CONSERVATIVE PARTIES AND FEMINIST DEMANDS VIEWED IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE:
MAKING SENSE OF THE PARTIDO POPULAR IN SPAIN

Antonia María Ruiz Jiménez

Antonia María Ruiz Jiménez is *Doctora Miembro* of the Juan March Institute, Madrid. This paper is based on her doctoral dissertation, *Mecanismos del cambio ideológico e introducción de políticas de género en partidos conservadores: el caso de AP-PP en España en perspectiva comparada,* defended at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid on 3 June 2002.

1. From Alianza Popular to the Partido Popular: The "Feminization" of a Conservative Party[1]

Can a rightist party be more feminist than a leftist party? Our intuitive answer would be not, yet looking at the recent evolution of the *Partido Popular* (PP hereafter) in Spain we could give an affirmative response to this question.

In 1996, the first PP's government appointed four women ministers (education, justice, agriculture and environment), more than any other previous socialist or center government before. The 27 percent female participation in this first government placed Spain among the group of most developed countries in Northern and Central Europe, together with Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria (Uriarte 1997: 58).[2] Similarly, 8 percent of the mayoralties held by the PP in 1995, and 10.4 percent of those held in 1999, were occupied by women, compared to 6 and 8.6 percent of women representation in the mayoralties retained by the PSOE (Spanish Workers' Socialist Party) in the same years. Among the mayoralties occupied by the PP's women were cities as important as Cádiz, Málaga, Valencia or Zaragoza. Another relevant datum is that 62 percent of the non-law motions and 20 percent of the legislative initiatives related to gender, and approved during the whole democratic period, were, in fact, approved under the first government of the PP (1996-2000). Internally, the party has experienced a similar evolution, highly visible since the 1990s. Female participation in national directive positions in 1994 was below the percentages in the PSOE and IU (United Left) in Spain, but was similar to the percentage of female participation in the French Socialist Party in 1990 (Uriarte 1997: 59).

Together with the ideological changes regarding the Constitution and the Devolution Statute, the party evolution on gender issues and politics remains one of the most impressive

[2] Luxembourg, Ireland, Germany, France, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, United Kingdom and Greece.

and dramatic experienced by *Alianza Popular - Partido Popular*[3], (AP-PP hereafter), during its recent history, and it is probably also one of the most important within the Spanish Right's history at large. This fact is clearly admitted by the PP's leaders themselves. According to an interviewee, "before, within *Alianza Popular*, there were things that you could not talk about: family, Army, Church (…), it was taboo. But you go to the *Partido Popular* and those things are not only talked about but discussed".[4]

Let's consider the changes regarding abortion as an illustration of this evolution. In May 1985 the congressman and speaker for AP, Ruiz Gallardon, stated that his party had a formal compromise to withdraw the legislation on abortion if *Alianza Popular* ever gained office.[5] Just two years before the party's president, Manuel Fraga, linked this rejection to "the statements made by His Holiness the Pope , the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, and the Spanish Episcopate Committee, absolutely clear and categorical in their condemnation of voluntary abortion".[6] Following the same doctrinal orientations *Alianza Popular* was even opposed to any regulation on the use of contraception.

Only ten years later, a re-named *Partido Popular* recognized that regarding abortion, there were "extreme cases of pregnant women that justified their exemption from criminal responsibility" in its 1993 electoral program. The same approval of criminal exemption for the voluntary interruption of pregnancy had been perceptible in parliamentary debates during the Fifth Legislature, (1993-1996). Already in the Sixth Legislature, (1996-2000), the *Partido Popular* organized its first government after the Spanish transition to democracy, yet there has not been any withdrawal movement regarding the legislation on abortion. Even more significant, in 1997 the party voted in favor of the non-law motion approving the RU-486's

---

[3] The party was initially created as Alliance Popular (AP). During a first period it took part in different alliances with other parties, and competed in elections with different names. During the National Congress held in 1989 the party was renamed the Popular Party (PP). In an extraordinary congress held the following year, José María Aznar succeeded the previous president Manuel Fraga,

[4] Interviews with the PP's elite by the author. The quotation is from interview 41.

[5] *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados* 308 (May 14th , 1985).

[6] *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados* 40 (May 25th, 1983).

commercialization, a pill that would make the performing of an abortion easier for women.[7] In a clear contrast with the previous acceptance of catholic doctrine, the PP ideological changes regarding abortion has brought the Church's criticism of the party. During the last 2000 electoral campaign the Church asked catholic people not to vote for those parties who did not defend the right to life, explicitly including the PP among them. It asked voters to cast blank or null votes as an act of protest. The Spanish Episcopate Committee criticized the *Partido Popular*, among other things, because after four years in the Government it had not abolished the abortion regulation.[8]

The modification of AP-PP's attitudes are incomprehensible within the Right ideological tradition, especially in Spain, given the deep and long lasting linkages between this ideology and the Catholic Church, whose opinions about women's proper places and roles are well known.[9] When we turn to the literature about the contemporary moderate right it does not provide us with a straight answer either. Yet it makes even more surprising and incomprehensible the AP-PP's changes regarding gender issues.[10] This literature has described the contemporary right as antifeminist either directly or indirectly. In the following sections of this paper I will explore this literature with further detail to try to find an explanation for the differences observed in the Popular Party in Spain regarding its "feminization". I also will test the current theory against empirical data from the *Parties Manifestos Project* (CMP hereafter) to see if it holds in different West European democracies. It might well be the case that the literature is biased toward a bunch of countries which do not represent the whole set of different responses given by the conservative parties to new social demands accurately. It could happen that the case of the PP in Spain is not as particular in an European context as this literature may suggest.

---

[7] *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados* 342 (November 26th, 1997).

[8] Newspaper articles in *El País* (February 4th and 8th, 2000).

[9] See on this point Llera Esteban (1984); Núñez and Muñoz (1976); Shubert (1990); López-Casero, Bernecker and Waldmann (1994); Pérez Díaz (1991); Cuenca Toribio (1985); and Callahan (2000).

[10] This is specially the case because AP, and especially its first president Fraga, always tried to follow the ideological path headed by their Anglo-Saxon colleagues. What makes them follow a different road then? It seems to me that the answer is to be found in the different electoral success harvested by both parties.

2. The Literature about the Contemporary Moderate Right: The Stated "Antifeminization" of Conservative Parties[11]

According to literature on the New Right and Neoconservatism,[12] the social-democratic political consensus reached after the Second World War II (WW II hereafter), based on keynesianism and the building of a social welfare state, was substituted with a new conservative political consensus at the end of the 70s and during the 80s. Roughly speaking, the characteristic features of this new era of conservative and Right wing thought would include both the defense of neo-liberal economic policies, and opposition to both new social and political changes and demands for change. Those were opposed because they were considered a threat to the *status quo* and the established social order reached by 1968. Indirectly, the Right was hostile to the New Social Movements and the New Left, the key actors pressing those social demands (Girvin 1994; Dubiel 1993). Opposition to these new demands had implied a reassertion of traditional ideas of order and morality (Girvin 1994; Dubiel 1993; Abbot and Wallace 1992; Girvin 1988; King 1987). Both dimensions of the new contemporary conservative thought have been characterized as antifeminist, either in a direct or indirect way.

On the one hand, one of the movements that has seriously threatened the established social order is Feminism. To some extent, it can even be argued that the New Right and Neoconservatism have constituted a reaction against this social movement above all others (Girvin 1988: 3). Feminism challenged patriarchy, conventional or traditional sexual morality, and the structure of the family, all elements of fundamental importance in the established conservative scale of values (Girvin 1994: 204). So it is often said that

---

[11] This article, and the present section, deal only with the moderate Right, explicitly excluding the radical Right from the study. I use the terms Conservatism and Right in an interchangeable way, since Conservatism has always been the main ideological component of the moderate Right. One might argue that this has changed recently, but the current definition of both terms is taken into account in this article. For a historical review of their meaning see Girvin 1994.

[12] Both of the labels named above are referred to the analysis of the contemporary moderate right after 1968. These denominations have been mainly applied to the changes within the moderate Right, especially in United States and Great Britain, particularly during the Reagan and Thatcher periods. The same label has been sometimes applied to new radical Rightist parties in Europe, especially in France and Italy. The two are not to be confused; I here refer only to the first use of the term.

Conservatism is now characterized by the defense of the conventional family, meaning the defense of women's traditional roles as mothers, wives and care givers/takers. This also implies that conservative forces oppose women's participation in the paid labor market in so far as this undermines their work in the family; but also because some conservatives identify women's work as one of the causes of the economic crisis of the 1970s (Abbot and Wallace 1992: 7; King 1987: 19; Gamble 1986: 47; Krieger 1986: 212-213; David 1986: 137).

On the other hand, those authors focusing on the neo-liberal economic policies of the contemporary Right have paid much attention to the attacks against the social welfare state. Although this group has not defined the contemporary Right as anti-feminist, there is evidence to suggest that those assaults against the welfare state have strong negative effects, overall, on the process of women's emancipation. So contemporary Conservatism might be considered as indirectly anti-feminist also from this point of view.[13] It must be noticed that most of the authors consider both dimensions, the neo-liberal economic policies and the moral arguments, in the definition of the contemporary moderate Right as a "new conservative ideology" (Girvin 1988; 1994; King 1987; Abbot and Wallace 1992; Levitas 1986; David 1986; Whitaker 1992; Isaac 1990).

There are several reasons why I think that the conclusions from those works do not apply outside of an Anglo-Saxon environment. First of all, the studies have suffered from case selection bias in favor of the United Kingdom and the United States especially.[14] These two countries were considered to be representative of the new conservative change in the 1970s. As a result, it has often been assumed that the inferences drawn from the analysis of these cases also applied to any other liberal democratic political system (Girvin 1988; 1994; Barry

---

[13] This assumption is derived from the fact that women are the largest part of recipients and workers of the welfare state. See the articles by Callender, Millar, Brudnsdon, Woods, Davis and Foster in *Women and Social Policy: an Introduction* (Halletts 1996); also Rein 1985, cit. in Pierson 1991: 73 and 79. It is therefore clear that a reduction in social welfare policies will affect women in a twofold negative way (Margetts 1996; Sainsbury 1996).

[14] A bibliographical search in the Hollis database of Harvard University performed in August 2001 showed 997 titles under the headings of conservatism and new right in the United States; in the United Kingdom the number of titles was 351. In France and Germany the titles under these headings were near 300, but in other Northern and Southern European countries the number was below 40 titles (Norway and Portugal had a count of only 4 titles).

1987; Suvanto 1997). This might be especially true regarding women's studies (Norris 1993: 310; Abbot and Wallace 1992). The reasons why conclusions drawn from those countries might not be applicable to other nations include their conservative parties' strong electoral support during the 70s and 80s, unparalleled in other contemporary democracies, and the particular kind of welfare state that they share, which is also quite different from other models in Northern, Central and Southern Europe. I shall review these two factors in detail later.

Second, many of the works on Neoconservatism and the new Right, were carried out during the 80s and the beginning of the 90s, in part as a response to the conservative electoral victories in Great Britain and the United States during the same period. I will argue that the time scope was too short to evaluate new general trends. As I will show, in many countries there were insulated attacks against the welfare state, and/or reassertion of traditional values during the 80s. But they did not constitute a new trend, or consensus. Doing the analysis at the time when most of the countries were experiencing just marginal backward movements has produced the impression of a greater change of direction toward a new consensus than turned out to be the case in the long run.

I test the outlined hypotheses in the next section using international data on parties discourses. Regarding gender issues I found that not every party followed the "Anglo-Saxon model" after 1968. Not every rightist party turned to the criticism of the welfare state and the defense of conservative moral and social values as a response to the new social demands.

3. Testing the Theory against the Empirical Evidence from the Parties Manifestoes Project

Here I will analyze, therefore, to what extent other Rightist parties in West European democracies followed the example set by conservative parties in Great Britain and the United States. For this purpose I will be using data from the CMP.[15] This is an international project, which, over the years, has gathered the codification of political parties' electoral manifestos over 26 countries, between 1945 and 1998. I have selected a few countries within Northern Europe (Sweden, Norway) and Central and Southern Europe (France, Germany and Italy). Great Britain and the United States are also a part of the comparison, as they are the countries against which to compare the findings. Within each country I have selected the two main electoral competitors to the Left and Right of the ideological spectrum. Given the relevance of Christian Democracy in Europe, this type of party has always been selected together with the other most important one among the Rightist parties. The temporal framework goes from the first democratic election in these countries, after WW II, to their last elections in, or immediately before, 1998.

Before presenting the empirical evidence, some caveats, about what can be concluded from the analysis, are in order. The conclusions have to be taken with caution. First, because we are working with limited and partial data: the electoral manifestos, among all the possible political documents produced by a party. Also, this kind of document might be slightly different in some countries. Second, because sometimes the literature about Neoconservatism and the new Right might have based its conclusions on the analysis of policies, not manifestos. And finally, because the data we are working with only allows for a quantitative analysis, so it is possible that we have lost some evidence about the qualitative differences among parties or countries.

---

[15] Volkens, A. et al., *Comparative Manifestos Project: Programmatic Profiles of Political Parties in Twenty Countries, 1945-1988* [Computer File]. Colchester, Essex: The Data Archive [distributor], 6 July 1995. SN: 3437. Access to the data base has been facilitated through ECASS -*European Centre for the Analysis in the Social Sciences*- Essex University (Colchester, UK), and supported by the European Commission through the program "*Improving Human Potential – Enhancing Access to Research Infrastructure programmes*". Professors I. Budge and J.L. Bara (Department of Government, Essex University) made possible the access to the updated data base (1945-1998) and gave me valuable hints about the use of the data.

Nevertheless, I find that the use of these data from the CMP is fundamental for the aims of this work. This is one of the few data sets that would allow us to perform a comparative analysis on parties' ideological evolution among countries and over time. This is so because the same type of document is used for every country and always at the same point of time, just before the national/general elections. Although the electoral manifestos might have a different meaning in some countries, in any representative democracy, and among the different kinds of electoral campaign documents, this is the only one made with political authority on behalf of the whole party (Robertson 1976; Budge, Robertson y Hearl 1987; Klingemann, Hofferbert y Budge 1994). They are also especially well suited as an indicator for the study of parties' ideology (Budge, Robertson y Hearl 1987). Even if they are different from policies, electoral manifestos can also be used as good indicators of the kind of policies that one party would carry out if it was in office (Klingemann, Hofferbert y Budge 1994; Budge, Robertson y Hearl 1987).[16]

As an approximation to the problem, I started my analysis comparing the percentage of discourse devoted to attacks against the welfare state and to the defense of traditional moral values in the parties' political manifestos.[17] The empirical evidence I found only confirms the behavior described by the literature in the case of the United States and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain. In both cases there is a mixture of attacks against the social welfare state, and the defense of traditional moral values. In the rest of the European countries analyzed, the Christian democratic parties devoted the largest percentage of discourse to the defense of traditional moral values, but there were not simultaneous attacks against the social welfare state. Both the defense of traditional moral values and the defense of a social welfare have

---

[16] Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge (1994), find that the issues expressed in electoral manifestos explain, on average, fifty percent of budget spending. Furthermore, the electoral programs of the winning parties are more likely to became policies than the programs of the losing parties. Budge, Robertson and Hearl (1987) also show that parties in Great Britain and Canada would accomplish most of their electoral promises, up to 70 per cent of them.

[17] The comparison was performed through the variables: **per603** (*Traditional Morality: positive*), defined as "favourable mentions of traditional moral values; prohibitions, censorship and suppression of immorality and unseemly behaviour; maintenance and stability of family; religion"; and **per505** (*Welfare State Limitation*) defined as "limiting expenditure on social services or social security, otherwise as 504, but negative". Tables and data are not shown here, but they will be available upon request. Please contact the author.

deep roots in the catholic ideology to which most of the European conservative parties are deeply linked.

Nevertheless, I observed a little increase in the percentage of discourse devoted to attacking the welfare state during the 80s, with different importance depending on the countries, but always limited in terms of time. As has been said, works carried out during this same period might have been misdirected by this fact in their conclusions about a new conservative consensus. When the data for a longer period, up to 1998, is taken into account I find no evidence of a trend, but rather of an insulated disturbance.

Besides the two categories just analyzed, there are others that include gender related issues in the CMP. They have been combined in a new scale-variable[18] that summarizes the percentage of discourse devoted to gender issues by political parties. Two main problems arose in relation to the scale. First, most of the categories included in the new variable were too broad, so they capture other issues besides those related only to gender. This means that the percentages of discourse estimated by the new variables would be over the real percentages of discourse devoted to gender issues. Second, the scale also faces the problem of low statistical reliability, as some of the topics captured by the different categories combined

---

[18] The new variable has been named GENDER-REL. Its combines the following categories from the "*Comparative Manifestos Project*":

- **per706** (*Non-economic Demographic Groups*) defined as "favorable mentions of, or need for, assistance to <u>women</u>, old people, young people, linguistic groups, etc, special interest groups of all kinds".
- **per603** (*Traditional Morality: positive*) defined as "favourable mentions of traditional moral values; prohibitions, censorship and suppression of immorality and unseemly behaviour; maintenance and stability of <u>family</u>; religion".
- **per604** (*Traditional Morality: negative*) defined as "Opposition to traditional moral values; support for <u>divorce</u>, <u>abortion</u> etc.; otherwise as 603, but negative".
- **Per503** (*Social Justice*) defined as the " concept of equality; need for fair treatment of all people; special protection for underprivileged, need for fair distribution or resources, removal of class barriers, end of discrimination such as racial or <u>sexual discrimination</u>, etc".
- **per504** (Welfare State Expansion) defined as "Favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand any social service or social security scheme; support for social services such as health service or social housing. Note: this category excludes education".
- **per505** (*Welfare State Limitation*) defined as "limiting expenditure on social services or social security, otherwise as 504, but negative".

GENDER-REL=[(per706 + per603 + per503 + per504) - (per604 + per505)] / 6.

in the new variable do not show a high correlation with one another.[19] Still I have decided to use it, as it seems to be theoretically and empirically valid.[20] It is treated as a unique true underlying dimension.[21]

Again, the analysis of this new variable does not show any evidence to support the hypothesis of a new conservative consensus outside of an Anglo-Saxon environment. Just the United States, and Great Britain and Sweden, within Europe, follow the hypothesized behavior in the new Right literature. Neither in Norway, Northern Europe, nor in any other country of Central or Southern Europe, can we talk of a convergence of Left and Right on gender issues before 1968, or of an ideological divergence after that year, during the 70s or the 80s.

The fact that conservative parties in the United States and Great Britain fit the model in the literature is also a good empirical indicator to compensate for the low statistical reliability of the scale. To the extent that this scale is able to capture the behavior described in the literature about conservative parties in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the fact that it does not reflect the same thing for other countries would mean that the conservative parties in those other nations do not follow the Anglo-Saxon pattern.

- *Anglo-Saxon countries*

The United States and Great Britain are the two cases most often studied in the literature about Conservatism and the New Right. According to this literature we should observe an ideological convergence between the Left and Right in the period before 1968, and a

---

[19] Alpha= -.1277

[20] In empirical terms, the scale is able to capture the same behavior that the literature describes for the conservative parties in Great Britain and the United States, as I will show below. Theoretically, all the categories added to the scale are in some way related to gender issues, as shown by their definitions above.

[21] About summated rated scales see Jacoby (1991); Spector (1992); and Arabie, Carroll and DeSarbo (1987).

divergence afterwards caused by conservative parties' reaction against new social movements and their return to the defense of traditional social and moral values.

That process of convergence that reaches its climax in 1972 and 1976 is clearly observable in the United States chart . Later on, a divergence between Democrats and Republicans took place; it was quite notable in 1980, yet the gap is narrower after that year until the beginning of the 90s. As pointed out by different authors Democrats and Republicans have kept their divergences regarding abortion and social services (Nelson and Carver 1994),[22] but there has been also some convergence on the issue of women political participation (Burrel 1993: 293-301; Jennings 1990: 224).

UNITED STATES: Percentage of phrases that reflected positive attitudes toward gender issues in the main parties' electoral programs

In Great Britain, on the other hand, the trend toward ideological convergence is less clear. Since 1979, however, the ideological deviation among the Labor and Conservative parties is much more straightforward and holds for a longer period of time than in the United States. Both parties have kept their differences on sexuality (Lovenduski 1994: 307-308) and working issues (Bagilhole and Byrne 2000), but there have been also some evolution and

---

[22] See also David (1986: 137), Abbot and Wallace (1992: 5), Witaker (1992: 37), Isaac (1990: 211).

convergence on women's political participation (Norris and Lovenduski 1993: 35; Lovenduski and Randall 1993: chapter 5).


GREAT BRITAIN: Percentage of phrases that reflected positive attitudes toward gender issues in the main parties' electoral programs

Northern Europe

The behavior of the United Moderate Party (MS) in Sweden is similar to that of the conservative parties in Great Britain and the United States. This party converged with the social democrats (SDA, SSA) between 1969 and 1973, and then they become ideologically apart from 1979 onwards. Since 1976, matching the MS arriving to the national government (in coalition with other partners), this conservative party diminished the percentages of discourse devoted to gender issues in a significant way. These figures stabilized after 1982, when the social democratic party returned to office. Although the MS's percentages have kept under 2 percent, this number is higher than before 1964 and reflect the adoption of quite advanced proposals on gender equality into the labor market and women political participation compared to those of the Anglo-Saxon conservative parties (Sainsbury 1993: 274, Bergqvist and Juncar 2000: 168-169).

SWEDEN: Percentage of phrases that reflected positive attitudes toward gender issues in the main parties' electoral programs.


Norway, on the other hand, is totally different from Sweden and also from the Anglo-Saxon conservative parties. The percentages of discourse devoted to gender issues by the Norwegian conservative party (Hoyre) have been higher since the 70s than they had been previously during 50s and 60s. Although the distance between DNA and Hoyre decrease between 1973 and 1981 and increased between 1985 and 1989, this pattern was due to an increase in DNA's percentages of discourse devoted to gender issues and not to a decrease in that of the conservative party, as happened in Anglo-Saxon countries. Besides, the global trend for both Norwegian parties during the period 1961-1989 is an increasing one, although it seems to reverse since 1993. The distance between DNA and Hoyre has been kept in the question of abortion overall (Van der Ros 1994); in all other questions, and especially in women's political and labor market participation, the conservative party is quite advanced compared to other democracies (Skjeie 1993).

NORWAY: Percentage of phrases that reflected positive attitudes toward gender issues in the main parties' electoral programs

Central and Southern Europe

It is also difficult to talk about a convergence between the main German parties. Here, both the social democrats (SPD) and the Christian democrats (CDS-CSU) have followed the same trends from the very beginning of the period studied, with a very narrow ideological gap between them. The CDS-CSU has usually lagged behind the SPD. In 1980 we can observe an important decrease in the percentage of discourse devoted to gender or related issues within the CDS-CSU electoral manifestos. But, contrary to what happens in the Anglo-Saxon countries, this process took place in both parties, and was very short in time, as the increasing trend was rapidly taken up again. The CDU-CSU has defended women's participation into the labor market, has accepted those policies that allow women to harmonize professional and familiar roles and has compromised to increase women's political participation (Lemke 1994; Kolinski 1993). The differences with the SPD seems to have increased during the 90s; this is due mainly to the question of abortion after the re-unification of the country (Lemke 1994; Anderson and Zinsser 2000).

GERMANY: Percentage of phrases that reflected positive attitudes
toward gender issues in the main parties' electoral programs

Nor does France follow the model posed by conservative parties in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The Gaullists (conservatives) followed an increasing trend in the percentage of discourse about gender or related issues until 1981. Between 1973 and 1981 this party even exceeded the percentages of the socialist. Nevertheless, we can observe a specific decrease in the percentages of discourse that reflected a positive attitude toward gender related issues within the Gaullists in 1986, but the growing trend resumed very quickly. However the high percentages of discourse in the Gaullist programs must be toned down in relation to other countries (Appleton and Mazur 1993; Northcutt and Flaitz 1985; Jenson and Sineau 1994), since it reflects the party preference for the "feminist of the difference". But it has not oppose those policies that allow women to work outside their homes either, and it is in this topic where the similarities with the socialist are greater; some advances have been realized also in the realm of women's political participation.

<figure>

FRANCE: Percentage of phrases that reflected positive attitudes toward gender issues in the main parties' electoral programs

Legend: —✳— PSF   —■— GAUL

Y-axis: Percentage (0 to 10)

X-axis years: 1946, 1951, 1956, 1958, 1962, 1967, 1968, 1973, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1997

</figure>

In Italy all the parties have converged since the mid 60s, after a period of wide differences mainly due to the low percentages of the Communist party. This trend suffered ups and downs, but not divergences, between 1972 and 1983, and stabilized since 1987. The convergence among parties has been especially noticeable in such issues as women's participation into the labor market (Del Re 2000). On other issues, such as sexual rights and women's political representation, the DC has kept its ideological distance with other parties (Guadagnini 1993; Del Re 2000; Barreiro 2000). On questions relating to the ideal model of family the Italian Right and Left are nearer than in other countries (both share the idea that the woman is the principal responsible for family care).

ITALY: Percentage of phrases that reflected positive attitudes toward gender issues in the main parties' electoral programs

4. Evaluating and Making Sense of the Empirical Findings

Only three out of the nine democracies analyzed show any evidence in favor of the hypothesis in the Neoconservatism and new Right literature. Only in the United States and Great Britain did the ideological gap among parties increase during the 80s as a consequence of the increasing conservatism of rightist parties. This behavior is more notable in Great Britain. Only the United Moderate Party (MS), in Sweden, follows the same trend outside the Anglo-Saxon context.

Still, it must also be clear that some countries experienced some backward moments during the 80s. As has been said this might have produced a wrong impression of a greater movement toward a new conservative consensus than the one that really took place. This is especially true for those works that were being carried out at the same period that those changes were taking place. However, in the long run, the data presented show that the backward movements on gender issues were very limited in time and scope outside an Anglo-Saxon context, and they did not lead to a convergence that allows us to talk with certainty of a new conservative consensus.

To be sure, and though the references are limited, the conclusions above are also coincident with other authors, who have stressed how particular the American and Britain conservative parties were in their attacks against the welfare state (Wilson 1994: 73, 84; Lewis 1993: 3). The scholars who have included other countries, along side the Anglo-Saxon countries, in their studies about Neoconservatism and the new Right show also evidence that the United States and Great Britain are not the model followed by other countries: not in the Netherlands (Lucardie 1988: 94), Norway and Sweden (Ljunggren 1988: 142), Spain (Montero 1988: 160), or Australia (Judith Brett 1999: 3). Focussing on gender issues specifically, Lovenduski and Norris (1993) also show that Great Britain is an extreme case, not a median one, in regards to its response to feminist demands, which has been weaker and slower than in any other European country.

There are several theoretical reasons that would explain why conservative parties have behaved differently in and out of an Anglo-Saxon environment. In the first place, we must remember that the attacks against the social welfare mean quite different things in and out of an Anglo-Saxon environment. In the United States and Great Britain the social democrats or leftist liberal built the modern welfare state. Meanwhile, the Rightist parties, or center-Right coalitions led its consolidation in Europe after WW II. The social catholic doctrine has played a predominant role in the construction of the European welfare state. It has institutionalized the model of the "male breadwinner<-->female care giver/taker", through monetary transfers to families, instead of social services (Lewis 1993). The liberal welfare state in the Anglo-Saxon countries offers social services that free women from their traditional role, and could be understood to weaken the patriarchal model of family (Pateman 1987; Wolfe 1989; David 1983; Madruga Torremocha 1996), therefore justifying the attacks from the conservative parties as a way back to their core ideological values (Girvin 1994). Similar assaults against the welfare state would have quite a different meaning in other countries in Europe, and would probably bear negative electoral consequences for the parties carrying them out.

In the second place, hardly any country has enjoyed such a strong electoral support as the conservative parties in Great Britain and the United States during the 80s, especially during the Reagan and Thatcher periods. This fact might have given those parties a greater capacity to develop their ideological preferences on gender issues, especially compared with the conservative parties in countries where the social democrats have been in power. Riker

(1990) has pointed out how those parties in office can use some strategies that give them advantages over their competitors. Among them, agenda setting is probably the most important. In the same vein Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge (1994, 264) have found that the electoral manifestos of winning parties have a greater probability of being translated into policies than those of the losing parties. Some authors have specifically pointed toward the fact that strong electoral support allowed the Conservative in Great Britain to set the agenda (Peele 1988: 13). Therefore, their strong electoral support must have allowed the conservative parties in the Anglo-Saxon countries to stress their point of view about women's roles, keeping them in the private sphere as care givers/takers. Meanwhile conservatives parties in the opposition may have used gender issues instrumentally as a way to compete with leftist parties.

I test the later argument in the following section. When conservative parties have been in the opposition, as is the case with the AP-PP in Spain, their attitudes toward gender issues depend, at least in part, on the attitudes and policies of the (leftist) party in government.

5. Does the Ideology of the Party in Office Affect the Conservative Parties' Responses to Gender Issues?

In this section I would like to bring depth to one of the hypotheses pointed to above. I will present some evidence about how being the party in power has affected the way in which conservative parties have responded to gender issues and feminist demands. For that purpose I examine the data from the *Comparative Manifestoes Project* (CMP) and the *Political Data Set* (PDS).[23] Departing from the assumption that being in power allows parties to follow their own ideological preferences to a larger extent than if they were in the opposition, I will examine the relation between the percentage of seats held by conservative parties in their

---

[23] Klaus Armingeon, Michelle Beyeler,, Sarah Menegale. *Comparative Political Data Set 1960-1998*, Institute of Political Science, University of Berne 2000.

countries' lower chambers and the percentage of discourse that reflected positive attitudes toward gender related issues in their electoral programs.

For the purpose of this test I integrated data from the CMP and PDS into a new database. If a high electoral support, translated in a parliamentary majority, allows a party to set the agenda according to its ideological preferences and assuming that conservative parties have a preference for traditional social and familiar models (vs. feminist demands), I may speculate that the higher the number of seat held by conservative parties in their national parliaments the lower the percentage of discourse that will reflect a favorable attitudes toward gender issues in their electoral programs. Pearson's correlation between these two variables confirms the hypothesized relation, with r = -.330.[24] But in fact parties' capability to follow its own ideological preferences must be higher in the period following an electoral success (after their position in parliament and/or government is well established). The correlation between the number of seats held by conservative parties in national parliaments in one period (*t*) and the percentage of discourse that reflects positive attitudes toward gender issues in the next period (*t+1*) increases in fact, confirming this relation (r = -.369).[25]

Besides considering the number of seats held by conservative parties in their national parliament, the fact that these parties control the government may increase their capability to follow their own ideological (traditional) preferences on gender issues. Therefore I performed a partial correlation between the number of seats held by conservative parties in their national parliaments in period *t* and the percentage of discourse reflecting positive attitudes toward

---

[24] Within a 95% confidence interval.

[25] Within a 95% confidence interval. N = 102. The parties in the analysis are the following:

Sweden – United Moderate Party (MS)
Norway – Conservative Party (Hoyre) and Christian Democratic Party
France – RPF-RPR and Conservative Party
Italy – Christian Democratic Party (DC)
Great Britain – Conservative Party (CP)
Germany – Christian Democratic Party (CDU-CSU)
United States – Republican Party (RP)
Spain – Popular Alliance-Popular Party (AP-PP)
Portugal – Social Democratic Party (PSD)

gender related issues in the next electoral period (*t+1*) controlling by the sign of government.[26] Under these assumptions the Pearson's correlation increases to r = -.5715.[27]

But the argument that conservative parties use gender issues instrumentally when they are in the opposition to compete with leftist parties also means that I have to probe that there exists a positive correlation between the number of seats held by leftist parties in their national parliaments and their percentage of discourse reflecting positive attitudes toward gender issues. The fact that leftist parties bring gender issues into the agenda when they are in power, remaining electorally strong at the same time, is the mechanism that will make conservative parties try to compete also in that domain.[28] The data also confirms this hypothesis. The higher the number of seats held by leftist parties in their national parliaments in period *t*, the higher the percentage of discourse that reflect positive attitudes toward gender issues in the next electoral period (*t+1*). Pearson correlation is r = .230.[29] When controlling by the sign of government the correlation increases to r = .2696.[30]

---

[26] This is a 5 values scales from 1- hegemonic right, to 5- hegemonic left.

[27] Within a 95% confidence interval. N = 69. The analysis include elections after 1960 and the following parties:

Sweden – MS
Norway – Hoyre and Christian Democratic Party
France – RPF-RPR and Conservative Party
Italy – DC
Great Britain – PC
Germany – CDU-CSU
Spain – AP-PP
Portugal – PSD.

[28] This is derived from Downs (1957), who explicitly assumes that the main objective of parties is to reach the government through their competition in regular democratic elections. Therefore, he understands that parties' main motivation is electoral (electoral maximization which is the previous and necessary step to realize their main objective of getting to power). Those parties which lose elections would compete in elections imitating the party in power. Nevertheless there is a debate in which other author have pointed out that parties might have also other objectives (Schelesinger 1975; Panebianco 1988; Kitschelt 1989; Strøm 1990; Harmel and Janda 1994; Roemer 1998). I tend to agree with Müller y Strøm (1999) and Wolinetz (2002) that the different motivations and objectives of parties are not exclusive. To a point, a certain electoral motivation (electoral maximization) is a prerequisite to realize any of the parties' possible objectives.

[29] Within a 90% confidence interval. N = 102. The parties in the correlation are the following:

Sweden – Social Democratic Party (SDA-SSA)
Norway – Labor Party (DNA)

The conclusion to be drawn from the analysis shows two quite different situations for conservative parties: those periods when they are strong in electoral terms and able to follow (and to some extent impose on other parties) their own ideological preferences, and those other periods when they are weak in electoral terms. When parties are weak not only are they less able to follow their own ideological preferences on gender issues, but, if leftist parties are in power things might be worse. Leftist parties will bring gender issues into the agenda and into the electoral competition, thus forcing the conservative parties to compete in that arena also. This is the situation that we find in Spain between 1977 and 1996: a strong socialist party (PSOE) in power for more than 20 years, that has incorporated part of the feminist movement's demands into its programs and policies, and a weak conservative party (AP-PP) that over the years has changed its attitudes toward those gender issues in an attempt to compete with the socialist party.[31] On the contrary, if conservative parties are strong in electoral terms they could follow their own ideological preferences, at seems to be the case with the conservative parties in the UK and USA. The situation for the PSD in Portugal, the main right-wing party in this country, is similar to the conservative parties in UK and USA. The PSD took part in, or formed, governments from 1979 until 1995, and so this party is more conservative on gender issues than AP-PP in Spain (which have been in opposition) although otherwise the situation in both countries is quite similar.

France – Socialist Party (PSF)
Italy – Socialist Party (PSI)
Great Britain - Labor Party (LP)
Germany – Social Democratic Party (SPD)
United States – Democratic Party (DP)
Spain - Socialist Party (PSOE)
Portugal – Socialist Party (PS)

[30] Within a 95% confidence interval. N= 60. The analysis includes elections after 1960 and the following parties:

Sweden – Social Democratic Party (SDA-SSA)
Norway – DNA
France – PSF
Italy – PSI
Great Britain - LP
Germany – SPD
Spain - PSOE
Portugal – PS

[31] The fact that women's voting preference turned to favor the socialist party clearly was also perceived by AP-PP leaders and taken into account as one of the factors that make the party try to compete for the women's vote.

6. From the Instrumentalization to the Ideological Assimilation of Gender Issues

According to the previous findings one would expect that AP-PP went back to its (original / traditional) ideological preferences on gender issues once it become strong in electoral terms and gained control of the government. But this is not the case as has been pointed out earlier in this article. Somehow there has been an assimilation of (certain) gender issues into the party's ideology. There are several factors that must be taken into account to understand this phenomenon which is only partially in contradiction with the previous findings and that has let down more than one fatalistic prediction about the odd future of Spanish women under a government of the PP by leftist opinion leaders.[32]

Although there has not been an involution on gender issues: abortion law has not been withdrawn, new laws that favor women's participation into the labor market have been elaborated, women's political participation continues to increase, there has been a change of emphasis in the kind of gender issues that is given more importance. In this case, AP-PP is giving much more weight to those gender issues the identification of which with leftist ideology is weaker. An empirical investigation with sociology and political science specialists has shown that there are gender issues which clearly load on the leftist side of the ideological dimension, while others are considered neutral (just a few are considered rightist nevertheless). Thus, the incorporation of women into the labor market, women's political participation, family protection and the combination of familiar and working roles, whose loading is almost neutral in ideological terms, are among the main gender issues favored by AP-PP. Other issues with a high loading on the leftist side of the ideological dimension, sexual issues overall, are kept in a second place, while during the socialist government were among the more salient gender issues. Therefore, on the one hand AP-PP has not revoked the current abortion law, but has voted against its extension on the other hand. The fact that AP-PP put more emphasis in those gender issues with the weaker leftist loading helps the party in reducing the electoral risk that making ideological changes always means.[33]

---

[32] See *Leviatán, revista de hechos e ideas* (71), Spring 1998, II epoch.

[33] This risk is also reduced because the party has no competition on its right side, so for AP-PP's alienated voters remaining within the same party is the best option. The stronger the leftist ideological charge of

Besides these considerations, there are two other factors that explain why AP-PP has kept quite positive attitudes toward gender issues after reaching the government. In the first place, the increasing presence of women, within the party and in local and national politics, may have created a "path dependency" that impedes the involution of party in certain gender-related issues. There is empirical evidence to suggest that women tend to perceive themselves as other women's representatives, and thus promote gender-related legislation with a higher proportion than men (Davis 1997: chapter 2; Thomas 1994; Skard 1980; Skjeie 1993; Norris y Lovenduski 1989; Norris 1996: 95-104). Women's capability to influence the agenda seems to depend on their percentage within national parliaments and governments: the higher the female percentage the higher their capability to influence legislation (Thomas 1994; Skard 1980; Wilford 1996: 43; Bystydzienski 1995: 67-69; Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994: 182-183).[34] Female participation has significantly increased within AP-PP in all levels. The percentage of women has increased from 12 percent within the party Executive Committee in 1979 to 22 percent in 1999; within the National Directive Assembly they went from just 5 percent in 1978 to 15 percent in 1999. Women represented 14 percent of the candidates to the Parliament in 1999 AP's electoral list; in 2000 female representation had increased up to 34 percent in PP's electoral list to the Parliament. Simultaneously the number of AP-PP's female PM increased from 6 percent in the first legislature (1977-1979) to 25 percent in the current legislature (2000-2004). The increase is also noticeable at the level of local politics: female mayoresses had risen from 3 percent in 1979 to 10 percent in 1999. Sixty percent of AP-PP's leaders interviewed between 1998 and 2000 confirmed that women within the party had a special sensitivity to understand gender and women issues and problems as well as an awareness to defend women's interest that was different from that of men. Female party members considered themselves as promoters of women's policies; they thought that their empowerment within the party has been an important factor for them to influence policies. Besides, I found what Lovenduski (1993:9) calls a "dual strategy" of women within the party. This strategy refers to the empowerment of women within the party while at the same time

---

a gender issues, the stronger the risk of alienating traditional voters while not convincing new voters (Sánchez-Cuenca 1999).

[34] There is a threshold under which women will be compelled to act as men, since their exclusive association with gender questions could endanger their political careers within their parties.

there exist some kind of female organization, either independent or linked to the party, that exercises a positive impact in the incorporation of women and gender policies within that party. In AP-PP this role has been performed by the NGO *Mujeres para la Democracia* (Women for Democracy, WFD hereafter). This organization acts as a female lobby whose main channels of (indirect) influence in the party is the double militancy of up to 30 percent of its member in WFD and AP-PP, some of them in high responsibility posts in the party and in national politics.

In the second place the influence of gender-related policies taken on by the European Union may explain why the party has continued to deepen into policies related to women's incorporation into the labor market and the combination of familiar and professional roles (Haintrais 2000). The EU has elaborated a coherent *corpus* of policies with gender content. Those have revolved mainly around the incorporation of women into the labor market and questions of equality among sexes within it; since the 80s this legislation has touched also on issues of familiar life's organization and the sexual distribution of work. The EU has also established methods to control the affectivity of these policies, has given incentives to assure their accomplishment and has set up sanctions for those countries which neglect them. Although these relations are established between the European Commission and the Member States' national governments, it is plausible that the influence extends also to the parties in each of the countries. On one hand, any party which aspires to reach the government would have eventually to compromise with the European gender-related policies, and therefore it wouldn't make much sense to oppose those policies without serious reasons. On the other hand, the ideological cost of incorporating those policies will be diminished in the case that they do not belong to the party's traditional ideology because the party's leaders can assign the change to external factors (Pridham 1995: 181). Besides, the fact that there is European legislation on these gender issues helps to give relevance to those issues, and so the parties will be inclined to take positions according to the mainstream public opinion. The importance of this factor was recognized in 20 out of 28 interviews taken with PP's leaders between 1998 and 2000.

Therefore, it can be concluded that AP-PP started to change its ideological statements on women issues in an instrumental way as a consequence of its electoral competence with the PSOE. Nevertheless, later on, some gender issues were assimilated within the party

ideology as a consequence of the increasing participation of women within the party and the influence of European legislation. The issues more easily assimilated by AP-PP are those with a smaller leftist ideological charge which are also simultaneously the issues promoted by the European Union.

REFERENCES

Abbott, P., and C. Wallace. 1992. *The Family and the New Right*. London: Pluto Press.

Anderson, B. S., and J. P. Zinsser. 1991. *Historia de las Mujeres: Una Historia Propia*, ed. Instituto de Investigaciones Feministas, trad. Beatriz Villacastañas. Barcelona: Crítica.

Appleton, A., and A. G. Mazur. 1993. "Transformation or Modernization: the Rhetoric and Reality of Gender and Party Politics in France". In *Gender and Party Politicts*, eds. J. Lovenduski and P. Norris, 86-112. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Arabie, P., J. D. Carroll, and W. S. DeSarbo. 1987. *Three-Way Scaling and Clustering*. Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, vol. 65. Newbury Park, California: Sage.

Bagilhole, B., and P. Byrne. 2000. "From Hard to Soft Law and From Equality to Reconciliation in the United Kingdom". In *Gendered Policies in Europe. Reconciling Employment and Family Life*, ed. L. Hantrais, 124-42. London: MacMillan Press.

Barreiro, B. 2000. *Democracia y Conflicto Moral: La Política del Aborto en España e Italia*. Serie Ciencia Política. Colección Fudamentos, vol. 171, ed. R. Máiz. Madrid: Istmo.

Barry, N. P. 1987. *The New Right*. London: Croom Helm.

Brett, J. 1999. "Social Democracy, Conservatism and Neoliberal Economic Reform: The Australian Experience". Proceedings of the ECPR (Joint Sessions), Mannheim, 1999.

Budge, I., D. Robertson, and D. Hearl. 1987. *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change. Spatial Analysis of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Burrell, B. C. 1993. "Party Decline, Party Transformation and Gender Politics: the USA". In *Gender and Party Politicts*, eds. J. Lovenduski and P. Norris, 291-308. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Bystydzienski, J. M. 1995. *Women in Electoral Politics. Lessons From Norway*. London: Praeger.

Callahan, W. J. 2000. *The Catholic Church in Spain, 1985-1998*. Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press.

Cuenca Toribio, J. M. 1985. *Relaciones Iglesia-Estado en la España Contemporánea, 1833-1985*. Serie Historia. Colección Mezquita, vol. 42. Madrid: Alhambra.

Darcy, R., S. Welch, and J. Clark. 1994. *Women, Elections & Representation*. 2 ed. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

David, M. 1986. "Moral and Maternal: The Family in the Right". In *The Ideology of the New Right*, ed. R. Levitas, 136-66. Cambridge: Polity Press.

David, M. 1983. "New Right in the USA and Britain: A New Antifeminist Moral Economy". *Critical Social Policy* 3(Spring): 31-45.

Davis, R. H. 1997. *Women and Power in Parliamentary Democracies*. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.

Del Re, A. 2000. "The Paradoxes of Italian Law and Practice". In *Gendered Policies in Europe. Reconciling Employment and Family Life*, ed. L. Hantrais, 108-23. London: MacMillan Press.

Downs, A. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.

Dubiel, H. 1993. *¿Qué es el Neoconservadurismo?* Barcelona: Anthropos.

Gamble, A. 1986. "The Political Economy of Freedom". In *The Ideology of the New Right*, ed. R. Levitas, 24-54. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Girvin, B. 1994. *The Right in the Twentieth Century. Conservatism and Democracy*. London: Pinter Publishers.

Girvin, B., ed. 1988. *The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism*. London: Sage.

Guadagnini, M. 1993. "A 'Partitocrazia' without Women: the Case of the Italian Party System". In *Gender and Party Politicts*, eds. J. Lovenduski and P. Norris, 168-204. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Hallet, C. 1996. "Social Policy: Continuities and Change". In *Women and Social Policy: An Introduction*, ed. C. Hallett, 1-14. Great Britain: T.J. Press.

Hantrais, L. 2000. *Social Policy in the European Union*. UK: MacMillan.

Harmel, R., and K. Janda. 1994. "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change". *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6(3): 259-87.

Isaac, J. 1990. "The New Right and the Moral Society". *Parliamentary Affairs* 43(2): 209-26.

Jacoby, W. G. 1991. *Data Theory and Dimensional Analysis*. Quantitative Applications in the Social Science, vol. 78. Newbury Park, California: Sage.

Jenson, J., and M. Sineau. 1994. "The Same or Different? An Unending Dilemma for French Women". In *Women and Politics Worldwide*, eds. B. J. Nelson, and N. Chowdhury, 243-60. New Haven: Yale University Press.

King, D. S. 1987. *The New Right. Politics, Markets and Citizenship.* London: MacMillan Education.

Kitschelt, H. 1989. *The Logics of Party Formation: Ecological Politics in Belgium and West Germany.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Klingemann, H., R. I. Hofferbert, and I. Budge. 1994. *Parties, Policies and Democracy.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Kolinsky, E. 1993. "Party Change and Women's Representation in Unified Germany". In *Gender and Party Politics*, eds. J. Lovenduski and P. Norris, 113-146. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Krieger, J. 1986. *Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Leijenaar, M. 1993. "A Battle for Power: Selecting Candidates in the Netherlands". In *Gender and Party Politics*, eds. J. Lovenduski and P. Norris, 205-230. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Lemke, C. 1994. "Women and Politics: The New Federal Republic of Germany". In *Women and Politics Worldwide*, eds. B. J. Nelson, and N. Chowdhury, 261-84. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lewis, J. 1993. *Women and Social Policies in Europe.* England: Edward Elgar.

Ljunggren, S. 1988. "Conservatism in Norway and Sweden". In *The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism*, ed. B. Girvin, 120-44. London: Sage.

Llera Esteban, L. d. 1984. *Relaciones entre la Iglesia y el Estado desde la Restauración hasta la Guerra Civil de 1936: El Archivo Miralles De Palma de Mallorca*, vol. 5, ed. Quaderni di Leetterature Iberiche e Americane. Milan: Cisalpino.

López-Casero, F., W. L. Bernecker, y P. Waldmann, Comp. 1994. *El Precio de la Modernización. Formas y Retos del Cambio de Valores en la España de Hoy.* Frankfurt: Vervuert Verlag.

Lovenduski, J. 1993. "Introduction: The Dynamics of Gender and Party". In *Gender and Party Politics*, eds. J. Lovenduski, and P. Norris, 1-15. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Lovenduski, J. 1994. "The Rules of the Political Game: Feminism and Politics in Great Britain". In *Women and Politics Worldwide*, eds. B. J. Nelson, and N. Chowdhury, 298-310. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lovenduski, J., and P. Norris. 1993. *Gender and Party Politics*. London: Thousand Oaks.

Lovenduski, J., and V. Randall. 1993. *Contemporary Feminist Politics. Women and Power in Britain*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lucardie, P. 1988. "Conservatism in the Netherlands: Fragments and Fringe Groups". In *The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism*, ed. B. Girvin, 78-97. London: Sage.

Madruga Torremocha, I. 1996. "El Papel del Estado como Garante de la Compatibilidad entre el Rol Familiar y el Laboral. Análisis de las Políticas Familiares de los Países de la Unión Europea 1980-1991". Proceedings of the Congress "Dilemas sobre el Estado de Bienestar", Madrid, 1996, ed. Fundación Argentaria.

Margetts, H. 1996. "Public Management Change and Sex Equality Within the State". *Affair: A Journal of Comparative Politics* 49(1): 130-42.

Montero, J. R. 1988. "More Than Conservative, Less Than Neoconservative: Alianza Popular in Spain". In *The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism*, ed. B. Girvin, 145-63. London: Sage.

Müller, W. C., and K. Strøm. 1999. *Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nelson, B. J., and C. A. Carver. 1994. "Many Voices But Few Vehicles: The Consequences for Women of Weak Political Infrastructure in the United States". In *Women and Politics Worldwide*, eds. B. J. Nelson, and N. Chowdhury, 737-57. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Nelson, B. J., and N. Chowdhury, editors. 1994. *Women and Politics Worldwide*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Norris, P. 1996. "Women Politicians: Transforming Westmister?" In *Women in Politics*, eds. J. Lovenduski and P. Norris, 91-104. New York: Oxford University Press.

Norris, P., and J. Lovenduski. 1993. "Gender and Party Politics in Britain". In *Gender and Party Politics*, eds. J. Lovenduski, and P. Norris, 35-59. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Norris, P., and J. Lovenduski. 1989. "Women Candidates for Parliament: Transforming the Agenda?" *British Journal of Political Science* (19): 106-15.

Northcutt, W., and J. Flaitz. 1985. "Women, Politics and the French Socialist Government". In *Women and Politics in Western Europe*, ed. S. Bahevkin, 50-70. London: Frank Cass.

Nuñez and Muñoz, M. F. 1976. *La Iglesia y la Restauración: 1875-1881. Servicio de Publicaciones de la Caja General de Ahorros de Santa Cruz de Tenerife*, vol. 8. Santa Cruz de Tenerife: Caja General de Ahorros.

Panebianco, A. 1988. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, trad. M. Silver. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pateman, C. 1987. "The Patriarchal Welfare State: Women and Democracy". Working Paper, vol. 7, ed. Center for European Studies. Cambridge: Harvard University.

Peele, G. 1988. "British Conservatism: Ideological Change and Electoral Uncertainty". In *The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism*, ed. B. Girvin, 13-34. London: Sage.

Pérez Díaz, V. 1991. "The Church and Religion in Contemporary Spain". Estudio/Working Paper 1991/19. Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones.

Pierson, C. 1991. *Beyond Welfare State?: The New Political Economy of Welfare*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Pridham, G. 1995. "The International Context of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective". In *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation. Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*, eds. R. Gunther, N. Diamandouros, and H. Puhle, 166-203. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Riker, W. H. 1990. "Heresthetic and Rhetoric in the Spatial Model". In *Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting*, eds. J. M. Enelow, and M. J. Hinich, 46-65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Robertson, D. 1976. *A Theory of Party Competition*. London: John Wiley & Son.

Roemer, J. 1998. "The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation". Estudio/Working Paper 1998/120. Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones.

Sainsbury, D. 1993. "The Politics of Increased Women's Representation: the Swedish Case". In *Gender and Party Politics*, eds. J. Lovenduski and P. Norris, 263-290. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Sainsbury, D. 1996. *Gender, Equality, and Welfare State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sánchez-Cuenca, I. 1999. "The Logic of Party Moderation". Estudio/Working Paper 1999/135. Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones.

Schlesinger, J. A. 1975. "The Primary Goals of Political Parties: A Clarification of Positive Theory". *American Political Science Review* 69: 840-9.

Shubert, A. 1990. *A Social History of Modern Spain*. Londres: Unwin Hyman.

Skard, T. 1980. Utvalgt Til Stortinget : In *Studie I Kvinners Frammarsj Og Mennsmakt*. Oslo: Gyldendal.

Skjeie, H. 1993. "Ending the Male Political Hegemony: the Norwegian Experience". In *Gender and Party Politics*, eds. J. Lovenduski and P. Norris, 231-262. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Spector, P. E. 1992. *Summated Rating Scale Construction: An Introduction*. Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, vol. 82. Newbury Park, California: Sage.

Strøm, K. 1990. "A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties". *American Journal of Political Science* 34: 565-98.

Strøm, K., and W. C. Müller. 1999. "Political Parties and Hard Choices". In *Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*, eds. W. C. Müller, y K. Strøm, 1-35. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Suvanto, P. 1997. *Conservatism From the French Revolution to the 1990s*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Thomas, S. 1994. *How Women Legislate*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Uriarte, E. 1997. "Las Mujeres en las Élites Políticas". En *Mujeres en Política*, eds. E. Uriarte and A. Elizondo, 53-94. Barcelona: Ariel.

Van der Ros, J. 1994. "The State and Women: A Troubled Relationship in Norway". In *Women and Politics Worldwide*, eds. B. J. Nelson, and N. Chowdhury, 527-43. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Whitaker, R. 1992. "Neoconservadurismo y Estado". In *El Neoconservadurismo en Gran Bretaña y Estados Unidos. Retórica y Realidad*, eds. R. Miliband, L. Panitch, and J. Saville, 9-46. Valencia: Edicions Alfons el Magnànim.

Wilford, R. 1996. "Women and Politics in Northen Ireland". In *Women in Politics*, eds. J. Lovenduski and P. Norris, 43-56. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wilson, F. L. 1994. *European Politics Today: The Democratic Experience*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.

Wolinetz, S. B. 2002. "Beyond Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracy. In *Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges*, eds. R. Gunther, J. R. Montero, and J. J. Linz. Oxford: Oxford University Press.