POLITICAL MEDIATION, TRADITIONAL PARTIES AND NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE SPANISH SOCIALIST WORKER’S PARTY

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Introduction

It is common to see traditional political parties of all ideological stripes as encountering new difficulties and, in some cases, in actual crisis. Electoral upheavals have redefined the political landscapes in countries such as Italy and Japan, reducing formerly hegemonic parties to marginal players. Less dramatically, many established parties are confronted by newcomers with agendas that are foreign to their own. In addition to whatever specific challenges parties are experiencing, there is general concern over the continuing viability of parties in an age of the crisis of ideology, the educating or socializing role of the mass media in politics, the growth of the service sector and the concomitant decline of the industrial working class and trade unions, and the rise of non-institutional political and social actors making new types of demands. This paper addresses one such challenge, that posed by new social movements, in the context of a specific party, the Spanish Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE).

Although the most developed countries, for example, Germany, have been the focus of most new social movement (NSM) theorists, the Spanish case is nonetheless extremely useful to study in this context. It is a society which in the recent past has been highly mobilized politically during the transition to democracy, both through political parties as well as other social organizations (Maravall, 1982; Garcia Santestmases, 1985). Social movement activity during this period, in particular citizen's movements and student protest, was among the highest in Europe (Alvarez-Junco, 1994). In terms of the interface between political parties and movements, the PSOE provides a particularly valuable case study. The concept of new social movements has played an important role in recent writings of leading party theoreticians (Guerra, 1987; Tezanos, 1987; Quintanilla and Vargas-Machuca, 1989). In addition, because parties of the left are assumed especially vulnerable in the face of new movements, many of which are also to the left of the political spectrum, a Social-Democratic party such as the PSOE may be

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able to shed light on party movement interactions elsewhere. The focus here is on how movements might affect parties, how they address these groups and the obstacles they may face in coping with them.

Certainly the difficulties faced by traditional class-based parties are not entirely new. In some ways, the growth of movements can be seen as the culmination of post-war social processes that have changed the nature of those parties and that have long been recognized as doing so. A generation ago, Kirchheimer (1966) saw a transition from mass class parties to catch-all formations. He viewed the post-war trends in a declining working class and the rise of the service sector as responsible for the shift away from the mass-class type. Working class parties had to be able to attract members and voters from other classes in order to survive, and especially, to govern. However, while the catch-all party did not rule out a mass organization, it was much less dependent on members to function since its rise coincided with changes in techniques of electing and financing parties. With the growth of the importance of the mass media, in particular television, in electoral campaigns, the importance of members declined since face-to-face contact with voters was no longer crucial as an electoral tactic. With the advent of state financing of parties, political life was no longer reliant on the dues paid by large memberships. Another reason to suspect that catch-all parties lead to declining membership is the fact that in order to appeal to a broader type of electorate, the traditional message of working class parties becomes diluted (Epstein, 1980). It may well be harder to retain committed militants if the platform they are committing to is a vague one that tries to appeal to the broadest common denominator (Hirschman, 1982).

In addition, decreased class conflict following World War II ushered in an era of political consensus, that was characterized by reduced ideological distance among major parties in many nations of Western Europe. Both left and right accepted some form of the Keynesian welfare state, and an expanded public economy, while neo-corporatist arrangements saw working class parties and trade unions agree to encourage political stability by keeping their memberships in line in exchange for rising standards of living, security and political participation.
This consensus also had a cultural component that implied a pared-down role for parties as organizers of the lives and free time of their members. Claus Offe (1985:823) describes the privatization of political life:

The implicit sociological assumption underlying the constitutional arrangements of the liberal welfare state was that "privatistic," family-, work-, and consumption-centered patterns of life would absorb the energies and aspirations of most people, and that participation in and conflict over public policy would for that reason be of no more than marginal significance in the lives of most citizens. This constitutional definition of the respective spaces of action of capital and labor, of the state and civil society, was a correlate of the centrality of the values of growth, prosperity, and distribution.

Others explanations for this relative quiescence might stress either the post-war aversion to the deep social divisions of the 1920's and 1930's that had characterized the class-polarized societies of Europe and led them to war or the rejection of the high degree of mobilization and politicization of daily life typical of fascism and other authoritarian regimes. This scaled-down political sphere and the renunciation by most parties of the need for radical social and economic transformation underlay the reasoning behind the proponents of the _End of Ideology_ thesis of the early 1960's (Bell, 1962).

However, while traditional parties may have been weakened or transformed organizationally and ideologically, the presumed depoliticization of the immediate post-war did not last. The rise of new movements and _anti-politics_ in the 1970's saw an upsurge in citizens' demands (Berger, 1979; Jenkins, 1987) and led to renewed interest among social scientists in the question of collective action.

One prominent area of inquiry traces the rise and significance of new social movements (NSMs). The new protest movements that have emerged in Western Europe and the US over the last twenty years include the student movement, feminism, environmentalism and the peace movement. There are a number of common features of these groups that are often stressed. Like accounts of the history of organized socialism that see its development as related to that of capitalism, many theorists examining NSMs also invoke the reining configuration of production in their explanations. NSMs may be linked to the development of an
advanced stage of capitalism (Melucci, 1989; Giddens, 1991) and the grievances they represent as reactions to "modernization and economic growth" (Klandermans and Tarrow, 1988:7). A related argument sees the advent of protest movements as a response to the growth of the welfare state. As incomes have risen, more competition exists for scarce goods, plus, in some instances, the degradation of the quality of life occurs as a result of attempts to satisfy heightened demand. (Hirsch, 1976; Klandermans and Tarrow, 1988). For instance, too many shopping malls may mean a shortage of natural spaces. In both cases, there is an increase in dissatisfaction with the post-war model and assumption of growth that has outlets in new forms of protest.

However, unlike many theories of the earlier labor movement with their focus on the centrality of the working class, the role of middle class activism in these new movements is emphasized (Inglehart, 1987). The middle class is seen as better-positioned to mobilize the resources needed to turn their demands into proposals or policies since they are more likely to possess the professional skills useful either for challenging existing laws and regulations or formulating new ones.

However, in some theoretical formulations, the middle class is not simply interested in pursuing different issues than the traditional working class because of the former's increased relative levels of wealth, leisure and skills. Rather, the issue of personal identity takes center stage (Kaufmann, 1990; Taylor and Whittier, 1993). David Plotke (1990) has noted the role that "the definition and valorization of personal and collective identities" plays in NSM theories. While there was a concern with collective identities on the part of the early socialist movement, theorists of new social movements view a crucial difference between the older and contemporary focus on identity. Plotke also suggests that some NSM theorists such as Foucault see the emphasis in older movements as seeking political power in order to redistribute it on behalf of a collectivity (the working class). New movements on the other hand, do not seek or employ one identity but rather a multiplicity of them.

The profusion of identities is, in part, related to the greater complexity of
modern nation states that have to contend with strong claims based on regional, linguistic, racial and gender divisions. However, it is not that NSM theory sees simply a shift from one identity (class) that was able, at least for a while and in some places, to contain these others to a situation where there are competing identities. Rather, identity is now described as a process: individuals must learn to create their own identities. The contrast is with what theorists see as the older view where identity was thought of as a given characteristic of people in groups.

An example of this view is found in Anthony Giddens' (1991) recent work, Modernity and Self-Identity. Here he argues that the creation of identity or the self is a project undertaken in the current period of _late modernity_. As belief in tradition and religion declines, people are forced to make decisions about their lifestyles and these decisions in part constitute their identities.

Politically, this search for identity implies making a distinction between old-style or _emancipatory_ politics and the new _life politics_. The former, for example, the labor movement, was concerned with issues like justice and equality and sought the autonomy of the individual. In contrast, life politics takes that autonomy as a given or as its pre-condition; now autonomous actors, unlike earlier ones, have the ability to make choices and contemporary political struggles are over what those choices will be. Giddens defines it in the following manner:

> Life politics concerns political issues which flow from processes of self-actualization in post-traditional contexts, where globalizing influences intrude deeply into the reflexive project of the self, and conversely where processes of self-realisation influence global strategy. (Giddens, 1991:214)

This theme of individual self-actualization as driving new movements is common in the NSM literature. Alberto Melucci (1989) argues that the shift to a service economy and the concomitant reliance on information production means that social reproduction now depends on a level of self-reflexiveness that is new. Industrial society had as its core the transformation of the natural or _outer_ world. This leads to a heightened awareness of man's capacity to be effective. Such knowledge underlay the particular leitmotif of the industrial age, progress, but
also is important because Melucci seems to suggest that the collectivist accent among traditional social movements stems from this understanding of, or belief in, "the expanding scope of human action" (Melucci, 1989:41). That expansion, however, depended on people working in concert. In contrast, the salient feature of post-industrial society and contemporary movements is not that they seek to transform the external world but rather internal human behavior, to "act upon human action itself" (41). This, for example, would explain the focus of some movements on transformation of the self as the basis of social change (Plotke, 1990).

At the same time individuals have new possibilities for action and are concerned with those, new social control mechanisms that attempt to shape behavior are also invading previously untouched areas of life. Technology, for example, vastly increases the potential for authorities to regulate individual behavior. This leads to the emergence of new power relations. In order to carve out a space for themselves in the face of increasing bureaucratic control over private life, individuals demand "control over the conditions of personal existence".

In essence, with this, NSM theorists are arguing that there is a new era of repoliticizing private life. This suggests a breakdown in the post-war political consensus described above and offers an account of how political life is being expanded and reconstituted. The demands now put forth are made not purely on the part of individuals but by new groups who can recognize the constraints and contradictions of the system (and it is often the middle class that is best able to recognize those). That knowledge of the systemic problems of modern life is used then to build a common identity.

I. Implications for Political Parties

The questions raised by these new social groups with political agendas raises questions about the continuing salience of traditional political parties. This section considers some of the implications of new social movements for established
Certainly much of the literature examining NSMs has assumed that the long-term decline of those parties is a distinct possibility if not a foregone conclusion. Two decades ago, Bottomore (1971) claimed that "the established class parties have attained a peak in their development while new political forces are beginning to challenge their dominance". More recently, Inglehart (1987) has suggested that some of the traditional left parties, in particular Marxist and communist parties, are in trouble for failing to reflect the concerns of those he calls _post-materialists_. While he sees great potential for new parties like the Greens who cater to Post-material demands, he also sees some hope for the old Left parties -- Socialists and Social Democrats, who are more palatable to this group than the parties of the right. He argues that if they can develop programs that appeal to young post-materialists (he does not say what those are) that also do not alienate their traditional constituency, they may survive and prosper. For Melucci (1989), traditional party ties may remain important but he sees them as belonging to a different era. He states:

Ties based on place, language and religion gave way slowly in industrial society to new _elective_ identities linked to new roles and institutions: the individual came to be defined by his or her membership of a profession, a party, a state or a class. These references still hold, but a new question seems to have come to the fore. It relates exclusively to the single individual: _Who am I?_ (113)

This question of individual identity as a feature of new movements offers a particularly clear implication of how organized political life may be changing in ways that will affect traditional parties. It suggests that one organization is inadequate to represent the multiplicity of identities that exist today, especially since the point of many movements focusing on identity issues is to highlight, preserve and further their development.

Traditionally, in their early stages, social democratic parties sought (though not always successfully) to create an overarching working class identity at the expense of geographic or religious ones. However, later (predominantly in the post-
war period), the focus shifted away from any specific identity -- class issues were downplayed -- to an even more diffuse type of characterization. The catch-all nature of many of these parties meant that the image cultivated was one which attempted a cross-class appeal to citizens. Although there were presumably some limits to how broad an appeal could be developed, the demand that voters and party members be committed to _progressive_ issues such as social justice gave them a wide potential audience. The point is that for many social democratic parties, either historically or at the present time, the issue of identity has been treated much more broadly than is the case in many of the current new movements. The latter’s focus on retaining a distinctive identity raises the possibility that a new phase of party development may be occurring where organizations are limited in size, rather than mass-based, and are generated around personal identity issues such as, for example, gender.

New types of concerns, non-responsive established parties, and the explosion of identity politics all argue for some decrease in attachments to older parties, partly as a result of the rise of new movements. However, it is not a view that sees the decline of ideology at the root of party decline. While Inglehart and most NSM theorists acknowledge that established parties no longer command the same loyalties they once did and that the newer ones such as the Greens and New Left parties of the 1960’s have yet to develop strong loyalties, they nevertheless reject the notion that politics no longer contains ideological struggles.

Implicit in these formulations is a view of deep ideological divisions in contemporary political life. The widespread assumption, too, of the general affinity between new politics and the left side of the political spectrum suggests that Left and Right continue to be important lines of division, even if the meaning of those terms has changed. One implication of these works is that although they may view the long-term survival of traditional groups as in doubt, contemporary organizations still will attract loyalties and members through ideological appeals. Thus, one possible reading of NSM theory suggests that new movements may to some extent replace old parties: the Greens take over the role and space occupied formerly by the communists under such a scenario, for example.
Ironically, while the implicit assumptions of party decline in many of these works allows such an interpretation, they also leave open the possibility of a diametrically opposed reading. Because NSM theorists assume that ideology continues to be a significant drawing factor in political organization, one can conceive of contemporary demands reinvigorating traditional parties under the right circumstances and eclipsing the new movements. The uncertainty here about the implications of NSM theory for the organization of political life is due to its failure to address this issue in a systematic manner.

In particular, a widespread criticism levied against it is its tendency to ignore politics and concentrate instead on issues such as the cultural nature of the claims made by movements. Plotke claims that in politicizing previously uncontested relations, NSMs by necessity run up against things like the state, courts, elections, interest groups, and other organizations. Interactions with these existing institutions are unavoidable for movements if they are to pursue their objectives and it is only through analyzing such contacts that the meaning of NSMs for old-style parties will be discernible.

These movements do not exist within a political vacuum; they do not simply gain their objectives or meet with rejection. They form alliances, make deals, strike bargains and one type of institutional actor with whom they do this is the traditional party. What is extremely important to recognize is that in doing so, parties do not necessarily stay static. Parties may adapt to challenges brought about by new movements through co-opting the message of the movement and its members, or aware of their potential effect, act preemptively to head off any future threat.

Indeed, to assume that traditional parties are unaware of, or unconcerned by, the growth of challengers with claims to the voters and political space these parties presume to be their own fails to acknowledge their potential flexibility. The example of the PSOE here is illustrative. While Spain is hardly a European leader of social movement activity (Greens, for example, have not made much headway electorally), even there one finds a great deal of discussion within the party about NSMs. It is perhaps not surprising that even in the most theoretical treatments of
These, the focus is explicitly on the consequences of NSMs for socialist parties and their electorates.

Two leading party theoreticians and politicians, Miguel Angel Quintanilla and Ramon Vargas-Machuca (1989), strongly argue for a recast socialism. They want to jettison many of the older marxist orthodoxies but at the same time hold onto the utopian spirit (though not content) which now has to be coherent or rational and based on a non-dogmatic appraisal of contemporary social conditions that have changed greatly from the early days of socialist thought. Part of their argument explicitly addresses the relations between parties and other, new social forces and breaks with the older tradition of parties as the sole political actor. In so doing, they insist on accommodating (or at least taking seriously) these movements:

Supposing the existence of a revolutionary subject that occupies a privileged position relative to other social agents represents, in light of social science and critical theory, nothing more than a myth. Abandoning this, the only reasonable way possible to design a common strategy among agents who have a multiplicity of different or conflicting interests is by the path of accord and compromise among them.(29)

A leading sociologist and member of the PSOE's inner circle, J. F. Tezanos has written extensively on new social movements. He is closely identified with Alfonso Guerra's wing of the party that controls the party organization as well as with Programa 2000, the series of documents that purports to open a debate about what the party's role in society should be as it heads into the next century. His work shows that at least at the rhetorical level, the PSOE apparatus takes the possible challenges brought by NSMs seriously. He writes about what socialist parties are facing:

Precisely the fact that a certain ideological and organizational dynamism has appeared - one perfectly compatible in principle with ours - but that is in part developing outside of our organizations is what obliges us now to recognize the necessity of a political convergence. (Tezanos, 1987:167)
One need not assume this is a specific policy recommendation for the party to see that the potential threat represented by NSMs is of some concern for the PSOE. Indeed, Tezanos is explicit in not offering a particular plan, saying that the path to such a convergence may be a strategy of formal alliances, incorporating other organizations or pacts of the moment. These specific ways in which a party may approach competing movements will be dealt with in the next section which considers how PSOE activists see these other movements. The point here is that it seems clear that contemporary parties will react to NSMs and are not about to simply cede political space to them without a struggle. Tezanos' work also makes clear that it is not simply the electorate or political theorists who view an affinity between traditional parties and NSMs but many within those parties themselves do as well.

This does not necessarily mean parties will be able to face the challenges well. On one hand, there may be institutional and organizational barriers within parties to effective action. The issues pursued by new groups, for example, may be looked upon suspiciously by party members who may hold old-style socialist beliefs that are thought to be at odds with the beliefs of the new social movements.

On the other hand, parties are not the only actors involved and while it may be important for them to devise ways of incorporating new issues into their platforms and attracting these new activists, there may be external barriers. That is, some of what new movements tend to object to is represented by traditional parties: hierarchical decision making, politics as usual, etc. Initially, movements may rebuff overtures by parties who may be in some senses those whom they view as the enemy. In addition, movements may have their own organizational dynamics that make interaction difficult. For example, they may be afraid of precisely the kind of political convergence that Tezanos talks about because they may fear co-optation of message and personnel and may not want formal alliances if it means submerging or giving up their organizational integrity.

The middle class basis of new social movements also raises questions for traditional parties, especially those that historically drew members and voters disproportionately from the working class. First, the view that the middle class is
the new locus of social change calls into question one oft-cited explanation for the increased moderation of social democratic parties in the post-World War II period (Kirchheimer, 1960). Such moderation is seen as partly due to the incorporation of middle class members who were formerly viewed as far more centrist than the _radical_ working class. While that may have been true at one time, certainly today many analysts view middle class party members as a source of demands, both in terms of policy and internal party organizational issues (Hine, 1986). NSM theory in particular argues that the radical potential of the working and middle classes has been reversed today. If social democratic style parties are attractive to those who sympathize with the demands of new social movements, either because they actively try to recruit those activists or because such parties may provide a vehicle which can be utilized by these movements, then middle class membership may be a radicalizing, rather than a conservative, force. One empirical question, then, for the study of parties is not simply the proportion of middle class members but how their attitudes compare to those of working class members on new social issues such as feminism or environmentalism.

At the same time, however, those who believe that the activism and views of the middle class movement activists are at odds with the cultural conservatism of the working class base of traditional socialist and social democratic parties suggest another set of barriers that could make it difficult for these parties to incorporate these groups. Traditional party members may be reluctant to welcome middle class members whose social values they do not share, while movement activists may assume a lack of shared beliefs with political parties.

Whether such barriers do indeed exist cannot be automatically assumed but needs to be empirically tested. David Weakliem (1991), for example, in reviewing Inglehart’s work has recently argued that the working class, rather than being opposed to the sort of issues that the post-materialists champion, such as nuclear power, is _becoming more favorably disposed toward them_ over time. This suggests that while barriers may exist, it is sometimes possible for parties to find strategies that allow them to adapt and overcome them over time.

New social movements have generated a great deal of interest among social
scientists and politicians in the advanced capitalist democracies. They represent a new phase of citizen activism and raise previously unknown demands. As such, they place new pressures on existing political and party systems. While a great deal of effort has gone into examining the types of issues they advance and highlighting their differences with established politics, less systematic attention has been paid to the response to these by the existing organizations. As this section has emphasized, the NSM literature suggests numerous questions about the future of parties but has been less adept at providing answers for them. They can only be addressed through an empirical examination of the relations that hold between parties and NSMs. The next section carries out such an investigation.

II. Party Views of New Social Movements

The data used here come from a survey of local PSOE militant leaders carried out by the author in 1988 and 1989. One hundred and twenty eight interviews were conducted using both a closed-ended instrument and in-depth, open ended conversations with members of local party committees in five Spanish provinces - Asturias, Barcelona, Granada, Madrid and Vizcaya. Town selection criteria were size of municipality and political composition of the local city hall. Roughly one third of those interviewed currently held or had in the past held elected office, usually local but about 10% occupied positions at the regional and/or national level. Women were slightly oversampled at 25% which is somewhat higher than the 18% female membership claimed by the party but equal to its target quota.

The interviews of militants are quite useful in addressing many of the issues raised in the last sections. From within the party, this study is able to look at militant attitudes towards a variety of issues and groups included under the new social movement framework. In addition, it can examine the possible barriers to incorporating the ideas and organizations of the new movements that may come from within social democratic parties. Ideally, parallel information from movement
activists about their opinions and attitudes towards the party should be gathered in order to gain a more complete picture. For example, it would be useful to know whether parties and movements share mutually positive or negative attitudes towards each other or whether they tend to be one sided. Nevertheless, the data from the party present quite detailed information about how the activists see the movements. They thus allow for speculation about how movement members may in turn interpret the position of the party.

Table 1 shows the attitudes of the local party leaders with respect to how the party should deal with a variety of contemporary progressive issue groups. They were given a number of different movements and for each, asked to indicate what position the party ought to take. The choices ranged from the very positive _incorporate the movement and actively push its platform_ to the most negative option of having the party keep its distance.

A very interesting picture emerges from these findings and it is one that allows us to present a somewhat different interpretation of the potential relationships between new social movements and established parties than that found in much of the contemporary literature. The overall level of support indicated by party activists for all of these movements is much higher than we would have expected from accounts of new social movements that stress their differences with traditional political forces.

Three groups stand out in terms of commanding a great deal of support from the PSOE activists. Consumers, professionals and ecologists are overwhelmingly endorsed as organizations that should be incorporated and whose demands should be actively pushed. At the same time, there is less, but still majority, support for incorporating and promoting the demands (column A) of pacifist and feminist groups while for anti-nuclear forces and youth, over half of all PSOE respondents (columns A and B) want them in the party, although do not necessarily agree with aggressively promoting the platforms of the two latter groups. Only the incorporation of sexual liberation movements provokes a primarily negative reaction from the militants. Yet even here, it is worth remembering that fewer than one quarter of the activists want to maintain a
distance from them while close to a third support active promotion of their platform.

What needs to be explained is not only why there is so much support from the party activists for all of these groups but also why some of the groups enjoy more support than others. The response to these questions offered here is multi-tiered, and at times speculative for lack of data. Overall while it supports some of the assumptions of the new social movement theorists, it gives, in general, a more plausible account of the results here than those theories can provide.

Political Mediation

First, it is argued that some of the support for the various movements simply corresponds to the more general support these groups enjoy in the Spanish population as a whole. However, as is shown below, this is not entirely true for all groups. This leads to the second claim that socialist support for these movements is mediated through politics. The approach used here follows the general theme of the work of Kriesi and his colleagues (1992). In an argument similar to Plotke's that _politics matters_, Kriesi et. al. present a case for taking political context or the _political opportunity structure_ into account when assessing the conditions faced by contemporary social movements. Their critique of NSM theory highlights the fact that the conditions faced by new movements, such as how sympathetic to demands the party in power is (which is at least loosely related to what kind of party it is), or whether the state is strong or weak, has some bearing on how successful the movement may be. However, while their focus on the mediating role of politics is well-placed, there is little attention paid to the effects that the organization of parties and party structure may have on the conditions movements face. Those effects too are part of politics and must be examined in order to explain the high levels of movement support found among party activists.

Political mediation is conceived of in three ways here. The first is political experience, internal to the party, with the group in question. Such is the case with
feminist or youth factions who have made demands within the PSOE. The party's experiences internally with such groups should have an effect on how they view and accept external organizations who represent those constituencies.

The second type of political mediation corresponds to Kreisi et. al.'s use of the concept. This is experience that the party has had with structured groups making demands in its capacity as a party of government. Such groups include consumers or pacifists.

The third manner in which politics is thought to condition socialist support for movements is through the conception militants hold of what politics is about. That is, how militants look at the type of bargaining appropriate to politics, the ways in which claims should be stated, the _repertoire_ of activities useful in laying a claim, how broadly or narrowly defined the group on whose behalf a claim is made, etc. should all affect the way the party leaders perceive other movements. The argument is that party membership and experience reinforce ideas about the nature of what is political and what is not and that these help determine acceptance of new groups.

Note, however, that in all three formulations of political mediation, the explanation of why the socialist activists support movements or fail to do so is different from NSM theory which tends to suggest that it is specific issues that divide old and new movements of the left. One implication of the interpretation here is that it may be difficult to predict a priori whether new issues or groups will be embraced or rejected by traditional parties.

For four of the eight groups examined here, there are Spanish public opinion data that are interesting to contrast with the views of the militants. The question asked of the public was whether and how strongly they approved or disapproved of each group. It must be kept in mind that this is, of course, a somewhat different issue than what was asked of the militants, but nonetheless each question taps into the degree of support the movement has. It is therefore a valuable, though limited, tool for comparison.

At the very least, it can be noted from Table 2 that for three of the four
groups: ecologists, pacifists and anti-nuclear movement, the militants are similar to the general population in their rank ordering. In addition, if we believe that the measures of support are somewhat comparable across the two samples, the total level of support for the ecology and pacifist movements is quite similar, while for anti-nuclear groups, the level of strong support in each group appears comparable, but there seems to be a higher level of general support for this movement among the Spanish public than among PSOE activists.

In these three cases, the parallel found is interesting because it does suggest, supporting some of the claims of NSM theorists, that traditional social democratic parties such as the PSOE may not likely be the source of demands on new issues. Rather, it appears that their strategy may be to follow the public's mood, rather than act as the vanguard.

At the same time, the strength among the militants of the option to incorporate and push the demands of the movements, in most cases, relative to the _co-opt_ option (Column B of Table 1) indicates the militants' desire for an activist party role. That is, as a percentage of total support for incorporation (Column A + Column B), the option to actively support the movements is quite high relative to wanting to simply incorporate the group and not emphasize its message (column B). (See Table 3). The latter option could be seen as having the effect of simply swallowing up the independent identity of the movement without any concomitant refocus of the socialists' identity to reflect their influx. That would be akin to co-opting the movement in question. This result of very strong support for the messages of many of the various movements tends to support Weakliem's (1991) notion that over time, the old left is becoming favorably disposed to the demands of the new movements.

In not all cases does the party parallel the public. The feminist movement presents quite a strong contrast to the other three movements. The support for feminists within the party is a great deal stronger than in the population as a whole. This might seem like an obvious finding since one might expect that the women in the party would naturally tend to want to incorporate women's organizations while there is no other similar _natural_ constituency within the
party for the other three groups. However, this argument is not persuasive since female activists were no more likely than the men to want to unite with feminist groups.

It is argued instead that what distinguishes this movement from the others in the eyes of party members is that it is the only one related to a specific, internal party policy. At the 31st Party Congress in 1988, the PSOE put into effect the rule mandating 25% female participation in party committees and electoral lists. The proposed policy was quite controversial and faced much more opposition at the Congress than proposals normally do but Carmen Romero, the wife of Felipe González, strenuously lobbied in favor of it.

Minimum quotas for women have been common in many European social democratic parties for some time and the PSOE’s adoption of it was in large part defended on the grounds that this simply brought the PSOE more in line with its sister parties. Since then, not only has the issue of feminism been more conspicuous to party members but it has also created some logistical problems. Many of the agrupaciones acknowledge that the quota would increase women’s participation but frankly stated that they had no hope of meeting it because of the lack of available women. One of the immediate effects of the quota was a much publicized group entry of a number of prominent feminists and other highly visible women into the party.

Incorporating feminist groups would be in keeping with the party’s efforts to attract more women. One way to interpret the level of support for feminism found among the militants is that is an issue on which the party has publicly taken a stance and one which is very related to its own internal issues. Here, it can be argued that the party activists' strong support for the feminist movement is partly the result of their organizational experiences which include both a great deal of discussion of the quota as well as having to make attempts to carry it out in terms of tasks like making election lists and filling local and regional executive committees. In this respect it is interesting that militants who agreed with the organization’s 25% quota were more likely to favor incorporation of feminist
groups into the party than those who opposed it. While, of course, one could argue
that it is undoubtedly a positive view of feminism that influences both of these
issues, the point here is that organizational experience may help to explain not the
fact of support for feminism but rather its relatively high level among the
militants compared to the general population.

Conceptions of politics held by the militants may also explain some of the
findings reported in Table 1, in particular, why some of the groups would be so
overwhelmingly welcomed into the party. The groups for whom there is most
enthusiastic support, that is, groups that the PSOE militants believe should both
be brought into the party as members as well as have a message that they want
the party to emphasize, are consumers and professionals.

At one level, the strong support for professionals seems paradoxical. After
all, much of the NSM literature would lead us to believe that hostility towards
professionals should be expected from a traditional working class party. And
indeed, PSOE militants overwhelmingly see the party as representing the
interests of the working class and decidedly not the middle class, whatever their
own class background.

At the same time, however, professionals and consumers are groups that
arguably have the widest attraction to the electorate. While professional groups
have a definite middle class appeal, their issues are not specifically class directed.
Consumers' demands are not only ones that tend to cut across classes but in a
sense, the underlying condition of those on whose behalf they make their claims is
highly universal: it is that of citizenship. The strongest support for these groups
should come as no surprise. These are the groups that most easily fit into the
catch-all strategy of a party like the PSOE.

In addition, they are groups whose style of making demands is likely to fit
better with traditional party politics. Claus Offe (1987) has noted that one of the
difficulties some new social movements present for political systems is their anti-

\[ \frac{85\%}{62\%} \] of militants favoring the quota also favored incorporation of feminist groups into the party
while only 62\% of those opposing the quota did. (p < .1)
politics stance. They are often unwilling to engage in the form of bargaining and compromising that typically characterizes political life (frequently because they can not deliver the members or voters that may be key bargaining chips in political compromises). This is especially true for groups such as anti-nuclear forces who may frame their demands as non-negotiable and uncompromisable because of their monumental, non-political nature, i.e. life on the planet or the survival of the human race.

In contrast, the kinds of demands for which consumers and professional groups are likely to press are precisely the type which are likely to engage in the kind of give and take negotiating that electoral politics does best. Consumers, for example, may want product labeling. The final form any labeling law takes is likely to be a compromise, with input from consumer groups, scientific researchers, government regulators and manufacturers' representatives.

While the reasons are clear why the socialists endorse consumer and professional groups, it may appear surprising how much support there is for incorporating ecologists, even given their strong popular support. In some ways, Green parties are the paradigmatic new social movement group. Not only are they often explicit competitors with social democratic parties for voters or even members as in Germany but in much of the literature there is a presumption of animosity between the two. The political expression of the ecology movement, the Greens, tend to reject the type of organizational hierarchy found in traditional parties and many authors assume a conflict of interests between the unionized, manufacturing sector (that tends to support the parties of the traditional left) and preserving the environment, which may cost those manufacturing and industrial jobs. Given this reasoning, one would expect less enthusiasm among the PSOE militants than is found. However, unlike in some Northern European nations, there is no credible Green party or well-organized movement in Spain so that ecologists are not likely to be seen by the Socialists as a political threat, nor have they had past political battles that might have led them to view this group antagonistically.

Spain also has one of the worst pollution problems of any country in the EC
and the Spanish population is aware of this. In addition, the frequent hospitalizations of inhabitants along Barcelona's harbor in the summer months when warm, polluted air becomes trapped between mountains and sea and chokes the city are the stuff of the nightly national news. Also, the Spanish realize that much of the nation's wealth depends on tourism and there is a growing awareness that to allow the Mediterranean coastline to be ecologically damaged could mean an economic disaster. It is because of issues such as these that the general support for the idea of an ecology movement or nature protection in Spain is strikingly high. The 1990 European Values Study quoted above shows that the Spanish rank second only to the Germans in supporting ecological protection and well ahead of the Belgians and Dutch, both of whom have strong ecology parties. Given a public appreciation of the problem, the willingness of the Spanish socialists to welcome ecologists and an ecology message into the party would seem to be a shrewd political move. Not only is it fairly costless since they are unlikely to antagonize any of their voters by doing so, but they also potentially could ward off or postpone the formation of a unified Green party. (Currently, there are a number of small Greens groups that tend to fight amongst themselves and be fairly local in scope.)

Much of the presumed antagonism between ecology movements and socialist parties, may not be the result of a lack of support of post-material issues by traditional (materialist) parties. Rather, quite often, it is the political interactions between the two that determine the state of relations and mutual acceptance. Contrast, for example, the state of affairs between two prominent social democratic parties, the German SPD and the French Parti Socialist, and the ecology parties in their respective countries. While the German SPD in the past has been somewhat chary of alliances with the Greens, surely this is in part due to the fact that the Greens were formed as a breakaway formation after losing a party battle within the SPD. The SPD's gradual espousal of green themes argues against the idea that the party rejects the claims of the ecology movement.

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2 The 1990 European Values Study data show that on the question of the "ecology movement or nature protection", 68.5% of the West Germans and 59.0% of the Spanish approved strongly. Compare this with the European mean of 54.3. Below this level are the Dutch with only 53.3% strongly approving and 47.5% of the Belgians.
However in France, when Mitterrand faced certain massive loss of electoral support in the March, 1993 general elections, his strategy was to turn to the ecologists. The hope (vain, it turned out) was that the latter would do well enough in the first round voting that a second round Socialist coalition with them would help save some of the Socialists' seats. Similarly in Spain, where there is little history of contentious interaction between ecologists and the PSOE, party support for this post-material issue is quite high.

In addition, the idea that governance as a type of political experience conditions militants' acceptance of social movements is strongly evident in the following. The fact of being a party of government is a crucial aspect of the political environment. For obvious reasons, a socialist party in power may react one way to the demands of a social movement when it is being asked to settle a difficult claim. Yet it may act in an entirely different manner when it finds itself in the opposition and sees the potential for gain by supporting the same claim and does not have to worry about finding the resources to settle it. This, of course, is hardly a new phenomenon. Well before the advent of the _new social movements_, left working class parties often found themselves estranged from their related trade unions when they came to power but reconciled after leaving office. From the standpoint of social movements, too, whether a party is seen as a potential ally or an advisory partly depends on its being a party of government or not.

When we look at the responses to the question of how the party should deal with other groups in terms of whether the respondent holds or has held elected political office, there are two movements for which office-holding makes a difference in terms of the responses. Elected office holders are less likely to support incorporation of consumer groups and pacifists than those who have never held such a position.

In the Spanish case, consumers and pacifists are precisely the two groups with whom office holders would be expected to have had the most contact and therefore the most potential for contentious relationships. Most of the office holders in this study occupy local positions (mayor, city councilor), and at this level in Spain consumer groups tend to be fairly active and make demands on city hall.
Pacifists are groups with whom the party has had a great deal of contact and conflict over Spain's remaining in NATO. Of all Europeans, the Spanish have by far the most negative attitude towards the alliance and the 1983 referendum on membership pitted the PSOE against many pacifist groups who urged a negative vote or boycott. Because the socialist government's position to remain in NATO appeared to contradict the party's long-held opposition to it, it not only offended long-time party members who often went along with the official position only because the party so publicly staked its reputation on a positive outcome but it also antagonized former progressive-left allies such as pacifist groups as well as some of their voters. Although the question narrowly passed, a third of those voters who sent the PSOE to victory in 1982 defected in the NATO referendum (Boix and Alt, 1989). These two examples show quite clearly the effect that political experiences may have on the opinions about new social movements held by activists in traditional parties.

We also need to consider in more depth possible explanations for the remaining groups for whom there is slightly less support (or in the case of sexual liberation movements, considerably less). In addition to the interpretation that sees the PSOE following the public's lead in dealing with these groups, it is important to note that three of them: feminists, sexual liberation organizations, and youth (though to a slightly lesser extent) closely fit the description of _identity politics_ that is supposed to characterize contemporary social movements.

The lower level of support given to these groups than those with more universal and less particularistic claims is in many ways that which NSM theory might lead us to expect. As discussed above in Section II, there are two key features associated with the new politics of identity. First, both the NSM and the value change literature assume that there is a greater acceptance of this type of politics by the middle rather than working class. In part, this is because the former have the intellectual and professional skills to develop these new identities.

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3 Almost three quarters of the Spanish say they have little or no confidence in NATO as an institution. On average, slightly under half of the Europeans have as negative a view. (European Values Survey, 1990)
but also because of working class conservatism on social issues. Accordingly, politics that stress things like women's rights or greater sexual freedom should be much less acceptable to the working class than the middle classes. Second, there is an emphasis in the literature on individual identities such as sexuality or gender rather than collectivist ones such as social position.

Both of these points can be addressed by findings from the study. With respect to the issue of class differences in acceptance of new movements, within the PSOE, there is little support for the idea that the working class is more likely to reject the new movements or be less amenable to them than the middle class. This is extremely surprising given the assumptions in the literature, yet there was no significant difference found between working class activists and those of the middle or upper-middle class in terms of how they felt the party should treat any of the movements that have been considered here. Indeed, to the extent that there was any (non-significant) indication of difference, it always tended to be in the direction of the working class being more likely to favor incorporating the group.

With respect to the movements of personal identity, there is an extremely interesting result found in Table 3. Three of the movements dealt with in this paper fit the description of personal identity movements: feminist, sexual liberation and youth. Above, we have looked at strongest support (column A) and total support (column A + column B) by the militants but it also important to consider how much of total support comes from the option that has been referred to above as the _co-opt_ option (column B) because it suggests a desire to incorporate groups but then to contain their message. This co-opt ratio (column B/[column A + column B]) is presented in Table 3. It is more interesting than looking at simply the co-opt option alone since the higher it is, the higher the likelihood or pressure within the party to downplay or ignore the group's message as part of the party's public platform or image.

The three _identity politics_ groups have the highest ratios of co-opt to total support of all the groups examined. The greater likelihood of wanting to co-opt identity-based movements than other types of movements suggests the difficulties traditional parties may face in dealing with new groups. The reluctance to
encourage the political style and message of certain groups, while at the same time assuming that they ought to form a part of the socialist family, belies a potential lack of flexibility on the part of the party. Such an attitude may not sit well with feasible partners and discourage their willingness to join forces with established parties. The language of identity may be one that is less intelligible to militants of traditional parties than the language of inclusion; as such, they are also incapable of, or averse to, articulating it themselves.

Individual Identities and Group Representation

Until this point, the discussion of identity politics has focussed on the groups or movements representing such identities. However, we need to examine two levels of identities: individuals who assume them and the groups representing them. This leads to a potential difficulty in the analysis of cross-group political dynamics. That is the possible lack of congruence within parties between beliefs about the political benefits, qualities and acceptability at the level of individual identities and behavior on the one hand, and opinions about the groups representing those, on the other. Such a difficulty is one not anticipated by new social movement theorists; there is an unstated assumption in the literature that the two levels are identical. However, the evidence from this survey suggests that they are not. It is argued that party acceptance of new movements depends not simply on the actual content of their claims but also on the political activity of the groups representing those claims.

There are interesting discrepancies between the level of support accorded the incorporation of groups representing individuals and the opinion of the militants regarding recruiting simply the individuals who belong to those groups. Activists were asked about the party's efforts to recruit new members and specifically, what kinds of people the party should focus on. Table 4 shows the results. What should be highlighted is that the two types of people the activists are most likely to think the party should concentrate on, youth and women, come out
well ahead of professionals. Yet, as we have seen, when asked about organized movements, they were much more likely to want to incorporate professional groups than either youth groups or feminists.

The case of youth groups is particularly striking. Not only is youth the group that members are most likely to want to try to recruit, but in conversations, many respondents specifically expressed regret and concern over the lack of young members in the party. There is a great awareness that lack of young people in the party will be detrimental to the organization's future. Why then the relatively tepid response to incorporating youth groups when youth are seen as the most urgently needed people to recruit?

The party's view of organized movements must be explained by something other than their theoretical support for the types of individuals mobilized by particular social movements. In the case of youth groups, the lack of congruence may be explained in two ways. The first is by the political style differences noted above between a social democratic, catch-all style and a group whose constituency is much more narrowly defined. Second, is the real political experience the PSOE has had with actual youth groups. Not only were organized youth groups (including the PSOE's own youth section, the Juventudes Socialistas) active in the No vote campaign against NATO membership but much more recently, at the time of the survey, another conflict between the party and these groups arose.

The Socialist government's Youth Employment Plan (the PEJ) was introduced as a way to decrease the high levels of unemployment among those under 25. It allowed businesses to pay lower training wages without benefits to young, first-time employees for three months with the hope of encouraging the hiring and investment in training of young people. With the exception of the Socialist youth group, all of the major organized groups of youth including university students unions, and youth sections of the other parties and trade unions were vocally against the plan. They contended that it allowed firms to lower their labor costs by creating a constantly revolving pool of low-wage labor without benefits and objected to the lack of sanctions for firms who laid their trainees off and simply replaced them with new ones (Julia, 1988). It is not
unlikely that the reason party activists exhibit a lower level of support for incorporating youth movements than other indicators might suggest is that their views on the subject are shaped by the actually existing groups they know and their political experience with them. It does not simply reflect their views on whether more youth in the party is a desirable condition or not.

Professionals present the opposite case. Here, while there is tremendous support among the militants for incorporating professional groups, they are far less likely to think the party should make a special effort to recruit individual professionals as new members. The discrepancy here may be explained in the following way. For the activists, there is not as pressing an intra-party need for professionals as there is for youth and women, who for different reasons (the party's future health and the current gender quota) are viewed as a more urgent internal priority. In addition, there is already a formal internal mechanism for affiliating youth through the Juventudes as well as the formal quota for women so that institutionally, there are well-established precedents for targeting these two groups. However, at the level of organizations, those representing professionals better fit the political strategy and traditional style of the PSOE than organizations geared to youth and women so the former are more attractive for wholesale, as opposed to individual, recruitment.

The last point that needs some explanation relates to the findings concerning movements of sexual liberation. This type of group is the least likely to receive enthusiastic support by the militants. This may seem an intuitive finding, corresponding to a stereotypical image of Spain as a traditional and Catholic culture which would have an influence on party members, regardless of their actual religious beliefs. However, it is actually more interesting than that and to

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4 This common perception of Spain as highly Catholic in some ways is borne out in recent studies. For example, Toharia (1992) has noted that religious identification has held fairly steady over the past decade and categorizes between one third and 90% of Spaniards as Catholic. The wide range reflects whether, and to what extent, people consider themselves practicing Catholics. The low-end figure refers to those who are self-identified as more or less practicing while 90% includes all who consider themselves as having any identification with the Church even those who do not practice their religion. On the other hand, the data in the 1990 European Value Study are complicated and show that Spanish attitudes toward the Church often place them in a middle range of predominantly Catholic European countries which does not allow us to conclude that Spain is an unambiguously Catholic and traditional nation. For example, while 25.5% indicate that they have 'a
see why, we need to take a slight detour and consider general attitudes towards sexual permissiveness in Spain. At least at the rhetorical level, the general Spanish population is extremely permissive on matters of sexual freedom. Oddly, perhaps, given the familiar perception of Spain, the Spanish are by far the most likely Europeans to endorse the notion that "individuals should have the chance to enjoy complete sexual freedom without being restricted". Forty-eight percent of Spaniards agreed with that statement in the 1990 European Values Study in contrast to, for example, 37% of the Italians or 34% of the Germans who were the next most likely groups to endorse it. The Spanish were also the least likely to disagree, only 29% of them did so, compared to a European mean of 42%.

It is significant that this popular belief in individual sexual freedom does not seem to translate into support within the PSOE for groups whose aim is sexual liberation. Although there is no data to show whether party activists are less prone than the population as a whole to agree with the statement quoted above, it is unlikely that they would be less likely to, if only because agreement with this probably reflects a general liberal outlook endorsing individual freedoms that militants would presumably agree with.

There are a number of plausible explanations for the reluctance of PSOE militants to incorporate movements of sexual liberation, relative to other new social movements groups, both of which support what has already been said about the role politics and experience play in conditioning support for them. First, despite the widespread public support for the idea of sexual freedom, this may be viewed as more of a negative-legal, rather than positive-political issue. That is, freedom from restrictions on sexual matters may be brought about by failing to enforce or enact legal measures. It may be viewed favorably as a civil liberties goal by militants but not necessarily as a collective political goal that the party needs.
to, or should, address.

A second possible explanation for the militants' skepticism is that organizational expressions of sexual liberation tend overwhelmingly to be gay rights groups, not movements of people with some theoretical and generalized demands for greater social acceptance of liberal sexual values. Homosexual rights or freedom is probably not what Spaniards have in mind when they proclaim their support for complete sexual freedom. Indeed, despite their responses to this question, the Spanish are among the Europeans least likely to view homosexuality as acceptable. Only Portugal and both Irelands have lower means on a scale measuring whether it can be justified. The fact that the socialist militants are more likely to reject movements of sexual liberation may reflect a rejection of gay rights groups who in the Spanish context would probably be a political liability. The important point here is that each of these explanations supports the general contention being set forth that party support for new social movements will depend crucially on politics, which includes conceptions of politics as well as political or electoral calculations.

Tentative Conclusions

The findings presented here raise some extremely important points concerning political action by parties. On one hand, the fact that at least within the PSOE, there is no support for the idea that the working class is more conservative than others in accepting new types of movements suggests that there is perhaps more room for understanding between the traditional parties of the left and new movements than often supposed. In particular, it tends to reinforce the notion, suggested by Weakliem and others, that the established party systems and parties will adapt to the challenges brought by new movements. Related to this,
the greater the length of time spent as a party member was associated with a greater likelihood of wanting to incorporate a number of the movements examined, including youth and sexual liberation. Respondent's age and socialist ideology were tested to see if they were what was really being measured by length of party membership but these had no effect. Possible explanations for the greater willingness of long-time members to incorporate other groups might be that internal party culture encourages a broad interpretation of potential allies so that those who have spent the most time in the party are more likely to see other groups as such or they may feel less threatened by external political forces than newer members. In either case, it supports the view that over time, traditional parties will come around to accepting new movements.

On the other hand, the greater tendency of the militants to want to downplay the messages of certain groups may imply that incorporating some types of new social movements will be difficult for an established party like the PSOE. The fact is that these groups share a common trait -- they are movements whose appeal is directed to specific sub-groups with irreducible identities that form the basis of their politics. This suggests that there may well be a fundamental incompatibility between the traditional parties of the left whose current strategy of politics is a broad-based appeal and who have historically viewed individual identities as politically subsumable to a collective one, and those groups whose approach to politics is built on establishing and appealing to very particular identities.

The lack of compatibility between parties and some types of movements is doubtless seen from both sides. Militants from traditional parties may favor bringing in new social movements but they are unlikely, at least in the short-run, to adopt a style of politics that is wholly at odds with their normal practice. From the point of view of some of these new movements, there is also likely to be a rejection of submerging their efforts into the established parties. For many of these movements, a change in style and emphasis would entirely undermine the very essence of their message so that a weak vocalization by the party of the group-in-question's program may well be entirely unacceptable to that group.
Finally, this leads to the question of whether grouping together a wide variety of movements under the same heading of New Social Movements is theoretically sound. Such a rubric seems especially problematic if the interactions between such groups and established political institutions are assumed to follow similar patterns. The evidence here suggests that there are plausible reasons to think that movement compatibility with parties is not simply conjunctural or related to past interactions but is partly based on overall visions or conceptions of politics. One implication of this work is that those movements whose activists have similar ideas about the nature of politics as those which we tend to find in traditional parties may be the ones that not only belong to a different category than some of the identity based movements but also are more likely to be the base on which traditional parties build their strategies for the future.
**Table 1.** Militants' Attitudes Towards Different New Social Movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>A*</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consumers</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecologists</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacifists</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminists</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-nuclear groups</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Liberation</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Groups</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A: Incorporate them and push their platform  
  B: Incorporate them without special emphasis on disseminating their message  
  C: Forge alliances with them when convenient but don't incorporate them  
  D: Maintain a distance from them.

N = 112
Table 2. Comparison of PSOE militants and Spanish public attitudes towards specific movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement</th>
<th>Strongest Support</th>
<th>Total Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecology</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacifist</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Nuclear</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The question asked of the Spanish public was: For each of the following movements, can you tell me whether you approve or disapprove of this movement? Possible responses were approve strongly, approve somewhat, disapprove somewhat or disapprove strongly. For the public, _Strongest Support_ refers to the percentages responding _approve strongly_ and for militants it refers to the percentage (corresponding to Column A in Table 1) indicating the party should incorporate mvt. and push its platform. _Total Support_ for the public is the total of those who approve strongly or somewhat of the movement while for militants it is the percentage who want to incorporate the movement, whether or not the platform is emphasized (Columns A + B in Table 1).

Table 3. Strength of Co-opt Option Relative to Total Support for Incorporating Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Coopt Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consumers</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecologists</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacifists</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminists</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-nuclear groups</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Liberation</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Groups</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A: Incorporate them and push their platform
B: Incorporate them without special emphasis on disseminating their message
Co-opt strength: B/(A+B)

N = 112
Table 4. Percentage of Respondents Indicating that Party Should Place Special Emphasis on Recruiting Specific Types of Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionists</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office workers</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionaries</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-one in particular</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 123
REFERENCES


