Electoral incentives and organisational limits.
The evolution of the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) and the United Left (IU)

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During the past fifteen years, western European communist parties have gone through a period of crisis and transformation. Given the important challenges these parties have been facing, they have had to decide about issues related to the very nature of their organisations. The crisis of socialist regimes in central and eastern Europe, the popular detachment from communist ideology, and the general weakening of their traditional sources of support, have placed western communist parties in a very uncertain position with regard to their electoral future. In this context, these parties had to decide how to behave in front of the crisis, how to reverse their bad electoral results, how to recover their leverage, and how to manage their ideological tradition and organisational legacy in order to facilitate a party revival.

The case of the Communist Party of Spain (*Partido Comunista de España*, PCE) responds to this logic of crisis and choices made with the goal of reviving the party. During these past decades, important changes have taken place in the organisation, ideology and strategy of the PCE. This has included the creation of a new organisation, United Left (*Izquierda Unida*, IU), in which the PCE has maintained a leading role. In certain respects, both organisations, the PCE and IU, have become indistinguishable. The aim of this paper is to explain this process of adaptation, the behaviour of the PCE and IU, their organisational and political strategies, and to clarify which factors influenced party choices and decisions. The period studied begins in 1986, the year in which the PCE decided to create IU, and ends in 2000, after the general elections.

The following section introduces the reader to the trajectory of the PCE since the mid-1970's to the mid-1980's to then move on to discuss the theoretical tools needed to analyse the parties' behaviour in the context of hard choices (Müller and Strom 1999)[1]. Finally, we will study the PCE and IU's political and organisational strategies.

3

THE PCE'S CRISIS AND THE APPEARANCE OF IU

The PCE's multi-dimensional crisis –electoral, organisational, ideological, tactical, etc.– followed closely the one suffered by western European communist parties –WEC– (Lazar, 1988; Bull, 1995). In this context, the PCE is a remarkable case in terms of the depth and rapidity of its crisis (Botella, 1988; Amodia, 1993). However, the Spanish case also has interesting peculiarities that deserve to be observed closely.

During the democratic transition, the PCE adopted a moderate political line. The party participated in the "Euro-Communist" project and redesigned significant parts of its traditional platform. The PCE tried both to contribute to the political stability of the new democratic regime and to increase its own electoral appeal (Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986; Heywood, 1987). However, the party's electoral results in the two first legislative elections of 1977 and 1979 were disappointing. A year after these second elections the outset of a serious internal conflict caused important leaders to leave, as well as massive expulsions and sanctions, and tensions between the central party structure and the regional branches. The authority of the secretary general was challenged openly. It seems clear that in spite of the apparent calm within the party between 1977 and 1980, the internal consensus was fragile (Gunther, 1986: 501). On the one hand, certain sectors did not share the moderate line promoted by the party secretary, Santiago Carrillo. On the other, certain groups that supported the ideological and political changes proposed by Carrillo were unhappy due to his hesitation to democratise the internal party structure (for instance, the PCE had rejected Leninism but not democratic centralism). This sector, known as "the renovators" began to express their criticisms openly, and beginning in 1981, intensified their attacks against Carrillo. During 1981 and 1982 "the renovators" suffered numerous expulsions and sanctions.

The PCE was already divided when the 1982 general elections took place: its moderate image had been damaged, its leader had lost his prestige, and some of its most important activists were not in the party

anymore. The defeat at the elections was a disaster: 3.9% of the votes and only four MPs (out of 350). Carrillo resigned as secretary general but the internal crisis and conflict grew in the following months. First, the party split in 1984 and the more orthodox communist wing –known as "pro-soviet"– abandoned the PCE creating a new communist party. After that, it was the former party secretary general, Carrillo, who leading the opposition against his successor Gerardo Iglesias, abandoned the PCE creating also a new communist organisation. In the mid-1980's, therefore, there were three communist parties, whilst the PCE was very weak from an organisational and electoral point of view, and was poorly represented at an institutional and parliamentary level.

In 1985, the PCE initiated a debate on the need to form an alliance with other left-wing organisations. This process of deliberation led in April of 1986 to the launching -with several other minor groups to the left of PSOE- of the IU. The driving force behind the creation of IU was mainly the PCE, which was also the biggest organisation within it. In addition to the PCE, the IU included five other very small parties and other non-affiliated people -some of them former PCE members. Thus, the IU was created as an electoral coalition only some weeks before the 1986 general elections, and shortly after the referendum on the permanence of Spain in NATO.

In the context of more or less radical changes within WEC parties, the Spanish case stands out for two reasons. The first one is the early date in which the Communist Party started to change (1986), preceding the transformations in the Italian, Swedish, Finnish and Dutch communist parties[2]. The second one is the complexity of the changes initiated with the formation of the IU. With the creation of the IU, the PCE was promoting an important organisational and political change, but the party itself did not disappear. The PCE reduced its own activity very strongly, and devoted itself to the development of the IU. As a consequence, the IU grew and developed its own structures, but the communist organisation continued alive. The result was a complex organisation (IU) that was not a party nor a

coalition, in which the PCE participated actively.

The election of this path through which the PCE was going to build the IU, meant making choices among very different organisational and political alternatives. The choices made were especially relevant given the fact that what was at stake was the party's own survival. Communist leaders had, at least, three options:

i) To dissolve the Communist Party and create a new organisation;

ii) To maintain the Communist Party without any serious organisational or political changes; and

iii) The "intermediate" option, the one finally taken, of carrying out organisational and political changes without dissolving the Communist Party.

However, these options offered different possibilities with regard to the depth of the transformations. One of the most striking features of the Spanish case is, precisely, the evolution of the "intermediate" option for change. From an organisational point of view, the initial design of the IU was that of a complex, developed and unitary organisation, something more than a simple electoral coalition. Although the PCE did not disappear, it sharply reduced its political activity. The PCE placed itself in a situation close to its disappearance in favour of the IU. However, subsequently, the PCE reversed this strategy and promoted the recovery of its role and activity. From an ideological point of view, the 1986-2000 period is characterised, to a great extent, by the radicalisation of the IU and the PCE. This radicalisation, interestingly enough, took place at the same time that the IU achieved its best electoral results, and ended not only with a total conflict with the Socialist Party (PSOE) but also, and more paradoxically, with a severe struggle with the traditionally sister union *Comisiones Obreras* (CC.OO.).

How and why did the evolution of the PCE and IU follow this particular version of the "intermediate" change option? Why, after the first steps that suggested a separation from the traditional communist identity,

did an ideological and organisational step backward take place? It is possible to hypothesise that the creation of the IU was a PCE initiative in an attempt to maximise votes by diluting the communist image, in a moment in which the PCE could hardly be considered as an electoral asset. However, there were no moves towards the full development of the logical consequence of that reasoning: the PCE did not finally disappear and the IU did not moderate its platform to compete with the socialists for the moderate left-wing voters. Why did the PCE not accept the logical consequence of the formation of the IU? Why did the PCE and the IU adopt a radicalised political strategy that could not easily attract former socialist voters? We could possibly also think that with the creation of the IU, the PCE only wanted to form an electoral coalition and that the communists did not conceive a more ambitious project of transformation. But the moves and tactics of the PCE at the end of the 1980's were such that, as we will see, they gave credibility to the possibility of a close disappearance of the communist organisation. Why did these initiatives not culminate in the dissolution of the PCE and the transformation of the IU into a new party?

There are at least two possible answers. Perhaps the leaders of the PCE really attempted to create a new post-communist organisation but they found or perceived important barriers to that purpose that made their original aim impossible. Or, perhaps, they only wanted to obtain the electoral rewards that an organisation like the IU could entail without assuming the costs of dissolving the PCE. The IU could then be an "umbrella" organisation for the PCE in which communists could have the control in the shadow. But irrespectively of what answer is closer to reality, it is necessary to account for the limits, barriers or incentives that guided the behaviour of the PCE leaders and to explain why they supported a very ideologically radicalised strategy towards PSOE and their former ally union, CC.OO.

This paper intends to give answers to these questions by studying how the leaders of the PCE and IU made the choices that determined the

evolution of both organisations, which dilemmas they confronted, and which factors limited their decisions and affected the final evolution of both organisations. The analysis will focus on explaining the evolution of the PCE and IU in three aspects of their organisational and political strategies: the creation of the IU and the PCE's role within it; the strategy towards the PSOE; and the strategy towards CC.OO. In short, the objective is to explain why the behaviour of the PCE and IU was as it eventually was, and under what preferences, strategies and pressures it took shape. Before beginning the analysis of the PCE and IU's behaviour we will briefly review certain theoretical hypothesis about party behaviour.

PARTY BEHAVIOUR AND PARTY CHOICES

Parties, as other organisations, have goals and these goals affect party behaviour. Goals direct and legitimate the activity and the existence of the organisation (Etzioni, 1960; Clark and Wilson, 1961). Therefore, goals are a guide for action (Mohr, 1977: 477) and limit the possible ways of action because they constitute principles that the organisation should satisfy (Simon, 1964). Nevertheless, organisations also adapt to the environment, and doing so they change their goals to guarantee their survival. This idea is important because it emphasises the possibility that the organisation, in certain moments, will privilege objectives directed to assure its own survival while leaving aside other organisational goals. This process of goal displacement (Merton, 1957) can also operate in parties. The search for organisational survival involves guaranteeing the mechanisms that enable its functioning, and minimising the sources of internal and external tension (Wilson, 1973).

Although it is important for our understanding, the identification of organisational goals is not an easy task. Organisations normally have several goals and this consideration also applies to the case of parties[3]. Going beyond Downs (1957), who considered that the main goal of parties and their leaders was the maximisation of votes to be able to govern, recent approaches have tended to define a more complex relationship

8

between the various party goals. In a famous article, Strom (1990) differentiated three party goals: office-seeking, policy-seeking and vote-seeking. Following Strom's argument, parties share all these three goals. There are no pure models. However, accomplishing all the goals simultaneously would be impossible. The pursuit of one goal may be in contradiction with the accomplishment of another. Leaders face trade-offs among these goals. In this context, the decisions made by the leaders about the priorities or goals to be pursued are influenced by several factors. Müller and Strom (1999) especially highlight two sets of aspects that affect leaders' choices. The first one is formed by the organisational features of the party. They refer, specially, to constraints on the leadership, such as factions or rules that give members the power to limit leaders' decisions. The second one is formed by institutional determinants, such as the electoral system and party legislation (i.e. party financing rules), and properties of the party system such as its competitiveness[4]. Therefore, these two sets of variables could, ideally, help us explain party behaviour, clarifying the reasons behind the choice of certain goals by party leaders. In this paper, I will concentrate on the analysis of two of these variables. With regard to the external factors, I will analyse the electoral competition. With regard to the internal factors, I will focus on the possible constraints that the party organisation can impose on leaders' moves[5]. But, what kind of effect can we expect from these different factors?

The spatial theory is the central paradigm in the analysis of party competition. In Downs' (1957) well-known version, parties will modify and change their messages to maximise their opportunities of electoral success. In the one-dimensional space presented by Downs, parties trying to maximise votes would move their position towards the location of the average voter. However, real parties have consistently shown a different behaviour adopting, in many cases, political positions that are more extreme than those of their electors. The partisan moderation we could expect in the real world according to Downs' model, is certainly not a generally extended behaviour.

Downs' arguments have been frequently criticised and reformulated. Some of his critics argue that parties are not so free to move ideologically towards the average voter's position, or that moving towards that position is not so beneficial from an electoral point of view. According to the saliency theory of party competition (Robertson, 1976; Budge, Robertson and Hearl, 1987) parties emphasize the issues in which they think they have an advantage, but they are limited in their capacity to move: some issues are attached to specific parties, and party platforms also do matter. This means that leaders do not easily change their programmes, although they can and do vary the emphasis they give to different issues. The final image, according to this model, could be one very different to that of the Downsian mobile parties, which compete in a centripetal way. The directional theory of party competition (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989) also presents an important contrast to the traditional Downsian model of party competition. In this case, the average position is not the place that parties should occupy to maximise votes. Every position within the "region of acceptability" can be electorally competitive if the electorate is symmetrically distributed. Central positions would not be particularly beneficial. On the contrary, parties should make strong statements and they should only avoid being too extreme. Thus, party systems would tend to moderate pluralism (Rabinowitz, Macdonald and Listhaug, 1991). Finally, Przeworski and Sprague (1986) argue that parties may sacrifice short-term electoral maximisation in favour of a more ideological strategy that would build solid political identities, in an attempt to assure long-term electoral success.

But, irrespectively of its possible electoral advantages, parties could also adopt a radical stance due to the pressures of affiliates on the leaders. The idea of party members having more radical political positions than leaders has one of its most classical origins in Michels (1969), and was later reconsidered in May's *Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity*. May (1973) argued that sub-leaders are more radical than top-leaders because the former are motivated by ideological incentives while top-leaders

prioritise the search for votes. This argument has been strongly challenged in several empirical studies (see, for example, Kitschelt, 1989; Norris, 1995)[6].

In any case, the argument of members limiting the leaders' choices is very rooted in the literature on party behaviour. Some of the authors stress the importance of possible ideological differences that would limit the leaders' room for manoeuvring (Robertson, 1976). But more generally, what is present in most approaches is the leaders' need to take into account the preferences of the affiliates in their calculations (Barry, 1974; Hirschmann, 1977). Given that one of the most important motivations for party leaders is to continue in power (Maor, 1998), they should avoid alienating affiliates, since they usually play an important role in the election of party leaders. Whether party leaders are ideologically motivated or not, they need to gain a minimum appreciation from members, in whose hands is the power to nominate candidates or, at least, to influence the process (Wittman, 1983; Aldrich, 1983).

Members can influence party decisions in two ways (Müller and Strom, 1999): 1) directly, through their participation in formal decision-making party mechanisms; and 2) indirectly, through their implicit threat to leave if the deviation of party lines from their goals exceeds their level of tolerance. In any case, their preferences or the perception of their preferences by party leaders, and the need to avoid possible sources of internal dissent, transform party members in a factor which influences and constrains leaders' choices and, hence, party behaviour.

Therefore, in order to explain party behaviour it is important to identify the party goals considered by party leaders, but also the factors that affect the election of their priorities. With regard to one of these factors, electoral competition, it is crucial to clarify how party leaders react to the competition environment. It is necessary to define if they conceive it according to Downsian principles or if they seek votes in a different way. Depending on how party leaders view electoral competition, different party behaviours should be expected. But it is also important to specify if party

leaders perceive their own party organisation –its structures and members– as a barrier or a constraint to their decisions. If this is the case, the election among different party goals will also be determined by this internal factor.

The next pages will present the behaviour of the PCE and IU in three domains of their organisational and political strategies: the creation of the IU and the role of the PCE; the strategy towards the PSOE; and the strategy towards CC.OO. The aim is to explain these strategies and to specify the impact of the factors previously mentioned on the adoption of these strategies: party competition and internal organisational limits.

PCE'S CREATURE: THE IU, BETWEEN PARTY AND COALITION

The creation of the IU by the PCE in 1986 and its organisational evolution (with the subsequent changes in the PCE's role) are the most prominent expressions of the changing path followed by Spanish communists in the last fifteen years. The IU began to operate in 1986 as a mere electoral coalition with some *ad-hoc* commissions as its only organisational structure that coordinated the immediate electoral campaign. In addition, there was a commitment to form a single parliamentary group with all MPs elected under the IU's label. However, since the first weeks after the 1986 elections, the IU's organisational evolution made it increasingly difficult to determine whether it was an electoral coalition, a federation of parties and non-affiliated people, or a sharply divided party. In the next paragraphs we will examine five aspects that can help to clarify what kind of organisation the PCE has promoted for the IU[7].

The Structure of Organisational and Governing Bodies

The executive committee that was formed soon after the creation of the IU included representatives from the different groups. This body, the Political Council, organised the first IU Congress that took place in February 1989. At that congress, the IU decided to label itself as a *political*

and social movement instead of as a coalition. It was also then when it decided to create a structure of bodies following the traditional pyramidal and hierarchical model of political parties. It also decided the creation of local organisations in which all the members of the groups integrated in the IU would participate. At IU's second congress in 1990, a financial regulation for the operation of the IU and a federal regulation for the relations between IU's centre and its regional branches were approved. In 1992, the third IU congress approved the first statutes. At the end of that same year other regulations were approved: a new rule that defined the rights and duties of IU's public representatives and MPs; a regulation that allowed to create factions within the IU; and a regulation for the operation of working groups in charge of writing the electoral platform. At the following conferences, no important changes were introduced, although the addition of new rules and issues made the statutes more detailed.

The IU Membership

The concept of the IU member was only defined at its second congress (1990). That definition included members of the integrated parties (indirect members), and the non-affiliated people that were direct members of the IU. However, at the third congress (1992), membership to the IU began to be defined by the individual and direct act of joining the IU. In this sense, the integrated parties formally abandoned the mediation role that they before had in the affiliation process. Since then, all members of the integrated parties would get a separate membership card from the IU branches to become members of the IU.

IU membership is very low (see Table 1). Although it rose during the 1990's, this increase was irregular and not very substantial. Limited attempts to transform the IU into an open, participatory, and democratic organisation produced very partial results that did not improve the IU's appeal. This small membership increase has not been homogeneous in all regions: while in certain places the growth is constant in others there has been a membership decrease, and even in others it is impossible to find a

clear trend. Andalucía, Madrid, Asturias and Comunidad Valenciana, the IU traditional electoral strongholds are also the biggest regional branches in number of members. If we observe the members/voters ratio and members/electorate ratio, the organisational weakness of the IU becomes very apparent.

Table 1
The IU Membership, 1992-2000

	Members	Members/ Voters Ratio	Members/ Electors Ratio
1992	57,303	0.031	0.001
1994	52,711	0.024	0.001
1995	57,000	0.025	0.001
1996	65,999	0.025	0.002
1997	71,578	0.027	0.002
1999	69,000	0.026	0.002
2000	65,000	0.051	0.002

Source: Figures provided by the IU

It seems that the increase in membership is due to the arrival of new members which are only affiliated to the IU, given that communist membership –the only integrated party with a significant membership– has decreased constantly since the 1970's (see Table 2).

Table 2
The PCE Membership, 1977-1999[*]

	Members
1977	191,607
1978	156,184
1981	132,069
1983	82,877
1985	67,808
1987	62,342
1991	55,000
1992	44,775 (78.1)
1996	34,704 (53.3)
1997	35,000 (48.8)
1999	26,553 (38.4)

The Status of the Integrated Parties

The original creation of the IU as an electoral coalition (of seven parties) gave an important role to parties in the first steps of its development[8]. However, the situation has much changed since then. The number of integrated parties has reduced dramatically. In 2000 only three parties were integrated into the IU at a national level but in 2001, after the IR and the PASOC left, only the PCE remained. In the first three IU congresses the parties reserved for themselves a percentage of the total number of delegates. Until 1992, a system of quotas that distributed the positions in the organisational bodies and electoral lists among the integrated groups (considering non-affiliated members as another group) was at work. However, the IU statutes approved in 1992 put an end to this system. Since then, the decisions about the IU lists and bodies would have to be made without reserving or respecting any fixed quota.

In 1997 –a period of serious internal conflicts–, the IU leadership regulated the activities of the integrated parties, restricting the autonomous action of these parties within and out of the IU. However, all these regulations were not enough to mask the absolute predominance of the PCE members among the MPs, local councillors and leaders of the IU. The PCE is still the most important actor within the IU. Its members usually form the core of the activists and cadres within the IU, and the IU headquarters in many cities and villages are buildings owned or paid for by the PCE even many years after the creation of the IU.

The Formation of Factions within the IU

One of the most peculiar organisational characteristics of the IU is that it is formed by parties, independents and factions organised in different ways. A relevant feature of the factions in IU is that they are also

formed by members of the different parties and by independents. This means that factions cross the party lines within the IU. The regulation for factions appeared in 1992 and it was then when the first faction was created (*Nueva Izquierda*). That said, there are lots of conflicts between factions and the central leadership of IU, which shows that there exists no peaceful recognition of the faction system as an operating method for IU.

The Funding of the IU

The funding of the IU was not regulated until the second conference in 1990. It was then decided that the administration of all public subsidies would be the responsibility of the IU central office. At that time a membership fee was also established. There was a collective fee for the members of the integrated parties and an individual fee for the independents. The third IU congress (1992) decided that every IU member should pay a fee irrespective of his/her membership to any of the integrated parties. However, in 1997 the possibility of collective fees was again introduced as a result of the pressures made by the PCE. The IU central office receives the funding (public subsidies and fees), and then distributes part of the funds to the integrated parties and factions.

With regard to the real finances, the IU has increased its funds in the last decade. The source of this funding is mainly public subsidies (see Table 3). Until 1994, the IU was exclusively financed through public funds. From 1994 onwards, the IU began to receive membership fees. Although the amount of these fees has increased, this increase is hardly relevant. As its largest income share comes from state subsidies, the finances of the IU very much depend on its electoral performance. The simple consequence is that when the IU suffers an electoral failure, as in 1999 or 2000, the basic operation of its organisation is in danger.

Table 3
The IU Income, 1990-1999

	Income Variation	Public Funding	Membership Fees
1990		99.3	0
1991	+35.5	82.2	0

1993	-21.5	99.9	0
1994	+15.1	96.8	3.1
1995	+10.8	97.1	2.8
1996	+19.9	89.3	3.8
1997	+4.0	94.5	4.8
1998	-7.2	94.2	5.3
1999	-19.3	93.5	6.4

Source: Figures extracted from the IU reports. Data for 1992 could not be obtained. Income data indicate annual variation. Public funding and membership figures are percentages over the total income

It is important to highlight that most of the PCE income comes from the IU's own funding. In the PCE, the income coming from membership fees is only a minor part of the total income, and thus the funding of the communist organisation depends on the public subsidies received by the IU (Table 4).

Table 4
The PCE Income, 1988-1999

	Income Variation	The IU Income	Membership Fees	Other Contributions
1988		43.1	7.9	38.8
1989	-17.3	52.0	4.1	37.4
1990	+103.3	61.4	4.1	11.3
1991	-26.2	81.7	2.5	4.9
1992	+31.9	68.5	5.0	7.3
1993	+1.7	50.8	4.6	15.8
1994	+76.9	24.0	3.5	11.5
1995	-48.7	41.8	12.5	15.6
1996	+16.7	35.8	10.7	11.6
1999	-56.8	83.0	10.9	5.2

Source: Figures extracted from the PCE reports. Income figures indicate annual variation. The rest of the figures are percentages over the total income

As we have seen in previous pages, the IU has created its own organisational structure, having local organisations, individual membership, and funding. However, the integrated parties have remained alive within the IU. While several features of the IU make it similar to a party, other demonstrate that some characteristics of its origin as a coalition still remain. The largest party, the PCE (which is now the only party within the IU), has conditioned the growth of the IU. In certain

17

respects, it has strongly determined some of the organisational decisions made in the IU. The PCE's great influence, for instance, deterred the IU's individual membership and was detrimental for the individual payment of fees. Despite the regulation on the role of the integrated parties, the majority of the IU office holders and leaders have always been the PCE members. Compared to the other minor parties, the PCE has a privileged status within the IU. Notwithstanding the gradual creation of a separate organisational structure for the IU, the PCE remained being the majority group (and the most structured one) in all the governing bodies of IU.

THE ELECTORAL EVOLUTION OF THE IU: FROM THE HOPE OF "SORPASSO" TO THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL

The IU has followed a trend of slow and irregular growth from 1986 to 1996 (see Table 5). In the 1999 local, regional and European elections the IU suffered severe electoral defeats that were confirmed in the 2000 general elections. In a certain sense, the electoral evolution of the IU has drawn a parabola: the IU has returned in 2000 to a vote share similar to that of the PCE before the creation of the IU (the 1982 general elections). In addition, the IU's best results simply equalled those of the PCE's during the democratic transition. This means that the IU's electoral "ceiling" has been about a 10% of the vote.

Table 5
Electoral Results: The PCE and the IU

	Percentage (over valid votes)	Votes
PCE 1977 General	9.3	1,718,026
PCE 1979 General	10.7	1,940,236
PCE 1979 Local	12.7	2,139,603
PCE 1982 General	4.1	965,670
PCE 1983 Local	8.0	1,500,017
IU 1986 General	4.6	935,504
IU 1987 Local	6.1	1,212,262
IU 1987 European	5.3	1,011,830
IU 1989 European	6.0	981,742
IU 1989 General	9.1	1,851,080
IU 1991 Local	8.3	1,579,097
IU 1993 General	9.2	2,202,282

IU 1994 European	13.4	2,486,550
IU 1995 Local	11.6	2,590,301
IU 1996 General	10.5	2,639,774
IU 1999 European	5.7	1,213,254
IU 1999 Local	6.5	1,383,151
IU 2000 General	5.4	1,263,043

Source: Ministry of the Interior

In addition, one of the most important features of the IU's electoral evolution is the uneven distribution of its electoral strength across the different electoral districts (provinces). This was a feature that also characterised the electoral sociology of the PCE. However, the IU has obtained good results in regions where the PCE never did (for example in some electoral districts of Castilla y León, in the Basque Country, or in Navarra). Nevertheless, it is also true that the IU has never reached the high levels of support that the PCE obtained in certain provinces. Therefore, although there is a high coincidence between the IU and former communist strongholds, there are significant variations in the territorial distribution of the support for both organisations[9].

The PSOE has been IU's main electoral competitor at a national level. In the 1986-1996 period, the electoral evolution of both the PSOE and the IU ran close together. In those districts where the IU got good results, the competition between socialists and post-communists was fierce (a strong negative correlation of their electoral results). This implies that there has been an intense electoral competition between both organisations in an important number of provinces (see Ramiro, 2000a).

The mutual transfer of the IU and the PSOE voters in successive elections is a reflection of this competition. On the one hand, in relative terms and considering only general elections, the transfer of votes between the IU and the PSOE was only beneficial for the IU in 1989 –when the IU obtained its greatest electoral boost. Only in those elections was the percentage of former socialist voters that shifted to the IU greater than the percentage of the IU voters that shifted to the PSOE[10]. On the other hand, the relevance of this bi-directional vote transfer is very different for the IU

19

and for the socialists. Attracting voters from the IU has never been a priority for PSOE from a quantitative point of view, but has been crucial for the fate of IU. Until 1996, the IU very much depended on attracting former socialist voters. In 1986, 1989 and 1993, an important proportion of the IU electorate was formed by former socialist voters. This situation changed from 1996 onwards when the importance of the former PSOE voters in the IU electorate diminished significantly.

The electoral competition between the IU and the socialists is closely related to the ideological changes of both organisations. According to survey evidence, the IU has slightly moderated its position in the left-right dimension[11]. However, its voters consistently place themselves in more moderate positions. Due to a process of parallel moderation of the IU and its voters, the ideological distance between them has remained constant[12]. On the contrary, socialist voters have placed themselves to the left of that party. It is also important to note that the voters that the IU lost in favour of the PSOE and the voters that the PSOE lost in favour of the IU were in slightly more moderate ideological positions than the IU was. Moreover, the ideological superposition (Sani and Sartori, 1983) of of both parties' voters was significant (see Ramiro, 2000a).

In this sense, it is reasonable to argue that there was an electoral incentive for the IU to move towards more moderate ideological positions to better compete with the PSOE. From a spatial point of view, and according to traditional Downsian arguments, we could consider the hypothesis that the IU could have won votes or could have reduced the losses in favour of PSOE by modifying its ideological position towards a more moderate ideological spectrum, which was the one occupied by the socialist electorate. However, as we will see in the next pages, the PCE and IU leaderships did not move in that direction in a perceptible way.

PCE'S ORGANISATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE CREATION OF THE IU

In relation to the communist strategies around the organisation of

20

the IU, it is possible to define three periods. During these three phases the goals and strategies of the PCE varied. That is, the PCE had in mind different organisation models that had to be implemented for the IU. How the IU was to be organised was of crucial importance for the PCE, since the activity and role of the PCE itself would depend on the organisational model of the IU. The possible range of options was broad, from a coalition in which the PCE would have the leading role, to a new party and the subsequent dissolution of the PCE. In this sense, we will present this evolution as a succession of goal changes and displacements in the organisational strategies adopted by the communist leadership.

The Origins of the IU. The Goals of the PCE (1985-1986)

The PCE did not have a defined plan about the creation of the IU nor about the type of organisation it wanted to build. The PCE's strategy was modified several times during the months previous to the creation of the electoral coalition. The origin of the IU is the *política de convergencia* (convergence politics) that the PCE established in 1984 and 1985[13]. This strategy aimed at building stable relationships between the PCE and other left-wing forces with the goal of creating some sort of coalition. This was its first goal. This proposal of convergence found internal resistance within the PCE. Certain sectors feared that this move would endanger the communist identity and ideology. The PCE leadership tried to eliminate these resistances arguing that the party would maintain its own ideology, identity, symbols, name, and would not dissolve itself. Party leaders defended that, in fact, the convergence was what could add force to the PCE. This was also the other goal of the *política de convergencia*: to recover, to renew, and to reinforce the PCE[14].

There were three factors that influenced the strategy that resulted in the launching of the IU. The first was the communist leaders' perception that the moderate policies of the socialist government meant abandoning a left-wing electoral space that could be occupied by other forces[15]. Secondly, after the defeat in the 1982 elections, the PCE was in a very

fragile electoral and organisational situation. The communist leaders themselves thought that the party's survival could be in danger if there was a new electoral defeat. The communist leadership also thought that the party, on its own, was not the most appropriate electoral vehicle to take advantage of the electoral opportunities that the socialist policies opened. It was necessary to create a new organisation and the perceived availability of voters allowed for the creation of a new left-wing party. Therefore, there was an electoral incentive for the creation of the IU that was clearly felt by the leaders of the PCE. Thirdly, there was a great internal resistance to any initiative that could imply the dissolution of the PCE[16]. This internal suspicion was also clearly felt by the communist leadership. As a consequence, the leaders had to justify the creation of the IU as an initiative that would buttress the PCE. This combination of the leaders' perceptions shaped the initial model of the IU.

Goal Change. The Communist Strategy in the Development of the IU (1986-1992)

After the 1986 elections, and during a certain period, the PCE gave priority to the political and organisational development of the IU. This strategy implied the delegation of functions that had previously been assigned to the PCE, to the IU. The main reason for this initiative was the good electoral possibilities that the communist leaders thought the IU had. The development of the IU in different fields was, then, the way to follow if it was to grow from an electoral point of view. According to the analysis made by the PCE and IU leaders, the poor electoral results obtained by the IU in 1986 were mainly due to its lack of development. The strengthening of the IU was the first and main goal of the PCE in this period and therefore subordinated all its activity to this purpose. Once the PCE finished transferring its functions to the IU, communist affiliates began again to doubt and fear about the real future of the party. The interesting point was that the members' fears were based not only in the new organisational priorities of the party but also in the discourse of communist

leaders.

Certainly, during the end of the 1980's, communist leaders tried to reduce the fears of members by assuring that the party, in spite of IU's development, was going to continue existing. However, at the same time, the leadership, including its General Secretary, declared that there was the possibility that the consolidation of the IU could lead to a close disappearance of the party[17]. This contradiction finally exploded in 1991 when part of the communist leadership positioned itself in favour of the dissolution of the PCE and transformation of the IU into a new political party[18]. The majority of the communist leadership opposed strongly to that proposal. The real disagreement was, however, around how fast the change should go because most of the prominent leaders had argued in previous years that the PCE could disappear. This latter group headed by the General Secretary (Julio Anguita) won the PCE's 13th Congress by defending the continuity of the party in spite of their previous statements about its near disappearance. This change in their point of view was due to their belief that an important part of communist affiliates would not accept the party's dissolution, and would provoke a serious conflict and, even, a split (see Ramiro, 2000a). For this part of the leadership, the creation of the IU and its electoral progress meant that the electoral pressure to get rid of the Communist Party had disappeared. The final result was the affirmation that the PCE should continue existing and that it should have a central role within the IU. However, this was always accompanied by the reiteration of the communist statement of support for the development of the IU[19].

Goal Displacement. The PCE's Strategy Between 1992-2000

After the PCE's 13th Congress in 1991 and the IU's 3rd Conference, the IU seemed to consolidate its organisational format with a model that, given the development of its structures, it was not exactly a coalition but neither was it a party[20]. The development and consolidation of the IU as a political actor caused continuous problems in defining a role for the PCE.

What functions could the PCE have in a context in which all relevant political activity was channelled through the structures of the IU?

In the 1992-2000 period, the PCE was in a constant search for functions and activities for its own organisation. However, the tasks defined by the party congresses (for instance, to devote the PCE mainly to the political education of their members) found in practice, very serious difficulties. The PCE tried with no success to adapt its operation to the framework of a developed IU. In this context, since 1994, there has been a new goal change in the priorities defined by the PCE leadership. Although communist leaders repeated the traditional calls for the strengthening of the IU, from 1994 until 2000 the priority of its members, according to the discourse of the party leadership, was to strengthen and reactivate the PCE[21].

In this sense, communist affiliates had to direct their efforts towards the achievement of tasks mainly aimed to guarantee the survival of the PCE as a political organisation. The survival of the organisation and the activities associated to this goal became the priority of the party. During those years, therefore, a goal displacement phenomenon took place in the PCE. In order to maintain the party, internal discipline had to be reinforced. Members had to devote part of their time and their political activities in tasks related to the party operation (not only working in the development and operation of the IU); the collective payment of membership fees to the IU had to be established; and the public presence of the PCE had to be strengthened. The final goal of these initiatives was to keep PCE's hegemony within the IU[22].

This new orientation was partially a result of the persistent lack of trust among communist members towards the IU. They feared the party would disappear if it lost its primary functions. In part, it was also a reflection of the ideological and organisational loyalty of communist affiliates to their party. But what really changed the party goals was the need to avoid the constant weakening of the PCE that, if it were persistent, would make the communist leaders' control impossible.

The crisis of this strategy began in December 2000. The goal displacement, the reinforcement of the PCE as the first organisational priority, made sense only if the dominant coalition of the PCE and the IU (formed by the same persons and groups) remained united. Only in this situation could that strategy be implemented because all the relevant groups of the leadership perceived some benefits in maintaining the organisational tool (the PCE) that made the control over the IU easier. But at the end of 2000, when the IU had to elect its new leader (to substitute Anguita), the PCE, the IU, and their leaderships, were divided between two candidates. Both were members of the PCE, both were communist leaders, and both were members of the restricted circles of the PCE and the IU leadership groups: the leader of the IU and the PCE in a traditional stronghold of the IU (Gaspar Llamazares, leader of the regional federation of Asturias) and the communist Secretary General (Francisco Frutos). This division weakened the PCE, broke the dominant coalition, and made the theorised reinforcement of the party impossible. The election of Llamazares and the defeat of the communist Secretary General placed the PCE in a new crisis. Once more, the questions about the sense and future of a weakened PCE, which was not even able to maintain a united leadership within the IU, arose intensely.

THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF THE PCE AND THE IU

The Strategy Towards the PSOE

Since 1986, the evolution of the IU and the PCE has been linked to PSOE, among other reasons because of their constant opposition to this party. One of the issues that led the PCE to create the IU was its concern about the tendency of the PSOE towards the centre. In fact, this was the PCE and the IU's core argument in their analysis regarding the PSOE during all the period studied: the PSOE, due to its governmental policies, was not a left-wing party anymore. In 1993 and 1994, when the weakness of the socialists made a victory of the centre-right PP possible, the PCE

and the IU argued that what facilitated the conservatives' electoral growth were the PSOE's moderate policies[23]. After the PP victory in 1996, the IU and the PCE continued identifying the PSOE with the right, and continued arguing that there were no differences between the PSOE and the PP. This argument was again used in the 1999 elections, although in a more moderate way.

This definition of the PSOE had obvious consequences over the possibility of establishing alliances between PSOE and the IU in local, regional and national governments. Since 1987, the IU has shown a scarce interest in the formation of coalition governments with the PSOE. The IU and the PCE leadership have given priority to the defence of their ideological identity instead of favouring agreements with the PSOE. Instead of approaching the PSOE, their competitor and hypothetical ally in the formation of governments, the PCE and the IU preferred to differentiate themselves from the socialists. The PCE and IU leaders clearly understood the pacts and agreements as a loss of autonomy. This strategy was also expressed in the contents of IU's election platforms that reflected some of its differentiated ideological profile. They combined classical left-wing issues, as the defence of workers' rights, with other topics related to the New Politics (Ramiro, 2000a). The IU has tried to adopt a red-green programme. The presence of environmental issues in the electoral programmes of the IU is especially relevant, and it is the party that gives more attention to these issues in its platform (Ramiro and Morales, 2002). It is also the party with closest relations with the environmental movement (Jiménez, 1999). The IU has also highlighted peace issues in its programmes and has pronounced itself against several war conflicts.

The IU and the PCE sometimes showed a certain willingness to pact with the PSOE. However, this was only a campaign tool to avoid being accused of being sectarian and anti-socialist. The existence of several agreements and coalition governments at a local level, has been an exception to a general rejection to any agreement. The interesting point

is that the electoral growth of the IU did not moderate their political stances and views about the PSOE. On the contrary, in the mid-1990's the IU and the PCE radicalised their approach towards the PSOE and its governments. After the European elections of 1994, the IU leaders even thought that the IU was close to winning the PSOE electorally. To reach that goal, the leadership thought that the IU should maintain a clearly differentiated identity and a strong opposition to the PSOE[24]. When in the 1995 and 1996 elections the IU only obtained modest results, this did not lead to modify the strategy defined years before. The electoral messages of as late as in 1999, still included the usual definition of PSOE as a right-wing party. It was only after the complete failure of the IU in the local, regional and European elections of 1999 that the leaderships of the IU and the PCE initiated an ambiguous change that included a global agreement with the PSOE to form left-wing local governments[25]. Therefore, the debate around the strategic appropriateness of the strong anti-socialist messages only emerged once the IU lost in virtually all the electoral districts in 1999. Finally, a few months before the 2000 general elections, the IU signed an agreement with its previous "enemy", the PSOE. It was really a colossal change in its traditional strategy, and it was reached at with little debate and discussion within the governing bodies and with only a minor internal opposition. The agreement included a short list of common policies, the commitment to form a coalition government and a pact for the elections to the Senate. This important change was motivated by the fear within the IU of suffering a new and more intense electoral defeat in the 2000 general elections.

Therefore, the PCE and the IU did not only maintain this general strategy of conflict with the PSOE for political reasons. Certainly, they thought that the radical defence of their autonomy and identity against any collaboration with the PSOE meant the defence of a correct political platform. But it was not only a policy-seeking strategy. They also thought that this strategy was the most beneficial in electoral terms, that it was going to lead the IU to become the first Spanish left-wing organisation over

and above the PSOE, and that it would have a great electoral boost. In this sense, the leaders of the PCE and the IU did not perceive the existence of any trade-off between the vote and policy-seeking strategies, which they thought to be coincident. Moreover, the electoral results of 1995 and 1996, which were far from their original expectations of "sorpasso", did not lead to any change in their strategic line. It was only after the 1999 election disaster that the leaders clearly saw that their political strategy was damaging from an electoral point of view, and that it threatened IU's survival. Only in such a dramatic circumstance did the PCE modify its political line to avoid more vote losses.

The Strategy Towards the CC.OO.

The CC.OO. trade union is the union to which the majority of the IU and the PCE members belong. However, the proportion of communist members within CC.OO. is small. In fact, this proportion has been decreasing in the last years and is very reduced compared to that of the democratic transition years. Also, in comparison to those years, the overlapping membership between the leaderships of the PCE and the IU with the CC.OO. has reduced dramatically. During the 1980's there was a certain personal link between the leaderships of the PCE and the CC.OO. due to the presence of several union leaders in communist governing bodies. The union leaders participated in several types of communist and IU activities and the PCE kept some degree of influence over the union. This party-union link began to disappear from 1991 and 1992 onwards. At this time, the position of the majority of the union leaders on the future of the party and the organisational model for the IU was different to that of the PCE leadership (the union leaders preferred the dissolution of the PCE). Today these personal links or the presence of union leaders in communist and IU governing bodies are almost insignificant[26].

The PCE still considers the CC.OO. union as the one its members should affiliate to. However, the traditional relationship of brotherhood between the PCE and the CC.OO. (and consequently between the IU and

the CC.OO.) broke up completely in the 1990's. While in the 1980's there was a smooth exchange between both organisations, sharing short and mid-term goals, and supporting each other, the situation changed sharply in the 1990's. Since 1994 the PCE modified its view on the Spanish unions' strategies and especially, of the CC.OO. Since the mid-1990's, the PCE constantly accused the CC.OO. of contributing to workers' demobilization, of sharing the neo-liberal ideology, of a lack of response to the policies of the socialist government, and of having a non-democratic and bureaucratic way of operating. In this environment of conflict, the PCE stressed the need to organise the party in the workplace and to coordinate the action of communist activists inside the union.

Therefore, in the mid-1990's the previous model of solidarity and cooperation between the PCE and the CC.OO. that was based on the existence of mutual benefits, disintegrated. Since 1994, there was a significant divergence about immediate goals, a disagreement about the roles and spheres of action of each organisation and the previous development of common actions. The preferential relationship had absolutely weakened. In the elaboration of its strategy towards the CC.OO., there were several factors that affected the PCE and the IU leaderships' choices. First of all, they perceived a decrease in union mobilisation. This was a key issue due to the idea, very rooted within the IU and the PCE, that the left could only grow electorally in situations of wide social mobilisation. This interpretation, at a time when there was a total conflict with PSOE and the IU was electorally growing, originated a very aggressive approach towards the unions and, especially, towards the former sister organisation, the CC.OO. In addition to this, the strategy of attacking union leaders could not have been developed in the absence of a favourable cultural milieu in the PCE and the IU. A very traditional view of the party-union relationship has survived in the PCE and among its leadership. This view, with a clear Leninist heritage, has also affected the interpretation of the recent evolution of Spanish unions, and has motivated the aggressive stances of the PCE and the IU. From this perspective, the

decrease in the industrial conflict (a trend that was real) and the growing distance that the unions and the leaders of the CC.OO. wanted to maintain with the parties, was seen as a political betrayal. A short-term conflict could be justified if it was going to produce changes in union tactics (workers' mobilisation) and a better electoral performance for the IU. This struggle only disappeared, once more, after the electoral failure of 1999 when the PCE and the IU began a more moderate strategy towards the CC.OO. After the electoral disaster of 2000 and the change of leadership in the IU at the end of that year, these peaceful attitudes towards the policies of the CC.OO. were reinforced.

CONCLUSIONS

The communist evolution and process of adaptation since the mid-1980's has resulted in a transformed party, with very low activity, that develops its political work mainly through another organisation controlled by the communists. This organisation, the IU, has an ambiguous model of operation. The IU is today a very developed organisation with deeply consolidated structures. However, the PCE continues to be present and the communists have the last say on the IU choices. The evolution of the PCE and the IU has been decisively influenced by external and internal factors. However, the importance of these factors that have affected the decision-making processes has been changing. The circumstances around an election determined that the vote-seeking strategies were given priority at certain times. On the contrary, at other times, internal or organisational needs pushed the strategies in other directions, thus paying less attention to vote-seeking aspects.

The communist electoral crisis at the beginning of the 1980's was the main incentive for the creation of the IU. And it was also the search for votes what gave an impulse to the development of the IU at the end of the 1980's. Other external factors, as the crisis of Communism since 1989 and the end of the Soviet Union, had a limited real effect. Although they originated some internal moves and debates, their influence was softened

by the previous changes in the PCE, the creation of the IU some years before, and its promising electoral evolution. The PCE showed a certain flexibility and transformed its organisation (losing activity while the political tasks were carried out through the IU) and its programme (launching the IU's red-green discourse) according to what the leaders understood as electoral imperatives. However, the PCE and the IU behaviour and evolution were not only determined by electoral incentives. The leaders' perception of the limits that the rank-and-file imposed upon further organisational developments (the disappearance of the PCE and the transformation of the IU into a party) constrained their choices. Finally, a shift of goals took place when the PCE's own survival was placed as a priority goal. This important change in the communist strategy is, again, due to internal motives. The loyalty of the communist affiliates was persistent. But, very remarkably, the PCE was also an organisational tool that enabled maintaining the control over the IU. Without it, the control that the communist elites maintained on the IU could disappear.

From a political point of view, the PCE and the IU are not the prototypical policy-seeking parties, as we could expect among the radical left. The PCE and the IU leaders thought that their intense confrontation with the PSOE was electorally beneficial. They sincerely thought that their differences and their powerful statements were the most competitive strategy. No doubt that this way of thinking is closer to the way in which Downs' critics conceive the electoral competition than to the traditional Downsian arguments. When the PCE and IU perceived that there was a trade-off between their political discourse and the search for votes (after the electoral failure of 1999) they changed their strategy by moderating their political tactics. A similar process can be described about the conflict with the CC.OO. given their moderation after the electoral failure. Confronted with the electoral failure, and perceiving for the first time a trade-off between the policy-seeking and vote-seeking goals, the PCE and IU radically changed the principles that had given form to their entire strategy during the second half of the 1990's.

The PCE and the IU are living at present the beginning of a new cycle that presents serious challenges. The electoral disasters of 1999 and 2000 left the organisation with a very reduced presence in parliament and in great trouble from a financial point of view. The competition for left-wing voters is nowadays more difficult at a moment in which the socialists are in the opposition to the centre-right government. Some messages of the IU's discourse may also be potentially adopted by their competitors. The organisation shows some signs of exhaustion. The PCE is going to find increasing difficulties to justify its own existence after more than 15 years working through the IU. At the same time, the organisational structure of the IU seems to have reached its limit of development. With only one party within it (the PCE) –which is gradually losing all its functions– new organisational changes could be just around the corner.

NOTES

1. A situation in which the party is faced with conflicts among its organisational goals; situations in which the different party goals are impossible to achieve simultaneously.

2. Only the formation of the Greek EAR during that same year could be considered similar.

3. On organisational goals see Perrow (1961), Etzioni (1961), and Simon (1964).

4. However, both authors admit that organisational and institutional factors can not exhaust the range of possible influences on party behaviour (Müller and Strom 1999: 24). For this reason they do also consider situational determinants, more difficult to study systematically, which can also affect party decisions.

5. These two factors are taken into account in several classical works such as those of Duverger, Panebianco or Harmel and Janda. I do not study the influence of institutional elements because, although they have surely affected the PCE and the IU, they cannot be directly made responsible for the changing behaviour of both organisations, given that these institutions have

not basically changed in Spain since the beginning of the democratic transition.

6. The comparative ideological position of members and leaders remains a topic to be researched. It is difficult to rule out the possible existence of differences in the ideological positions among party members and also among party members occupying different hierarchical strata. In addition to this, the internal ideological balance could change from one case to another and within the same party at different times.

7. For a more detailed analysis, see Ramiro (2000b).

8. The parties were the PCE, the pro-soviet communist PCPE, the IR (*Izquierda Republicana*, Republican Left), the FP (*Federación Progresista*, Progressive Federation), the left-socialist PASOC (*Partido de Acción Socialista*, Socialist Action Party) and two more parties with confused ideological principles (the Humanist Party and the Carlist Party). The relevance of the parties that joined the PCE in the formation of the IU will be well understood from the fact that, even if the PCE was in 1986 a party in crisis and extremely weakened, it was the strongest and most institutionalised party within the IU.

9. The correlation index among the electoral results of the IU and the PCE in each one of the Spanish electoral districts in the elections of 1979 and 1996 is 0.75. The elections which took place in 1979 and 1996 were those in which the PCE and the IU obtained their best results respectively. The IU got its best results ever in the 1994 European elections which led to a certain euphoria within the IU and to consider the "sorpasso" of PSOE as a possible scenario for the following general elections of 1996.

10. 7.9% of the citizens that voted for PSOE in 1986 voted for the IU in 1989, but only 3.3% of the citizens that voted for the IU in 1986 voted for PSOE in 1989.

11. From 1.9 (1986) to 2.3 (1999) in the ten-points left-right scale. For the voters of the IU the ideological moderation was from 2.1 to 2.6 (see Ramiro 2000a).

12. Between 1986 and 1999, the distance in the ten-point left-right scale was between 0.4 and 0.3 points (see Ramiro 2000a).

13. *Informe al Comité Central*, 11-5-1984.

14. *Informe al Comité Central*, 6-3-1985.

15. See, *Informe al Comité Central*, 23-6-1985.

16. The debate on the policies that could strengthen the PCE was already very relevant within the party during 1984 and 1985.

17. See, for example, *Mundo Obrero*, n. 569, 1990, p. 11.

18. See, F. Palero, "La nueva organización de la izquierda", *Enmienda minoritaria presentada al Comité Central*, 27-7-1991; and J. Berga, "XIII Congreso del PCE: Un paso de convergencia", *Enmienda minoritaria presentada al Comité Central*, 27-7-1991.

19. *XIII Congreso del PCE, Documentos aprobados*, 1992.

20. See, *III Asamblea Federal de IU*, 1992, and *Estatutos de IU*, 1992.

21. See, for example, *Informe al Comité Federal*, 9-4-1994, and *XIV Congreso del PCE*, 1995.

22. See, *Información* n. 21, 1998.

23. See, for example, *Manifiesto, IV Asamblea Federal de IU*, 1994.

24. *Informe Balance, IV Asamblea Federal de IU*, 1994.

25. Approved at the *Consejo Político Federal*, 26-6-1999.

26. The weight of the PCE and the IU members in the CC.OO. is low, although the great majority of the members of the PCE and the IU belongs to that union.

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