

# **Leadership Selection in the Spanish Political Parties**

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Working Paper n. 6

Barcelona 1989

## **1.- Some Words About the Spanish Political System.**

Our study of the Spanish political system just covers a short period of eleven years, beginning in 1978 when the Spanish Constitution was approved. We could extend this period of time up to one year if we considered that the new system started with the first general elections after those held in February 1936. There is no agreement among political scientists neither about the initial and final moments of the Spanish transition<sup>1</sup> from a dictatorship to a democratic political system nor about the stability of the party system that resulted from this process. Some writers consider the Spanish political system as a whole, with regional subsystems<sup>2</sup>, and analyze it just within the left-right cleavage; others<sup>3</sup> believe that several political systems co-exist without being subordinated to the Spanish one. In this latter sense we can consider that Catalonia, the Basque Country, Navarra, etc., have their own party systems mostly because the historical cleavage between the center and the periphery has not been resolved.

There are certain features that differentiate the Spanish democratic political system and its consolidation from all other systems in Western European countries. In this paper, we will try to underline the most significant ones in order to see how they relate to leadership and to the election of political party leaders.

During the 1960's, Spain changed unlike any other First World country from a pre-industrial to a post-industrial age without having had an industrial period<sup>4</sup>. The crises of European parties generated alternative ways of political action, and parties were compelled to adapt themselves to the new ideological and organizational circumstances. After Franco's death, the new political situation in Spain, with some political parties coming out from clandestinity and others just being founded, allowed for the development of the party system, that was to become quite different from the European ones: the attempt to follow the classic Duvergerian model, formally the mass parties' model, contrasted with reality, exclusively based on institutional functions and on the consensus of the first democratic period (1977-79)<sup>5</sup>.

There were other factors that also conditioned the Spanish political system, some specific to Spain and others shared with other Western countries. Spanish political culture is characterized by low participation in organizations. In this sense, civil society is not organized; even during Franco's period just some few

specific groups -workers, students and civil movements- were active and strongly rejected the dictatorial regime as a result of the Francoist strategy to provoke political demobilization within the different strata of society<sup>6</sup>. At present, the only articulated and meaningful channel of participation is the electoral one, with elections (at various levels) being held almost every year<sup>7</sup>, with different turnouts depending on the type of election and on the different geographic areas<sup>8</sup>.

Another important fact is that television, unlike in most other Western countries, was already a consolidated media when the new Spanish political system was established<sup>9</sup>. This implied that public opinion and, more specifically, voters were less aware of the differences between the parties' programs than of the political leaders' public image representing both the party and its program. Although this process takes place in all Western democracies, we must also bear in mind that broadcasting takes place in the authoritarian and very personalized Spanish political culture.

## **2.- Party and Leadership. Models.**

As a result of the specific features we have just seen, the organization of the party system has been unstable and has been marked by internal disputes that have provoked different situations:

— Disappearance of the party:

The most significant example is that of «Unión de Centro Democrático» (UCD), an electoral coalition created around the President of the Government using the Old Regime's institutional mechanisms, winner of the first democratic elections. The party disappeared from the political scene when its founding leader left it<sup>10</sup>.

— Division of the party:

We will talk about two parties that solved their break up in different ways. The crisis in the «Partido Nacionalista Vasco» (PNV) was caused by the confrontation between the party leader and the President of the Basque Government. As no solution seemed to exist to solve the conflicts among the members of the power elite within the party, it broke up and the dissenting section created a new party.

On the other hand, in the first two general elections the Partido Comunista de España (PCE) failed in its hope to become the first party of the opposition on the left. Santiago Carrillo controlled the two confronted currents in the party -the Leninist and the Euro-Communist- until the 1979 Party Conference was faced with the issue of ideological revisions and democratization within the party, both currents becoming more obvious and radical. That was the origin of crises and divisions that continue nowadays<sup>11</sup>.

— Processes of unstable coalition:

«Alianza Popular» (AP) aimed at organizing the right in Spain which was -and still is- crumbled into pieces; Manuel Fraga and AP wanted to integrate part of the Francoist right into the project of the new Spanish political system.

AP and its leader tried to organize a strong right wing alternative by integrating prominent politicians and making coalitions with small parties, especially during pre-electoral periods. The division of the right had a negative effect: it meant the non-consolidation, and thus the instability of many coalition processes<sup>12</sup>.

— Party integration:

The «Partido Socialista Obrero Español» (PSOE) impelled a process for the integration of all the different socialist options that were present in the first general election. This is the only example of a process carried out satisfactorily in the political system, being a positive point for the configuration of PSOE as a real alternative to government<sup>13</sup>.

The focus of our research is based on the two main national parties: PSOE and AP.

The unstable coalition differs from the integration model in a series of traits that we will see as follows. In the first place, PSOE achieved the union of the socialist political spectrum by integrating all the other socialist parties, whereas AP was unable to integrate the right in one political force thus finding itself in a permanent instability caused by its own forces.

Secondly, both hierarchy and internal cohesion were imposed in PSOE. This was due perhaps to its leader's ability to solve the complex internal situation provoked by the presence at once of the historical leaders, some critics and many young people that were just joining the party given the possibility of it becoming the alternative to government. The highest point of this process was the 28th Party Conference and the 1979 Extraordinary Conference<sup>14</sup>.

At the same time, two parallel and related processes were taking place in AP. On the one hand, AP tried to establish a strong party organization, which would be achieved in certain areas but not in all of them because of the difficulties caused by the integration of the different clientele and personalities. On the other hand, it started coalition processes with other parties and some leaders that, coming from disappeared parties, entered its governing elite that implied a constant re-adaptation of the selection and internal operation mechanisms.

In the third place, as a result of the two factors already mentioned Felipe González remained as the indisputable and hegemonic socialist leader since his election in 1974. On the other hand, AP's leader Manuel Fraga gave special importance to the first factor, that is, the hope to place all the right wing around his party. This led to two temporary resignations and to an important renewal in the party's leadership as an attempt to articulate AP's political option.

Finally, there is a strong leadership personality in both parties affecting the inner as much as the outer party. In PSOE this role is positive both internally and externally<sup>15</sup>. In AP the leader's role is positive in order to keep the party together but negative in relation to the second factor<sup>16</sup>. In both parties, the leader's influence imposes itself on the selection method<sup>17</sup>. Also in both of them, the two

models described above are exactly followed. That is, in spite of his party's instability, Manuel Fraga keeps his leadership in AP whereas Felipe González has a stable leadership in the PSOE.

Thus far we have analyzed the external factors that affect the political parties, or the influences they receive from the political system where they operate. Let us now analyze the internal method to select and elect leaders in those parties, although we'll have to bear in mind that some of the questions asked in this Working Paper do not have an easy answer, mainly because of the short period it covers.

### **Selection Methods**

We will basically talk about formal selection mechanisms; nevertheless we think it would be interesting to complete this research in the future by determining the importance of the political party's elite. There is usually a tendency to identify the party with its leadership and even with its national top man: this is also the position we take in our study. We will point out the importance of the horizontal dividing lines, the intermediate elites<sup>18</sup> and their role in relation to the renewal of the governing bodies: we will bear in mind that they could be leaders in the future. In the Spanish situation, the parties' crises (1978-79) and especially the change in their structure and dynamics since 1982 influence the renewal of the elite. The importance of mechanisms and formal selection procedures is conditioned by the role the PSOE plays in the political system.

In AP, the strategy to develop the organization and coalition re-foundation processes caused two temporary resignations of its leader and a high degree of renewal within the party elite.

The predominance of PSOE in elected positions and the employment of its members in large areas of government and public administration helped to decrease the tensions within the party. It also influenced the composition and renewal process of the party's elite (ministers, presidents of autonomous governments, etc.) in the Federal Committee Commission.

## SELECTION METHODS USED IN PSOE

After the Civil War, Indalecio Prieto, a historic Spanish socialist leader, first led PSOE followed by Rodolfo Llopis from 1944 to 1972. But there would be a progressive alienation between the socialist party in exile and the members of the party who lived in Spain, due to the differences in their respective views and analyses of Spanish politics. The final party break up took place during the 12th Party Conference held in Toulouse in 1972. The in-country members succeeded in turning the General Secretariat into an executive body, the first step in promoting Felipe González as party leader. This was finally achieved at the 13<sup>th</sup> Conference held in Suresnes in 1974 when the in-country members imposed themselves on the members in exile and obtained the control of the party's leadership. Jorge de Esteban and Luis López Guerra stated in their book: "in fact, the call for the celebration of the 12<sup>th</sup> Conference in 1972 was not carried out legally as it was not announced by the right person (Rodolfo Llopis, the party's Secretary General) but by Nicolás Redondo, who was not entitled to do so." It was a successful «coup d'état» in the party's organization. The «orthodox» Conference took place in December of the same year, this one summoned by Llopis. So it is difficult to determine who divided PSOE, the renewed or the «historic» leaders. The latter had legality on their side, but the former ones won<sup>19</sup>. Rodolfo Llopis and his section never acknowledged the legality of that Conference nor accepted its resolutions. Finally, the International Socialist brought the discussion to an end by recognizing the «renewed» PSOE as the unique and legitimate representative of PSOE's name.

The dictator's physical death in 1975 and the transition process towards a democratic system would open different ways to undertake the future within the fragmented Spanish socialism. PSOE tried to attract under its name the various existing socialist parties, the most important of which was the «Partido Socialista Popular», led by Enrique Tierno Galván. Two parallel processes began at a time: on the one hand the integration within the PSOE of a series of regional and provincial parties, with the exception of the Catalan socialists who organized themselves in the «Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC-PSOE)» in 1978, becoming a legally independent party (although linked to PSOE). On the other

hand, the creation of the «Federación de Partidos Socialistas», an electoral federation of socialist parties led by PSP. The results of the first election of 1977 brought about the merge of PSP and its federation of parties into PSOE in 1978.

Through these processes, PSOE was able to organize its political area by integrating all the potential contending parties.

Since he achieved power in the party, the figure of Felipe González as the leader has never been disputed, neither domestically nor abroad. Not even when he left the Secretariat in the 1979 crisis was there a real possibility that he would not be reelected in that same year's Extraordinary Conference. A party ideological issue caused the crisis: Felipe González did not agree with the decision to maintain Marxism as the party emblem and decided to resign. But his succession was not clear, as none of the party leaders who supported the option of maintaining Marxism in the program wanted to take over the Secretariat. The 28<sup>th</sup> Conference and the Extraordinary Conference held in 1979 represented the «Bad-Godesberg» for Spanish socialism. After the failure in the 1979 general elections, internal and external party bases were established to make access to Government possible.

Since 1976, the election of the General Secretary takes place in a Conference where the Federal Executive Committee and a part of the Federal Committee (the most important governing body between conferences) are elected. The delegates attending the Conference are representatives elected in the Federations' Conferences (art. 3 of the party statutes). The election of the governing bodies takes place through the vote of each delegation's spokesperson weighted by the members of each federation. Thus the largest federation can control the adopted resolutions.

### **Table**

The internal representation of delegates in the conferences has changed throughout the years. We cannot say they represent the party membership but the politically active members<sup>20</sup>, the so-called «inner-circle» of the party. Conference delegates could be considered as a «snapshot» of the party, but their profile has changed, with an ever-increasing presence of members holding public elected

offices. To a certain extent, this is logical, as PSOE has won central Government, the presidency of twelve «Autonomous Communities», and the most important city councils -the number of socialist councilors being 24,000.

From the outside, Felipe González's leadership is seen as «the electoral engine»<sup>21</sup> that has dragged the party's machinery to Government. In a country where mass media are centered on television, his leadership role has been very important to get such good electoral results.

We can say that the leader's influence displaces the selection process. According to Schonfeld<sup>22</sup> we could define González's figure as that of the «monocratic leader». The stability within the party since 1979 and the good electoral results make him an indisputable leader. The potential tensions within the party, like the Conference debate on the integration in NATO and the following referendum, have been absorbed through the acknowledgement of different currents of opinion within the party. The conflict with the socialist trade union, «Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT)», led by Nicolás Redondo, is the only uncertainty: it is difficult to know how it is going to affect the party, the electorate and PSOE's leadership.

## SELECTION METHODS USED IN AP

The idea and foundation of AP in October 1976 was the consequence of the selection process of an executive leadership conceived by a section of the Francoist political elite. This section decided to start a political convergence platform in the context of the «pre-party system»<sup>23</sup> created in Spain just after Franco's death. Five months later, the supporters of all those groups<sup>24</sup> approved this executive committee during the 1<sup>st</sup> AP Conference.

From that moment onwards, members do the selection in the party conferences that normally take place once a year in accordance with the party statutes. The composition, distribution and nomination of delegates vary throughout the period studied here<sup>25</sup>: they change from non-fully structured patterns and methods to a progressive structuring of procedures. The selection

and cooptation mechanisms and the democratic presidential criteria are combined, implemented alternatively and/or superimposed according to the party's policy.

### **3.- Selection Mechanisms and Procedures**

The different statutes of the party foresee the possibility to summon extraordinary conferences; only one extraordinary conference has been called in these few years, in February 1986, when a new leader had to be elected after Fraga's resignation as the party president. In fact, this 7<sup>th</sup> Conference has been the only one gathering some competitive elements: there were two candidates to the party's presidency and, for the first time, representatives (delegates in the conference) were elected in local assemblies of party members, through a system of open lists and with no instructions from the top. Affiliation is considered more important than electoral results in the provincial distribution of these representatives. On the other hand it is the only case in which delegates are known as well as their social and political profiles<sup>26</sup>. The open list system, that someone had already tried to introduce after the 2<sup>nd</sup> Conference in 1979, was used for the election of the National Executive Committee in the 7<sup>th</sup> Conference and introduced in the 8<sup>th</sup> Conference just for the election of representatives and national members. Although this is a practice of obtaining votes in exchange for something it can balance the presidential effects.

Each of the two candidates represented a meaningful section of the party: A. Hernández Mancha was a member of AP since its foundation; he was the regional president of the party in Andalucía and was elected senator by the members of the Andalusian Autonomous Parliament. His winner candidacy was supported by different territorial organizations and also by the national mass media<sup>27</sup>. His political career followed the party's recruiting trend.

The other candidate was Miguel Herrero, outstanding member of UCD until January 1982 when he joined AP after the fateful crisis in his party. Soon after his integration in the party he became part of AP's leadership<sup>28</sup>. Thus he represented the trend developing political action in AP, by starting processes of coalition and convergence within the Spanish right political spectrum, which implied that politicians coming from other parties or groups were immediately integrated in AP's elite. Herrero also had the support of a section of the party<sup>29</sup>.

But this selection process just took place in the extraordinary situation created by Fraga's resignation and is thus considered unusual. In other conferences the party's leader, Manuel Fraga, has been elected being the only candidate to the presidency. Nevertheless, the mechanisms of selection and composition of delegates -inborn and elected or co-opted- have changed as well as the leader's powers. The ordinary character of the eight conferences celebrated by AP should be discussed in relation to the 1<sup>st</sup> and the 9<sup>th</sup> Conferences, this last one held in February 1989, both of which could be considered extraordinary.

Once the pre-conference process was started with the usual objectives, the approval of reports and election, or rather, reelection of the party's president, the former leader Manuel Fraga decided to present his candidacy for president as part of the "re-foundation" process of the party. Thus the conference did not follow the formal mechanisms and, as usual in AP, took place in two levels, within the party and outside of it. Also, as usual, the leader impelled the strategy of coalition and integration of other people and political groups that were superimposed to the internal mechanisms. The Conference's rules were reformed three months before it took place, changing the number and functions of delegates and the statutes' report in relation to the mechanisms for selecting the leader and his powers.

Fraga was the winner in this confrontation with Hernández Mancha who withdrew his candidacy two months before the Conference, as it was clear that the party organization supported Fraga's option. We must point out the influence played by Fraga in changing the party's name at the last moment and with a lot of opposition within the party (just 1/3 of the delegates agreed to the new name -«Partido Popular»- and to its Christian Democrat orientation).

After these remarks, we shall now try to analyze the mechanisms of selection in the other six ordinary conferences in which Fraga was the only candidate for president. In general, presidentialism was introduced in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Conference held in December 1979. It marked the beginning of the process to formalize the internal organization of the party<sup>30</sup> and became stronger<sup>31</sup> in the 5<sup>th</sup> Conference (February 1982) that was simultaneous to UCD's crisis.

The mechanisms and processes of selection have changed throughout these years. Changes were due to the need of adapting the organizational

apparatus of a mass party with no governmental experience as they reached local and autonomous governmental bodies through the electoral process.

Thus the number of AP's members in town councils and parliaments grew at the same time as they took up responsibility positions in the party's executive bodies: the statutes of the party were changed so that members normally became either inborn delegates or members of the national executive bodies; the inclusion of the party's European Parliament members to the party's leadership is the latest example of this<sup>32</sup>. Although it is increasing, the presence and powers of members of parliament have always been limited to about a third of delegates; this fact has caused many tensions that are now solved with the new trend to increase their presence in the party's leadership<sup>33</sup>.

In contrast to the inborn delegates, as we have already observed, most of the selected delegates are members of the party but have no real influence in the leader's election and can only approve whatever has been decided beforehand.

The "Consejo Nacional de Dirección" (National Board of Directors - CDN) of the party is in charge of convening the party's conferences. Normally, as in most cases, conferences serve as platforms with external repercussions, instead of bringing up internal opinions (which in theory is its aim). Once the CDN has set the criteria for the following conference, its equivalents in the smaller districts must proceed to select delegates. As happens in most parties, the social and political profiles of the delegates, as well as the development of the selection process, are not known to the members of the party. Some questions such as to what extent do delegates represent the party, what are their ideological profiles, or which is their degree of identification with the party's program are impossible to answer because of these restrictions.

In relation to their political profiles, all we know is that just two thirds of the delegates are party members since AP's growth in 1982, an important number of which hold executive positions within the party. At this moment, we are working on the ratio between delegates and elected officials and all we can say is that the number of elected officials is only significant among the inborn delegates. In relation to the social characteristics, we can point out that the average age of party members is decreasing, that the number of professionals is diminishing (liberal professionals and managers are disappearing), and that the number of students

and middle class members is increasing. The territorial distribution of delegates is related to formal variables that are given in the statutes. In general, we can assert -formally at least, that the criteria that have governed the composition and distribution of delegates follow the strategy that intends to strengthen the organizational structure of the party.

The distribution of delegates in provinces takes into account two factors. One is related to the party organization: number of members, councils and headquarters; and the other is an external factor, based on the electoral results. A mathematical formula combines both criteria giving more importance to one or the other in each stage of the process: first, the electoral variable (number of votes and of elected officials) is more significant; secondly, the variable related to organization (members and headquarters) has more weight. We must not forget though that, in practice, the elected members increase the volume of inborn delegates and become part of AP's leadership.

#### **4.- Membership, Leadership and Local Headquarters**

The process to strengthen the inner party organization started, as we have pointed out, during the 3<sup>rd</sup> National Conference and involved both the human and organizational bases, in the attempt to restrain some frauds in territorial organizations by increasing their participation in the party structure. As the number of delegates and the composition of some territorial bodies (provincial and regional councils) depended on the degree of influence on the territory and on the number of party members, control of new membership and withdrawals took place in Madrid since 1983. This measure may have been effective and contributed to a greater transparency of the whole process but its real significance is limited because of the little influence delegates have in the selection of the leader and of other executive bodies. Besides the election of the «Comité Ejecutivo Nacional» (Executive National Committee - CEN) from open lists, at the 7<sup>th</sup> Conference, the function of delegates was reduced to ratify the election of closed candidacies proposed by Fraga and accepted by a relative majority.

Nevertheless and even though the scope of these mechanisms is limited, we can think of their effects in the party as cohesive elements that complement the

role of the leader. This is the only way of understanding the role of this kind of mid-level elite in keeping the party together.

There is no doubt that these hypotheses can be enriched through discussion with conclusions drawn from other studies.

Table

<b>TABLE.-PSOE XXX Conference (1984): Delegations' representation</b>		
<b>Delegations</b>	<b>Membership</b>	<b>Delegate</b>
Andalucía	33.954	169
Aragón	4.140	21
Asturias	5.917	30
Baleares	1.652	9
Cantabria	2.863	14
Castilla-La Mancha	10.623	59
Castilla-Leon	8.488	43
Catalunya	12.096	58
Euskadi	5.137	26
Extremadura	9.448	48
Galicia	6.971	34
Madrid	13.715	69
Murcia	6.426	32
Navarra	1.091	5
La Rioja	715	4
Com. Valenciana	22.416	112
Ceuta	207	1
Exterior	2.490	10
Canarias	4.557	25

Source: information given by the PSOE

## NOTES

(1) CACIAGLI, M.: Elecciones y partidos en la transición española. Madrid (C.I.S.), 1986, pp. 9 and ss.

(2) LINZ, J and MONTERO, J.R. (eds): Crisis y cambio: electores y partidos en la España de los años ochenta. Madrid (C.E.C.), 1986, pp. 27-71.  
GUNTHER, R. et alii: Sistema de partidos en España: génesis y evolución. Madrid (C.I.S.), 1986.

(3) VALLES, J.M. in CACIAGLI and CORBETTA: Elezioni regionali e sistema politico nazionale. Milano (Il Mulino), 1987, pp. 97-131. CACIAGLI: Op. cit, pp. 122-187.

(4) MURILLO FERROL, F.: "Dificultades" in Rev Dpto. Dcho. Político, n.6, 1980, p.8.

(5) COTARELO, R.: Los partidos políticos. Madrid (Sistema), 1985, pp. 87-131.

(6) AGULA, R. and MONTERO, J.R.: El discurso político de la transición española. Madrid (C.I.S.), 1984, p. 221.

(7) The membership of both PSOE and AP is about 200.000. The percentage of affiliation to trade unions is between 10% and 15% of the active population. Electoral participation was of 80% in the two general elections (1977 and 1982), 70% in the others (1979 and 1986) and lower in local and regional elections.

(8) As of January 1989, 28 electoral processes have taken place since the beginning of the political transition: 3 national and 5 regional referenda; four national, three local and one election to the European Parliament. The rest were regional elections.

(9) MONTERO, J.R. "Partidos y participación política algunas notas sobre la afiliación política en la etapa inicial de la transición política". Revista de Estudios Políticos, n.23, 1981, pp. 33-73.

SANI, in LINZ-MONTERO: Op.cit. pp. 27-71.

LOPEZ GUERRA, L.: "Sobre la evolución de las campañas electorales y la decadencia de los partidos de masas". Revista Española Opinión Pública, n.45, 1976, pp. 91-110.

(10) A.Suárez left the presidency of the Government and that of UCD in January 1981. Some days later, A. Rodríguez Sahagún was elected president of the party in the second and last conference of the coalition. The candidate for president of the Government was Calvo Sotelo. Several months after his election, part of the party's leadership left and moved to other parties. Herrero de Miñón went to AP; the current Foreign Affairs Minister, Fernández Ordóñez, to PSOE. Others created new parties, like the Christian Democrats who joined AP before the 1982 general elections. Landelino Lavilla took on UCD's presidency in February 1982, but the party had already broken up and the elections proved it was dead. See also CACIAGLI, M.: Op.cit.pp.233-278.

(11) Several crises that started in 1979 are still alive nowadays. After the conference in 1979, three leaders went through the party's presidency and the party split in two other communist parties. Before the 1986 general elections the PCE created a coalition -Izquierda Unida- that aimed to gather, in addition to other politicians, some of the communists that had left the party. See also GUNTHER, R et alii: Op.cit. pp. 80 ss.

(12) AP was founded as a coalition of seven Francoist politicians in September 1976 and broke up two years later during the debates on the democratic Constitution. Since then, Manuel Fraga has carried on with AP through different coalitions with small right and center-right wing parties (Coalición Democrática just before the 1979 elections; Coalición Popular before the 1982). Two months ago, AP changed its name for "Partido Popular" at the time some UCD former leaders and some Christian Democrat politicians joined the party. See also LOPEZ NIETO, L.: AP: estructura y

evolución electoral de un partido conservador. 1976-1982. Madrid (C.I.S.), 1988. and COTARELO,R.- LOPE NIETO,L.: "Spanish conservatism, 1976-1987" in R.E.P., v.II n.2, pp. 80-95.

(13) Several socialist candidacies participated in the first general election (1977): PSOE, as a coalition of small regional socialist parties; PSP (whose leader was Tierno Galván and which obtained six seats), party that merged with PSOE in 1978: and the "Alianza Socialista Democrática", integrated by the historic socialists that had rejected F.González's leadership after the 1973 party conference held in Southern France. See also GUNTHER,R. et alii: Op.cit. pp. 180 ss.

(14) At the PSOE conference in 1979, an "ad hoc" commission was elected to prepare an extraordinary conference that was held six months later, and in which F. González was reelected and succeeded in his wish to give up the Marxist principles. See also CACIAGLI, M.: Op.cit. pp. 184 ss.

(15) CACIAGLI, M.: Op.cit. pp. 191 ss.

(16) MONTERO in LINZ-MONTERO: Op.cit. pp. 345-433.

(17) SCHONFELD, W.: "La stabilité des dirigeants des parties politiques" in Revue Française Sciences Politiques n. 3, 1980, pp- 477-505. and Revue Française Sciences Politiques n.4, 1980, pp. 846-866.

BLONDEL, J.: Political leadership. London (Sage), 1987, pp. 78 ss.

(18) BOTELLA, J.: Las élites intermedias de los partidos españoles: una década de cambio. Mimeografiado, Barcelona, 1988.

(19) DE ESTEBAN, J. and LOPEZ GUERRA, L.: Los partidos políticos en la España actual, Barcelona (Planeta), 1982, pp. 115-116.

(20) DUVERGER, M.: Los partidos políticos, México (FCE), 1981.

PITARCH, I.E. et alii, Partits i parlamentaris a la Catalunya d'avui, 1977-1979, Barcelona (Ed.62), 1980, p. 164:

To what degree would "delegates" represent the members of the party:

- That only, or preferably those more worthy, more acknowledged or who are former members of the party would be elected as delegates;

- That, needing a party conference a quite intense dedication for at least some days, some persons whose availability is limited (older members, housewives, etc.) would have less chances of being elected;

- That the prevailing cultural and social values would somehow influence the choice of delegates. Maybe some of these reasons would go against women's presence or in favor of a greater representation of those persons with a higher cultural level.

- We must not exclude that political parties, in their aim to create a certain "image" among public opinion, promote and encourage a major presence of certain sections or groups."

CAYROL, R. and YSMAL, C.: "Les militants du PS, originalité et diversité" in Projet n.165, 1982, pp.572-586:

"Les congrès des partis politiques constituent une instance particulièrement significative pour qui s'intéresse à la sociologie du militantisme. Ils rassemblent, en effet, en un moment solénnisé par la culture politique de l'organisation, tous les animateurs du parti, considéré à ses cadres intermédiaires et représentants actifs de la base, qui tiennent à participer à ce "temps fort" de la vie de leur formation politique, où l'on définit la ligne du parti pour les mois et les années à venir, où l'on désigne la nouvelle direction, où l'on dessine le visage du parti pour l'extérieur et pour les médias." (p. 572).

TEZANOS, J.F.: "Radiografía de los congresos. Una aportación al estudio sociológico de los cuadros políticos del socialismo español" in Sistema n.35, 1980, pp. 79-99.

TEZANOS, J.F.: "Estructura y dinámica de la afiliación socialista en España" in Revista Estudios Políticos n.23, 1981, pp. 117-152.

(21) CACIAGLI, M.: Elecciones y partidos en la transición española. Madrid (CIS), 1986.

(22) LINZ, J. and MONTERO, J.R. (eds): Crisis y cambios: electores y partidos en la España de los años ochenta. Madrid (CEC), 1986, p. 343:

"We must consider the fact that the post-Francoist Spain constitutes one of the first cases (at least in the "first world") where the establishment of the party system took place after television conquered the mass-media market, having been able to shape the new mechanisms of political propaganda and electoral campaigns".

GUNTHER, R., SANI, G. and SHABAD, G.: El sistema de partidos políticos en España. Génesis y evolución. Madrid (CIS), 1986.

(23) Coalition practices were initiated in Spain by the PCE under Franco's Regime with the promotion of the "Junta Democrática", a political platform that included politicians and opposition groups. Later, PSOE promoted the "Plataforma de Convergencia Democrática". Both groups merged into one in early 1976, organizing the most important events for political change. AP was founded in September 1976, as a coalition of leading or former leading Francoist politicians representing different groups within the "Principles of the *Movimiento* (the single party)" which were mainly integrated by civil servants and members of the official trade union. Manuel Fraga was AP's leader from the beginning.

(24) The first Conference of AP, where M. Fraga was elected as the General Secretary of "Partido Unido de A.P.," was held in March 1977. "Some of the seven original groups that joined "PUAP" kept a federative relation; from the beginning, this party established flexible forms of admission of different politicians and small groups.

(25) The selection of delegates to the first three conferences (1977, 1978 and 1979) did not follow established rules. Later, the selection was made by the territorial organizations. In the last three conferences, the headquarter office has established a great control of the process or delegates' selection, centralizing in Madrid both the affiliation and the quota payment files.

The number of delegates has always been about two thousand even though membership has varied from 10,000 to 20,000.

(26) Data on this and following references mainly come from different official and internal documents of the party.

The total of delegates was 2,837. Characteristics: 12% were women; only 12% were nominated – non -elected- delegates; 75% belonged to the party since before 1983. There was an important representation of "Nuevas Generaciones," the party youth organization that maybe explains that 28% of delegates belonged to the age group between 18 and 30 and that 14% were students, 21% had a liberal arts profession and 14% were in trade and industry.

(27) A. Hernández Mancha, a civil servant, started his political career in 1978 as a provincial president of AP, later becoming a regional president, member of a regional parliament and senator. At the Conference he was supported and voted by "Nuevas Generaciones" and the biggest regional organizations, obtaining 1,930 votes against the 729 of his rival.

(28) Herrero de Miñón transferred to AP's parliamentary group in January 1982 and nine months later he was elected within AP's candidacy. His strong position within the parliamentary group opened his way into the party's leadership, becoming AP's vice-president two years later.

(29) He got 27% of votes coming from different residual groups of the party: historical members, Francoists, members of Parliament and just a few territorial organizations.

(30) AP suffered its first electoral defeat in 1977. Its leaders, especially Fraga, tried to create a strong structure and when the anti-system group was forced out by the end of 1978 Fraga promoted a new electoral coalition with some center-right leaders. A new defeat in 1979 provoked Fraga's departure just for six months as he was reelected as AP's president in the third conference

(December 1979) in spite of internal disputes between the elected delegates and the party organization.

(31) In October 1981 AP won the regional elections in Galicia and profited from UCD's crisis in the general elections of 1982, ranking second with 26% of votes. AP obtained 3.5% of the city councilors in the first local elections and a third of them in the next two, which is about the same percentage it got in four elections to regional governments.

(32) The statutes approved at the conference in January 1989 established that all the members of the European Parliament belong to the "Junta Directiva Nacional (JDN)" and the affiliated presidents of regional governments were included in the presidential list. In 1984, a year after the local elections in which AP got a third of the councilors and mayors, a representation of the principal city mayors and members of regional parliaments was established in the JDN. In fact, although by different ways (designated by the president without election, etc.), the percentage of elected representatives is very high in most of the directive bodies.

(33) Throughout these years the percentage of non-elected delegates (being members of European, national or regional Parliaments or councilors) has varied. The lowest rate was of 2.5% in the 8<sup>th</sup> Conference (in which, moreover, the executive committee was elected in an open list) where Fraga got 78% of the votes. In the other eight conferences the percentage of non-elected delegates was higher, about 15%, and the executive committee was elected from a closed list led by the president.