

**IS THE NATIONALIST VOTE *REALLY* NATIONALIST?
DUAL VOTING IN CATALONIA 1980-1999.**

Santiago Pérez-Nievas and Marta Fraile.

Estudio/Working Paper 2000/147

March 2000

Santiago Pérez-Nievas and Marta Fraile are doctoral candidates at the Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Juan March Institute, Madrid. They presented this paper at the *IV Congreso de la Asociación Española de Ciencia Política y de la Administración*, Granada, 30 September 1999.

1. Introduction

This paper attempts to throw new light on the nature of the vote for non-state wide parties that articulate a peripheral nationalism. The vote for these nationalist parties, at least in Western Europe, has been traditionally explained by the impact of a regional identity that is different from the dominant type of identity in the state in which that nationalist vote takes place. It is not the purpose of this paper to explain why these distinct identities become politically salient. This may be due to rapid processes of modernisation, to massive migration movements, to the position of inferiority that a minority language (to which regional minorities are often linked) holds in society, or to a combination of some or all these different elements. The aim of this paper is more modest: once identities are formed, settled and even cohabit peacefully; once parties emerge to articulate these identities; once party systems adapt to them: does the option to vote for a nationalist party depend exclusively, or even principally, on the type of identity the elector holds?

Ever since the path-breaking work of Anthony Downs (1957), spatial models of electoral behaviour have been a vital tool for electoral studies. Researchers have adapted the spatial model to the analysis of political systems in which more than one type of national identity coexist by arguing that in such cases electoral competition takes place in a bidimensional space: the classical left-right spectrum and an additional continuum on which one might place the electorate's preferences in terms of national identity. Spain is a country rich in such systems: on the one hand, Catalonia and the Basque Country have a long tradition of distinct national identities; on the other hand, the still ongoing process of decentralisation seems to have opened the way to a plethora of new regional identities. Indeed, decentralisation makes Spain a particularly interesting case to study bidimensionality since it has opened new arenas of electoral competition in which, as we shall see below, electors sometimes behave differently depending on the type of election.

Not surprisingly, there are in Spain several regional party systems with features considerably different from the national party system. The difference is most frequently due to the impact of one or more parties that articulate a different (non-Spanish, or at least not

primarily) type of identity. The most consolidated of such systems, where regional elections are held separately and nationalist parties have controlled regional governments since the early 1980s, can be found in the Basque Country and Catalonia (Linz and Montero 1999). Of course, these party systems are not only different from the national party system but also among themselves. In the Basque Country, for instance, Basque nationalist parties have gathered more than 50% of electoral support in all elections since the beginning of democracy except for the first free elections of June 1977 and the last general election of 1996 (Llera 1998; Acha and Pérez-Nievas 1998). Indeed, it has been often argued that the nationalist axis is more relevant in explaining Basque electoral behaviour than the left-right spectrum (Llera 1994). Likewise, the greater success of Catalan nationalist parties in regional elections has often been explained with the same argument. One of the aims of this paper is to demonstrate the fallacy behind such reasoning. The greater success of nationalist non state-wide parties does not necessarily imply a greater relevance of the nationalist dimension in determining the vote of the electorate. We may even face the apparent paradox that nationalist parties are most successful when the impact of national/regional identities is weaker.

The purpose of this paper therefore is to explore the relative weight of regional identities in determining the vote for parties that articulate a peripheral type of nationalism. Additionally we will look at alternative explanations of this type of vote. We have chosen Catalonia for the following reasons. To begin with, Catalonia has a long tradition of a distinct national identity¹. Also, for the last twenty years there has been a process of decentralisation under way in Spain which tried to respond (although not exclusively) to nationalist demands. This has opened new arenas of electoral competition to nationalist parties; but also allows these nationalist parties (when they have been electorally successful as is the case in Catalonia) to occupy positions of institutional responsibility, if only at a sub-state level. This leads to the question of the effects on support for these parties once their demands have been (if only partially) met -something that was surely in the minds of policy makers at the initial

¹ For a good account of Catalan nationalism see Balcells (1996).

stage of decentralisation. In addition, however, it allows us also to test how the change from opposition to governmental responsibility may affect their electoral outcomes.

But we have also opted for Catalonia because electoral results of nationalist parties in that region show a particularly interesting pattern: as can be seen in Table 1, there is a high electoral volatility between nationalist and state wide parties depending on whether the election is to the Spanish Parliament (general elections) or to the Catalan one (regional elections). This shifting electoral behaviour has been repeated since the first regional election of 1980 and stands out as one of the most interesting and puzzling phenomena of Spanish electoral studies. This high volatility is not only due to transfers of votes between the two types of parties (what has been known as *dual voting*) but also to a particular pattern of electoral turnout in regional elections that is more detrimental to some parties than others (*differential turnout*). In this context, many authors have resorted to spatial explanations of electoral competition arguing that the greater success of nationalist parties is due to a greater impact of the nationalist dimension in regional elections. The main hypothesis we defend in this paper is that although Catalan electoral competition is indeed bidimensional, the greater support for nationalist parties in regional elections is not explained by the greater impact of the nationalist dimension but by other factors. Instead, we propose a model based upon the *retrospective* control of voters over incumbents. The empirical relevance of this model is heightened by the fact that electoral volatility is most frequent between the two parties, PSOE and CIU respectively, that were incumbent at different institutional levels (central and regional governments respectively) for most of our period of study. These two parties were also the main competitors in the Catalan party system.

In section 2 of this paper we look at the evolution of the Catalan party system since the late 1970s. In section 3, we revise previous explanations of Catalan electoral behaviour and we present our working hypotheses. In section 4 we present the empirical evidence to support our explicative models and in section 5 we present some conclusions that may be derived from these models.

The empirical evidence we present comes from survey data that was carried out by the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* in November 1992 on a representative regional-wide (Catalan) sample of 2470 adults (CIS2033).

2. The Catalan party system during the democratic period²

Between the first free elections held in Spain in June 1977 and the most recent general elections of March 1996 there have been seven general elections (to the Spanish Parliament) (1977, 1979, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993 and 1996) and six regional elections (to the Catalan Parliament) (1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1995 and 1999). As can be seen from Table 1, only five political forces have managed to survive throughout the period and stabilise their electoral results. These are the CiU, the ERC, the PSC-PSOE, the PSUC/IC, and AP/PP. Another three parties disappeared at different stages of the period: the UCD, the CDS, and the PSA. We have grouped the electoral support gathered by these different parties under two categories: *nationalist vote* versus *vote to state-wide parties*. This, however, needs some explanation and qualification.

Beginning with what we have labelled as nationalist parties, we find two political forces, CiU (*Convergència i Unió*, Convergence and Union) and ERC (*Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*). These are parties whose organisational domain and performance are exclusively limited to Catalonia, or at least to a domain below the state level (ERC in fact presents candidates in areas outside the Autonomous Community of Catalonia which the party regards as culturally Catalan). Moreover both political forces regard nationalist solidarity fundamental to their political strategy and action.

² For more detailed accounts of the evolution of the Catalan party system, see the following: Botella (1984), Molas (1994), Pallares and Font (1994), Marcet and Arguelaguet (1998), and Soller Llebaria (1998) among others.

CiU is actually a coalition formed by the CDC (*Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya*, Democratic Convergence of Catalonia) and the UDC (*Unió Democràtica de Catalunya*) which is located on the centre-right of the political spectrum. As can be seen in Table 1, CiU has maintained an electoral dominance in all regional elections since 1980. This has permitted the party to monopolise all regional governments formed since the beginning of the decentralisation process, external support being needed only in the 1980-84 period and after the last regional elections of 1995 and 1999. It is interesting to note, nevertheless, that CiU was the third/fourth political party in the Catalan party system up to its unexpected victory in the regional elections of 1980 in which the division of the Left (between the PSC and the PSUC) and the collapse of the UCD, no doubt, played a role. The party's holding of the regional government therefore meant a great leap forward in electoral terms. With regard to elections to the Spanish Parliament, CiU has come second to the PSC-PSOE on all occasions since 1982. Nonetheless, these results have allowed it to play a pivotal role in Spanish politics, in particular from 1993 onwards, when neither of the two major parties at the state level, the PP and the PSOE, managed to obtain parliamentary majorities, and both have needed the external support of the coalition to maintain stable governments.

ERC has its origins in the pre-civil war period and was the dominant party in Catalonia during the Second Republic (1931-1939). After the restoration of democracy, ERC presented itself as a nationalist party which, however, placed itself on the left of the political spectrum. In 1989, a pro-independence wing gained control and stated as the party's main goal to achieve the "independence of the Catalan nation" (Marcet and Argelaguet 1998: 83) preserving, nevertheless, its left-wing credentials. In 1997, ERC suffered a split that had more to do with a leadership crisis than with ideological issues. The survey analysed here in any case refers to two elections held prior to the party's break up. From Table 1 we can see that the more leftist and radical wing of Catalan nationalism espoused by ERC has gathered less electoral support than that of CiU. Nevertheless the party has enjoyed some presence in the political institutions, particularly in the Catalan Parliament.

Table 1. *Electoral results in Catalonia, 1977-96 (% of the valid vote)*

Year	CiU	ERC	Tot.nationalist	PSC-PSOE	PSUC/IC	AP/PP	UCD/CDS	PSA	Tot.state-wide
1977g	16.9	4.6	21.5	28.4	18.2	3.5	16.8	-	66.9
1979g	16.2	4.1	20.3	29.3	17.1	3.6	9.1	-	59.1
1980r	27.9	8.9	36.8	22.5	18.8	2.4	0.6	-	47
1982g	22.5	4.0	26.5	45.8	4.6	14.6	2.0	2.7	67.5
1984r	46.8	4.4	50.4	33.1	5.6	7.7	--	0.5	46.2
1986g	32.0	2.7	34.7	41.0	3.9	11.4	4.1	-	60.2
1988r	45.7	4.1	50.1	29.8	7.8	5.3	3.8	-	46.7
1989g	32.7	2.7	35.4	35.6	7.3	10.6	4.3	-	57.7
1992r	46.2	8.0	54.2	27.6	6.5	6.0	0.9	-	41
1993g	31.8	5.1	36.9	34.9	7.5	17.0	0.8	-	60.2
1995r	41.0	9.5	50.5	24.8	9.7	13.1	-	-	47.6
1996g	29.6	4.2	33.8	39.4	7.8	18	-	-	65.2
1999r*	37.7	8.7	46.4	37.8	2.5/1.4(IU)	9.5	-	-	51.3

Source: own elaboration from Table 5.1 in Marcet and Argelaguet (1998) and from Generalitat de Catalunya. Departament de Governació. * In the 1999 elections the PSC-PSOE formed an electoral coalition with IC except in the electoral district of Barcelona. On the other hand IC had broken off its relationship with IU which stood alone in that election. The results given for the PSC-PSOE are actually the sum of the vote obtained by the PSC in Barcelona and the vote obtained by the coalition with IC in the remaining districts. The results given for the IC are the vote obtained by this political force in Barcelona; the second percentage is the vote obtained by the former partner, IU.

Turning now to what we have labelled “state-wide” parties, we first find two parties that had disappeared from the Catalan scene, the UCD and PSA, by the time our analysis begins in 1989, and a third one, the CDS, that was already on the wane. We will refer to them very briefly. The UCD (*Unión de Centro Democrático*, Union of the Democratic Centre) was the centre-right party led by Adolfo Suárez that steered the Spanish transition to democracy in the late 1970s only to collapse in the early 1980s. Suárez founded a new party, the CDS (*Centro Democrático y Social*; Social and Democratic Centre Party) that during the 1980s succeeded in preserving some of what had been the electoral support gathered by its predecessor. The third party, the PSA (*Partido Socialista de Andalucía*; Andalusian Socialist Party) is the only political force that strictly speaking should not be under the “state-wide” category since the PSA was basically a regionalist party based in Andalusia which, however, for a short period of time presented lists in Catalonia trying to appeal to the immigrant electorate of Andalusian origin; if we have placed it under the “state-wide” category this is simply because the PSA did not appeal to a Catalan type of identity. The PSA, nevertheless, did not survive long upon Catalan soil.

Still within the “state-wide” category we find the AP/PP (*Alianza Popular*, Popular Alliance, refounded as *Partido Popular* in 1989), the PSC-PSOE (*Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya- Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, Party of the Socialists of Catalonia- Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party), and the PSUC/IC (*Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya*, Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia, leading a coalition with smaller parties called *Iniciativa per Catalunya*, Initiative for Catalonia, from 1987 onwards). These three are still present in Catalan politics. The three of them have maintained some type of relationship with organisations at the state-wide level throughout the 1977-99 period. Yet there are important differences between the AP/PP and the other two parties. First of all, whereas the former is organised in Catalonia as elsewhere in Spain, the PSC and the PSUC/IC have maintained a federal type of relation with their state-wide counterparts, the PSOE and the PCE/IU (*Partido Comunista de España*, Spanish Communist Party, leading later on to a larger coalition known as *Izquierda Unida*, United Left) respectively. Likewise, both the PSC and IC define Catalonia as a nation within the Spanish state, the PP being an exception in this respect. In short, one might argue that Catalan nationalism has permeated the PSC and IC to a much

greater extent than the PP and it is often that we find the latter opposing the other two on issues connected with the nationalist dimension such as language politics.

The PP, at the state-wide level, is the major party of the conservative, centre-right of the political spectrum. In Catalonia, however, it competes with CiU in this dimension where it tends to gather the support of those voters with a predominantly Spanish, rather than Catalan, sense of identity. The PP won the 1996 general elections, but having failed to obtain an absolute majority it has needed the external support of CiU (among others) in the Spanish Parliament in order to maintain a stable government.

As can be seen from Table 1, the PSC-PSOE is CiU's main competitor within the Catalan party system. Again, its electoral results depend on the type of election: the PSC-PSOE has won all general elections in Catalonia since the first free elections of 1977; in all regional elections since 1980, however, the Catalan socialists have been second to CiU on all occasions. This is one of the consequences of the *dual voting* -which with regard to the balance kept between the two parties might be seen either as a transfer of votes from the PSC-PSOE to CiU in regional elections, or the other way around, that is, a transfer of votes from CiU to the PSC-PSOE in general elections- but also of a lower electoral turnout in regional elections that affects primarily that part of the electorate which votes for the PSC-PSOE in general elections. We will discuss both these phenomena in greater detail below. With regard to the PSOE, it is important to recall now that this party formed all the Spanish Governments from 1982 to 1996, having won all general elections held during that period with an absolute majority except the last, in 1993. The PSOE, as three years later the PP was forced to do, signed an agreement with CiU, exchanging new concessions in the decentralisation process for the parliamentary support needed in the Spanish Congress to maintain a stable government in Madrid. Nonetheless, it is important to recall that the survey we employ here for our analysis was conducted in 1992 when the PSOE still enjoyed an absolute majority in Madrid.

Lastly, we find the PSUC/IC. The PSUC is a Catalan communist party founded in 1936. As mentioned above, in 1987 the PSUC, together with its Spanish counterpart the PCE

with which it was federated, led the formation of a coalition of parties that in Catalonia became known as IC, and in the rest of Spain, as IU. As far as the nationalist cleavage is concerned, the electoral support gathered by IC is perhaps the most difficult to categorise. We have decided to place it with the “state-wide” camp with some hesitation. To begin with, of all political forces with a “state-wide” connection, IC is the one that has had fewest problems in articulating a Catalan nationalist discourse within its global strategy; in fact, some analyses place it in the nationalist camp, together with CiU and ERC, although on more moderate positions (Font y Pallarés 1995). It is also true that the sociological composition of IC voters shows a more pronounced sense of Catalan identity than that of the three other state-wide parties competing from 1989 to 1992, the period that our analysis is focused upon. Indeed, the relation between IC and its Spanish counterpart, IU, was broken off in 1997, so nowadays IC stands as a non state-wide coalition (although on the path to this break-up there were issues concerned that had little to do with differences on the nationalist dimension). Nonetheless, we have opted for placing the vote to IC as a “state-wide” vote since at the time of our analysis the coalition was still federated to a political force at the state level; indeed the electoral evolution of the PSUC/IC resembles quite closely that of the PCE/IU at the state level.

The results of the 1999 elections were somewhat different from previous regional elections. The PSC and IC formed an electoral coalition in all districts except Barcelona. The sum of the vote obtained by this coalition (and the PSC and IC separately in Barcelona) surpassed the vote gathered by CiU, but the latter obtained a greater number of seats and was asked to form a new minority government. Nonetheless, the electoral breakthrough of the PSC-PSOE has signalled the end of the nationalist parties’ parties dominance of regional politics (see Table 1).

3. The electoral behaviour of Catalans: *dual voting* and *differential turnout*


3.1. *Defining the problem and our object of study*

Returning to Table 1, the most striking feature of Catalan electoral behaviour is the high inter-block volatility from general to regional elections and vice versa. In this case the blocks have been defined as *nationalist vote* versus *vote to state-wide parties* rather than that more commonly defined by the left-right continuum. This high volatility between different type of elections became known as *dual voting* and has been at the centre of most analyses of Catalan electoral behaviour (Montero and Font 1989; 1991; Padró-Solanet and Colomer 1992; Font and Pallarés 1994; Molas 1994; Riba 1995). One of the reasons that has made *dual voting* so thoroughly analysed, no doubt, is because, since the first regional elections of 1980, it has been this high inter-block volatility which has determined which party emerged as the winner in every single election.

Dual voting has, in fact, two components. First of all, analysts realised that from general to regional elections there was a transfer of votes from state-wide parties to Catalan nationalist parties, in particular from the PSOE, in central government since 1982, to CiU; but also from the PSOE to the ERC, and from the state-wide parties of the centre and the right of the political spectrum (the PP and the CDS in our analysis), again to CiU (Montero and Font 1991). There was nevertheless a second particularity to Catalan electoral behaviour and that was the very low electoral turnout in regional elections. In Spain as a whole, electoral turnouts for regional elections are usually lower than for general elections, but this gap is widest (14% on average) in Catalonia than in any other Autonomous Community (Riba 1995: 17-18). In the regional vote of 1992, one of the elections on which our analysis is based, electoral abstention reached a peak 45% of the electorate. In Figure 1 we can see the evolution of electoral abstention in Catalonia both in general and regional elections. In addition, analysts realised that this low electoral turnout in regional elections did not affect all parties to the same extent and that it was especially detrimental to the PSC-PSOE. Thus the latter's electoral victory in all general elections is not only due to the transfer of votes from people that in regional elections vote for other parties, but also to the behaviour of a section

of the Catalan electorate that opts for abstention in regional elections and mobilises for the PSOE in general elections. This second phenomenon became known as the *differential turnout* of the Catalan electorate and completes the whole picture of what was initially called Catalan *dual voting*.

Figure 1. Electoral abstention in Catalonia both in general and regional elections



Source: Pallares and Font (1994), Anuario El País (1994, 1997) and Generalitat de Catalunya.
Departament de Governació

In order to avoid confusion, we have opted here for clearly differentiating both components. Thus in the remaining of this paper we will talk of *dual voting* to refer to that section of the electorate that is not loyal to one particular party and votes for different political forces depending on the type of election. On the other hand, we will talk of *differential turnout* to refer to that section of the electorate which casts a vote in general elections but opts for abstention in regional elections.

3.2 *Existing explanations of the phenomena and alternative hypotheses*

There have been many different attempts at explaining both *dual voting* and *differential turnout*. The results of research, however, have often been contradictory with one another, as we shall immediately see. In order to simplify what is a growing literature, we have divided the existing explanations in two types: spatial models and non-spatial models. As we shall see, most authors actually resort to a combination of both to explain the whole picture; nonetheless, there are important differences between them.

Padró-Solanet and Colomer (1992) developed a spatial model, based upon the assumption of the rationality of voters, which explains both *dual voting* and *differential turnout* in one go. According to them, the Catalan party system is structured in a two-dimensional space with two axes: the traditional left-right spectrum and a nationalist axis. Assuming that each voter votes for the party that is closest to their own position in the political spectrum, a shift in the relevance of each dimension depending on the type of election creates a variation in the distance that voters perceive from the different parties and might even provoke, in some cases, that the closest party be different depending on whether it is a regional or a general election. In general elections, political competition would be based primarily upon the left-right spectrum, whereas in regional elections the nationalist axis would be more relevant. This would explain, on the one hand, *dual voting*: a moderate left-wing voter with a Catalan sense of identity would feel the PSC-PSOE closest when the left-right spectrum is the most important, and CiU closest when the nationalist axis is the most

relevant. Likewise, a right-wing voter with a Catalan sense of identity would vote for the PP in a general election and for CiU in a regional one. The *differential turnout* would also be explained by this model, by simply adding an argument about the *supply side* of the political market. The reasoning in this case would be that a voter located on the left side of the political spectrum with a predominantly Spanish sense of identity would vote for the PSC-PSOE in general elections, but would not turn out in regional elections since he perceives too far a distance between himself/herself and all parties, including the PSC-PSOE³. Further research into the validity of this model has arrived at the conclusion that, although the relative importance of both axes changes depending on the type of election, the left-right axis is more relevant in both type of elections, between two and three times greater in general elections, and two times greater in regional elections (Riba 1995).

Padro-Solanet and Colomer were first in presenting a detailed spatial model that sought to explain *why* nationalist parties obtained greater support in regional elections. Nevertheless, research carried out by other authors shared, although not always explicitly, some of the model's axioms and one in particular: if Catalan nationalist parties obtained greater support in regional elections this surely meant that the nationalist dimension was more relevant in regional elections. Results, however, were perplexing in this respect. As far as *dual voting* is concerned, if Padro-Solanet and Colomer's model was right we would expect those who in regional elections transfer their vote from the PSC-PSOE, or from the PP, to CiU, to show a profile in the nationalist axis that is closer to CiU's loyal voters (those who vote for the party in both type of elections) than to the PSC-PSOE's or the PP's respectively. Likewise, their ideological profile (on the left-right political spectrum) should be closer to either of the state-wide parties. Montero and Font (1991) looked into these hypotheses and found they were correct for transfers from the PP or the CDS (right and centre-right) to CiU, but not for those who shift between the PSC-PSOE and CiU and who constitute, after all, most dual voters.


³At the time of its consolidation as a party in the transitional period, the PSC-PSOE leadership sought to avoid elements of too strident a Spanish nationalism within its discourse or, at any rate, any potential elements of anti-catalanism. This would have created a shortage on the supply side of the political market since no party on the left side of the political spectrum would articulate a Spanish (as opposed to Catalan) nationalist discourse. As we have already mentioned above, both the PSC-PSOE and IC define Catalonia as a nation.

Likewise, Pallarés and Font (1994) found it easier to explain why dual voters opted for CiU in regional elections (they were closer ideologically after all) than to explain why they returned to the PSC-PSOE in general elections (from which they were further away ideologically). Our own results with respect to transfers between the PSC-PSOE and the CiU confirm Montero and Font's findings. In Figure 2 we can see the profile of the three types of voters on the left-right spectrum. The results contradict Padro and Colomer's model to the extent that dual voters show a somewhat closer resemblance to CiU on the ideological axis (they even share the same mode). If they voted for the PSC in general elections for ideological reasons, then their profile should be closer to that of the PSC on the left-right spectrum; if it is not, one might think that in general elections they voted for the PSC-PSOE for reasons *other* than ideological proximity.

Figure 3 shows the same three types of voters' profiles on the nationalist axis (measured in terms of identity) to which we have added the profile of those who vote for the PSC-PSOE in general elections but do not turn out in regional elections. Both dual voters and the PSC-PSOE's loyal voters share a mode in the value "as Catalan as Spanish", although it is slightly higher for dual voters than for those who are loyal to the PSC-PSOE. No doubt dual voters have a slightly firmer Catalan sense of identity; however, they show a closer resemblance to those loyal to the PSC-PSOE than those loyal to the CiU. Also, 15% of dual voters feel exclusively Spanish which requires explaining why they vote for a Catalan nationalist party in regional elections. In our view, this and the previous figure prove that dual voters are closer to the PSC-PSOE in the nationalist dimension, and yet closer to CiU in the ideological spectrum. This suggests that the reason for a transfer of votes from the PSC-PSOE to CiU in regional elections does not lie in the greater relevance of the nationalist versus the ideological dimension, but, rather, the opposite⁴. Our empirical analysis, presented in the following section, will be based precisely on this hypothesis.

⁴ Nonetheless, in Figure 3 we can also see the distribution on the nationalist axis of those who vote for the PSC-PSOE in general elections but do not turn out in regional elections. This shows that as far as the *differential turnout* is concerned, Padro-Solanet y Colomer's model may be closer to the truth, to the extent that more than 40% of the PSOE's differential turnouts "feel only Spanish". This suggests that, indeed, at regional elections there might be a certain demobilisation of the PSC-PSOE's electorate with the strongest Spanish (as opposed to Catalan) sense of identity.


Figure 2. Type of vote by ideological self-placement



Non-spatial models have resorted to a wider range of explanations. On the one hand, *differential turnout* would be caused by a lack of identification by a section of the electorate with Catalan institutions of representation. According to this explanation, differential turnout voters would be electors from immigrant origin who vote for the PSC-PSOE in general elections but are uninterested in Catalan elections because they come from other parts of Spain. On the other hand, *dual voting* has been explained by both leadership and government evaluations by Montero and Font (1989, 1991) and Font and Pallarés (1995). Following this line, Riba (1995) suggested the possibility of interpreting *dual voting* as a *retrospective* control of voters over governments. This is an important line of research which emphasises that voters are not always determined by their class, ideological origins or other types of constraints; they also evaluate parties on the basis of their recent government performance (Fiorina 1981; Key 1967; Kiewit 1983). We find this line of research particularly interesting for the following reasons: at the time of our analysis, both the PSOE and CiU were

incumbent parties at different institutional levels (the central and the regional governments respectively); the bulk of *dual voting*, as we mentioned above, involves transfers between these two parties; and finally, we have just seen that these transfers are the most difficult to explain by spatial models. We have therefore opted to develop further this line of research, which we present in the section below.

Figure 3. Type of vote by national identity



4. Modelling Catalan Electoral Behaviour

Most empirical research done on *dual voting* has used bivariate analysis⁵. We think that multivariate analysis might solve some of the problems that previous research left unsolved. Multivariate methodology is more appropriate for dealing with possible spurious correlations. For all these reasons we have opted for it in order to test our hypotheses. These we now summarise again:

1. The nationalist axis is more relevant in explaining the vote for nationalist parties in general elections *rather* than in regional elections, as had been hypothesised in previous research. Therefore *dual voting* is not the result of a change in the relevance of the nationalist dimension depending on the type of election.

Having checked the validity of the former hypotheses we were led to the question of why, then, nationalist parties gathered greater electoral support in regional elections. A potential explanation that had not been thoroughly tested before is that of retrospective control of voters over incumbents. For this reason we decided to focus our analysis on the most frequent case of *dual voting*: the transfer of votes between the PSOE and CiU.

2. The vote for CiU versus the vote for PSC-PSOE is more strongly determined by both ideology and retrospective voting in regional elections than in general elections. Additionally, and following the first hypothesis, the nationalist axis is more relevant in determining the vote for CiU versus the vote for PSC-PSOE in general elections than in regional elections.

⁵ There are two exceptions: Riba (1995) runs multivariate regression analysis using aggregate data. Pallares and Font (1994) also use multivariate techniques with individual data, but they try to explain the vote for each party versus the rest, rather than the transfer of votes between two types of parties, or between two particular parties, as we do here.

Let us now turn to the empirical evidence. In order to test the first hypothesis, we have run logistic regressions to predict the vote for nationalist parties versus the vote for state-wide parties in both general and regional elections. The results are presented in Table 2.⁶

Our model predicts the nationalist vote (both in general and regional elections) as a function of four variables. First we took the individual self-placement on the Catalan/Spanish type of identity as an indicator of the nationalist axis⁷. Additionally, we included two sociodemographic variables (knowledge of Catalan⁸ and Origin⁹) frequently linked to the

⁶ The dependent variable of this model takes the value 1 for those who vote for either the CiU or the ERC (what we grouped as *nationalist vote*) and 0 for those voting for the PP, the CDS, the PSC-PSOE, or the IC (what we grouped as a *vote for state-wide parties*).

The independent variables included in the model were the following:

Nationalist feeling: refers to a nationalist self-placement on a continuum that goes from 1 (only Spanish) to 5 (only Catalan).

Subjective Social Class: refers to a subjective self-placement on a continuum that goes from 0 (upper class) to 5 (lower class).

Knowledge of Catalan: is a categorical variable with three intervals: 1. Those who do not speak Catalan, whether they understand it or not; 2. Those who both understand and speak Catalan but cannot write it; 3. Those who can both speak and write Catalan.

Origin: refers to the origin of the individual. It takes four values: 0. Those who were born outside Catalonia; 1. Those who were born in Catalonia but their parents were born outside Catalonia; 2. Those who were born in Catalonia and one of their parents was also born in Catalonia; 3. Those who were born in Catalonia and both their parents were also born in Catalonia.

⁷ We had another possibility as an indicator of the nationalist axis: the individuals' self-placement on a scale that goes from 01(not a Catalan nationalist at all) to 10 (a strong Catalan nationalist). We decided to use as an indicator the individuals' types of identity (as Catalan or Spanish, or both) for the following reason. We thought that, out of the two indicators, the individuals' type of identity is best in expressing a nationalist axis or cleavage in the sense that respondents place themselves on a continuum that goes between two concepts (feeling Catalan or Spanish) that may be compatible but are different from one another whereas the other potential indicator is more of a scale in which respondents express their different degrees of attachment to one single concept: "being a Catalan nationalist". Furthermore, previous research (Padro-Solanet and Colomer 1992) regards the individuals' type of identity as an acceptable indicator of the nationalist axis or cleavage.

⁸ In those regions in which there is a widespread sense of national identity different from that of the centre, this is usually reinforced by the knowledge and/or frequent use of the regional language when this exists, as is the case in Catalonia.

⁹ Catalonia is a region with a long tradition of immigration from other parts of Spain. This was particularly intense in the 1960s. This is why electoral studies of Catalonia have frequently used the origin of the respondent (immigrant or native) to explain the nationalist vote.

vote for nationalist parties. Finally, we also added a socio-economic control variable (subjective social class)¹⁰.

Empirical results seem to validate our first hypothesis. As we see in Table 2, the coefficient of the nationalist axis (Nationalist Feeling) is stronger for general elections than regional elections. This also applies to the two sociodemographic variables usually linked to the nationalist vote (Knowledge of Catalan and Origin). The same information can be read in the second and third columns of each model.¹¹ Since coefficients in the logistic model translate into individual probabilities of a nationalist vote in a non linear and non additive manner, we have transformed these coefficient estimates into probabilities in order to highlight the relative magnitude of some of the independent variables on the prediction of the nationalist vote.

Following other research on voting behaviour, we estimated in Table 3 the probabilities of a respondent voting for a nationalist party for each of the independent variables of interest both in their lowest and highest value (that is, the first and second entries of each cell) while holding constant the remaining independent variables at their mean ¹². The third and last entry is the difference between these two estimated probabilities: this gives us a measure of the strength of each independent variable on the dependent variable, known as “first difference” (King, 1989; Alvarez and Nagler 1998).

¹⁰ We tried to include two other socio-economic control variables: Income and Education. However, they did not turn out to be significant. For this reason, we decided not to include them in the final model.

¹¹ The first partial derivative of the coefficients is a way to summarise the effect of each single independent variable on the dependent variable. As the logit model is non-linear and non-additive, it is true that the effect of each independent variable is difficult to compare between the two models (general and regional elections). Nevertheless, they have the same variables (measured in the same way) and their effects are taken at the same interval of the functional form (between 0.3 and 0.7, the interval that is more linear and additive). See the predicted probability of the model when holding constant the variables at their mean in Table 2.

¹² See the mean values of each independent variable in the Appendix, Table I.

Table 2. *The vote for nationalist parties versus the vote for state-wide parties in general and regional elections*

Independent Variables	1. General Elections			2. Regional Elections		
	Coeff	First D+	Odds-ratio	Coeff	First D+	Odds-ratio
Nationalist Feeling	.76** (.07)	0.16	2.15	.54** (.06)	0.11	1.72
Subjective Social Class	-.29** (.10)	-0.06	0.74	-.26** (.09)	-0.05	0.76
Knowledge of Catalan:						
Understand and speak Catalan but cannot write it	1.48** (.33)	0.32	4.39	.94** (.20)	0.20	2.57
Understand, speak and write Catalan	1.44** (.35)	0.31	4.25	.71** (.22)	0.15	2.03
Origin:						
Born in Catalonia with both their parents born outside Catalonia	.45 (.28)	0.09	1.57	-.06 (.09)	0.09	0.94
Born in Catalonia with only one of their parents also born in Catalonia	1.10** (.29)	0.24	3.02	.55* (.26)	0.12	1.74
Born in Catalonia with both their parents also born in Catalonia	1.39** (.21)	0.30	4.02	1.21** (.18)	0.26	3.53
Constant	-4.82**			-2.04**		
Chi 2 (9)	597.95**			507.87 **		
Pseudo R2	.31			.26		
% Correct	78%			73%		
Number of cases	1391			1488		
Predicted probability of the model (at x-bar)	0.34			0.67		

Note: Entries are logit maximum-likelihood estimates and their associated standard errors below.

** indicates an estimate significant at the level of 99%

* indicates an estimate significant at the level of 95%

+ Calculated at the mean value of each variable included in the models

Table 3. *Effects of nationalist feeling, language, and origins on the vote for nationalist parties in general and regional elections.*

Variables of interest:	Probability of voting for nationalist parties in	
	General elections	Regional elections
Nationalist Feeling		
1 only Spanish	.07 (.05-.10)	.37 (.30-.44)
5 only Catalan	.63 (.56-.70)	.83 (.80-.87)
<i>Difference</i>	.56	.46
Knowledge of Catalan		
0 other	.20 (.15-.27)	.61 (.55-.66)
1 Understand, speak, and write Catalan	.52 (.43-.61)	.75 (.70-.80)
<i>Difference</i>	.32	.14
Origin		
0 other	.18 (.14-.23)	.52 (.47-.58)
1 born in Catalonia with both their parents also born in Catalonia	.47 (.41-.53)	.78 (.74-.82)
<i>Difference</i>	.29	.26
Baseline probability	.31 (.27-.35)	.68 (.65-.71)

Estimated probabilities were calculated with the other variables set to their mean value. Numbers in parentheses correspond to 95% confidence interval for each simulation.

According to our model, a voter who feels “only Spanish” would have a 7% probability of voting for a nationalist party in general elections; however a voter feeling “only Catalan” would have a 63% probability of doing so in the same type of elections, holding the remaining variables constant at their mean. This represents a “first difference” of 56%. In regional elections, a voter that feels “only Spanish” would have a 37% probability of voting for a nationalist party, and a voter feeling “only Catalan”, 83%. Therefore the “first difference” is ten points lower in regional elections: only 46%. This is additional evidence that the effect of Nationalist Feeling on the probability of voting for nationalist parties is stronger in general elections. Likewise, the effect of Knowledge of Catalan and Origin are strongest in general elections. More specifically, for those who understand, speak and write Catalan, the “first difference” is 32% in general elections and 14% in regional elections,

whereas for those who were born in Catalonia with both their parents also born in Catalonia, the first difference is 29% in general elections and 26% in regional elections.

Therefore we have found empirical support for our first hypothesis. We now turn to test the second hypothesis focusing on the most frequent case of *dual voting*: the vote for CiU versus the vote for PSC-PSOE both in general and regional elections. For the reasons that we stated above, we have now created a model to predict the vote for CiU as a function of seven variables. The results of this model are presented in Table 4¹³. Four of the independent variables were already present in the previous model (Nationalist Feeling, Subjective Social Class, Origin, and Knowledge of Catalan). These, we had to include, since, as we have just seen, they are crucial for explaining the vote for nationalist parties in any type of elections. As we can see in the table, the nationalist axis predicts the vote for CiU in general elections much better than in regional elections. This is further confirmation of our first hypothesis, tested in our previous model.

However, the main purpose of this second model was to identify those factors (not related to the nationalist axis) explaining the choice between a Catalan nationalist and a state-wide party- in this case, the PSC-PSOE and CiU. For that purpose, we have included three new variables in this model: Ideology, and the retrospective Evaluation of both Central and Regional Governments. The empirical relevance of our model is heightened by the fact that

¹³ The dependent variable in this model takes the value 1 for those voting for CiU and 0 for those voting for PSC-PSOE. Additionally, four of the independent variables are the same as in the previous model. The three new variables are the following:

Ideology: refers to self-placement on a continuum that goes from 01 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).

Central Government Evaluation: expresses an evaluation of the central government that may go from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good).

Regional Government Evaluation: expresses the same evaluation of the regional government.

We have also tried to include two other socio-economic control variables: Income and Education. However, they did not turn out to be significant. For this reason, we decided not to include them in the final model.

both these parties were the incumbent at different institutional levels, and that both were the main competitors in the Catalan party system.

In the previous model, we had not been able to include Ideology because we had grouped the vote for parties belonging to the same side of the ideological spectrum in opposite values of the dependent variable (since the latter split the vote into *vote for nationalist parties* versus *vote for state-wide parties*). Focusing on the specific dichotomy of CiU versus PSC-PSOE allows us to test the relative strength of the ideological spectrum versus the nationalist axis in each type of election. In Table 4, we see that coefficients are somewhat stronger for Ideology in regional elections than in general elections. Also, as in the previous model, we have estimated the probability of voting CiU at different values of Ideology (Table 5) both for regional and general elections. More specifically, we have estimated the probabilities of voting for CiU versus PSC-PSOE for variations in each of the independent variable while holding constant the remaining independent variables of the model either at their mode value (for the variables Ideology, and both Central and Regional Governments Evaluations) or at their mean value (for the remaining independent variables included in the model)¹⁴.

The “first difference” is slightly higher for regional elections than for general elections which again suggests a greater strength of Ideology in predicting the vote for CiU in regional elections. This is consistent with what we saw in Figure 2: the profile of dual voters on the ideological spectrum was somewhat closer to CiU’s loyal voters than to those of the PSC-PSOE. Leaving the effect of the *differential turnout* aside, this would partly explain why Ideology predicts the vote for CiU better in regional elections. Nonetheless it is not a great difference, the implication being that Ideology only explains the transfer of votes between the PSOE and CiU marginally.

¹⁴ As can be seen in Table 5, we have chosen values of Ideology, and of Central and Regional Government Evaluation, that do not exactly correspond to their lowest and highest values. For Ideology, we prefer to compare the probabilities of someone of the left with someone of the right (given that very few cases were self-placed in the extreme categories of this variable: 1 and 10). And the same applies to both Central and Regional Government Evaluations where the “good” and “bad” evaluations are more common than the “very

Both Central and Regional Government evaluations, on the other hand, allow us to test the *retrospective vote* hypothesis. If voters are able to evaluate incumbents on the basis of their performance, this may explain why they shift their vote depending on the type of election. We have divided this main hypothesis into several subhypotheses: A) The higher Central Government Evaluation, the lower the probability of voting for CiU in either general or regional elections. B) The higher Regional Government Evaluation, the higher the probability of voting for CiU in either general or regional elections. Nevertheless, these two subhypotheses have been qualified by the following: C) we have assumed that voters use each election to reward or punish the incumbent party at the institutional level that is at stake in *that* election: that is, Central Government Evaluation will be more important in general elections and Regional Government Evaluation will be more relevant in regional elections. D) linked to hypothesis C: only secondarily, voters use an election to reward or punish a party that is not incumbent at the institutional level that is at stake in that election; that is, Central Government Evaluations may have some importance in regional elections but always inferior to Regional Government Evaluations, and the other way around. From our results in the previous model we derived one final hypothesis: if the nationalist axis is insufficient to explain the vote for nationalist parties in regional elections and the differential impact of voters' ideology is minor, as we have just seen, then E) the predictive strength of *retrospective voting* (that is Central and Regional Governments Evaluations taken together) must be greater in regional elections than in general ones.

Looking at Table 4 we see that our model seems to confirm hypotheses A, B, and E, but comes to surprising results in relation to hypotheses C and D. As we expected, Central and Regional Government Evaluations show significant coefficients in both type of elections. Furthermore, the joint effect of these two variables seems to be stronger for the case of regional elections. This is *prima facie* evidence that retrospective control of voters over incumbents accounts for the choice for CiU versus PSC-PSOE more strongly in regional elections. Hypotheses C and D, however, are fulfilled only in general elections; that is, evaluations of the Central Government are more important than evaluations of Regional Government in accounting for the choice for CiU in general elections. However, these central

good" and "very bad" extreme evaluations.

government evaluations are even more relevant in predicting the vote for CiU in regional elections, even more so than regional government evaluations. This suggests that a section of dual voters might be using regional elections to exert a punishment vote on the party in central government, the PSOE. Why should these voters not do this at general elections? Voters could be restrained from exerting a punishment vote on the PSOE in general elections if they calculated that the cost of that action (a victory of the PP) is higher than its benefit¹⁵. These potential costs would not exist in regional elections either because these voters realise that the PP is not a real alternative for the regional government *or* because they regard regional elections as less important and feel inclined to use them to give the central government a signal or show their discontent. We lack evidence to support either proposition; all we can do is to underline the evidence we have pointing to the existence of a punishment vote on the PSOE. Nonetheless, from Table 4 we can see that evaluations of regional government show a similar strength in predicting the vote for CiU from which we must conclude that the shifting voting patterns of a section of the Catalan electorate might be equally explained as a punishment vote on the government performance of the PSOE and a reward for the government performance of CiU¹⁶.

How do these coefficients translate into real probabilities? According to the estimations of Table 5, a voter who regards the central incumbent's performance as bad will have a probability of voting for CiU in general elections of 61%. However, if the voter regards the central government performance as good the probability of voting for CiU drops

¹⁵ It is important to remember that the principal party in the opposition at the central institutional level (PP) has suffered many problems of credibility as a governing alternative. For instance, in a survey carried out in July 1987 (CIS 1695) only 20% of the total respondents agreed with the view that the AP/PP was ready to govern. This was only very slowly modified: in December 1994 (CIS 2127) 41% of those interviewed thought that the PP was a credible alternative to the incumbent.

¹⁶ We have included some additional evidence on the effect of government evaluations. Figure 4 and 5 show both central and regional government evaluations by type of vote. As can be seen, comparing both Figures, dual voters' evaluation of regional government is almost the same as that of CiU's loyal voters whereas their evaluation of central government is somewhere in the middle between that of PSOE's loyal voters and CiU's loyal voters. This bivariate analysis also gives us some interesting clues about *differential turnout*. The latter may also be partly explained by *retrospective vote*: those who vote for the PSOE in general elections, but do not turn out in regional ones, show a very similar profile to that of dual voters in their evaluation of central government (in fact slightly worse) and yet, they have the worst evaluation of regional government of all groups examined in this bivariate analysis: this would suggest that their way of expressing a punishment vote on the party in central government is electoral abstention.

to 12%. Hence the first difference in the case of general elections is 49%. In regional elections this first difference is higher: 54%. The same applies to evaluations of the regional government. The first difference is much higher in regional elections: 43% versus 25% in general elections. Again, the first difference is higher for the evaluations of central government than for the evaluation of regional government: 54% versus 43% respectively. This is additional evidence for the hypothesis of punishment of the central incumbent.

5. Conclusions

Both our models in the previous section seem to prove what we presented in the introduction as our main hypothesis: Catalan electoral competition is bidimensional; nevertheless, the greater electoral support gathered by nationalist parties is not explained by a greater impact of the nationalist dimension, but by other factors. However, as we explained in Section 2, the shifting voting pattern of Catalan electors has two components: *dual voting* and *differential turnout*. The results of our multivariate analysis only allow us to draw conclusions with respect to the combined effect of both phenomena; but we have also shown some bivariate analysis and this seems to suggest that our results are more conclusive for *dual voting* than for *differential turnout*. Indeed, in Figure 3 there is some evidence that Spanish exclusionist feelings (those who feel “only Spanish”) are more common among those who vote for the PSOE in general elections but do not turn out in regional elections. To these voters the nationalist dimension could be more relevant in regional elections and perceiving that all parties are too far from their position (since the PSC-PSOE does not articulate a Spanish form of nationalism) they would abstain as Padro and Colomer’s model predicts. We do not have definitive evidence with which to dismiss this hypothesis. All we may do is present an alternative explanation in the form of *retrospective voting*: as can be seen in Figure 4, the PSOE differential turnout voters have in common with dual voters a poorer evaluation of central government –and there is nothing in the spatial model that would predict this- than the PSOE’s loyal voters; since they also have the poorest evaluation of regional government (see Figure 5) they feel inclined to abstain probably because they regard regional elections as less important.

Table 4. *The vote for CIU versus PSC in general and regional elections.*

Independent Variables	3. General Elections			4. Regional Elections		
	Coef	First D+	Odds ratio	Coef	First D+	Odds ratio
Nationalist Feeling	.63** (.11)	0.14	1.88	.33** (.11)	0.04	1.39
Subjective Social Class	-.43** (.15)	-0.10	0.65	-.33* (.16)	-0.04	0.71
Knowledge of Catalan:						
Understand and speak Catalan but cannot write it	1.64** (.46)	0.37	5.19	1.14** (.31)	0.16	3.13
Understand, speak and write Catalan	1.84** (.48)	0.42	6.34	.88* (.35)	0.12	2.41
Origin:						
Born in Catalonia with both their parents born outside Catalonia	.40 (.41)	0.09	1.47	-.01 (.36)	0.001	0.99
Born in Catalonia with only one of their parents also born in Catalonia	.73* (.42)	0.16	2.07	.15 (.40)	0.02	1.16
Born in Catalonia with both their parents also born in Catalonia	1.38** (.31)	0.31	3.98	1.38** (.30)	0.19	4.01
Ideology	.54** (.07)	0.12	1.71	.68** (.07)	0.09	1.97
Central Government Evaluation	-1.25** (.15)	-0.28	0.28	-1.47** (.17)	-0.20	0.23
Regional Government Evaluation	.59** (.16)	0.13	1.80	1.14** (.19)	0.16	3.13
Constant	-5.16			-3.62**		
Chi 2 (10)		674.41**			657.92**	
Pseudo R2		.52			.53	
% Correct		86%			84%	
Number of cases		936			984	
Predicted probability of the model (at x-bar)		0.38			0.82	

Note: Entries are logit maximum-likelihood estimates, with their associated standard errors below.

** indicates an estimate significant at the level of 99%

* indicates an estimate significant at the level of 95%

+ Calculated at the mean value of each variable included in the models.

Table 5. *Effects of nationalist feeling, ideology, and retrospective evaluations of both central and regional incumbents on the vote for CiU versus PSC-PSOE in general and regional elections.*

Variables of interest:	Probability of voting for CiU versus PSC-PSOE in:	
	General elections	Regional elections
Nationalist Feeling		
1 only Spanish	.10 (.05-.17)	.55 (.41-.69)
5 only Catalan	.57 (.45-.69)	.82 (.74-.88)
<i>Difference</i>	.47	.27
Ideology (1-10)		
3 left	.13 (.09-.19)	.41 (.33-.49)
7 right	.57 (.46-.67)	.91 (.86-.94)
<i>Difference</i>	.44	.50
Retrospective evaluations of central incumbent		
2 bad	.61 (.51-.69)	.92 (.88-.94)
4 good	.12 (.07-.17)	.38 (.29-.49)
<i>Difference</i>	.49	.54
Retrospective evaluations of regional incumbent		
2 bad	.20 (.12-.31)	.46 (.33-.59)
4 good	.45 (.38-.53)	.89 (.85-.92)
<i>Difference</i>	.25	.43
Baseline probability	.31 (.27-.35)	.73 (.67-.78)

Estimated probabilities were calculated with the other variables set to their mean or mode value. Numbers in parentheses correspond to 95% confidence interval for each simulation.

However, with regard to dual voters, and in particular with regard to those who transfer their votes between the PSC-PSOE and CiU, we have fewer doubts in our conclusions. Why should these voters prefer voting for CiU in regional elections? We have seen a great deal of evidence *other* than their regional or national identity to explain this: to begin with, they are closer to CiU than to the PSOE on the ideological spectrum; their evaluation of CiU's regional government is nearly as good (in fact, it is almost the same) as that of CiU loyalists; finally, their evaluation of central government is not as positive as that of PSOE loyalists; (and therefore they may feel inclined to exert a punishment vote on the party in central government). However, if we try to do the same exercise, that is, trying to

explain *why* these voters should opt for the PSC-PSOE in general elections *other* than their regional/national identity, we are left with nothing; so *it must be their regional identity*. Of all factors examined, only the elector's regional/national identity has greater strength in explaining the vote for the PSOE versus CiU in general elections. Why, then, has *dual voting* been explained in previous research as a result of the greater relevance of the nationalist axis? Of all the different types of votes we have examined in bivariate analysis (see Figure 3), dual voters show the highest proportion of a dual type of identity, that is, they combine both a Catalan and a Spanish identity to different degrees, and only very few, when compared to the other groups, feel they belong exclusively to one group. When these holders of dual identities opted for a Catalan nationalist party in regional elections it seemed natural to conclude that territoriality became prominent on these occasions and that they voted "as Catalans". The evidence of multivariate analysis, however, (at least for the PSOE-CiU dichotomy) shows that the logic is, in any case, the opposite, and that in general elections, holders of dual identities feel inclined to vote only for parties that operate at the state-wide level and that in doing so they are voting, if anything, "as Spaniards".

The results of our research may also help us to address some of the wider questions posed in the introduction. Decentralisation does not seem to have been detrimental to electoral support for nationalist parties; if anything, the opposite. At least as far as CiU is concerned, the occupation of regional government seems to have served the party in consolidating its position and even expanding it. Here, we must recall that the party won the first regional elections of 1980 in minority, and yet in all subsequent regional elections (except the last) by absolute majority, not least due to its capacity to channel the discontent with the performance of state-wide parties at the centre.

Figure 4. Central government evaluation by type of vote





Figure 5. Regional government evaluation by type of vote



REFERENCES

- Acha, B., and S. Pérez-Nievas. 1998. "Moderate Nationalist Parties in the Basque Country: PNV and EA". In *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe*, ed. Lieven De Winter and Huri Türsan. London: Routledge.
- Alvarez, R. Michael, and Jonathan Nagler. 1998. "Economic Entitlements, and Social Issues: Voters' Choice in the 1996 Presidential Elections". *American Journal of Political Science* 42: 1349-1363.
- Balcells, A. 1996. *Catalan Nationalism*. London: Macmillan.
- Botella, Joan. 1984. "Elementos del Sistema de Partidos en la Cataluña Actual". *Papers* 21: 27-45.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Key, V.O. Jr. 1966. *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting: 1936-1960*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Kiewit, D. Roderick. 1983. *Macro-economics and Micro-politics: the Electoral Effects of Economic Issues*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- King, Gary. 1989. *Unifying Political Methodology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Linz, Juan J., and José Ramón Montero. 1999. "The Party Systems of Spain: Old Cleavages and New Challenges". *Estudio/Working Paper 1999/138*. Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones.
- Llera, F. 1994. *Los Vascos y la Política*. Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco.
- Llera, F. 1998. "Pluralismo y gobernabilidad en Euskadi (1980-1994)". In *Las Elecciones autonómicas en España 1980-1997*, ed. Manuel Alcántara and Antonia Martínez. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- Marcet, Joan, and Jordi Argelaguet. 1998. "Nationalist Parties in Catalonia". In *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe*, ed. Lieven De Winter and Huri Türsa. London: Routledge.
- Molas, I. 1994. "Electores, simpatizantes y partidos políticos: el caso de Cataluña". *Revista del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales* 12: 145-181.

- Montero, José Ramón, and Joan Font. 1989. *El Voto Dual en Cataluña: Dimensiones, Sujetos y Factores*. Barcelona. Mimeo.
- Montero, José Ramón, and Joan Font. 1991. "El Voto Dual: Lealtad y Transferencia de Votos en las Elecciones Autonómicas". *Estudis Electorals* 10: 183-211.
- Padro-Solanet, Albert, and Josep M. Colomer. 1992. "Modelos Espaciales y Temas de Campaña. El caso de las Elecciones Autonómicas de Cataluña de 1992". *Revista de Estudios Políticos* 78:
- Pallarés, Francesc, and Joan Font. 1994. "Las elecciones autonómicas en Cataluña 1980-1992". In *Comportamiento Político y Electoral*, ed. Pilar Del Castillo. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- Riba, Clara. 1995 *Vot Dual i Abstenció Diferencial*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.
- Soller Llebaria, Josep. 1998. "Las elecciones autonómicas en Cataluña 1980-1995". In *Las Elecciones autonómicas en España 1980-1997*, ed. Manuel Alcántara and Antonia Martínez. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.

APPENDIX

Table I. *Descriptive Statistics of the Variables used in the Models*

Variable	Number of Observations	Mean	Std Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Nationalist Feeling	2417	3.2	1.29	1	5
Origin	2470	1.7	1.35	0	3
Knowledge of Catalan	2459	2.2	0.78	1	3
Ideology	1777	4.7	1.85	1	10
Subjective Social Class	2399	1.3	0.71	1	4
Central Government Evaluation	2330	2.8	0.82	1	5
Regional Government Evaluation	2331	3.3	0.76	1	5
Nationalist vote in general elections	1440	.41	.49	0	1
Nationalist vote in regional elections	1553	.63	.48	0	1
CiU versus PSC-PSOE vote in general elections	1183	.45	.49	0	1
CiU versus PSC-PSOE vote in regional elections	1243	.67	.46	0	1