it, the German Government) are confronted with other important questions: How can the effectivity and legitimacy of the CFSP/CSDP be increased? Which norms should be transferred in what manner? What is the appropriate level of ambition? In the future, how will effective multilateralism and close cooperation with social actors be possible? Principally:

- The effectiveness of the CFSP/CSDP should be strengthened through better policy networking and increased political integration, instrument bundling and task specialisation.
- The EU's foreign and security-policy legitimacy should be increased through more parliamentary right of scrutiny and greater cooperation of national parliaments and the European Parliament.
- Stabilisation through the transfer of norms should take place through peaceful change, cooperative security and the consolidated use of civilian instruments.
- The level of ambition should focus on goals that ought to be deduced from a still-to-be-developed European strategy for peace and security.
- In the areas of crisis prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding, the heralded true multilateralism should lead to intensified cooperation with the UN, the AU and other regional organisations, as well as with civil society.

Since its founding, the EU has been reproached for its weak foreign and security policy. All too often, the Member States only tend to their national egos – although they ought to have known all along that their political importance would significantly increase if they combined their efforts.. This is why the EU often reacts sluggishly in crisis situations and can – like in the cases of the Iraq and the Libyan war – briefly suffer its own crisis. Although the sphere of civilian-military crisis management is one of the few success stories of the last decade, the EU must nevertheless considerably improve its capacity to act in crisis situations. However,

compared with the situation before the introduction of the CFSP/CSDP, the EU's foreign and security-policy capacity development appears to be altogether positive.
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the EU's capacity to act potentially increased, the Union was accorded the status of a legal person. But – especially following the June 2009 decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court regarding the Lisbon Treaty – the EU is hardly likely to develop into a real federation with a supranational government that can determine foreign and security policy. It remains bound by structural and historical limits that can only be changed very slowly, if at all. From the point of view of peacebuilding, however, that is no disadvantage: pressure to reach a compromise actually increases the chances that the EU will prove to be a force for peace.