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Timofey Agarin and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski

Editorial: Citizenship and Civic Education in Postcommunist Countries

Keywords: citizenship, civic education, collective identity, postcommunism, Eastern Europe

Research in social sciences has dealt for decades with the concept of citizenship. Depending on the epistemological access to citizenship, scholars in general subscribe either to a normative account of citizenship or to the historic-functionalist one. Normative accounts of citizenship often refer to a lost ideal of Ancient Greek or Roman citizenship (e.g. Pocock 1992), canonising it into a universal citizenship standard. In contrast, historic-functionalist approaches to citizenship deal with the explanations of specific citizenship forms and their development as associated with functional requirements of societies such as military aspects of social life or the mode of economic activity (e.g. Marshall 1950; Weber 1998). This special issue deals with post-communist citizenship and the related topic of civic education. In this sense, postcommunist citizenship refers to concepts and practices of citizenship in societies that underwent deep political, economic and social transformations and where both legacies of the past and newer postcommunist developments overlap.

Robert Putnam's studies of social capital have enjoyed wide readership across Europe, but have they had a deserved impact on our understanding of the role education has on levels of social capital in general and social trust in particular? We, the editors, and our authors, are in agreement that more could be salvaged from the widely cited – but only superficially understood – hypothesis on “hunkering down” of social capital across Europe. The papers in this special issue additionally claim, that though the role of the “social lubricant” has been changing continuously in postcommunist societies, these changes reflect the shifting importance ascribed to education in the context of transition societies.

In short, the question the authors in our special issue address explicitly follows from the attention paid in all transition societies to the important role played by real-existing, desired and/or imagined collective identities. Beyond doubt, the relevance and the role perceived to be played by a range of identity markers across postcommunist societies has been discussed at great lengths in the past, if anything suggesting the significance of ethnocentrism and importance of statehood across the range of societies undergoing transition from socialist to European. The wide receptiveness of domestic publics, policymakers and not least academics to the thesis of “civilizational clash” by Huntington gives us just a small hint as to the perceived need for an antidote for experience of the past in a situation of 'social anomie,' where one's ethnolinguistic kin, socioeconomic group, or national community is being valued in relation to an idealised community of “European” societies. Rightly so, some claim, because whilst postcommunist, “eastern european” societies define their members via congruity between societal and social communities, most societies in the west have placed premium on individual choice to and identification with the community of citizens. Superficially the distinction between the Eastern and Western nations still holds sway for many analyses of social processes: in postcommunist societies individuals are presumed members of homogeneous communities (largely of ethnic, linguistic, cultural groups), in the West – they are identified as members of communities that have made a choice to stick it through, even if not "bowl" together.

We however, believe that the reference to community as a building block of an individual identity is misleading. It is for two reasons: First, all societies across Europe demonstrate increasing concern for limits of social cohesion experienced particularly as a result of economic crisis, allegedly shaking up the very foundations of social fabric. Euroscepticism is on the rise across the EU societies revered in the past for their welcoming attitudes of the EU project, inward looking parties are claiming for decisions to be made closer to home in nearly every state and many political parties brandishing centrifugal political agendas have seem run off on their offices of late. All of this indicates that west-east regardless, contemporary citizens in Europe are concerned with perks their community will maintain under increasing constraints experi-enced in backsliding European economies; and to counter their fears, they gain points by turning on their community-focused rhetoric to activate the bond that binds easiest, the ethno-cultural bond. There is little difference between East and West in Europe in this regard.
Second, feelings and actions of individual members of societies broadly associated with ethno-nationalism should not be read off the page discussing Eastern European states. As has been the case throughout the world, most accounts focussing social transition have made broad and fertile references to social impact institutional changes have on the mechanics of societal cohesion. These very mechanics are often said to change as a result of disorientation in the newly established political, economic and social circumstances individuals find themselves in and undoubtedly result in changes in individual behaviours. However, while going over postcommunist states with a small brush marks these societies as different, we as researchers are acutely aware of causal mechanisms behind social change should use a broader brush: no society is static, just as no society is locked in practices that cannot be improved. If anything, the very fact that we as social scientists engage in the study of processes of change observed throughout the post-communist region, suggests that these societies are on a trajectory for more open, more liberal and more diverse future.

We as editors of this special issue sought to offer our authors a veritable platform to debate the issues pertaining to social change and problematise these by reference to specific institutional aspect of that change: education. On this way, we have offered our authors but a generous margin of reference indicating that discussion of input education as a process locked in an education system has into individual and broader societal development should not be considered overdetermined by experiences of the past. We have also suggested that while much ink was spent on brushing over specific transformations in education since socialism there is precious little on transformation towards more liberal approaches in education. This in itself posed a huge challenge for us, the editors: Do we project a yet to be identified goal in education development for postcommunist societies? How can we factor in the experience of communism, do we urge our authors to discuss approaches to and dialectics in education that surpass ethno-nationalist concerns of general publics? The editors decided these pivots to be unnecessary. Instead, we supposed that transformation in postcommunist societies is set on the "democratic" path, it is market-based not only in economic terms - societies buy what they want also in terms of what they perceive is necessary "within their value system" and act accordingly. For this purpose, the only term that needs explanation however is collective identity, which we are carefully distinguishing from emotive references to national, ethnic and plethora of others 'cultures with army' concepts.

Between the two covers of this virtual special issue, we refer to collective identity as a practice - and this ultimately different from what other authors would see as a "construct" - of individuals, who are, as we acknowledge are citizens with their own goal-setting capacities, who have been historically subsumed to be objects of communist institutions and as such reactive agents of change: making choices and undertaking action only where no penalty followed. In short, we carve out the dearly needed space for thinking of potentialities brought into social processes by institutionalised forms of state-citizen interaction, particularly interactions with those citizens that will be shaping future political institutions, define social priorities and indeed, work off assumptions about their individual and collective freedoms. We are concerned with the interface of objects and objectives in education, the relationship between the students and content, between educators and their assessment of ways to impair, between subject specific content and developmental ideas of fostering active citizens out of students.

For the abovementioned reasons, we are keen on moving away from discussing collective identities as pinnacles of state-citizens relations commonly emphasised in discussions of (political) participation in Western Europe and (ethnopolitical) mobilisation in Eastern Europe. In so doing, we would like readers to be aware of the quasi-familial relationships of dependency projected upon education systems in many states, systems, institutions and agents of teaching, impairing little but compliance. Though we see the point in many case studies that put forth the ideas of state paternalism, not dissimilar to that of socialist regimes, our special issue contributions emphasise the link between opportunity to access education - and by extension a chance to form one's opinion oneself - with political rights, respect for ethnocultural diversity and, ultimately participation in a social cohesion project of wider European scope. It is here that we see strengthening the bond between members of society individually and as a whole as feeding into the concept of state-society relationships that emphasises a moral tie linking subjects with the state through their rights to share in and tap the jointly developed social product. In so doing we radically break the concept that postcommunist citizens are subjects neither socially and politically active for the benefit that is not their own, we presume that postcommunist education has already bred a generation of citizens that are not merely grateful recipients, like small children in a family, of benefits their leadership conferred upon them.

Naturally, one of the key answers our authors have on offer to the question whence the impetus for social change has originated, lies in the confrontation head on with legacies of communist education. While compliance with official rules was a must in public sphere, it is widely acknowledged that individuals enjoyed quiet a considerable margin for implementing rules learnt. This selective rule implementation is the asset that all postcommunist publics can rely on to navigate the complex and transparent (i.e. unpredictable) set of rules and requirements. Could we go as far as to suggest that
the subject disposition presumed by the past regime facilitated societal transformation after communisms collapse. Possibly, however, our focus on citizens collective identities suggest much less scalar implication of dependency relationships observed in the past: rather than pursuing their own goals, set and pursued by independent agents of change, post-communist citizens were ascending to what was on offer, as a result coping with the collapse of practices and legal frameworks better than rule reliant citizens would have had. Proverbial solidarity, mutual support, and ‘thick’ social bonds that required cooperation and networks of solidarity have offered a kinship-familial metaphor for individuals to enjoy some certainty under conditions of multifaceted transformation.

This is where we come full circle that allows us – and our authors – to see education as framework that spurs collective identities as practices that sustainably shape interpersonal relations. In fact, education establishments as objects that frame societal transition highlight two important issues in fostering citizenries. First, they focus our attention at practices that maintain stability across generations while facilitating contestation of the established norms by younger cohorts in society. Shaped by the ideological baggage of the past (and not too distant past that is), the educators construct the and expose the younger citizens to subjectivities they have experienced as ones making sense to them; this sensitises the younger members in postcommunist societies to differences in the way ideas are expressed, to ask questions as to what, and why is being imposed upon them. Second, it shakes up the mechanisms in place that were perceived to be reflecting the (socialist?) promise of a new, albeit still paternalist relation between subjects and state in the early years after communism. Particularly this process influences the prospects for both social and political change in states and societies that are located closer to the EU, enjoy opportunities for free movement into EU member states and can negotiate their own mechanism of individual and collective integration into the EC community of active citizens.

The papers in this special issue come mainly from the conference that took place at the University of Wroclaw in February 2013. During the two days in the Willy Brandt Centre, our authors alongside a dozen other participants have reflected upon dynamics in practices of citizenship across postcommunist states with particular focus on countries which have experienced considerable institutional changes as a result of state building. While we were interested in comparative studies of societies that saw practices of citizenship changing since early 1990s as a result of border changes (including territorial adjustment and dissolution of socialist federations), population dynamics (both demographic, as a result of in and out migration, and resettlement after warfare) and amendments to their citizenship regimes (issuing passports to an ethnic kin folk and provisions for extraterritorial citizenship), the focus on education as a widely neglected experience of political socialisation caught our sight immediately.

During the conference participants reflected on the impact structural factors have had on comparative developments in practices of citizenship across postcommunist region and we have established that too many studies discuss citizenship as if it was a fixed set of attributed (e.g. T.H. Marshal, W. Kymlicka, Jo Shaw). Everyone of us (we presume) has run through an institutional experience of education outlets: kindergardens, schools, universities, administrations of all kinds that maintain their relevance for us as citizens in societies where we live either to make sense of others’ behaviours, relate to experiences of others that are not known to us, or contrast our (perceived) successes with (perceived) failures of our counterparts. All these hinge upon personalised analyses of continuities and changes in practices – political participation, civic engagement, community activities – related to formal criteria defining us as members of a wider society, itself contained within a “pot” of a state, that marks all of us by means of citizenship status, passport as members of collectivities.

Simona Szakács’s article deals with the consequences of the 1989 for the civic education in Romania. The paper presents empirical evidence supporting the claim that the postcommunist civic education in Romania exhibits similarities with the post-war concept of the ‘good citizen’. The findings of the paper suggest a complex picture, combining liberal, communitarian and cosmopolitan aspects of the postcommunist “new citizen” in Romania. This complexity is often overlooked in the research on postcommunist countries, as its dominant focus lies on the failures to comply with an idealized Western liberal model. Simona argues that the Romanian case invites us to reconsider both the pitfalls and the opportunities of postcommunist citizenship education by considering them from the angle of wider socio-cultural change that is gradually being institutionalised at the world level.

Helga Zichner’s article focuses on Moldovan citizenship in the context of the Erasmus Mundus Programme of the EU. The paper explores how far external actors such as the EU can impact citizenship in postcommunist countries. First, the article discusses the rhetoric employed in EU documents on internal and external education policy. Helga uses a differentiated concept of citizenship highlighting the boundary between insiders and outsiders of a community. In this context, the paper analyses what kind of integration the EU intends for formal non-EU citizens by offering them certain opportunities of participation. Second, the article takes a look at individuals from Moldova participating in the EU’s Erasmus Mundus programme and the meaning their stays abroad had for them. The paper shows in how far their experiences abroad influence their daily practices as citizens of their countries.

Jennifer Bruen’s paper compares political education in postcommunist and post-colonial states with the cases of Eastern Germany and the Republic of Ireland. Jennifer points out that that some post-communist states including the former German
Democratic Republic practice a narrow form of civic education in their school curriculum focusing on the mere transmission of facts. This type of civic education tends, however, to produce citizens who are more likely to accept the status quo, rather than to critically engage with it. The paper shows that this is also the case in the Republic of Ireland which espouses a different historical background but can be categorized as postcolonial. The article uses attitudinal data from the European/World Values Survey and the European Social Survey to compare Eastern Germany and the Republic of Ireland on key attitudes towards politics and society. The paper lends support to the hypothesis that attitudes in both Eastern Germany and the Republic of Ireland tend towards the compliance highlighting the importance of broader forms of civic education for democratic socialisation both in post-communist states and postcolonial states.

The fifth and final paper of this special issue engages with the European citizenship and collective identity in the context of the enlarged EU. Stanisław Konopacki shows the limits of European citizenship, focusing on the accession of postcommunist countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 and 2007. The paper argues that the introduction of transitional periods for the free movement of persons with regard to the 'new European citizens', as well as the deportation of Roma from France in 2010, demonstrated how porous the practice of the EU citizenship is, which as a result weakens the often conjured 'European identity'. The paper highlights that the fear of the Other has become an essential element of European identity which poses a normative challenge to the construction of European identity. Against this background, the paper draws on the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida to sketch the contours of more open concepts of European identity.

Overall, the focus of this special issue on practices of collective identities as mediated through education opens the door to consideration of the role civic education plays across the wider European region in framing identities during transition. Papers reflecting on the role of formal and informal education, cooperation between individuals through social, political and cultural networks collected here illustrate ways in which the extant social, political and cultural practices can be and are translated into individual and group identities of active citizens. As the editors of the special issue we welcome you, the reader, to relate these issues to your own experiences of education, policies and initiatives emphasizing actions of civil society. The five erudite and stimulating essays presented here offer insights into different country case studies, but much more than this, they invite their readers to assume greater ownership over own identities and engage with opportunities to think of “years lost to schooling and education” as processes building individual social capital, contributing to and general agreement on the import of social cohesion in transition societies.

References


Simona Szakács

Converging with World Trends: The Emergence of the Cosmopolitan Citizen in Post-Socialist Romanian Citizenship Education*

Keywords
citizenship education, post-socialism, Romania, cosmopolitan citizen, World Polity theory

Based on thematic content analysis of textbooks, curricula, and an overview of educational legislation after the 1989 change of political regime in Romania, this paper presents empirical evidence to argue that that post-socialist citizenship education displays surprising similarities with converging post-war changes in the concept of the ‘good citizen’. The findings suggest a complex picture of change combining liberal, communitarian and cosmopolitan renditions of the new citizen, all having a common thread: the shift towards a post-national ethos delinking the citizen from the exclusive purchase of national belonging and decoupling citizen action from the absolute duty to the patria. Such significant changes are often overlooked due to the dominant focus on the failures to comply with an idealized Western liberal model. However, they invite us to reconsider current understandings of both the pitfalls and the opportunities of post-socialist citizenship education by considering them from a different angle: that of wider socio-cultural change that is gradually being institutionalised at the world level.

1 Introduction: The changing faces of citizenship

In the first half of the 20th century the concept of ‘good citizenship’ referred more to obedient subjection than to active involvement. The model was not at odds with individual initiative and subversion of social norms as long as it was exercised at “proper times and places” and ultimately led to the betterment of society (Sneden 1919, 4). While liberal nuances in the normative portrait of the ‘good citizen’ were promoted selectively to privileged groups - e.g. in Britain in elite schools for boys (Holt 2008) - the greater good to which citizens’ contribution was to be made referred to an “imagined” national community (Anderson 1991). Citizenship was conceived as an ineffable bond between citizens and their nations, a link founded upon mutual rights and obligations (a legal-status aspect, often described in universal, rational terms) coupled with a sense of belonging (an identity aspect, often described in ethno-cultural terms). With the gradual institutionalisation of the nation-state model in 19th century Europe, the notion of univocal national citizenship linking citizens and states was effectively in place and transmitted to the young through state-organised mass schooling (Weber 1976; Gellner 1983; Ramirez & Boli 1987; Soysal, Strang 1989).

However, the institution of citizenship witnessed dramatic changes in the post-war world and is increasingly understood in post-national terms. Beyond academic debates centred on “denationalised” citizenship (Bosniak 2000), there are also notable changes observed empirically. With the rise of an international human rights regime, citizenship was reshaped by notions of universal personhood as a complement to national belonging (Soysal 1994; Shafir & Brysk 2006). In the context of trans-national labour migration and other global changes, individuals and groups have become beneficiaries of certain rights even in the absence of citizenship status in their countries of residence. Rights are legitimately claimed by, and offered to, previously marginalised groups, as well as to individuals recognized as bearers of personal worth in a variety of contexts across the globe, from Europe to Latin America, from local villages to global cities (Soysal 1997; Yashar 2005; Holston 2008; Sassen 2002). The univocal attachment to the nation, while still important, no longer represents the only requirement of good citizenship in today’s world. Conversely, given the increasing legitimacy of the modern actor as a rational human being endowed with the power to act (Meyer & Jepperson 2000), the aim of individual self-realization no longer poses a threat to the cohesive goals of the national collective. In return for this newfound empowerment, rights-bearers are expected to act responsibly, participate in the improvement of their communities, be environmentally aware, and collaborate creatively in addressing problems such as poverty, famine, war and disease, all of which cut across national boundaries. At a normative level, such concept of citizenship matches the ideal of a cosmopolitan deliberative democracy, which, in the view of some, could find fertile grounds in the transnational polity that is the European Union (Habermas 2001; Delanty 1998; Delanty & Rumford 2005) or, even more generally, in the global sphere where international organizations could gain greater democratic leverage provided that certain conditions are met (Held 2006, chapter 10).

While public schooling continues to be entrusted with the mission of moulding future citzenries, citizenship education is not only the target of much reformation efforts at national and international

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levels from both the state and the NGO sector, but has also become an internationally-spread topic of research. Citizenship education in countries, especially in the context of European integration, has been receiving increasing attention. The common thread linking studies of post-socialist civic education invariably touches on the difficulties of adapting to democratic citizenship models in the West, casting the region in a constant shadow of laggardness. The aim of this article is to challenge the picture painted by these dominant studies in the field: (1) proposing a different analytic strategy (focused on change in time rather than current policy evaluation); (2) resting on a fresh theoretical outlook (using insights from a sociological neo-institutionalist perspective); and (3) using empirical data to make an argument that challenges the very assumption inherent in mainstream ‘laggardness’ explanations, namely the dichotomy between an idealized Western-democratic model to be adopted and the un-matching realities of the so-called post-socialist ‘transition’.

Methodologically, my strategy has been to focus on changing emphases in civic education instructional materials across two time periods approximating the 1989 change of political regime; I aimed to take into account the “processual” nature of citizenship education rather than offer a shortsighted view anchored only in the present (Hedtke et al. 2008). To this end, I sampled materials from before and after the 1998 reform which introduced the first post-socialist curriculum and opened the textbook market to competing publishing houses. I consulted all curricular guidelines elaborated after 1989 for civic education (both compulsory and optional), as well as all relevant educational legislation pre- and post-1989 (i.e. the 1978, 1995 and 2010 Education Laws). The textbook selection followed the specificities of the Romanian textbook market, and comprised of a final sample of thirteen civic education books for the secondary and five for the primary level (for both compulsory and optional courses). Before the 1998 curricular reform, teaching was based on unique textbooks produced solely by the Ministry of Education. I thus used all available materials for this time. After 1998, the textbook market was opened to competition between publishing houses. While theoretically there would have been several books available for each grade and discipline, this was not the case due to the peculiar mixture of centralized and free-market logics operating in the field of textbook production, approval and distribution (Singer 2008, 371–2). As the textbook refreshment rate in schools is relatively low and runs independently from curricular revisions, publishers have few incentives to invest in the production of updated books. In consequence, the availability is scant for certain grades and disciplines across time rendering research sampling choices (just as teachers’ choices) rather vacuous. The end-result was that for the post-1998 period, I have selected all the books that have been approved and used in schools for each grade, while also including several well-known books designed for optional courses.

For the data analysis I used an inductive thematic content analysis strategy. In a first step, instructional materials (curricula and textbooks) were reviewed from the point of view of their changing form, structure and organization, as well as their explicit disciplinary aims and justifications along the pre-1998 and post-1998 time division. For the thematic content analysis I purposefully avoided any rigidly defined scheme of categories. Some topics of interest (i.e. citizenship, nation, patriotism etc.) constituted the starting point for in-depth content analysis which resulted in a nuanced landscape of clusters and motifs associated to the notion of ‘good citizenship’.

In the following, I present some of the findings of this analysis related to the theme of ‘good citizenship’. These findings demonstrate how three interrelated aspects — individual self-realization, active participation in community life, and a concern with global issues affecting all human beings — concomitantly made their way into the content of citizenship education, particularly after 1998. While each of these trends could be depicted as a separate dimension of the citizenship ideal inviting the conclusion that there is some inconsistency of definition at hand, an important synergic effect is also observable: the pronounced shift from a strictly nationally-bound to a widened frame of reference for the constructed citizen ideal. This I consider to be a sign of emergent cosmopolitization, for the reasons I shall bring forth below.

I present my analysis in two parts. First, I introduce some of the global changes in the ideal of good citizenship in civic education and propose a theoretical background inspired by the work of the Stanford School of neo-institutionalism, also known as World Polity theory to explain the paradoxes of these changes in the post-socialist context from a fresh angle. Second, I give ample empirical evidence of world convergent trends from the post-1989 Romanian education context along three renditions of citizenship: liberal, communitarian, and cosmopolitan, whilst highlighting what brings them together. I conclude by reflecting on the significance of these shifts for wider societal change, particularly in the post-socialist and Europeanising contexts, and how these can be understood in a World Polity reading.

2 Post-war civic education trends and the World Polity perspective

While at the normative level scholars have promoted the idea of a tolerant cosmopolitan citizenship education to reflect the challenges occasioned by globalization and multiculturalism (Osler & Starkey 2005; Banks 2006; Kymlicka 2003), there is also growing empirical evidence showing that the post-war ideal of the ‘good citizen’ started to permeate the content of education worldwide. These findings suggest that the idea of an active, individually empowered, and globally concerned citizen becomes reflected in the educational sphere in two key inter-related ways: (i) the content of
schooling (curriculum and instructional materials), and (ii) its means of transmission (pedagogy).  
In terms of content, the new model finds expression firstly in the rise of social studies and civics disciplines focused on individual autonomy to the detriment of national history subjects centered rather on collective actorhoods (Benavot et al. 1991; Wong 1991; Hymans 2005). Secondly, specific topics within civics focus more and more on individual self-realization, a trend observed both in the neo-liberal West and in the globalization East were these appear to be in consonance - rather than contradiction - with nation-building features (Schissler & Soysal 2005; Soysal & Wong 2011). Thirdly, there is a clear worldwide growth in coverage of topics of global relevance. The most recent study conducted by the International Educational Association in 2009 in 38 world countries revealed that the top three most frequent topics invoked as having a major emphasis in civic education curricula were “human rights”, “understanding different cultures and ethnic groups”, and “the environment” (Schulz et al. 2010, 48); significantly, all of these entail a universalising logic rather than a particularistic one. Moreover, cosmopolitan forms of citizenship rooted in transnational imaginaries increasingly permeate specific instructional materials, as shown in the inclusion of themes with global purchase: e.g. membership in the world community (Bromley 2009), protection of the environment (Bromley et al. 2011b; Ramirez & Meyer 2012), safeguarding human rights (Ramirez et al. 2006; Meyer et al. 2010), celebration of diversity (Soysal et al. 2005; Soysal & Wong 2010), or intercultural linkages between previously conflicting civilizations (Soysal & Szakács 2010b, 2010a). At the same time, pedagogical transformations reflect a turn towards the value of the individual, as the pupil-teacher relationship moves from authoritative towards egalitarian approaches, the focus on factual knowledge-transmission is complemented by skills, attitudes and competence formation, and educational materials become more attractive and relevant to pupils in terms of imagery and topic selection (Bromley et al. 2011a).

Often considered a response to the challenges of globalization or the changed needs of learners (Karseth & Sivesind 2010; Yates & Young 2010), these important shifts are however fraught with tensions and not easily amenable to direct cause-and-effect relationships, notably in situations defined as ‘transitional’ (as post-socialism has often been defined). A sociological neo-institutionalist perspective promoted by the scholarship of John Meyer, Francisco Ramirez and their collaborators, provides a compelling explanatory model for these changes. In this line of thought, the post-war rise of the individually-empowered citizen in education (as elsewhere) is not a direct consequence of new global imperatives but rather a reflection of the worldwide diffusion of the cultural “script” of an “expanded” modern actor, providing a blueprint for legitimate behaviour (Meyer & Jepperson 2000). In the new model, the pupil is no longer expected to become an obedient subject, but an involved active-citizen, “scripted to be an empowered member and participant in a very broad society and nature, not to be subordinated to an exogenously authoritative elite culture” (McEneney & Meyer 2000, 207). Because such changes are observed in a wide variety of national contexts with differing socio-historical trajectories and divergent constellations of interests, realist explanations based exclusively on the logic of consequentiality (March & Olsen 1989) or the praxis of political and economic interests are called into question. In contrast, neo-institutionalist interpretations recognize the key importance of cultural, non-rational, and socially constructed aspects contouring human activity, and highlight the role of symbolic legitimacy in structuring worldwide change.

To explain the possibility of contradicting logics resulting in similar outcomes in the educational sphere (isomorphism), these approaches often reflect on transnationally legitimated “educational ideologies” made discursively available to, and used by, domestic actors in different ways (Fiala 2006; Soysal & Wong 2011) without necessarily assuming a simple copy-and-paste process, or clear-cut distinctions between “borrowers” and “lenders” of educational models (Steiner-Khamsi 2004, 2009). Thus, while the diffusion of educational ideologies is not considered in the World Polity perspective to be a straightforward process but instead likened to a “gas” spreading out without a definite centre, without a univocal source, or any purposeful destination (Krücken & Drori 2009, 19), it is no less true that much of this literature has been more interested in the surprising reach of educational scripts across the world (and looked for the features that made them successful) rather than in how this “gas” interacts with other “substances” encountered elsewhere. In this paper I do not take the simplistic view that local interactions (or the meeting point between the global and the local) are not important, nor that there is a single explanatory factor for diffusion. Instead, I challenge both the idea that trans-nationally authorised ideals are either diffused or not in a particular context and that, consequently, we can evaluate them as successes or failures at any given time (the either-or view), as well as the assumption that the diffused ideals have a standard-like quality in the sense of an immutable essence which is to be transferred as is if it is to be considered successful (the essentialist stance).

With the tectonic shifts brought by the year 1989 in the post-war definition of world regions, particularly with the de-legitimation of soviet-style state-socialism which arguably promoted alternative ideologies of education, Eastern European countries have become especially intriguing for testing the world-convergence thesis given their perceived difference from (Western) world ‘standards’ at the time. Yet, countries from the former Soviet bloc are at worst excluded from international analyses, at best flagged as outliers due to their “post-socialist condition” (Silova 2010) without much further elaboration. Paradoxically then, underdeveloped interpretations of the region’s educational change constitute not only a missed opportunity in international
comparative work - as argued by Buk-Berge (2006) in relation to the publication of results from the 1999 IEA Civic Education study - but also a weak point at the very core of the global convergence thesis. However, if applied to the case of post-socialist education, an approach inspired by neo-institutionalist scholarship promises to render some of the previously observed paradoxes more manageable: instead of considering internal contradictions to be an anomalous stage that would be overcome once transition was over (understood as a clear path from a well-defined point A to an equally well-defined point B), these could be considered simply an inherent feature of institutionalised (world) culture. As remarked by a well-known Scandinavian institutionalist theorist, inconsistencies between talk, decisions, and action can serve a useful purpose in organizational settings: they may be an impediment to act, but at the same time they constitute an asset in the very survival of an organisation (Brunsson 1986). In the following section I focus on the case of Romania’s changing civic education ideals in order to draw a more complex picture of change and continuity, one which combines several renditions of citizenship which do not neatly fit in an ‘either-or’, ‘old’ or ‘new’ model, evolving in transition or stuck in inertia. With this, I hope to shed some light on the complexity and contradictory nature of change but also argue that even with its well-acknowledged limits, an account inspired from neo-institutionalist scholarship of the World Polity variant may prove its usefulness in our currently one-sided understanding of post-socialist change.

3 The ideal of the good citizen in post-1989 Romanian education: liberal, communitarian and cosmopolitan renditions

One of the classical strands of citizenship debates in the 1990s revolved around distinctions made between liberal, or ‘thin’, vs. republican and communitarian, or ‘thick’, concepts of citizenship15. Analyses of civic education based on this distinction typically pit a focus on individual rights and minimal involvement against an emphasis on collective aspects of citizenship, such as group rights, agency and strong involvement (Zimenkova 2008; Kerr 2002, 214–215; Neubauer 2012). However, with the renewed discursive attention brought to social cohesion and civic forms of patriotism, notably in the post-9/11 West, rigid distinctions of this sort have become uneasy. Civic education programs may promote ‘thick’ citizenship ideals (i.e. obligations of the individual towards the community or a renewed focus on cohesive values) even in contexts that would be habitually considered as ‘thin’ and overly individualistic, such as the USA (Peterson 2011, 143–144), or the UK (Osler 2009, 86–88).

Drawing on dominant citizenship debates, scholars reflecting on civic education in the post-socialist societies of Eastern Europe have also laid emphasis on the individual vs. collective dichotomy, albeit in a different form. In the post-socialist context, tensions between individualist and collectivist understandings of citizenship have been presented in the form of teleological narratives of transition from an authoritative-socialist to a liberal democratic social order (Tibbitts 1994; e.g. Freyberg-Inan & Cristescu 2006). The tension between the two dimensions was seen as a hallmark of transition periods, a sort of “inter-regnum” until the ideal, anti-collectivist, individualistic, (neo-)liberal form of democracy would be achieved at the cultural level (Bizrea 2002). But simplistic polarities of citizenship (e.g. liberal vs. republican, individual vs. collective) are not neatly applicable to West/East, democratic/authoritarian or socialist/post-socialist distinctions. Instead, a mixture of emphases across time periods and local contexts is found empirically, an aspect of consensus particularly amongst researchers concerned with the post-socialist context in education (see Mincu & Horga 2010; Mincu 2009; Silova 2002, 2009).

Developments in post-1989 Romanian education also depart from polarised discussions of the ideal citizen constructed through formal education. By analyzing the changing content of Romanian post-1989 civic education and of the declared missions of the school I exemplify the threefold nature of ‘good citizenship’ combining: (1) individual self-realization (liberal citizenship), with (2) active involvement in community life (communitarian citizenship), and (3) the extension of citizenship concerns to the global level (cosmopolitan citizenship). All three trends are represented in the post-1989 Romanian context in various degrees and are consonant with wider world trends in civic education both in the West and in the East (Soysal & Wong 2006). The liberal/communitarian citizenship dichotomy and the transitional phase hypothesis reinforcing a simplistic West/East divide have limited explanatory power in the case under scrutiny. In the following sections I bring empirical support for this claim.

3.1 Individual self-realization: The liberal rendition

Declarations of the mission of public schooling enshrined in national education laws often contain codified notions of an ideal citizen. In 1978, the role of Romanian education was to train and develop the “socialist consciousness of the young generation” and to ensure “the growth of a new generation that is free, complete and harmonious development of the human
individuality, in the formation of an autonomous and creative personality” (Article 3, points 1 and 2, Legea învățământului 1995, emphases added). Such an ideal targeting the development of human individuality (only based on, but not contributing to, the “aspirations of Romanian society”) seems far removed from the mission of the Romanian school found in previous legislation that stated the primacy of the social (i.e. the formation of a generation) over individual formation.

No longer an end in itself, social progress is now presented as a side consequence of personal development. The 1995 Education Law depicts contribution to society as a result of individuals’ professionalization and successful insertion in the job market by becoming “useful” workers (Article 4, point 1, Legea învățământului 1995). The 2011 Education Law furthers the emphasis on personal development despite maintaining the collective-focused aims of forming “the mental infrastructure of Romanian society” (Article 2, point 2, Legea Educației Naționale 2011). According to the new law, education contributes to individual skill formation through “personal fulfilment and development by realizing one’s own objectives in life, according to each person’s interests and aspirations and their wish to learn all along the course of [their] life” (Article 4, Legea Educației Naționale 2011). Such formulations take for granted the existence of a young person with unique life objectives and reflects the embeddedness of the self-realizing individual model in current educational discourse.

But how is this ideal manifested at the level of citizenship education materials? My analysis reveals that the increasing permeation of the modern script of a self-realizing individual (Meyer & Jepperson 2000; Meyer 2010) is found in curricular contents in three major ways: through a pronounced shift from society- to individual-centred view of social life grounded in the notion of personhood; through a default presentation of the value of individuality as a good in itself; through increasing expectations of self-management placed upon pupils at all levels of schooling. I will give examples of each, in turn.

During state socialism, the primacy of the social over the individual went uncontested. In the tenth grade ‘Social-political knowledge’ textbook, pupils were told that: “society is a whole in which the individual integrates, given that he cannot exist as a human being outside of collectivity” (Ardeleanu, Clătică 1975, 11). Individuals were present in history books, for example, as national (not individual or universal) heroes because of their contribution to national aims of independence, unity, or state formation. Pupils were singled-out only if they reflected the qualities of the entire Romanian people. As the Pioneers’ guide mentioned, “During the millenarian history of our patria, founders and country leaders have risen from amongst the Romanian people, embodying its most precious qualities” (Consiliul Național al Organizației Pionierilor [National Council of The Pioneers’ Organization] 1985, 4).

The situation gradually changed in the decade after the collapse of Ceausescu’s regime in 1989. The first Civic Culture syllabus included a strong focus on democratic institutions and human rights. But the early contents lacked an equally strong emphasis on the value of individuality. Even though topics on the individual person were covered in separate sections in seventh grade, other topics were still framed through an emphasis on the value of the collective. For example, the existence of a human rights international regime was not justified by recognition of universal personhood but as emerging from the goal of societies to maintain non-violent relationships against dangerous individual domination tendencies.

The interests of people, inequalities, the will to dominate, can all lead to societies governed by violence and fear. All societies wish to limit violence and install social harmony; this has gradually led to the fruition of efforts to elaborate a document, a Charter, containing the fundamental rights of people everywhere (Chirițescu et al. 1997, 96).

With the new 1998 national curriculum, the individual person fully entered the stage of civic education. This shift was apparent in the formulation of specific civic education aims which included “positive valorization of self and others” (Consiliul Național Pentru Curriculum [National Council for Curriculum] 1999, 11). Textbooks defined the goal of seventh grade Civic Culture as concerned with “the young person both as a citizen of the state [he/she] belongs to, as member of the different social groups, and as a unique and dignified being” (Nedelcu & Morar 2003, 5). Curricular themes specifically reflecting the concern with the individual person were extended to the primary school and included a full chapter on “The Person” in third grade Civic Education to complement existing sub-topics on “The person: the uniqueness and dignity of the human being” in seventh grade Civic Culture and on personal identity in eighth grade Civic Culture (Consiliul Național Pentru Curriculum [National Council for Curriculum] 1999, 2004). Yet, the preoccupation with the individual transcended prescribed content addressing the person. The idea that the individual is part of different groups with different interests and identities appears in a fourth grade textbook in a lesson about groups and relationships in the absence of a curricular topic on the person (Radu 2006, 5). A multi-level approach to identities completely shifts the perspective from a society-centred to an individual-centred view of social life. In a book for eighth grade national identity is described as an element of personal identity: “National identity […] can be found as part of the individual way of being” (Georgescu & Ștefănescu 2008, 102). Thus, even curricular topics that are traditionally focused on the collective (i.e. the nation) are reinvented to include the value of individuality. National identity is no longer the ultimate differentiator amongst people, but is redefined as part of the
personal (individual) identity which is relative, complex, multi-layered and can include other determinants of equal importance.

Another pattern highlighting the value of individuality is the novel presentation of self-enhancement and the pursuit of individual fulfillment as legitimate personal goals, most notably after the 1998 reform. In a textbook for the optional course on civic education for fifth grade we find the example of Ioana, an ambitious and self-confident girl, whose personal aim in life is to become a supersonic airplane pilot. Despite her grandmother’s opposition who considers her ideal “unfit for a woman”, her parents “encourage her to think that through tenacious work [one] can accomplish [one’s] dreams” (Tomoiu et al. 2007, 52). Similarly, in a lesson on “Courage vs. Cowardice” the textbook authors advise pupils to “permanently express [themselves], the person [they] truly are” (Tomoiu et al. 2007, 44).

The opposite of personalisation is deployed in newer books. Uniformity is depicted as a serious threat to the value of individuality, which in turn emerges as a good in itself and is linked with democracy. For example, a book for seventh grade Civic Culture discusses the risks of depersonalization through mass media and belonging to certain social groups (Nedelcu & Morar 2003, 18–19). The authors of an optional textbook express a similar view:

Accepting multiple identities represents one of the strongest arguments of democracy against those who depersonalize the human being based on unifying moulds. Multiple identities allow people to manifest themselves as personalities, and this is one of the objectives of democracy (Chirițescu et al. 2004, 16).

Such a view of the social is dramatically different from earlier periods because it challenges the inherent goodness of the collective, placing individualization aspirations and personal choices as primary. Personal qualities are described as more important than socially authorized or inherited statuses such as aristocratic titles that “produced tragedies in the lives of many people” (Nedelcu & Morar 2003, 9). Having an opinion divergent from that of the majority is celebrated as a sign of autonomy in the distinction made between individual and public opinion, which is in turn prone to manipulation (Georgescu & Ștefănescu 2009, 58).

But it is not only through civic textbooks or the mission of the school that a reconstruction of individuality occurs. Personal realization goals also crop up in cross-, trans-, and extra-curricular educational efforts from an increasingly early age, dramatically extending the expected scope of self-development. For example, the cross-curricular area “Counselling and Orientation” that starts in the first grade and covers all levels of schooling is thematically centred on the child: “Self-knowledge and personal development”, “Communication and social competences”, “Information and learning management”, “Career planning” and “Quality of lifestyle” are its key themes. The overall aim is to form competences for successful insertion in the labour market, but more prominently, it is to transmit a sense of personal acthorhood:

(...) pupils acquire knowledge and skills that help them become responsible actors and contribute to school, community, family and peer group level, to transform the learning activity into a process of lifelong learning and to create their futures (Consiliul Național Pentru Curriculum [National Council for Curriculum] 2005, 16).

In this curricular framework, pupils as young as six years old are expected to engage with their future careers, to learn how to manage their time, and be in control of their personal, social and professional lives. Along with other objectives regarding interpersonal and learning skills, the following objectives of the discipline spanning the full spectrum of schooling levels reflect a strong preoccupation with individual self-realization: “developing a positive attitude towards self as unique and valuable person”; “acquiring skills for career exploration and planning”; “exercising management skills for a quality life-style” (Consiliul Național Pentru Curriculum [National Council for Curriculum] 2005, 19).

Finally, there are extra-curricular efforts towards developing an individually responsible perspective on society at large. The National Program of Education for Democratic Citizenship, developed by the Extra-curricular Activities Department of the Ministry of Education together with UNICEF, displays a strong focus on individual self-development and the notion of individual personhood. Its optional textbooks for lower secondary (fifth to eighth grades) are exclusively focused on human rights and the basic principles enshrined in the UNDHR. The notion of ‘person’ is central in the activities suggested and is particularly applied to disadvantaged groups such as refugees, persons with disabilities, or drug addicts. What is noteworthy here is that a variety of social dynamics are presented as driven by personal motivations. The individual person holds the answer to problems related to her own destiny. For example, in the eighth grade book migration is presented as motivated by personal and professional fulfillment and unrelated to any structural factors (Cerciu et al. 2004, 64–65). Portrayals of social phenomena as driven by individual choices are very different from prior deployments of citizenship in which not only was the betterment of national society the main purpose of human activity, but the people as a whole and structural factors (such as class struggle in a Marxist-Leninist depiction) were the real drivers of any individual destinies.

In sum, there are several ways in which a focus on individual self-realization has formally permeated the Romanian content of schooling: an abstract focus on the individual person as a bearer of basic human and citizenship rights safeguarded within a democratic state; the value placed on individuality and the increasingly legitimate pursuit of personal goals; a pronounced shift towards rendering
individuals responsible for their lives, and increasingly expected to do so from a very young age, even from positions of social disadvantage. All of these themes surrounding individual self-realization could be understood as a liberal form of the ideal citizen, but they contribute, as I argue further, to the construction of an individually empowered cosmopolitan citizen that matches the script of the expanded modern actor in the post-war world.

3.2 Active involvement: The communitarian rendition

The idea of creating a citizen that is socially responsible is not new in Romanian education as socialist discourses capitalized on active involvement in the collectivity. Each pupil had to show his/her love of the patria by recycling materials, volunteering for patriotic work etc. Even though the word ‘citizenship’ was not used, a sense of duty towards the greater good was strongly promoted, for instance within extra-curricular activities organized by the Pioneers youth organization (see Consiliul Național al Organizațiilor Pionierilor [National Council of The Pioneers’ Organization] 1985). Active involvement in preserving the socialist order was presented as matter of fact in instructional materials. The participation of “working men and women” in the leadership of society through membership in different trade unions, civil organizations, and state institutions was portrayed as an unquestioned aspect of social life. Moreover, the involvement of citizens in society was depicted as part of the nation-centred socialist ethic. For example, helping communities affected by floods in July 1975 was considered in a tenth grade textbook for social political knowledge as a sign of patriotism undertaken in the service of the nation, not for the benefit of the people affected by the calamities (Ardeleanu & Clăciță 1975, 126).

However, the aim of active involvement shifted in post-1989 textbook renderings together with the meaning attached to community. The purpose of becoming involved changed from building socialism to safeguarding democracy, construed as fragile in the absence of citizen action. The community preference was no longer just the patria which in turn simultaneously shrank and expanded to include the local level (relevant to pupils’ everyday lives) and the global scene (relevant to pupils’ being part of the whole of human kind).

How is the purpose of civic involvement redefined as democratic duty in post-1989 schooling? In civics textbooks, we find innumerable examples of active citizenship as a sign of a democratic order. Participatory models of democracy gain precedence in the post-1998 period. In a lesson on “Democratic principles” from an eighth grade Civic Culture book, we read: “Because democracy does not function by itself without mistakes, it is up to everyone of us to render the society we live in democratic” (Georgescu & Ștefănescu 2008, 11). In contrast, a passive stance is ridiculed. In a textbook for seventh graders we find a caricature showing a man pushing a group of citizens in a baby-stroller. Pupils are asked, ironically, whether they think “the President of the republic should be like a parent to all citizens, solving all of their problems and fulfilling all of their wishes” (Georgescu & Ștefănescu 2009, 51). From such examples it becomes apparent that there are strong links between the general turn towards individual empowerment (discussed in the previous section), participatory models of democracy and an anti-authoritarian stance promoted in civics books particularly after 1998.

Even in pre-1998 reform books wherein citizenship duties were less linked to individual self-realization, involvement in public life was depicted as a guarantor democracy in the form of duty towards fellow human beings (thus reflecting more the value of the collective):

The lack of involvement in current problems of the locality, the country, and the world we live in, only results in the subversion of democracy. It is the ‘sin of not committing’ (…), of passing by facts, people, ideas or suffering with indifference. In our ‘citizen’ lives there are a series of obligations that we must respect. Doing otherwise means losing all [the rights] that people have managed to gain through hardship and collaboration. (Chiriteșcu et al. 1997, 86–87)

In this example, being involved (nota bene: at local, national and global levels) is correlated with explicit obligations deriving from the legally formalized relationship between citizen and state. But interestingly, even if the value of the collectivity remains strong, citizenship obligations are not portrayed as patriotic duties circumscribed exclusively to the national community, as used to be the case in the national socialist paradigm; they simply appear as duties towards others, members of the abstract, universal community of mankind.

This portrayal of active involvement as democratic obligation abstracted from patriotism and national feeling is coupled with a shift in the community of relevance for such involvement. This shift is expressed first in the usage of abstract words to refer to the locus of participation. In a book for an eleventh grade optional civic education course pupils are told that: “democracy presupposes the participation of citizens in the life of society” (Chiriteșcu et al. 2004, 34), without mentioning which society it refers to. In another fifth grade optional book a sense of citizenship duty is portrayed as comprising moral and legal elements including: to help the less fortunate, to be informed about public issues, to take a stand if things go wrong, and to be ready to get involved in the life of the community (Tomoiu et al. 2007, 16). All of these duties refer to fellow human beings, not only compatriots. The community of reference is nowhere defined nor qualified as national.

A second sign of an updated citizenship model is that even though active involvement is presented as a matter of individual choice, it emerges as a taken-for-granted aspect of the everyday lives of pupils. The resulting image is that of a social reality in
which everyone chooses, unconstrained, to be involved. For example, in a book for seventh graders, an exercise asks pupils to “give examples of activities [they] have undertaken for the good of the community where [they] live” (Georgescu & Ștefănescu 2009, 24). This type of wording points to the universal character of local involvement, applying to each student in their lived communities, without allowing for the possibility of non-involvement.

Citizens’ responsibilities towards the state are mentioned too, but these are divorced from national feeling and, most importantly, do not appear as taken-for-granted aspects of everyday life. In an eighth grade book, citizenship duties are presented as legal aspects enshrined in the Constitution correlated with democratic rights, not as patriotic duties leading to national development (Georgescu & Ștefănescu 2008, 42-43). In the same chapter, exercises do not ask pupils about their responsibility towards the country, but about their duties and rights within their local environment: “to what extent do you fulfill your duties towards the community in which you live?” (Georgescu & Ștefănescu 2008, 45). The images and examples used to illustrate a lesson on “Citizen participation and responsibility” are extracted either from the international scene i.e. depicting help offered by civilians after the Kobe earthquake of 1995, or the children’s immediate local environments i.e. depicting a pupils’ council meeting in a school (Georgescu & Ștefănescu 2008, 46-48). In a section about responsibility, the authors give the example of a group of residents deciding to create a common relaxation space on top of their building (Georgescu & Ștefănescu 2008, 47). While drawing examples from the familiar life of pupils also reflects the turn towards student-centred pedagogies, it is noteworthy that the national community is not mentioned in relation to active citizenship. Instead, either an abstract transnational community is depicted, or a highly localized context, such as a neighbourhood or school, side-stepping the national level.

To conclude, active involvement in the community, which could be seen as the communitarian aspect of the citizen ideal, takes two specific shapes in post-1989 civic education. First, the duty to participate in public life is linked to democracy and constitutes the expression of individual freedom towards an abstract public good, rather than as a collective duty towards the socialist order, as used to be the case before 1989. Second, the target of involvement has shifted towards non-nationally bound understandings of ‘community’ to include both local and global levels of action, a point that equally supports the cosmopolitan dimension that I turn to next.

3.3 Global concerns: The cosmopolitan rendition

The shift towards non-nationally bound dimensions of civic involvement is matched by a redefinition of citizenship as increasingly cosmopolitan, decoupled from the national imaginary and concerned with world problems (Soysal & Wong 2006). This development merits particular attention in the Romanian context because it departs strongly from renderings of citizenship from the recent past. Despite projections of international solidarity amongst socialist states (suggestively called “proletarian internationalism”), the ultimate “imagined community” (Anderson 1991) of the socialist period stopped sharply at the national level: “Within the different social formations, humans live in certain forms of community, for example grouped into families, clans, tribes, peoples and nations” (Ardeleanu & Călățeci 1975, 13). Tellingly, all sources cited in pre-1989 textbooks referred to the Program of the Romanian Communist Party, the speeches of Nicolae Ceaușescu, or the code of conduct for Romanian Communist Party members. The existence of monological sources surely reflects the lack of political pluralism during Ceaușescu’s regime; but it also points to two key peculiarities of the “national socialism” promoted during his rule: the equation made between the flourishing of the nation and the efforts of the Romanian Communist Party, and Romanian protochronism, the belief in the superiority of Romanian cultural productions (Verdery 1991, 116-121).

In sharp contrast to the casting of the nation as the ultimate community of belonging for a socialist citizen, the new textbooks are increasingly consonant with post-1945 worldwide developments in educational definitions of the nation, which tend towards a de-glorification of the latter (Schissler, Soysal 2005; Soysal 2002; Soysal & Szakács 2010a). In post-1989 Romanian education, as in the post-war world, the nation has been redefined not only as less heroic or belligerent (Szakács 2011) but also as increasingly inserted within a global frame of reference.

This is already apparent in the pre-reform Civic Culture textbooks. Even though the seventh grade book presents a traditional nation-building narrative in its historical account of the “Formation of the Romanian Nation” (Stefan et al. 1996, 120-123), the only section specifically addressing Romanianness in the 8th grade is, interestingly, located within a chapter on “The Global problems of human kind”, and is titled “Romania’s identity amongst the states of the world” (Chirițescu et al. 1997, 106). Here, identity is deployed as an abstract concept, applying equally amongst world states. Only economic aspects create inequalities. Claims to identity refer to state features abstracted from history and culture, such as geographical and geopolitical position, beauty of landscape, economic or political specificities: “The Romanian lands mean harmony, variety, beauty and considerable resources” (Chirițescu et al. 1997, 107). Such an approach reduces the aura of the nation: its uniqueness is reduced to a specific location and specific political/economic circumstances that hardly resemble the bombastic patriotic language of former times. Romanianness emerges less as a community of feeling based on unified exceptional values and more as an identity referring to a territorial unit with a particular political organization, with its assets and problems, simply a state amongst others."
By contrast, the world emerges as a community endowed with its own will, based on shared values such as human rights, diversity and equality: “Ensuring respect for human rights, the world we live in today wants to be a community; a community of peoples and states that are different in terms of development, customs and ways of life, size and organization” (Chirițescu et al. 1997, 106). In a post-1998 reform seventh grade textbook, the same goal is presented as an accomplished reality: “Despite so many differences, we can talk about a single world, about the existence of an international community, with its own interests and problems” (Nedelcu & Morar 2003, 27). In a fourth grade Civic Education book the international community not only appears as a group of (nation)-states, but also as a community of persons: The totality of people on the continents of the Earth form the international community (Radu 2006, 51). Defining the international community in this way reinstates the principle of personhood and reflects the increasing fragmentation, individualization and uncoupling of the bonds of citizenship from the national principle.

A reframing of the imagined community also emerges implicitly from the means chosen by textbook authors to convey prescribed curricular notions. The personalities used either as bad examples or as role models to illustrate citizenship principles are increasingly non-Romanian. Historical and cultural characters that populate civic textbooks are drawn from the global legacy of mankind rather than from Romanian history or culture alone. Mahatma Ghandi serves as example of the legitimate disobedience of laws, Mother Theresa as an example of solidarity, Richard Nixon as an example of the power of the media, Rosa Parks of courage against all odds, Anne Frank of human tragedy etc. In contrast, Romanian historical heroes are presented less gloriously than ever before18. In a seventh grade book, Vlad Tepes and Alexandru Ioan Cuza, two of the traditional heroes of the Romanian imaginary given their purported role in national independence and unification, are offered as examples of non-democratic rule and censorship of the press. Reference is sporadically made to historical or fictional figures associated to other nations, such as King Arthur, Napoleon, Harry Potter, or Charlie Chaplin suggesting a trend towards populating the world of citizenship with a multi-national set of heroes and villains in addition to the national ones (Lăcătuș 2007, 49-89; Tomoiu et al. 2007, 11; Georgescu & Ştefănescu 2008, 28).

Quotes also started to draw from non-Romanian authors. A fifth grade optional Civic Education textbook opens with a quote from Rudyard Kipling (Tomoiu et al. 2007, 3). Further in the book we find quotes from cultural and scientific personalities from the Anglo-Saxon, French and ancient Greek worlds: Beethoven, Plato, la Rochefoucault, Aristotle, Demosthenes, etc. along with only two Romanians, Nicolae Iorga and Tudor Mușatescu (a historian and a playwright). Similarly, a seventh grade textbook extensively quotes from non-Romanian, internationally recognized texts such as the American Constitution, the French Constitution, the UDHR, or a UNESCO report (all seen as hallmarks of democracy), alongside excerpts from the Romanian Constitution (Nedelcu & Morar 2003). In this way, it becomes apparent that the social world presented to pupils is no longer a purely Romanian one, populated exclusively with Romanian heroes. Romanian youth is presented with global personalities to look up to, reflecting universal principles, such as struggles for peace, justice and equality. Such changes are relevant to the creation of a globalized world of cultural and scientific authority beyond an exclusive sense of belonging.

In such re-imagined world, citizenship is also redefined as post-national. In a seventh grade book the new meaning of citizenship is presented as a contemporary reality: “The content of citizenship has gradually surpassed the aspect of legal belonging to a state, incorporating the rights and liberties based on universal principles, expressed in human rights documents” (Georgescu & Ştefănescu 2009, 10). In the post-national view (Soysal 1994), the citizen ceases to be understood only as a national and is instead defined as a resident of a country; an aspect confirmed by textbook definitions whereby a citizen is “the inhabitant of a state who enjoys political and civil rights”. Citizenship, in turn, is not simply defined as a bond based on cultural or national identity (i.e. an ethno-cultural understanding of nationality), but as a legal relationship: “the political and legal bond between a person and a state” (Chirițescu et al. 1997, 20). This post-national citizen emerging from civics textbooks is concerned with global issues as much as with local ones. The degradation of the environment, natural catastrophes, poverty, the violation of human rights, or war are all portrayed as global problems that each citizen should be concerned with, already in the pre-1998 reform period. For example, under the title “The Global problems of mankind: The world at the end of the twentieth century” the 1997 eighth grade Civic Culture book addresses global inequalities and underdevelopment, third world poverty, famine and violation of basic rights, global migration, war and violence, intolerance and racism, diseases of our century (cancer, and especially AIDS)19. In the same book, environmental concerns and defending the universal right to education of children are described amongst those citizenship duties that all of us should fulfil as part of humanity, interestingly in the same paragraph with national citizenship duties such as military service and the payment of taxes (Chirițescu et al. 1997, 87).

Post-1998 books move from simply presenting global issues as “concerning all of us” (Lăcătuș 2007, 38; Nedelcu & Morar 2003, 27) to encouraging pupils to actively engage with them through debate and critical thinking. In a seventh grade book pupils are asked to “find out what destroys [the ozone layer] and how they could contribute to its protection” (Lăcătuș 2007, 39). In an optional eleventh grade course, pupils are asked to debate whether or not Greenpeace actions to protect the whales are justified in the context of millions of people dying of
hunger in the world (Chiritescu et al. 2004, 111). Even though these examples do not represent a predominant concern in the analyzed textbooks (as most topics are still related to the state and the local community, especially for the core formal curriculum), their growing presence is noteworthy. Pupils are increasingly encouraged to think about, debate and engage with topics that are not of relevance to their country alone, but to the larger world. All of these topics gradually contribute to imagining a community larger than that of the nation.

But this reframing does not only emerge from prescribed content and its illustrations chosen by authors, but also from its packaging. A cosmopolitan redefinition of citizenship transpires from the structural organization of topics within the curricula which construct a multi-level view of society that includes the global level. The syllabus for fourth grade Civic Education from 2005 contains a chapter entitled “The Community” including: the local community, the people, the nation and international community. The syllabus for seventh grade Civic Culture from 1999 onwards similarly organizes the chapter on “Life in society” along sub-chapters on the person, the social being, local community, national community, international community. Finally, the eighth grade syllabus for Civic Culture from 1999 approaches the chapter on “Patriotism” by discussing personal identity as comprising: family, regional, local, national, European layers, and then moving on to patriotism and European integration. The significant point to note is that the nation is not portrayed in isolation, as a single determinant, but in relation with the local and the international communities in a progressive approach, both in topics that are not traditionally linked to the nation (e.g. the individual person) and in more traditional ones (i.e. patriotism as collective value). The cosmopolitan packaging given to portrayals of the nation highlights, as much as the content, the emergent post-national trend in Romanian in civic education.

To conclude, there is solid evidence to suggest that both periods of post-1989 change considered (i.e. before and after the 1998 curricular reform) display certain degrees of convergence with world trends in schooled constructions of citizenship. These scripts involve an increasingly cosmopolitan view of the social and the citizen, as a complement to (not replacement of) the national imaginary. The new citizen reflected by these changes is an expanded actor, empowered at the individual level, expected to act to the benefit of the community and to be concerned about global developments as ways to uphold a universalizing ideal of democracy.

4 Conclusion: Reinterpreting post-socialist change in a world polity key

The most commonly invoked factor to explain challenges to citizenship education in post-socialist states is the weakness of their democracies, socio-economic difficulties or cultural gaps (Georgescu 2000; Tibbitts 1994; Radiukiewicz & Grabowska-Lusinska 2008; Bunescu et al. 1999). These explanations often conflate the failures of citizenship education (as those of democratization) with the post-socialist condition understood in terms of transiology, a model that posits a more or less linear, yet clearly deterministic, transition from point A to point B, or two states of affairs that are known in advance (Wagner 2004). In this paper, I took issue with this dominant view of citizenship education in post-socialist contexts and brought evidence of the changing contents of citizenship teaching since the shift of political regime in Romania to show that the laggardness assumption may be flawed if the global context is to be taken seriously. To this end, I used insights from sociological neo-institutionalism and showed several ways in which an increasingly post-nationalised ideal of citizenship has made its way into Romanian education, despite its refraction into different, arguably contradictory, renditions (liberal, communitarian and cosmopolitan), and despite the complementary persistence of national frames of interpretation (which provide the expected local flavouring to the meanings associated to ‘good citizenship’).

However, it is impossible to conclude this argument without reflecting on the wider significance of these changes and on the context in which they are taking place. As it has been suggested in calls for institutionalist approaches to citizenship education in transformation countries (Zimenkova & Hedtke 2008), educational policy-making is an organisational field undercut by political interests of different kinds; this field is embedded in both internal and external contexts in which a multitude of actors are to be found, each leaving an imprint on the decisions and actions that are being taken, and finally on the end ‘product’ of citizenship education: what is taught and practiced in schools. Amongst the external pressures most often invoked in research on post-socialist countries we find the EU or sometimes Europe more broadly, taken to include the Council of Europe and its manifold initiatives in the field of education for democratic citizenship. It would be thus highly seductive to claim that the Romanian changes in the content of citizenship education presented here are mere window-dressing aimed to emulate a (Western) European model, in a national bid to meet the criteria for acceptance in the select club of Europe - a rather low price to pay, all other things considered²¹. In contrast to this possible interpretation that assumes clear-cut boundaries between actors, interests, and demands, as well as a strong conditionality power of the EU in the area of nationally-controlled educational contents, I wish to put forward a radically different reading of change in connection to Romania’s European aspirations.

The key insight that I propose is not, as most contend, simply that the educational sphere is subject to multiple external pressures from donors or international organizations, such as the World Bank, the EU or the OECD; these indeed often influence the adoption and sometimes to even greater extent the discursive justification of educational policies, the wording of certain curriculum guidelines etc.,
through a myriad of instruments, from data collection to standardisation of tests, the diffusion of best practices through international expert meetings and other so on (Steiner-Khamsi 2004; Grek & Lawn 2009; Robertson 2005; Beech 2009). The key insight I suggest in addition to recognising the external embeddedness of any national system is that the role of such actors (often mistakenly considered as clearly-bounded and interested entities), is much more indirect and diffuse than usually thought. Europe, in this sense, which, as I argue elsewhere (Szakács 2013, 128), constitutes Romania’s ‘significant other’ in terms of its own nation-building project, is not shaping Romanian education directly by purposefully using carrot-and-stick techniques to shape domestic policy-making as it may happen in other policy fields that are Europeanising in a classical “conditionality” reading (Schimmelfennig 2007)\(^2\). Instead, Europe’s powerful influence rests on the legitimacy it holds in the Romanian imaginary and it effectively transmits into the transmission of globally attractive discourses. These discourses are not the exclusive monopoly of Europe, nor of ‘the global’ (centreness as it may be); they are promoted by Europe because in its turn, Europe is also externally embedded in broader frameworks of meaning (one example would be the human rights regime which Europe claims as its own, but has gained global currency in the post-war world with the rise of the UN and has become increasingly abstracted from its Western European origins). Given the lack of clearly specified European-wide policies in the area of citizenship education - with the exception of some programs promoting active and tolerant citizenship that however do not have hard binding power, and do not originate from the European Commission alone, but also from other international bodies such as the Council of Europe, UNICEF or the UNESCO (Hedtke et al. 2008; Pingel 1999; Grek & Lawn 2009; Novoa 2007), it may be difficult, if not impossible, to discern between European and global influences in the promotion of ‘good citizenship’ concepts, not least because such models implying a post-national and cosmopolitanised citizenship have been abstracted from their specific contexts.

How does all of this explain the unlikely emergence of cosmopolitanised citizenship ideals in the Romanian context, a context that has been characterised as a particularly “reluctant democratiser” (Kubicek 2003) and late-comer to the EU? In the World Polity understanding that I am putting forward here, Romania emerged after 1989 from a period of relative isolation from agents of diffusion of world culture - i.e. international organisations, transnational networks, INGO’s, international experts etc., in other words, from the key agents of diffusion of world culture (Boli & Thomas 1999) - and it now slowly aims to reconnect with them. The eagerness of post-socialist countries to become legitimate players on the world stage (and also the European stage in the case of Romania, as shown above) is reflected in the openness of their governments and other domestic stakeholders to promote post-war democratic citizen-ship education ideals and to embrace world-authorised principles of education, such as life-long learning (Jakobi 2011), student-centred pedagogies, individual self-enhancement, universal human rights, active global citizenship etc. The puzzling aspect for students of post-socialism should not be why there are difficulties in realizing such ideals in practice, because, as institutionalist scholarship has shown, these ideals often fail to materialize in consolidated democracies as well. The more interesting question is rather why is it that nation-states promote, through their public education, citizenship models that may seem contradictory to their own raison d’être (e.g. citizens involved in their own self-development and concerned with global issues as much as, or sometimes even more than, they are concerned with promoting national goals). In a World Polity interpretation, these developments are explained by the wide cultural change reflected in the citizenship discourses promoted through education and trans-mitted via transnational networks of experts, European ones included: the post-1945 script of the nationstate which makes it difficult for well-connected states to portray themselves in isolation from others, or to promote exclusive constructions of their identities.

However, it is important not to idealize this state of affairs. What I have highlighted in this paper are the usually overlooked significant changes, but there are also inherent tensions that must be accounted for, recognized and thoroughly researched - even though they fall outside the remit of this paper. Despite the admitted polyphony of voices, interests and stakeholders pushing for citizenship agendas for different reasons and resulting in contradictory outcomes (Rus 2008), one undoubtedly point emerges: the path taken by Romanian education is gradually more consonant with global scripts of citizenship and nationhood which are shifting towards cosmopolitanised versions. The new citizen reflected in the new student-centric education is an empowered, locally involved, socially responsible and globally concerned individual, endowed with personal dignity and human rights who is no longer expected to bow to the exclusive demands of the patria. The pantheon of ‘gods’ to be worshipped has been shrunk and extended at the same time. The new citizen is encouraged to speak out, claim rights and debate freely, in the name of values that have a global reach. Unlike that usually held, post-socialist Romanian education is not lagging behind world developments, nor is it caught in-between two paradigms, but contributes to these very shifts, whilst exhibiting an (unsurprising mixture of citizenship dimensions that resonate with current world constellations of educational ‘best practice’. The novelty illuminated by these findings consists in the combined presence of three dimensions of the citizenship ideal, rather than in their separated consideration as reflective of different times or divergent external influences. These observations invite further questions regarding the case the Romanian education as an instance reflecting wider societal change in relation to individualization and liberalization, empowerment and global awareness, themes that have hardly been seen as correlated before and yet might provide good impetus for a renewal of our concepts.
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Endnotes

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1 Post-war transnational rights include some social and economic rights for non-nationals, but scarcely any political rights if we are to follow T.H. Marshall’s (1950) classical definition.

2 See Hahn (2010) for an overview of citizenship education research grouped according to world region; Fernández and Sundström (2011) for a state of the art report on citizenship education research from a liberal perspective; Neubauer (2012) for a critical review of eight key international civic education comparative studies; and Heeter (2004) for a broad historical account of preoccupations with citizenship education since antiquity to present-day.

3 See for example most of the evaluative studies of post-1989 Romanian education (Mironescu 1988, Bîrzea 1996; Vălcăeanu et al. 2002; Bîrzea and Furtunescu 2003).

4 A note on approval and financing: textbooks are subject to ministerial approval based on curricular guidelines (drawn by a ministry controlled body). Textbook authors often were experts in the field who contributed to the creation of the curriculum, or were involved in civic education programs and transnational networks (such as, for instance, well known Ruth expert, Danmarz Ceausescu). Textbooks from the approved list are then chosen by schools and provided free of charge to pupils by the Education Ministry, at no cost to parents. In particular, after 2000 there has been an increasing trend in the provision of optional civic education courses, often as a result of partnerships between the Ministry and different non-governmental organizations (Rus 2008: 113); as a result, civic education textbooks produced and financed in the context of international or NGO partnerships (so-called gray materials) have mushroomed in the system, but data on their use and reach is currently limited.

5 For instance, sometimes only one textbook was available for a particular discipline and grade. As a consequence, sampling textbooks from one publisher over a full cycle of schooling to ensure consistency of selection criteria through different periods of time was difficult in this study due to the fragmented nature of the market.

6 Cross-national and longitudinal civic education studies conducted as early as 1971 by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) in Western democratic countries have shown that student participation and more participatory pedagogies in the classroom are linked with tolerant youth’s civic attitudes (Tonry-Purta, Schwille 1986).

7 The World Polity perspective has often been criticized for being overly culturalist by considering social actors (the enactors of the scripts) as mere ‘cultural dupes’ leaving them without a trace of effective agency. While fully acknowledging the socially-constructed nature of what is thought of as ‘the modern actor’ and his/her agency, it is not my intention to posit here such a passive view of the actors. Crucially, the World Polity model recognizes the existence of an alternative model of education that can be considered with due care. The socialist ‘alternative’ ultimately ‘invented’ its own distinctiveness and was taken seriously precisely because it did not contradict the world-authorized modern script of education, hailing the same principles of progress and equality lying at the heart of institutionalized education models (Ramírez, Meyer 2002).

8 According to some World Polity authors, the very existence of an alternative model of education should be considered with care. The socialist ‘alternative’ ultimately ‘invented’ its own distinctiveness and was taken seriously precisely because it did not contradict the world-authorized modern script of education, hailing the same principles of progress and equality lying at the heart of institutionalized education models (Ramírez, Meyer 2002).

9 To detailed accounts of prevalent citizenship debates in the 1990s in Kymlicka and Norman (1994); Shafir (1998); and Isin and Turner (2002). For a normative discussion of the connections between citizenship theories and civic education ideals in a liberal democratic context see (Callan 2004). For a comprehensive presentation of classical and contemporary models of democracy cutting across the over-simplified distinction between ‘liberal’ and ‘republican’ notions of citizenship highlighting their philosophical bases leading to developmental vs. protective variants, see Held (2006).

10 All translations from Romanian are my own. Unless otherwise indicated, all italicics are my own.

11 The Pioneers’ organization was the main socialist youth organization for primary and lower secondary pupils before 1989.

12 This was a new discipline for seventh and eighth grades introduced in the early 1990s.

13 In pre-1998 Civic Culture, themes about the individual person were already in place and occupied more than half of curricular time for seventh grade. What is new in 1998 is an extension of such themes in primary school and eighth grade.

14 By traditional national-building narrative I refer to what historian Lucian Boia has described as the Romanian nationalism: unity, continuity and noble origin (Boia 2001).

15 While such descriptions may indeed serve to construct a sense of the national pride, it is important to note that there is nothing glorious about them.

16 A more traditional description of Romanian identity highlighting the positive qualities of the Romanians, its cultural personalities and linguistic distinctiveness has also been shown to exist in this study. However, this short passage is framed (visually and textually) as an example of the picturesque of ‘our country’ amongst other countries in Europe and the world, thus diminishing its importance in the economy of the text.

17 This observation should be understood in context. Nation-centred myths have by no means disappeared from post-1989 education, and most notably from history schoolbooks (Szakács 2007; Murgescu 2004; Duteac Segesten 2011), while the idea of de-mystifying national heroes was met with strong opposition in the post-socialist context. The 1999 textbook scandal testifies (Pavel 2000; Păraianu 2001). But the fact that changes are underway is by no means insignificant, and this is the point I insist on here.

18 AIDS is by far the most relevant topic being allocated three pages as compared to less than half a page for the other disease discussed (cancer). This is explained by the fact that in the 1990s the international community had been sensitized to the large number of AIDS cases amongst Romanian children.

19 This is similar to what Soysal & Szakács (2010b) refer to as the ‘multiscalar approach’ with regard to the French 2008 history geography curriculum.

20 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for making this excellent point and hence occasioning the ensuing discussion.

21 Examples of policy fields that are deemed to respond to a larger or lesser degree to conditionalization criteria in accession countries are the movement of persons (Grabe 2006) or gender equality policies (Chika 2009). However, much of the Europeanisation literature has already distanced itself from simple consequentiality models and increasingly recognizes the role of the cognitive dimension with its emphasis on discourse, identities and the institutionalization of rules, procedures, paradigms, styles, practices, beliefs and norms (Radaelli 2000).
Emilian Colceru
The Impact of Civic Education on the Citizenship of Romanian Youth

Keywords
civic education, Romania, post-communism, youth

This paper discusses the contribution of the public system of citizenship education to the development of civic attitudes of the youth in post-communist Romania. As one of the goals of the state is to create “good citizens”, there is a discipline called Civic culture in the compulsory system of education. However, the fact that the discipline lacks consistency determines young people not to manifest the desired civic attitudes, as shown in public surveys targeted on youth. Therefore, the paper discusses the failure of the state to develop “good citizenship” through citizenship education.

1 Introduction: “good citizenship” acquired through state education

Being “a good citizen” throughout the world is a matter of the relationship between each state and its population (Ricci 2004). State policies are important in determining the quality and features of citizenship. Amongst these policies, most important are those regarding the field of education (Ramirez & Boli 1987).

The quality of citizen is earned when fulfilling a series of conditions, which are well codified by laws (e.g. in Romania, according to law 21/1991, Romanian citizenship is granted by birth, adoption or at request).

There is, nevertheless, a difference between being a simple citizen and being “a good citizen”, as the latter is subjective. There is no law that defines “good citizenship”. This concept varies, as it is an answer to the expectations of the state regarding its citizens. Each state has its own policy regarding its citizens and each state perceives the quality of “good citizen” in a specific manner. It is, thus, obvious that being “a good citizen” varies according to the political regime of each state. For instance, a good citizen in a communist regime is different than a good citizen in a democracy.

The construction of the idea of “good citizen” is made through state policies. Primarily it is made through the system of compulsory education. The system itself is conceived following a model of “educational ideal” that must be applied to the children that grow up to be citizens. Thus, education creates behavioral patterns for the population.

We start from the premise that this certain notion of “good citizenship” is inflicted by the state to the population through the system of public and compulsory education. As it is an ideal followed by the state, it should, in the eyes of the state, determine a desirable behavior of its citizens. This is the type of “good citizenship” that will be discussed throughout the paper.

Citizenship education has become recently a topic of research for academics (see for instance Heater 2004). Various papers discuss the state of this subject in Romania in the context of post-communism (Bunescu et al 1999, Birzea 2002, Freyberg-Inan & Cristescu 2006, Mincu 2009). The contribution of this paper to the general research on the topic is given by the attempt to make a link between the system of citizenship education and sociological surveys in contemporary Romania.

The success of disciplines on civic education can be measured through the attitudes shown by students in sociological surveys (polls of opinion). The hypothesis of this research is that a weak civic education system could be an explanation for the failure of the state to forge a population which shows the required features of “good citizenship”. The paper will attempt to determine if this hypothesis applies in present-day Romania.

2 Being a “good citizen” in communist and post-communist Romania

During the period Romania has been subjected to the communist regime (1948-1989), the goal of the state was to create a “new person”, whose model originates from the Soviet Union. According to the official ideology, the new communist man is interested in constantly improving his own performances, as well as the well-being of society. He is characterized by the will to work (out of pleasure, not out of obligation) and intellectual self-improvement.

With the aid of the propaganda system, people were exposed throughout their life to communist ideology, which was bound to transform them into new persons. Starting with childhood, education system involved children in organizations (such as the Pioneers) in which they received teachings on socialist society. Once involved in the field of work, they became responsible for the fate of Socialist Romania. Their responsibility was put into practice by involvement in mass organizations (Syndicates), even the Party, by collaborating with the structures of direction of the state (Party activist, agent of the political police), by its determination to defend the country in front of external menace (since 1978 there was a high-school subject called Preparing the Youth for Defending the Country – PTAP; adults were integrated in formations of civil defense).

The desired model of citizen was, to the limit, a combination between Pavel Morozov (the adolescent...
who denounced his father) and Alexey Stakhanov (the worker that constantly exceeded production targets). This ideal has never, fortunately, been accomplished.

In fact, the process of social engineering attempted by the communist regime never succeeded, as it only accomplished the forging of a different type of “new person” than the one officially desired. The new person during the communist regime was familiarized with the “double language” (the difference between what is said and what is thought) and did not show a real interest in work or socialist competition.

Nevertheless, despite the extreme cases aforementioned, it must be said that most of the requests of the regime on the population (e.g. keep clean, do not throw garbage on the streets etc.) were simply of common sense. In fact, the “socialist” model of education did not contradict with any other model of education known throughout the world (see Ramirez & Meyer 2002). The difference would be that this model was enforced with a power of coercion that would not be possible after 1989.

The democratic regime that followed gave citizens their rights and liberties (as mentioned by the Constitution of 1991), but also kept some of their duties (Title III, chapter 4 of the Constitution on the Fundamental duties mentions fidelity towards the country, defense of the country, financial contributions and the exercise of rights and liberties with good-will, without violating the rights and liberties of the others).

Living in a democratic society meant the disappearance of the coercion system that dominated throughout the communist regime. This and the lack of a general vision regarding citizenship have created an atmosphere of incertitude regarding the “good citizen” behavior. Communist propaganda which was highly developed and offered people “the right vision” concerning their behavior was left aside, as it was hardly replaced by any vision at all.

In the following sections we will try to analyze the system of compulsory civic education in present-day Romania (section 3) and the civic attitudes of the Romanian youth (section 4) as to understand if there is a determination between the two.

3 Civic education in Romania

Regime change in Romania also favored a change in the approach of civic education, reintegrating Romania to a global trend which meant the passing from nation-based education to a more globalised vision of citizenship (see Shafir & Brysk 2006). The discipline’s study opened to new themes, such as the treatment of human rights from a global perspective (Ramirez & Mayer 2012). This new approach in contents was intended to be complemented by a new approach in the methods of teaching the discipline. The authoritarian approach would be replaced with an egalitarian one, focusing on acquiring skills and competences instead of simple information (Bromley et al. 2011).

The compulsory system of education in Romania includes a discipline called Civic culture, studied in the last two years of junior secondary school (approximately at the age of 12 to 14), one hour / week (it can be extended to two hours / week). According to the curriculum,

“through the discipline Civic culture, civic education of students, initiated in the primary education, is continued and deepened, regarding the practice of a civic behavior in a democratic society, defined through democratic values and principles, through democratic practices and through active citizenship” (Consiliul Național pentru Curriculum 2008, 3).

The Civic culture curriculum is based on a series of values and attitudes that the students should internalize through its study:

“respect towards the dignity and the rights of human, towards the Constitution and laws; tolerance and respect towards persons and groups that support different values, opinions and beliefs; self-confidence and trust in the others; inclination towards dialogue, positive relationships with the others and cooperation; assuming responsibility for his own actions and the responsibilities of all citizens; critical and flexible thinking; equality in front of the law; freedom of expression, of opinions, of conscience: civic involvement in the life of the community, active citizenship” (Consiliul Național pentru Curriculum 2008, 11).

After the study of this discipline, students should acquire a series of competences, such as:

“using the concepts specific to social sciences to organize the demarches of knowing and explaining facts, events, processes from real life; applying the knowledge specific to social sciences in solving problem-situation, as well as in analyzing opportunities for self development; cooperating with the others in solving theoretical and practical problems, within different groups; manifesting an active and responsible social behavior, adequate to a changing social and political climate; participating in decision-making and in resolving community problems” (Consiliul Național pentru Curriculum 2008, 5).

Leaving aside the issue of the wooden language specific to this kind of educational documents, we can see that the intentions of this curriculum are noble. However, the competences required from students after the accomplishment of the study are somehow vague, as they are competences specific to all disciplines of the area Human and society, including history or geography. In fact, it is through the subjects of the discipline and to the practice of the study that we can measure the success rate of studying the discipline.

In 7th grade (ages 12-13), the curriculum proposes three great subjects to be treated. The first one, Life in society, discusses Being a person: uniqueness and dignity of humans; Man as a social being (Group attitudes and interpersonal relationships; Family as a social group; Local, national and international community); Human rights. The longest subject (in term of number of hours dedicated) studied is Political
system in Romania, which covers Modern states and constitutions; The Constitution of Romania, Democratic institutions and practices (Separation of powers, Authorities of the Romanian state). The final subject is Relationship between citizen and state: power of public opinion and force of the individual; it includes Active citizenship and democratic practices (The right to association; Political parties; Civil society, citizen initiatives and NGOs; Elections and voting), Mass-media and public opinion.

The curriculum for the 8th grade (ages 13-14) is more abstract. It deals with a series of principles that are explained to students in five great chapters: Authority, including the relationship between citizens and state authorities; Liberty and responsibility, including the relationship between liberty and the respect for the law, citizen involvement and responsibility; Justice and equality, including Justice as institution of defense and making of right and Equality of chances, equality in front of the law; Property, including The right to property; Public and private property and market economy; Patriotism, including Local, national and European identity and Alterations of patriotism – xenophobia, chauvinism, demagogy.

When looking at these contents, we can observe that the relationship between citizen and state authorities is emphasized. The first subject in the second year of study is entitled Authority, dealing with the right way of relating to the institutions of the state. The second subject reminds students that Liberty comes only with Responsibility. The third chapter is somehow interesting: Justice and Equality are put together as if one of them originates in the other. Finally, at the end of studying Civic culture, students learn how to be patriotic.

Another interesting fact is that some of the issues from the curriculum appear in italics, as to be studied only if the discipline is extended (two hours / week instead of only one hour, which is the average). The choice of these issues that exist in the curriculum but are not to be studied normally speaks for itself. Amongst them, Civil insubordination, Participating of citizens in decision-making, prejudices and stereotypes in the first year of study, Consequences of the lack or excess of authority, juvenile delinquency, Alterations of patriotism in the second year of study.

The textbooks of the discipline (according to the law of education, there can be more than one textbook for the disciplines in a year of study, if they pass the evaluation of the ministry) are generally fair, well designed, containing the subject descriptions, as well as exercises. One of them in particular (Nedelcu & Morar 2005) provides more information, as well as text excerpts, but lacks practical exercises. Another series of manuals (Georgescu & Ştefănescu 2003a, 2003b) emphasizes on practical exercises, but also has more content information. The choice of the authors regarding images is interesting: they have chosen to illustrate the content through caricatures made by Ion Barbu, one of the most appreciated artists in contemporary Romania.

In fact, the real issue to be discussed is whether students are prepared to process this kind of abstract information at such a young age. Some of the issues taught may be too hard to understand or to retain. It is, certainly, beneficent that students are familiarized with these issues at a young age. However, the practice of teaching reveals a generally low interest of students in the discipline. It is regarded as a less important one (together with artistic education, music or technologic education) in contrast with the “highly important disciplines” such as literature, mathematics, history or geography. Another bothering fact regarding the practice of the discipline is that most teachers are either history or social sciences teachers; there aren’t teachers specialized in teaching only Civic culture, which means that their interest in teaching this discipline is also quite low.

One of the most concerning problems of this matter in the educational system in Romania is that there is not such a discipline in theoretical high-school (higher secondary education). Students that follow high-schools are, instead, taught social sciences, such as Logic, Psychology, Economy and Philosophy. Some of the issues discussed previously at the discipline of Civic culture appear, certainly, in the study of social sciences, but not as a coherent, integral set of knowledge. At an age that would be more suitable for a discipline as such, it is inexistent.

History and social sciences teachers attempt to cover this lack of the official curriculum, but they are constrained by their own discipline’s contents. Having studied Civic culture only for two years, at a very young age, students are not familiarized in high-school with the set of knowledge that would allow them to be educated citizens.

It would appear that the case is better in technological high-schools, as there is a discipline, called Civic and entrepreneurial culture in the first two years (9th and 10th grade, at the age of 14 to 16), which has the intention to replace social sciences, not studied in the technological education system. However, this discipline focuses more on economic, rather than civic issues. The contents of the curriculum (Consiliul National pentru Curriculum 2004a, 2004b) include an introduction to social sciences in the first chapter, Individual and society, which includes Relationship between individual and the democratic society; Individual exercising the quality of citizen; Rights and responsibility in society and the discussion on the political system of Romania in the second chapter, Democratic institutions and practices, including Relationship between citizen and governmental institutions/ NGO’s and Electoral system and voting procedure. From the third chapter on, the curriculum focuses on entrepreneurial education: Individual as consumer and entrepreneur, Initiating and maintaining a business, Business ethics, Risks and success in business.

As the discipline’s reason of existence is to give students the basis of social education, the practice of teaching the discipline shows that it hardly accomplishes its goal. The students are more oriented to technological education, this discipline
coming somehow as an unnecessary burden for them. The discipline is taught by social sciences teachers which show less interest in the act of teaching. The situation is somehow similar to lower secondary education, but accentuated by the fact that everybody perceives the discipline as being useless.

It would appear, despite the lacks aforementioned, that the state has fulfilled its “duty” to impose civic education to its young generation. The next section will discuss whether the youth of Romania acquires the civic attitudes desired by the state.

4 Civic attitudes of Romanian youth

In describing student’s perception of citizenship in post-communism we base our research on two studies. The first one was conducted at the request of the Soros foundation and was published in December 2010 under the name Civic and political involvement of youth (Fundatia Soros Romania). The other one was conducted by Institutul de Marketing și Sondaje (Institute for Marketing and Polls, from now on called IMAS) in November – December 2011, on Civic activism and attitudes towards protest amongst Romanian youth (IMAS 2011). Both studies are based on surveys targeting young people (Soros involves high-school students aged 14 to 18, IMAS involves students in high-school and the University) and the results are quite similar.

In both cases students are unsatisfied with Romania: 38% are not proud to be Romanian, as opposed to 10% of the adult population (Fundatia Soros Romania 2010, 10). 74% believe that Romania is going in a wrong direction (IMAS 2011, 27). 26% consider that the democratic system is not good for Romania (as opposed to 16% of the adult population) and 40% would rather Romania be ruled by a military regime, as opposed to only 26% of the adults (Fundatia Soros Romania 2010, 15). The proportion of students that trust a military regime is higher at technological schools (47%) than theoretical high-schools (34%). This could show that the subjects involved in patriotism in civic education are not convincing enough for students. They tend to base their opinion on democracy more on the surrounding environment (media, family and friends) than the disciplines studied in class.

Authoritarian institutions, based on strict hierarchies are more trusted than democratic institutions. According to the IMAS research, students trust the army (65%) and the church (53%). There is a high rate of trust in the European institutions (58%) that could be explained by the recent admission of Romania in the EU. 29% trust the NGOs, 38% the education system, 35% the Police, 30% the justice system and 22% mass-media. The least credited are political institutions: only 5% trust the Presidency, 3% the Government, 2% the Parliament and 2% political parties (IMAS 2011, 27). In the Soros study, the church (52%), the army (59%) and the police (52%) are the most trusted institutions. Half of the respondents (50%) trust the education system and 39% the justice system. The Presidency is trusted by 17%, the Government by 10%, the Parliament by 9% and the political parties by 13% of the respondents. Surprisingly, in this poll mass-media is one of the least trusted: only 14% of the responses trust the press (Fundatia Soros Romania 2010, 24). These results are in total contradiction with the vision promoted by the subjects of the Civic culture discipline, which emphasizes on democratic institutions rather than the army and the church.

Only 19% of the high-school students are very satisfied or satisfied by the functioning of democracy, as opposed to 41% of the adult population (Fundatia Soros Romania 2010, 19). The percent decreases as students grow: if 26% of the students aged 14 are satisfied with democracy, only 13% of the students aged 18 agree. The result is similar when discussing the ancient regime: an average of 38% consider that the communist period was better than the present, but no less than 43% of the students aged 18 (Fundatia Soros Romania 2010, 65). This is another example of the youth’s radicalism as opposed to the subjects they are supposed to be familiarized in school, not only through Civic culture, but also through the discipline of History.

When it comes to civic attitudes and involvement, interest in politics is not necessarily important in being “a good citizen”. The IMAS study has a qualitative component, focused on University students, which reveals the following attitudes: young people do not speak of politics when they socialize, as they avoid confronting their political options; they are more interested in NGO activity that the process of government; they consider that civic involvement does not include a political dimension, with the exception of voting; for them, social activism means mainly charity and environmental actions; their involvement in student organizations is not mainly intended to defend the rights of the students, as it is to promote other kinds of activities; if the students are involved in political parties, this involvement has more of a practical dimension, which does not contribute to developing abilities of civic participation (IMAS 2011, 12-23).

Thus, political dimension seems not to be important in defining civic involvement or the concept of “good citizen” (IMAS 2011, 16). Speaking in percents, 40% of the IMAS respondents could not define the term “civic involvement” (IMAS 2011, 31). As for the Soros study, it notices that, as high-school students grow up, the idea of “good citizen” implies less a political dimension than a social one (Fundatia Soros Romania 2010, 36).

According to the Soros study, for students, a “good citizen” is mostly the one who does not obey the law, for 88% of the respondents (Fundatia Soros Romania 2010, 33). Also, a “good citizen” votes (65%) and is politically informed (55%). For less than half of the respondents, a “good citizen” discusses politics (33%) or involves in politics (21%). Observing the law is crucial in being “a good citizen” for 33% of respondents of the IMAS research. 82% consider that if they were involved in the field of fighting for the human rights they would be “good citizens”.
Nevertheless, only 13% are members of any organization, either NGO or political party (IMAS 2011, 29-37). These results show a vision on “good citizenship” which is more likely inherited from the Communist period (through family and media) than pointed out in present-day schools: being faithful to the country rather than showing concern for politics.

This analysis of these two studies leads to somehow worrying conclusions. Students tend to be more intolerant than grown-ups, as the percentage of those who do not agree with the democratic regime is higher. Their level of intolerance increases in function of two factors: their field of study and their age. Students that attend technological education are more oriented towards an authoritarian regime than students that attend theoretical high-school. Students aged 18 are less satisfied with democracy and tend to regret the communist period (which they did not experience personally) more than students aged 14.

There is a high ratio of intolerance towards minorities, of any kind. Students show adversity to ethnic minorities (especially Roma people, but also Hungarians), to religious minorities (such as Muslims), to sexual minorities (such as homosexuals), to people suffering from AIDS. Reminiscences from the past of the XXth century can be detected: one third of the students show adversity towards the Jews who cannot be found in Romanian society of our days.

The student’s attitude towards citizenship is confused. They cannot define the concept of “good citizen” or “civic involvement”. They perceive “good citizenship” as a feature that obeys the rule of the state (respecting the law, voting). However, they are not interested in being politically involved. We can find here more reminiscence from the communist regime: students do not tend to consider the action of protest as an important feature of citizenship.

There are multiple reasons for these attitudes. Dissatisfaction towards the state of the Romanian society is, certainly, a primary issue and it can lead to civic disengagement (as shown by Snell 2010). At their age, young people tend to be more radical than the grown-ups, which can explain their inclination towards authoritarianism. Reminiscences from the communist period, either translated to them by their parents or simply collected from society, can also explain their lack of interest towards politics. Another explanation comes from the change of the society that young people face (e.g. the informational and technological evolutions, see Lupia and Philpot 2005).

All these issues should have been dealt with in school. The fact that students, just after finishing the study of civic education, express the opinions mentioned above is an indication of the failure of the discipline to inflict the kind of attitudes requested by the curriculum and thus desired by the state. When it comes to the teacher-student relationship, these responses may suggest that teaching civic education does not yet follow the global trend to a student-centered and participatory pedagogy which would determine more tolerant attitudes (as shown by Torney-Purta & Schwille 1986).

5 Conclusions: failure of the state to develop “good citizenship”?

The contradiction between “good citizenship” as outlined by civic education curriculum of the public education and the attitudes shown by young people in sociological surveys originate in more than one determinant. The explanations for this contradiction can be attributed either to 1) society, 2) the state, or 3) public citizenship education.

Most of the studies which have treated civic education and its problems have focused on (1) social factors, such as the post-communist state of transition in terms of mentality, economics or cultural gaps. This paper suggests an explanation of the difference between what is desired and what is acquired focusing mostly on the bad policies of the state in the field of civic education.

Basically, the failure of the state to develop “good citizenship” behaviors to its youth can be credited mostly on (2) the state itself, as it shows a notable difference between theory and practice regarding civic behaviors. Students are subjected to various types of information from society (in media, in the local community, even in school) that outlines the weakness of the state, the same state that demands them to be “good citizens”. The fact that civic education is promoted only verbally from the top generates a rejection of its discourse at the bottom.

The other issue to be taken into consideration is (3) the lack of consistence of the discipline Civic culture. As opposed to the communist period, when students were openly required to obey the rules of the state, civic education in present-day Romania, as shown by the contents of the curriculum, is a mix of requirements to submission (such as submission to state authority) and rules of participatory democracy (such as free speech and civil insubordination). This contradiction makes the discipline less credible and therefore contributes to its failure.

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Endnotes

1 The study’s theoretical premises are based on the 1950 classic work of T.H. Marshall, which separates “citizenship” into three dimensions: civil (the rights necessary for assuring individual liberty), political (the right to participate to the exercise of political power) and social (the whole sphere of rights, from the right to welfare and security to the right to a civilized life) – cf. IMAS 2011, p 16.

2 The study defines “social involvement” as participating to actions in the field of supporting the other citizens (promotion of rights, social volunteering, environmental actions, protest against an incorrect law) and “political involvement” as acquiring information and discussing on political issues, respecting the factors of power, quality of member in a political party and participating to the vote – cf. Mircea Comă, “Bunul cetățean și avatarurile sale” (‘Good Citizen’ and its Avatars), in Fundația Soros România, 2010, p 34.
Helga Zichner

How to grow English Lawn in Moldova? Reflecting on the Reasons to Establish and those to Participate in the Erasmus Mundus Programme of the European Union

Keywords
European Neighbourhood policy, Eastern Partnership, Erasmus Mundus, Moldova, education, citizenship

In the framework of its Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU opens up certain facets of its education policy for members of the educational systems of the direct neighbour countries. Bearing the important role of education for processes of nation building and the related formation of citizens in mind, I analyse the meanings of this extension because the reordering of the relations with the new neighbours after the last enlargement of the EU is one of the main aims of the ENP. In the paper I would like to address this issue from two perspectives: Firstly, I want to take a look at the rhetoric employed in EU documents on internal and external education policy. Drawing on the concept of citizenship and its double role for differentiating between insiders and outsiders of a community and realting individuals to a political community, the question arises what kind of integration the EU intends for formal non-EU citizens by offering them certain opportunities of participation. The thesis is that the attitude towards participants from non-member states remains without a clear “finalité”, reflecting thus one of the overall problems of the ENP. Secondly, I want to look at the level of individual participants in the programme Erasmus Mundus and the meanings their stays abroad have for them. I will show in how far their experiences abroad impact on their daily practices as citizens of their countries1.

1 Introduction

What I will address in this article are some of the perspectives that are underlying the EU’s efforts to (re)build relations with countries outside its external borders, the so called third countries. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) are the core instruments invented by the EU in order to re-frame its relations with countries that are not offered an EU-membership for the time being and education policy is one chapter covered by these political programmes. ENP and EaP are meant to bring these countries in line with European standards in many policy fields and to prevent “new dividing lines” (Commission 2004) between members and non-members of the EU. As this applies also to the domain of education policy my basic question is: how can we interpret the efforts of the European Union to partly open up its education policy to third countries and to the citizens of these countries? How far does the EU take the idea of preventing new dividing lines, if we bear in mind that education policy is still perceived as one of the main instruments nation states have at their disposal in order to make “their” citizens (see e.g. Turner 1994, 159). Education systems are used as a means to make people not only think in terms of a collective entity but to make them “competent members” of this entity according to its values and rules (on competence see Turner 1994, 159; Isin & Wood 1999, 4). Yet, the definition of a group implies the definition of boundaries and with it the definition of outsiders at the same time. Like identity, we can define citizenship as a group marker, the latter having rather legal implications, the former having cultural and social implications (Isin & Wood 1999, 20). The two concepts overlap in that they both relate to or are even based on a sense of belonging (ensemble of belonging, Isin & Wood 1999, 21; see Isin 2008, 37 and Wiener 1993, 211), which in the case of citizenship is complemented by a legal belonging or membership. They overlap also in that both concepts deal with the relation between individuals and some bigger social entity: the individual and the state, the individual and a group. They overlap thirdly, in that both are said to have aspects of status and practice alike (Turner 1994, 159; Isin & Wood 1999, 4; Isin & Nielsen 2008).

As we will see throughout this article education policy on EU level was approached in a similar way as on the national level: it is being perceived as a potential instrument to promote the idea of an (again) collective identity, yet one not limited by national states’ borders but drafted as one that could be integrative to the existing diversity within the space of EU member states.

In order to get into the subject I will in the first part of the paper roughly introduce to the difficult discussions around the development of a common education policy which were difficult precisely because of its implications with the idea of constructing a “European” identity and a “European” citizen(ship). Yet, while the efforts to invent some collective identity on EU scale may be seen as the logical consequence of the progressing integration in other policy fields - with Erasmus being recognized widely as an important milestone in that sense (among others Medrano 2011, 33) - it is not so easy to understand why the EU tries to extend its education policy and with it certain dimensions of the identification offers or patterns towards its formal "outside". While there exists some research on ERASMUS, research dealing with the expansion of the exchange scheme into ERASMUS Mundus by which Higher Education Institutions (HEI) of the EU become much more accessible (and vice versa) to non-EU citizens is very scarce.

What interests me in the second part of the paper is to find out more about the motivation behind the
establishment or the extension of the exchange scheme as one concrete example of how ENP and EaP are put into practice. In order to do so, I will look at how the notions of identity and citizenship are used in EU documents related to the establishment of Erasmus in a first step. I assume that on the political-rhetorical level these notions stand rather for some idealistic imagination or desiderata concerning inhabitants of the union and the development of a society at EU scale presented in a way as the precondition for a prosperous economy. Political rhetoric however has to be distinguished from how these notions are defined and used in scientific debates. With the help of more recent concepts of citizenship I will try to reframe this talk about citizenship, what will enable us to identify certain parallels between the ways EU-citizens are referred to and the ways non-EU citizens are referred to, meaning that at this point I will turn to documents related to the establishment of Erasmus Mundus. Here, I will draw especially on works that focus on the distinctions and overlappings between citizenship and identity (Isin & Wood, 1999) and others that focus on the question of “substance” of EU-citizenship in general (Vink 2004; Wiener 1993).

In the third part of the paper, I will deal with the concrete experiences individuals have had participating in the exchange scheme Erasmus Mundus because these ultimately reveal something about the concrete effects these political approaches unfold on the local level. Thus the idea is to look at how (large scale) EU politics translate into concrete (small scale) practices of individuals, by talking with former participants about their experiences in the exchange programme. Evidently, the EU seeks to influence education policy in these countries on a larger scale than that of the individual, but the question is what kind of local effects we can identify in these countries. In how far do the participants perceive themselves as actors of the intended change? In order to interpret the concrete experiences of individuals (participants in Erasmus Mundus), I will draw on the idea of “acts of citizenship” developed in Isin and Nielsen (2008). Their differentiation between active and activist citizens relates to different patterns of claiming rights or practices as already being citizens (active citizens) who tend to follow established “scripts” (Isin 2008, 38) which remind of the sets of duties common in many citizenship concepts. Active citizens are contrasted to activist citizens as the more creative ones, those who rather interrupt established orders and patterns of doing things, inventing new ways of putting forward claims and thus inventing new forms of citizenship. I will analyse how societal context matters for individuals to realize bits of self-conception gained or altered in another context, coming to some preliminary conclusions about the gap between intentions and practices on the level of individuals that ultimately tell us something about the impact different societal contexts have on the permeability of the (dividing) lines between EU states and their direct neighbours.

2 Europeanizing education policy

“After more than fifty years of institutional construction and legal development, the visionaries of Europe await the sociological proof of a new highly Europeanized population.” (Favell 2008, X)

Traditionally, education policy is seen as one of the core chapters of national politics because it is assumed to be one of the main instruments of citizen formation or to be a means of reproducing national culture. These ideas are bound up with the introduction of a clear distinction between the members and non-members of nation-states and the definition of a certain state-territory. So, not only the nation-state as such but also the concept of the citizen as the legitimate inhabitant of a certain nation state acquired an exclusionary character, among others through compulsory education (Soysal 1994, 17; Hobsbawm 1990, 93) aiming basically at making people aware of belonging to an imagined community (Anderson 1996), or at “attach[ing] all to nation and flag” (Hobsbawm 1990, 91).

Yet, as mentioned above, by defining a “we”, you are defining an “other”, too. Choosing criteria for eligible citizens means that at the same time you define the “outsiders” or “aliens” (Shaw 2007, 20), and this applies to national education systems as well. So on the one hand, we can consider especially primary schools as part of an “increasingly powerful machinery [of states] to communicate with their [the nation states‘; HZ] inhabitants” (Hobsbawm 1990, 91), trying to make them believe in a specific exclusionary vision of the community they are part of. On the other hand, a certain international dimension was present in education from the beginning, too, precisely because national education systems were established as a means to distinguish oneself from others (Lawn & Grek 2012, 19; Anderson 1996, 75 ff., 88ff.).

The implicit dimension of “internationalization” in academic institutions (Jöns 2010, 97) or, referring to our regional focus, “a sense of wider Europe”, is however mostly absent in the narratives of historians of education, who “have tended to produce constructed silos of the national” (Lawn & Grek 2012, 19).

Bearing this in mind and turning to the second half of the 20th century and the then still young European Community, it becomes easy to understand that first attempts from within the relatively young Community structures pointing into the direction of opening up these “silos” (Lawn & Grek 2012, 19), failed. For a long time, education in the sense of primary and secondary education (in contrast to vocational training) represented “a sensitive issue” (Lawn & Grek 2012, 35) if not even a “ taboo” (Corbett 2003, 315; Pépin 2006, 22 and also Jafab 2008, 89) which “should not be part of Community competence” (Corbett 2003, 318). In other words, forms of Europeanization in the sense of institution-building at the European level or any Europe-induced policy changes (Börzel & Risse 2000,
3) in this political domain were not a subject at all, or if they were, it was a peripheral one on the agenda.

The idea of framing education as a domain of Community politics and as something of supranational importance grew only over time. First initiatives from the late 1960s until the mid 1980s are classified rather vaguely as “cooperative” in character (see Corbett 2003, 319 ff. on the “Deal on Cooperation”; Lawn & Grek 2012, 39 f. on “Governing by Cooperation”). The circumscription of what exactly should be the aim of cooperation was again a matter of debate. After in one of the first documents this aim had been defined as “a European model of culture correlating with European integration” (Pépin 2006, 64, cit. Resolution 1971), the expression “European model” had to be removed, reflecting once again “sensitivities in the field of education” (Pépin 2006, 64, Corbett 2003, 322-323 on fights about other wordings).

The institutionalization of education matters progressed and in 1981, education together with vocational training were attached to the same Directorate General, namely that of employment, social affairs and education. Finally, the matter gained more importance on the agenda of European politics (Pépin 2006, 92-93) and was included into the treaty of Amsterdam in 1992. But even after its “enshrinement” (Pépin 2006, 143) into the treaty framework, practically “softer” forms of cooperation continued to characterize the efforts in the field of education. The role of the European level for education matters was perceived as a complementary one, aiming at encouraging nevertheless collaboration.

Despite all this scepticism, the Erasmus programme was established in 1987 after “[e]ighteen months of bitter negotiations” (Pépin 2006, 117: see also Corbett 2003, 324ff.) on the budget and its legal basis. It’s establishment is not only an example of intensified cooperation in the field of education but has to be seen in the light of other processes that were going on at the same time within the Community, processes related to efforts of making people aware of being part of a European Community. From the very onset it was clear that Erasmus (without Mundus!) as a subchapter of the common education and vocational training policies serves two aims: the first aim is economic in character, stressing the necessity to create a labour force fitting the economic needs of a “Europe” that was or is to change more and more into a “Europe of knowledge” (Commission 1997). The second aim is rather cultural and consists in getting “Europe” closer to its citizens or in creating a “People’s Europe and a sense of European citizenship” (Lawn & Grek 2012, 37). My focus will be on this latter aspect, the creation of the idea of a European citizenship as it has been pushed especially from the mid 1970s onward (Lawn & Grek 2012, 37).

Precisely this “sense of citizenship” seems to have played a role when in 1985 two reports were issued by a commission with the title “ad hoc Committee on a People’s Europe” (Adonnino 1985), being part of the “awareness raising” process just mentioned. The starting point for this initiative - according to a member of the Committee (quoted by Shore 1993, 763) - may be traced back to the low turnout of the 1979 European elections, European officials worrying ten years later again about the low interest of the public in European elections (Pépin 2006, 100). So part of the background to initiate Erasmus was a “lack of public awareness” among the citizens in the member states evident in that they were not voting (as a part of following their script), posing ultimately a problem for the political legitimacy or representing a “democratic deficit” (both quotations Shore 1993, 785; similarly Lawn & Grek 2012, 44) of the Community. The answer consisted in inventing a whole strategy, an awareness-raising campaign with the help of a professional public relations company which bore the title “A People’s Europe” (see Shore 1993, 788ff.). And it is exactly the consolidation of the concept of “a people’s Europe” which also Erasmus should contribute (Council Decision on Erasmus 1987, art. 2, v), it was about the “civic rationale of student mobility in the light of creating European citizens” (Papatsiba 2006, 99).

Apart from the development of symbols - known from nation building processes - like flag and anthem, passport, driving licence and number plate, and the introduction of a “Euro-Lottery”, it was stated with reference to the role of institutions of higher education: “University cooperation and mobility in higher education are obviously of paramount importance” (Adonnino 1985, 24). The overall aim was to “make Europe come alive for the Europeans” (Adonnino 1985, 22; see also Wiener 1993, 205). The parallel between the significance of education of citizens in a single nation state with what was tried to initiate on a supra-national scale is obvious (Lawn & Grek 2012, 41 and 43), however, we need to take a closer look at the citizenship discourse on the level of political documents. In the next section, we will put this into perspective with concepts on identity and citizenship from scientific literature, assuming that this will be helpful later in order to unveil argumentative overlappings in documents relating the establishment of Erasmus Mundus in which a different vocabulary is employed.

2 If Erasmus shall contribute to the creation of European citizens, what shall Erasmus Mundus do?

“In May 2004 the European Union acquired not just ten new member states but also several new neighbours.” (Smith 2005, 757)

Erasmus became successful extremely quickly: by the end of the academic year 2008/09, two million students had participated, the aim being to reach 3 million participants in 2013. It is “one of the most successful attempts to touch directly a large public” (Corbett 2003, 325). And if the assumption put forward by King and Ruiz-Gelices (2003, 230) is true that especially young people can be “won” easily as advocates for Community matters, it should be interesting to reflect on the meaning of Erasmus Mundus, too.
We start our analysis by returning shortly to the "A People's Europe" communication (Commission 1988) because it reflects the consensus on thinking about identity issues and the role of education on the European level of that time:

"European identity is the result of centuries of shared history and common cultural and fundamental values. But awareness of it can be strengthened by symbolic action..."

and on the European dimension of education:

"the Ministers adopted a resolution designed to strengthen in young people a sense of European identity and to prepare them to take part in the economic, social and cultural development of the Community" (both quotes Commission 1988, 5 and 15).

Here we find a view on identity as "common heritage" (Wiener 1993, 205), as something that results almost automatically from shared history, where it is of course questionable, what the meaning of shared shall be. It is assumed that this identity already exists, without being adopted sufficiently, so identity appears as something at least latently pre-existing. Exactly at this point, the role of education is brought into the game, namely, to help especially young people to embrace the (pre-existing) identity. All this is intended however not for the sake of the discovery of such an identity only, but because it is regarded as necessary for the general wellbeing or positive development of the Community. It is an appeal to a sense of responsibility for the wellbeing of the context in which the young people are living. What the quotations call for, reminds us of the "competent members" in a community (Turner 1994, 159), but in the framework of the concept of citizenship this competence is often coupled with the legal membership and the social and legal dimension:

"But those who do not possess the civil, political and social rights to exercise such citizenship would be denied to become such a competent and full-fledged member of the polity in the first place. Thus the sociological and politico-legal definitions of citizenship are not mutually exclusive but constitutive." (Isin & Wood 1999, 4)

Obviously, Isin and Wood’s perspective is that of a citizenship “from below” (Turner 1994, 158), people struggling for gaining certain rights, which is in contrast with how it is promoted on EU/EC level: the EC of that time began to promote a cultural and social dimension of citizenship from above (passive citizenship, Turner 1994, 159), with the legal/juridical dimension in terms of a European Citizenship remaining “under construction” until its establishment in the 1992 Maastricht treaty. In the light of concepts of citizenship resting upon the existence of formal citizenship, exactly this element is missing. “[... arguments for active citizenship or deep citizenship [...] presuppose that the status of citizenship already exists.” (Isin & Wood 1999, 19)

I would agree therefore that within Community logics at this stage, the aim was perhaps more about inventing “a unifying myth” (Lawn & Grek 2012, 44) and that efforts were directed much more to the creation of a “feeling of belonging and identity” (Wiener 1993, 204, 207, 211) than the creation or definition of the legal ties of belonging, presupposing that a sense of belonging in terms of identity is also part of the concept of citizenship. The more practical aim of these efforts, however, were not lost out of site: it seems that the strategy was to arouse people’s interest and get them engaged in Community affairs. According to the Communication from the Commission “Towards a Europe of knowledge”, especially the educational area should contribute to the idea of unity: “[it] must encourage a broader-based understanding of citizenship founded on active solidarity and on mutual understanding of the cultural diversities that constitute Europe’s originality and richness” (Commission 1997, 3). An inclusive perspective is emphasised where before exclusive thinking dominated, symbolized ultimately in the lifting of the internal border regime when establishing the Schengen-area (at the cost of restricting the borders with the new neighbours). In difference to the first quotations, now in 1997 we have the European Citizenship (Amsterdam Treaty in 1992), even if it is a status “granted to people who did not really ask for it” (Vink 2004, 26). Still, however, the Commission seems to stick to the cultural/identity issues (diversity, originality, richness) aspect and to the social dimension (solidarity and mutual understanding). So the efforts are still directed towards raising an awareness of community of belonging together, obviously being assumed to be a precondition for reaching the main aims that prove to be primarily economic in character, as we will see immediately.

Turning finally to the decision on establishing the Erasmus programme, we find several (disillusioning) allusions to its economic aims: the programme shall contribute to generate a “pool of graduates with direct experience of intra-Community cooperation” it is meant to be the “basis upon which intensified cooperation in the economic and social sectors can develop at community level” (Council Decision on Erasmus, art. 2, v). So the whole idea can be reformulated as promoting people who would identify themselves and consequently feel responsible for the further development of Community matters, including their role as members of the future workforce on European level. In short: it is about creating “agents of the European integration” (Findlay et al. 2005, 192) or “Eurostars”, described as “the very emblem of the new, de-nationalized Europe that the European Union has enabled” (Favell 2008; Favell & Recchi 2011, 72).

Summing up this sketchy analysis, we can say that in the quoted documents what is alluded to as citizenship resembles more with what Isin and Nielsen call the dimension of “depth” of citizenship (2008, 37), which is but one fragment in their concept, concerning the question of a feeling of
belonging or emotive commitment as Turner puts it (1994, 157). The dimensions of “extent” and “content” (voting, legal status) remain untouched in EU documents, provoking criticism for lack of the political dimension of the understanding (Abelson 2005, 9-10), being qualified even as “political kitsch” (Vink 2004, 24). Clearly, efforts directed at the creation of a “feeling of belonging” antecedent the establishment of the “legal ties of belonging” (Wiener 1993, 211 italics in the original).

The question that arises when we are moving on to the establishment of Erasmus Mundus, is how we can consider the opportunities this programme offers to non-EU citizens in terms of the degree of integration of the participants (the ENP shall be about avoiding new dividing lines, as mentioned already). Wiener hints to the general problem the European Citizenship concept implied once the Berlin Wall came down:

“After Maastricht a new debate unfolded over the gap between politically included and excluded residents – that is, between citizens who had legal ties with the Union and so-called third-country citizens, or individuals who did not have legal ties with the Union but who might have developed a feeling of belonging” (1993, 213).

Is it possible to frame the participation in Erasmus Mundus with what Shaw describes as examples, where “practical benefits of membership of a polity are in some circumstances extended also to those who lack formal citizenship” (2007, 19-20)? Similarly, Soysal is hinting to cases of non-citizen immigrants benefitting in a way from citizens’ rights while participating in education systems (Soysal 2012, 385).

If citizenship is one marker of the border between inside and outside (see Shaw 2007, 20; Wiener 2013) then what can the decision to expand the programme to non-EU citizens tell us about the efforts of the EU to (re)build relationships with (citizens of) neighbouring countries who represent exactly those formal outsiders?

The decision to establish Erasmus Mundus was taken in December 2003 (Decision on Erasmus Mundus 2003), the same year in which the European Security Strategy (ESS 2003) was adopted as a consequence to the perceived risks and dangers in the aftermath of 9/11 and the forthcoming “big bang” enlargement (Schimmelfennig 2009, 17) of the EU in 2004. About half a year later the Strategy Paper on the “European Neighbourhood Policy” was published (Commission 2004): altogether this makes clear that the idea to open Erasmus Mundus for third countries has to be seen in the context of the EU’s efforts to re-order the relations with countries that were to become the “new neighbours” after the eastward enlargement of 2004. The main motivation lay with securing the EU by securing the neighbourhood, so in that sense the premises were quite different from those of Erasmus that was meant as an instrument to foster inner cohesion: “The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states” (ESS, 10). The EU’s efforts to handle its “outside” are framed by different concepts, e.g. extraterritorial engagement, external governance or as Europeanization beyond Europe (see e.g. Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004; Lavenex 2008; Sasse 2008; Korosteleva 2012). Despite theoretical differences, all of them analyse how the EU searches to influence in some way or other the domestic policies of states that for the time being, however, are not to be offered a membership perspective.

Even if education policy does not figure among the top priorities of the ENP, there are several references to it, mostly in connection with people to people contacts, presented not so much as an objective in itself but as being important to achieve overarching goals of the ENP: “An effective means to achieve the ENP’s main objectives is to connect the peoples of the Union and its neighbours […] Thus […] the ENP will promote cultural, educational and more general societal links between the Union and its neighbourhood.” (Commission 2004, 19). So far, Erasmus Mundus is not mentioned explicitly, in other documents we find however that the chapter “contacts between people” translates into the Erasmus Mundus programme in the first place (Commission 2012). Above that, the significance attached to the programme is evident in the fact that the allocated budget for Erasmus Mundus has been doubled in 2012 (Commission 2012, 4).

The overlapping with what is tried with Erasmus lies, I argue, on a level that has to do with the aim of making people identify with a certain idea. In a way, the EU had to think once again or to continue its reflections on what Europe “as a region in world politics” is, similar to the situation in 1989, up to where European basically meant “Western European” (both quotes Wiener 1993, 210). Transposed to yet another scale, the aim of Erasmus Mundus is to help decrease distances between countries in the sense of building closer relations between them:

“The external dimension [of education and training, HZ] famously encapsulated in the Tempus programme and recently extended through Erasmus Mundus, addresses an equally important and distinct set of needs. Cooperation in education and training is a very powerful instrument at the service of strengthening relations with third countries and for fostering mutual understanding between EU countries and those beyond our borders.” (Commission 2004a, 8-9, my italics).

Given the fact that practically this kind of exchange and approximation can be organized ultimately only on the level of individuals, we encounter again also the idea of individuals (participants) becoming something of ambassadors for the EU: “The aim of this programme is [...] to have an impact on the visibility and perception of the European Union around the world, as well as building a capital of goodwill among those who have participated in the programme.” (Decision on Erasmus Mundus
This idea takes a more concrete shape if we look at the obligations formulated for individual participants or scholars: “Contribute […] to the promotion and dissemination of the Erasmus Mundus programme in general […] in their HEI and country of origin” (Commission 2012a, 29). On the level of institutions the task consists even in developing a durable strategy in order to disseminate European and social values (Commission 2012a, 55).

To sum up: On the one hand, there is a difference between the intentions of the two programmes: while the above mentioned emblematic Eurostars emerging ideally from former Erasmus students are standing for the inner-European integration, the bearers of goodwill emerging from those who participate in Erasmus Mundus are to promote the good conditions of the EU HEI and to attest its attractiveness. On the other hand, there are at least two commonalities, one being that the achievement of different goals seems to rest on the same precondition, namely that the target group accepts and adopts what is being said to be European values and to identify with these ideals. A second commonality between the two programmes is that ultimately both refer to the optimisation of the workforce available in the EU, because Erasmus aims at training people familiar with the “European way of things” while Erasmus Mundus tries to attract the best students from third countries (Decision on Erasmus Mundus 2008, (3)).

Yet, the question to be answered in this section is what kind of membership does Erasmus Mundus offer the participants from non-EU countries? Even if they benefit for a certain period of time from their inclusion into the European Area of higher education, we can ask with Shaw whether that “does make […] such persons, in some practical if not formal sense, ‘citizens’” (2007, 19-20).

Given the fact that the participants lack not only the legal status, but that they are in the EU also for comparatively short periods of time (in contrast to a part of the immigrant population from non-EU countries referred to above) and due to the fact, that they benefit only from education systems, to see them as another kind of “partial citizens” (Heater 1999, 131) seems not appropriate.

Despite that we find an appeal to the ideal of equality between EU citizens and other “country nationals”, like in the following quotation: “The Commission shall ensure that no group of EU citizens or third country nationals is excluded or disadvantaged” (Commission 2012a, 5). This appeal however should rather be interpreted as a part of the EU’s strategy to tackle (all kind of) “global challenges”, among others securing the neighbourhood.

Erasmus Mundus altogether has to be considered as a part of the external dimension of the EU education policy in which “soft power” (Nye 2004) is employed in order to initiate domestic reform (Sasse 2008, 295). Programmes facilitating people-to-people contacts are an instrument of “cultural diplomacy”, increasing the attractiveness to partner countries (Commission 2004a, 12), are part of this soft power approach. Participants are being exposed to the environment of an EU country, which results ideally in a process Schimmelfennig calls “transnational socialization” (2009, 8) meaning that individual actors promote “European” values after they have gained some personal experiences: “[…] in the ‘transnational socialization’ mode of governance, the EU may try to persuade these societal actors of its values, norms, or policy ideas.” As Schimmelfennig continues, he makes clear that the transfer of ideas is not finished when somebody returns with a head full of inspiration, but that then these ideas need to be brought home somehow: “Societal actors will then work to disseminate these ideas further domestically.” Indeed, the decisions on Erasmus Mundus (2003 and 2008) both make reference to “the social dimension of higher education” (2003 Art 1 [14], 2008 Art. 1 [11]), mobility allowing for the exchange of experience and understanding of “new cultural and social environments” (2008 Art. 1 [11]). If we interpret Erasmus Mundus as a means to contribute to transnational socialization and if we further accept affiliation to some cultural identity or commit-ment to a set of values (defined as being part of the identity the belonging should be directed to) as one dimension of belonging which can be considered a part of citizenship, then we can reformulate the intention behind the extension of the EU’s education policy to “third states” like this: it is a trial to encourage non-EU citizens to follow its ideals of citizenship and all the associated values (democracy, human rights etc.). Participants as potential bearers of the “capital of goodwill” are invited to learn some of the meanings of European citizenship, or more frankly they are offered to stick to the emotional dimension of one of the fragments of European citizenship: the feeling of belonging (again Wiener 1993, 211) in the cultural sense, with limited opportunities to participate in the educational system of the EU. They are “offered” to associate with the cultural ties, far beyond legal ties (Wiener 1993, 211), but significant from the EU’s perspective of soft power ambitions.

According to the programme scheme, participants are to return home after their stays and this takes us to the last aspect of this section: the moment of returning home means leaving the new environment and going back to the societal, institutional context of origin.

So in terms of citizenship, as a concept which defines a relation between individuals and society or state (Wiener 1993, 199), closely tied to the notion of membership (Bellamy et al. 2006, 2-3), the situation of former Erasmus Mundus participants may turn out to be a bit more complicated due to the fact that they eventually have become part of two different societal contexts. I argue that the question of what they can really make of their eventually new insights from an eventually different culture etc. once back home, depends not only on themselves but also on the societal and political context of their home countries in which, however, they are full citizens. The understanding of how citizens like
students and professors should behave and involve in their home societies and on the political stage, may differ, that is, the “scripts” (Isin 2008, 38) being available for citizens, the idea of the “good citizen” are context-dependent.

In the last section of the paper, we will see in how far the situation of former participants can be described as “dislocated” or more precisely “bifurcated”: on the one hand he or she shall, roughly spoken, accept a certain set of values in consequence of encountering another environment, top down way. On the other hand, he or she shall make a bottom up effort to take these values home and promote them at the interface with institutions in his country of origin. As empirical evidence will show, there are differences at play depending on which side of the interface we look, making it suitable also to differentiate further the concept of the citizen.

3 Being there and coming home – matching and mismatching of citizenship concepts and societal context

"Being there we have enlarged our horizon and coming back it is like we want to change something, to make something better for Moldova." (Student from Moldova, 955-957)

When talking to former participants in Erasmus Mundus, from all participating universities in Moldova, you hardly hear any critical comments about the programme. All the people I talked to appreciated their stays abroad very much. The only aspect some of them remembered as not very satisfying and not very smooth, were the border crossing or entry procedures. After all the above discussion of the emotional aspect of belonging, difficulties like the punctuality of visa issuing, the cumbersomeness and accessability of embassies in general or erroneous controls at airports when arriving or travelling back home relate exactly to the lack of legal ties, the legal status of membership as a mechanism of access or the denial of access to a community and its defined territory.

In order to address their experiences once participants have escaped the border controls, I will come back to the distinction between active and activist citizens introduced in the very beginning. The distinction will prove useful in order to analyse the experiences of some participants in Erasmus Mundus that result from a double or bifurcated interface they are confronted with.

Recalling the underlying intentions leading to the establishment of the programme (attract the best students from outside the EU, turning them into bearers of a “capital of goodwill”), we could call these tasks as a rudimentary “script” for the “good participants” in the exchange scheme of Erasmus Mundus. Those who act accordingly, may be called active citizens (Isin & Nielsen) or perhaps “competent members” (Turner 1994; Isin & Wood 1999) in the very limited understanding I have elaborated above. Active in this sense means to behave in a way that is intended by others presupposing however the active embracement of proposed behavioural patterns, standing insofar in contrast to passivity. Empirical evidence suggests that in some respects the “plan” to employ participants as ambassadors works out quite well while in others it doesn’t. Many professors and coordinators of Erasmus Mundus in Moldova mentioned that the interest of students in Erasmus Mundus is too weak. They described their students as amorphous, immobile, sleepy or as not used to enter into a situation of competition. From their point of view, students were not “active” enough since they were too hesitant to apply. This is not to say that places offered remain vacant, but that they would welcome if more students applied so that really the “best” students would profit from the exchange programme. Talking to students and staff members directly revealed a different perspective. looking at the initial access to the programme or to the conditions of application in the home country, we find typically that while staff members describe the process of application as very smooth, students are confronted with impediments on the level of the programme administration at their home universities. For students, very much depends on the information policy of the universities and furthermore on the competencies of the specific personnel in charge of handling their applications:

“When I applied in 2008 my only problem was that nobody could explain to me how to fill out the documents, where I need to go to have them signed. The coordinator of my university did not help me at all.” (Vlad, student from Moldova, 194-197)

“My wife applied this year and in Mr. Sandu’s [programme director, HZ] office she stayed about an hour listening how much he is fed up with Erasmus Mundus, how much he has to do and so forth. That he does not want to sign anything, that she should go away, a whole hour (…) So that you can write a first recommendation: organize the administration of the programme outside the university, attach it to the office of EU or the delegation, it should be an office of its own independent of the university, because it harms a lot.” (Nicu, student from Moldova, 634-43)

First of all, we have to see that students who apply for an Erasmus Mundus scholarship are ready to engage in a programme not known to them. In contrast to other forms of migration (labour migration especially), educational migration is not that widespread yet and arose also the mistrust of parents who could not believe in the monetary size of the scholarship. Since we talked to participants who were among the first ones from Moldova to leave with Erasmus Mundus, they should be considered pioneers. In that sense, it presupposed a certain degree of courage even, ignoring scepticism of the own family: they can be said to have diverged from conventional paths.

Bearing in mind that Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine participate in the exchange programme only since 2007, the difficulties encountered by Vlad may be
explained by a lack of experience on both sides. Students as well as administrators at that time were inexperienced in a way (the total number of scholarshop for all the three Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine was 231 in the 2008 call). Several staff members mentioned that before Erasmus Mundus the occasions to visit Western countries were extremely limited.

In contrast to that, Nicu’s experience four years later points to a complex of problems that lies beyond the level of personal experience or motivation as it might appear on first sight. Since other students confirmed his experiences in relation to other staff implied in the programme administration, I think that they point to problems that have to do on the one hand with the highly hierarchical relation between students and superiors from teaching and administration staff and that have to do on the other hand with the problem that is in Moldova university personnel in general is overburdened and underpaid. Interpreting the experiences against this background with the help of Isin’s distinction between active and activist citizens, I would like to stress the following: the will to overcome administrative impediments or individual resistance and traditional attitudes, to try to get access to something unusual so far, can be compared to putting forward a claim (e.g. a claim for support in coming to terms with the procedure). It means to make others used to new claims (resulting from obligations the university assumed by concluding a contract with other EU universities), in a situation where access to these opportunities cannot be taken for granted yet, the appendant procedures not being well established in the beginning. A student engaging in getting a new type of scholarship, in need for a certain degree of cooperation from his home university stands in contrast to the general portrait professors had sketched about their students. Obviously, those who get active in that sense, break the usual patterns of students’ behaviour in this specific context, they aspire to something new and in that sense appear as activist citizens.

After leaving the country with the scholarship, everything seems to evolve as the imaginary “script” foresees. Some quotations from the group discussion read like advertisements for the programme. An extreme, yet not unique, example is Bogdan who describes how his value system changed in the course of his scholarship (the dissemination of “European” values is one of the aforementioned aims):

“My stay abroad had a very positive impact on me in the sense that I have learnt there to learn much better than I did before. Aaa, until I left there, I was (...) well coming back I had become much less discriminating.”

Moderator: “Against whom?”

“against everybody, I did not like jews, gypsies, I was a nationalist, there I lived among strangers, and I saw that they are human too and that, in addition I got friends who are advocates in Russia, professors in Belarus, people from the Polish opposition and so forth. When I leave now to another country, I know whom to contact, who can help me for instance, I have friends in Ukraine and Spain alike. I have friends almost in the whole of Europe. That is the main idea for me.” (Bogdan, student form Moldova, 924-930)

Many participants in the discussions, students and staff members alike mentioned that their experiences abroad altered their perceptions about themselves, their country of origin and about their “university life”. Almost everybody saw the scholarship as helpful in order to compensate certain deficits of Moldova’s system of higher education, primarily in some very practical respects: the availability of specific literature, the possibility to learn a foreign language, to be able to see the country you want to study and to establish relations for further collaboration, book exchanges, acquaintance with other teaching methods etc. All this is contained in the metaphor of the enlarged horizon. In addition, especially staff members mention that sometimes they felt like contributing to enlarge the horizons for others, too:

“My doctoral thesis is about the bank sector in Moldova, some interior mechanism of the bank. Yet, I wanted to see what it is like in their banking system, how does this mechanism work there (...). That was what I wanted to see, the tangents. (...) Finally, I did a presentation how these things work in our country, how it looks like, what happens, and what is the current situation. Well, and as my other colleagues said, perhaps we don’t know much about them, but they know even less about us. Somehow, we are still in a black hole. (Laughing))” (Staff member from Moldova 120-127)

If one keeps in mind that in the respective call for applications from 2008 only 52 scholarships have been reserved for applicants from EU countries, being able to apply in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, the imbalance is clear. The idea to promote knowledge about each other, suggesting a reciprocal interest, is difficult to accomplish and the numerical design of the exchange “rates” suggests that the emphasis lies rather on advertising the EU HEI than on learning about the “new neighbours”. In that sense, making non-EU citizens familiar with part of scripts for EU-citizens is much more a priority than achieving a degree of “mutual understanding” as suggested on the rhetorical level.

Finally, many discussants said that after their stay abroad, they wish to change something in Moldova and in some cases they directly copy “good practices” they perceived as such during their scholarship:

“I want to say that recently (...) at our university there was a professor from France. So this professor adventures to chose us in Erasmus for one month (laughing). All was on a very high level, but I coordinated everything. And she asked me how she arrives in our town? And I said,
Mr. Dean, I know how we should receive her. We must go to the airport, receive her there and accompany her to our town, so that she doesn’t get lost on the way, because this is not France, this is not Germany (laughing). (...) Simply, I wanted her to have positive impressions, and I think. Simply, I knew that we should offer her this, I was pleased by the way the welcoming was organized in my host country. (...) And I insisted that it should be pleasant, that she has positive impressions.” (Doctoral Student from Moldova, 778-791)

All these are (small) examples on the level of individuals where the intended effects of Erasmus Mundus come true. Participants use the chance to go abroad and the opportunities offered, almost as in a handbook, adopting or adapting parts of their value systems according to EU models, rethinking their relations to other people in their home country. Clearly, most of them accept the ways the visited HEI functioned as preferable, calling them normatively “the reality” or as one of the staff members put it: “Thank God, there are some people who see how it is normal” (Staff member, 1112-13, my italics). But as we will see in the remaining chapter, limitations may occur when you try to apply certain forms of knowledge gained during Erasmus Mundus stays abroad. Individually, all of the participants have enlarged their personal horizon, but what about sharing these experiences with others, namely, to disseminate what you have acquired in another context within your home context, where you are a full citizen? Above that, the wish to act as equal partners within newly created cross border collaboration networks is not at all easy to realize. At these points, the script often doesn’t work as intended and the main questions are how do the discussants interpret these interruptions and what conclusions do they draw? Addressing the context at home with new ideas proves to be quite a challenge because it implies another concept of citizen which maybe in contrast to established patterns of citizenship in the countries of origin.

Staying with the distinction between “active citizens” who “participate in scenes that are already created” (Isin 2008, 38) and activist citizens engaged in creating the scene, I will point to three examples, which show on the one hand how difficult it is to be creative in a way that really produces an “effect” and that show on the other hand that behavioural patterns or other ideals accepted as good citizenship are not necessarily accepted in other national contexts.

According to Isin, the creativity at play in actions of activist citizens goes hand in hand with questioning, altering or rupturing actual patterns of behaviour (habitus) which is not always welcomed by others. What the following examples will show is that one certain behavioural pattern can be framed either as participation in a scene, as the creation of a new scene or as something in between, depending on the (national) context.

In our group discussions one of our questions was what chances participants in Erasmus Mundus have or see in order to apply knowledge, practices or experiences in general after they had come back to their home institution. Unfortunately, during the students’ discussion, we did not really touch upon this point, so all material is drawn from the discussion with teaching staff members. In their case, there was quite some agreement in several points, which I want to illustrate in the following, some of which reminding slightly of difficulties met by students in the application phase.

First of all, all participating staff members agreed that basically there is no problem to use the concrete scientific knowledge gained abroad in their classes, so transfer of knowledge in this sense goes unproblematic. If however you are changing teaching practices, things start looking differently. One professor had indeed changed her praxis of testing students. In her exams she accepts individual presentations instead of the traditionally written exam, because she thinks that it is essential for her students in their professional life to know how to do a presentation. In fact, written exams are still the only officially accepted form to test students, so that she really breaks a convention:

“I want to say that, okay, I have been to different universities both in Europe and in the US. Basically, I have implemented some teaching methods and methods of evaluation some time ago already, but some of them I apply in...like that... and I think when will somebody come and penalize me because I...

“Yes, that's it”

“I realize, I do the exam not in the form we are to do but in form of a presentation. [...] While here [at our university, HZ], it is obligatory that all get the same identical exam. [...] without paying attention which is the specific of the class, which is the finality of the class, even if everybody is talking about finalities. But you cannot evaluate them all in an absolutely identical way.” (Staff members Moldova, 905-923)

Obviously inspired by several stays abroad, she has changed the way to test her students, so that her practice should be in accordance with the practice in the other contexts she had visited. Interestingly however, her change of practice back home remains effective only on the individual level: she is not trying to establish it on a higher scale, she is not calling for the discussion of the appropriate kind of exams in her discipline at her university. In that sense, she is not putting forward a claim, but simply rupturing her individual practice, seemingly not having suffered any sanctions so far but expecting them should her divergence be discovered one day. It is difficult then to appreciate whether her behaviour corresponds with what activist citizens do according to Isin and Nielsen, because the effect of this divergence or change in practice upon the relation between individuals and society remains a more or less latent, until it will be discovered one day.

As however this staff member has touched upon the subject of “finalities”, the discussion takes an
The last speaker creates a "we" and a "them" group: the stay abroad in EU countries (or the US, see above) represents a commonality, creates similar visions about what would be good as well as similar criticism vis à vis the prevailing system in their home country. So again, personally they have been convinced, they are even ready to correspond to their role as ambassadors and promote some aspects as worth a trial in their own context. So far, the aim of capturing some kind of "emotive commitment" (Turner 1994, see above) among the participants is achieved. This engagement is not very welcomed however and provokes even animosities with colleagues who have not travelled to the EU. The positive impressions cannot easily be made fruitful at home, the critical perception of their colleagues seems even to introduce or fortifying a divide of perceptions between how things work at home and how they work abroad: "...they have seen only Moscow, the same system, eventually Iași [Romania, HZ] and so on, but they do not know the system, for sure they think that what they do here is the centre of the universe, but... it's not" (Staff member, 824-827).

To sum it up, their stays abroad mean to a certain degree also a potential tension with colleagues from within the university administration as well as with colleagues from the teaching staff. While the EU intends to avoid new dividing lines between EU and non-EU countries on a large scale, on the level of Moldovan universities the fact that a part of the staff identifies with certain aspects of how HE can be organized opens a new dividing line among staff members. Commenting on the chances they see for changing the current situation in education in Moldova, their statements are pretty pessimistic. They see a need for comprehensive systematic changes, declaring them however as totally out of their reach, even if at the same time, some say that if not they themselves, nobody will produce these changes.

In conclusion one can say that despite insights in other contexts, despite identification with other ways of organizing HE, despite agreement on common critique and despite an HE environment in Moldova that at least officially is being reformed according to EU standards, it is difficult to effectively put forward new claims with reference to alter established patterns of doing things in HE in Moldova and to become an activist citizen in this sense. To make the interface between individual staff members and a university work according to the model of activist citizenship presupposes a general societal context that is prepared and open to such kind of interventions including the self-perception of citizens as the ones, who are able to initiate change. Individuals coming up with new ideas or suggestions are perceived rather as enemies and perhaps even as alienated. From the point of view of EU external education policy as a means to create positive identification with its models and values, this represents however a success: the intended awareness raising, the building of a capital of goodwill is achieved. For the affected participants this goes hand in hand however with a feeling of alienation and powerlessness when back in the context of origin. Many of them have the feeling that they have the potential to change something but they feel blockaded, so that one could call them blockaded or potential activist citizens.

What then about the possibilities of intensifying contacts made during the stay abroad, in order to not loose the connection at all? Do they feel as
emancipated members in the European space of higher education after their scholarship has ended, able to continue to knit their network, the incipient links between the EU and its new neighbours? The answer is negative. Nor are they able to accept invitations coming from the networks established during their stays abroad, neither do they feel able to invite colleagues from the EU to Moldova because there is no money with which to finance the most basic things for international guests like travel expenses, accommodation, food. Without any “carrot”, they are convinced, nobody will come:

“Cooperation exists but the main problem is finances, because, I think I have six or seven invitations already for conferences. But financially “You cannot accept them

“And to invite them here, again from the financial point of view, the university does not have any accommodation, absolutely nothing, but only because of our beautiful eyes nobody no, you do not want to come here. Nobody comes. On their account.” (Two staff members Moldova, 1469-1474)

To continue to act as “active citizens” according to the ideals formulated in European education policy, to foster the desired mutual relations proves to be difficult in an academic environment that the participants describe as by and large unchanged since the end of Soviet times. Above that, and as banal as it may appear, departing from the traditional paths in Moldovan educational and academic practices and following further the paths they got to know during their stays abroad depends like all fruitful academic travel on a financial backup which is not offered by either side.

4 Conclusions

The idea of European citizenship gained shape in the beginning by debating the need for establishing a European identity, it was about creating a sense of cultural belonging among citizens of the member states hoping that consequently they would be more interested in the political affairs of the Community and in contributing to the economic well-being. While EU-citizenship was established later also as a legal status, we can observe that in the EU’s policies towards its “outside”, towards the neighbouring countries, elements of the early citizenship approach pop up again without adding some kind of legal status. Among others in the framework of Erasmus Mundus, the EU tries to promote a sense of belonging by fostering the “mutual understanding” among EU and non-EU citizens, seeing participants in the exchange scheme as potential bearers of goodwill who will disseminate “European values” in their countries once they have returned and as potential workforce for the EU. As this approach is thought as a potential contribution to the goal of preventing new dividing lines between the EU and its neighbours and as the sense of belonging in terms of culture can be seen with many authors as one dimension of citizenship, the question arouses what exactly shall be the integrative effect of this policy on the level of individuals. Given the fact, that the level of emotive commitment represents but only one part of the dimension of belonging (the other being legal status), that the stays abroad are short and that on the level of whatever status nothing changes for the participants, I decided not to apply the notion of citizen. The remaining question then is what happens in the case that participants indeed develop the intended cultural ties, get convinced of another system, of the ways organizing things differently in education according to some model encountered in the EU? Empirical evidence suggests that in most cases it is difficult to invest or valorize the capital accumulated abroad beyond the individual level. Suggestions to change certain practices are rejected by colleagues, while others change their practices (of teaching) “clandestinely” without telling colleagues, anxious to be “discovered” and sanctioned one day. Furthermore, contacts established during the stay abroad are difficult to maintain and risk to get lost again or to remain isolated if there are no follow-up options neither on the part of the EU nor on the part of Moldova. Coming back home means in many respects to go back to the point of departure. So in the case that the cultural ties of belonging are not substantiated by personal contacts, these will be difficult to keep up and develop.

When belonging (like in citizenship e.g.) says something about the relation between an individual and a bigger community, the intention of Erasmus Mundus can be said to be twofold: firstly, it tries to establish a relation between non-EU citizens and an however existing EU identity/culture/value-system on one side. Secondly, the citizenship fragment of emotive commitment/the feeling of belonging which in the case of many participants indeed emerges or is strengthened during the stay abroad shall be transferred in a disseminating manner into the non-EU context, it shall be put into relation to this context. While the first step is done quite smoothly, experiences of coming back home remind of returning into a “dead end street”, into a context depicted as unchanged since the end of Soviet times. The participants see virtually no chance to contribute to change this situation or to put forward their claims for changes desirable from their point of view. The fact, that the group discussion in which the cited material was generated was the first occasion on which they exchanged their experiences in a bigger circle is telling therefore. The built up capital of goodwill risks to remain isolated instead of connective and with little effect beyond the very limited personal level.
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Endnotes

1 My thanks go to Pawel Karolewski and Timofey Agarin and an anonymous reviewer for their thorough and constructive comments on the first drafts of the paper.

2 I adopt here the perspective as it has been developed in the research project “Within a ring a secure third countries. Regional and local effects of the extraterritorial engagement of the European Union in Belarus, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova”, coordinated by Bettina Bruns at the Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography, see [http://www.ifl-leipzig.de/en/research/project/detail/im_ring_sicherer_nachbarstaaten.html]. The empirical data I will refer to in this article have been generated in the framework of this project. We talked to students and staff who have all participated in Erasmus Mundus in 2008 and 2009. All the quotations are taken from the two discussions in Moldova, organized in March 2012, which were moderated by people from the local context. Interestingly, to organize group discussions in the field of education turned out to be more difficult in Belarus while in Ukraine it was totally impossible. All names and locations have been changed or are omitted.

3 We will see that on European level, education in this sense and vocational training were treated differently from the beginning. Even if in most of the literature, education and vocational training are treated together, they are clearly distinguished as two different aspects, education identified much more or even exclusively as the task of single states, whereas vocational training due to its more obvious economic relevance being identified quite early as a matter of the community.

4 The phase of cooperation lasted roughly from the late 1960s until the mid 1980s.


6 Consisting at that time in the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community.

Jennifer Bruen
Civic Education and Democratic Socialisation: From Passive Subject to Active Citizen in Post-Communist States and Beyond

Keywords
civic education, active citizenship, post-communist, democracy, pedagogy, education, (East-) Germany, Ireland.

Several studies suggest that some post-communist states or regions such as, for example, the former German Democratic Republic engage in a narrower form of civic education in schools which focuses on the transmission of facts. They also indicate that such civic education produces citizens more likely to accept the status quo than to critically analyse and attempt to transform it. This paper posits, however, that this is also the case in the Republic of Ireland, a state with an apparently very different historical background. Attitudinal data from the European/World Values Survey and the European Social Survey is used to investigate this possibility by comparing eastern Germany and the Republic of Ireland on key items relating to attitudes towards politics and society. The results provide tentative support for this notion indicating that attitudes in both eastern Germany and the Republic of Ireland tend towards the compliance end of the compliance-transformation spectrum underlining the importance of broader forms of civic education for democratic socialisation both in post-communist states and more generally.

Einige Forschungsergebnisse zeigen, dass Staaten, die den Kommunismus durchlaufen haben, eine begrenzte Form von Politikunterricht an Schulen durchführen und auf diese Weise Bürger heranziehen, die dazu tendieren, den Status Quo zu akzeptieren anstatt politische Entscheidungen kritisch zu hinterfragen und die Politik aktiv mitzugestalten. Die Möglichkeit, jedoch, dass dies auch in einem Staat mit einem ganz anderen geschichtlichen Hintergrund, wie zum Beispiel die Republik Irland, der Fall sein könnte, wird zur Diskussion gestellt. Mit Hilfe von Daten zu politischen Einstellungen aus der European/World Values Survey und der European Social Survey soll diese Frage untersucht werden. Die Ergebnisse unterstützen zum Teil diese Idee und zeigen, dass Einstellungen in sowohl der früheren Deutschen Demokratischen Republik als auch in der Republik Irland eher eine Tendenz zu Anpassung aufweisen, was die Wichtigkeit der politischen Bildung für demokratische Sozialisation nicht nur in Staaten, die den Kommunismus durchlaufen haben sondern im Allgemeinen betont.

1 Introduction: Broad and narrow forms of civic education

Many researchers are of the view that a continuum exists with regard to the nature of civic education with a broad form located at one end of the continuum and a narrow form at the other (de Weerd, Gemmecke, Rigter, van Rij 2005; Kennelly, Llewellyn 2011; Kerr, Sturman, Schulz, Burge 2010; Neubauer 2012, 89; Wolmuth 2010). A narrow understanding of civic education limits it to the presentation of factual material concerning formal, legal and judicial structures, terms and organisations. Such an approach focuses on the transmission of information on and knowledge of an existing political system, traditions and culture. A broad form of civic education, on the other hand, focuses on equipping the learner with the requisite knowledge and skills needed to reflect on their impact on society as well as on motivating them to critically evaluate existing social and political structures with a view to their transformation.

In terms of citizenship, a narrower form of civic education is associated with the concept of “good citizenship” which suggests passivity, acceptance of the status quo and compliance on the part of the individual. In contrast, a broader form is linked to the concept of “active citizenship” which focuses on the notion of citizens’ responsibility and the potential for societal transformation (Kennelly & Llewellyn 2011). In pedagogical terms, a narrower form of civic education tends to be content led, teacher-centred and in relative terms is considered to be easier to achieve and to assess in formal classroom settings (Kerr et al. 2010). A broader form, in contrast, is process led, learner-centred and is considered more difficult to assess and achieve in practice.

The crystallization and refinement of these different conceptualisations of civic education have been described as a consequence of the process of transition from communism to democracy, and therefore as an element of the era of post-transition (see for example, Chioncel & Jansen 2004; Neubauer 2012, 90) in which, for example, eastern Germany found itself after reunification with western Germany in 1990. For example, some studies suggest that states post transition from communism to democracy are more likely to display features compatible with a narrower form of civic education than are established democracies and are thus more likely to produce more passive citizens. For example, the final report of RE-ETGACE, a large scale study funded by the European Commission in 2003 and designed to study citizenship and governance education in Europe, particularly in Hungary and Romania, argues that “a number of states which have undergone or are still undergoing the process...
of (post-) transition tend to overemphasise the importance of the 'democratic hardware' or legal structures and institutions, while neglecting the importance of the 'democratic software' defined as socio political relations and mechanisms, which is crucial for informed and collective decision making in contemporary states and societies" (Neubauer 2012, 90).

This paper argues, on the other hand, that a tendency to associate narrower forms of civic education with post-communist societies may represent an oversimplification of the current situation. It argues instead that narrower forms of civic education may also be a feature of many so-called "established" democracies, such as, for example, the Republic of Ireland. Ireland was chosen as a point of comparison for this paper in this case, as, as Section 2 indicates, it would not appear to share many similarities with post-communist states and regions in terms of their recent history and its likely impact on predominant forms of civic education in schools and its likely outcomes in terms of democratic socialisation.

In order to provide a context within which to explore this issue further, the focus of the following section is on the nature of civic education in both Eastern Germany and the Republic of Ireland against the backdrop of significant political events which have shaped their respective political landscapes. The third section then uses a combination of attitudinal data and pertinent literature to determine whether the argument that a narrower form of civic education resulting in the education of "good" citizens in terms of passivity, compliance and acceptance of the status quo is prevalent in comparable measure in both eastern Germany and the Republic of Ireland.

2 Civic education in (East-) Germany and the Republic of Ireland in historical context

After the German Revolution of 1918–1919 and its surrender in World War I, the Weimar Republic was established in 1918. With the country in the throes of economic depression and experiencing a loss of confidence in parliamentary democracy, the Nazi party overthrew the democratic system of the Weimar Republic of Germany in 1933 paving the way for the second World War. Following Germany’s defeat in this war, territory not ceded to Poland or the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was divided into four Allied Zones of Occupation according to the London Protocol of September 1944 which was ratified and extended at the Yalta conference of February 1945 (Fritsch-Bournazel 1992, 1, 73-75).

The American, French and British zones were integrated in May 1949 with the inception of the Federal Republic of Germany, known informally as West Germany1, in which democracy was re-established for the first time since the Weimar Republic. In order to provide support for this fledgling democracy, a subject known as civic education or Politische Bildung was established in second level schools in the 11 different states or Länder.

The first chancellor of West Germany, Konrad Adenauer, remained in office until 1963. He secured full alignment with the West as well as membership of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. In addition, Adenauer initiated and supported foundation agreements with France that evolved into the present day European Union and created a foundation for the Franco-German alliance in Europe today.

During this time, the nature of civic education in West German schools was dogged by controversy which further intensified throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The controversy centred primarily around the philosophy that should ideally underpin this subject with at least two state elections focussed on whether the primary objective of civic education should be the transmission of traditions and beliefs to the younger generations or whether it should enable them to "change this world by political means" (Reinhardt 2008, 69), viewpoints which can be perceived as representing the polar extremes of the compliance versus transformation continuum referred to at the beginning of this paper. The former approach, which can be viewed as aligned with the narrower conceptualisation of civic education, was considered to be the more conservative one with some arguing that it tended towards indoctrination into a particular world view and therefore could not be considered true "education for democracy" (Gagel 1994, 178-220, cit., Reinhardt 2008, 69). The latter approach is more closely aligned with a broader view of civic education.

As a result of the ongoing controversy, in 1976, the Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung, the agency responsible for civic education in the state of Baden-Württemberg, set up a working group of key thinkers in the area of civic education and tasked them with the identification of principles which in their view should underpin civic education in West German schools. The group agreed several fundamental principles which together became known as the Beutelsbacher Konsens (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung 2011; Sutor 2002). Three of the key principles are:

1. Students may not be forced in the direction of a particular opinion or point of view (Überwältigungsverbot) and thus prevented from forming their own opinions. In the opinion of the expert group, this is the point at which civic education becomes indoctrination or, in their words ‘Hier genau verläuft nämlich die Grenze zwischen Politischer Bildung und Indoktrination’.

2. Issues which are controversial in society must be treated as such in the classroom.

3. Students should be given the necessary skills to enable them to analyse a political issue both from a macro perspective and in terms of its direct impact on them personally. (own translation)

While respecting the autonomy of the individual states, or Länder, with regard to questions of educational policy, civic education in a reunited Germany, its official policy documents, guidelines
and curricula continue, in theory at least, to be based today on these principles which tend towards the broader end of the civic education continuum.

In parallel, in the Soviet Zone, or East Germany, a communist German state was established on the 7th of October 1949. It declared itself the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and an inseparable component of the socialist community of states (Fritsch-Bournazel 1992, 9). It also became a member of the Warsaw Pact and has been described as one of several satellite states of the then USSR (for example, Erdmann 2005, 314).

The combination of the GDR’s perceived illegitimacy internationally, economic problems, a relatively poorer standard of living and restrictions on travel and freedom of expression enforced by institutions such as the State Security Service, the Staatssicherheitsdienst or Stasi, resulted in 2.7 million East Germans fleeing to West Germany in the 1950s (Funder 2011). Many of those who left the GDR at this time were well-educated, younger people. Frontier barriers were constructed to prevent further emigration. The most prominent of these was the Berlin Wall which was constructed in 1961. Those who attempted to flee across the internal German border after the construction of the Wall risked their lives as East German Border Guards were authorised to use lethal force against escapees, resulting in many deaths.

The principle task assigned to the education system in the GDR was the creation of “socialist personalities” or “fully fledged personalities, knowledgeable on political, special and general scientific matters with a firm class viewpoint and a Marxist-Leninist philosophy of life...” (Schneider 1978, 65). An additional objective was the generation of support for the ruling socialist party, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] (SED).

Review of the teaching plans for civic education classes, known as Staatsbürgerkundeunterricht, in secondary schools in the GDR (for example Lehrplan Staatsbürgerkunde [Teaching Plan Civic education] 1964, Lehrplan Staatsbürgerkunde [Teaching Plan Civic education] 1988) reveals that the central aim of civic education in the GDR corresponded to that of the education system as a whole, i.e. the development and reinforcement of socialist convictions and the teaching of socialist behaviour. This subject dealt directly with basic questions of socialist ideology, politics and morality and as such was a vital instrument in the hands of the SED. Its most important sub-goals included developing a Marxist philosophy of life among students, creating a belief in their minds of the veracity of communist theories and strengthening their loyalty to the GDR. Resista-tance to foreign, particularly western, influences was also to be strengthened. Additional objectives included monitoring and evaluating the political beliefs of students and indirect recruitment for the SED. Thus civic education as a whole appears to have been based on conformity, compliance and an unquestioning commitment to the cause of communism (Klapper 1992, 244).

In the late 1980s, inspired by Mikhail Gorbachov’s notions of Glasnost and Perestroika, a process of democratisation began in the communist states of central and eastern Europe. One of its most dramatic consequences was the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the unification of East and West Germany on the 3rd of October, 1990, as a single, democratic state (see Kirkwood 1991, 7).

Following the collapse of the socialist regime in the GDR and the reunification of East and West Germany on the 3rd of October 1990, civic education in its then form was abolished in eastern Germany and reintroduced as a subject in eastern German schools in March 1990 under several new titles. The-se included Gesellschaftskunde (Saxony), Politische Bildung (Brandenburg) and Sozialkunde (Mecklenburg West Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia). Guidelines were published for this subject by the newly created federal states (Vom Lehrplan zum Rahmenplan 1992: 13, Vorläufige Rahmenrichtlinien Sozialkunde Mecklenburg Vorpommern 1991, 22). These indicated that, in line with the principles of the Beutelsbacher Konsens discussed above, there was to be a movement away from the passive acceptance of given truths. Students were instead to be facilitated in becoming critical, mature citizens capable of independent judgement. In other words, a broader form of civic education was called for.

The guidelines also specified additional aims of civic education in schools, i.e. that students are to be made capable of self-realisation and of bearing responsibility for the consequences of their decisions. They are also to be helped to understand the purpose of social and political structures and to use them correctly, as well as to develop a sense of responsibility which would enable them to recognise their rights, responsibilities and obligations in their democratic society.

The objectives or principles underlying civic education were at this point and indeed continue to be, in theory at least, similar across the whole of the reunited Federal Republic of Germany. They are also similar to those currently in force in the Republic of Ireland, the evolution of which are traced in the remainder of this section.

In 1800, a key date in Irish history, the British and Irish governments passed the Acts of Union establishing The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, effectively placing Ireland under the rule of the British government until the establishment of the Irish Free State over a century later in 1922. The Irish Free State consisted of 26 of the 32 counties on the island of Ireland and existed against the backdrop of the growth of dictatorships in mainland Europe, for example, in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Germany.

In contrast with these states, Ireland remained democratic. However, many elements of Irish society viewed the Free State as a repressive state imposed by Britain at least until the elections and subsequent change of government in 1932 which some consider signalled its more generalised acceptance. (McDonagh 2003; O’Halloran 1984; O’Halpin 1999).

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In 1937 a new Constitution re-established the state as Ireland and it remained neutral throughout World War II and was formally declared a republic in 1949.

In the 1960s, Ireland underwent a major economic change with a series of economic plans produced and free second-level education introduced. The nature of civic education in these second-level schools had been a challenging issue ever since the foundation of the state. This is partly owing to the fact that the vast majority of schools were and continue to be run by the Catholic Church which did not support the development of a school subject devoted to civic education. Instead, it was felt that moral and personal development were best incorporated into the teaching of religion which was and is taught as a separate school subject in the majority of schools.

In 1966, however, a mandatory, but unexamined, secondary school subject was introduced which was taught independently of religion and which was known as Civics. The primary aims of Civics were described as being ‘to inculcate values such as civic responsibility, moral virtue, patriotism, and law abidingness’ (Gleeson & Munnelly 2004, 3). In addition, in a document entitled The Rules and Programme for Teachers, the Department of Education in 1967 described Civics as ‘teaching the young citizen to recognise and obey lawful authority, to help preserve law, order and discipline, to respect private and public right to property and to be ready to defend the national territory should the need arise’ (Gleeson & Munnelly 2003, 3). These guidelines with their emphasis on ‘law-abidingness’ would appear to have directed the subject towards the narrower end of the compliance-transformation continuum referred to in the Introduction to this paper.

In 1973 Ireland sought and gained admission to the European Union. However, global economic problems and conflict within the six northern counties on the island which had remained under British rule, resulted in economic stagnation throughout the 1970s. By the end of this decade, the study of Civics was in decline in Ireland for several reasons. These included a lack of trained teachers and appropriate teaching materials and a perception that it was not as important as other subjects as it was allocated a relatively small amount of class contact time, one 40 minute session per week, and was not formally assessed as part of the examination process (Gleeson & Munnelly, 2004, 4).

A further attempt were made in 1984 to reintroduce civic education in the form of ‘Social and Political Studies’ which, however, met with resistance this time at a political level as the subject was perceived as trespassing on areas traditionally handled by religion and the family and as having a particular agenda, possibly being driven by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, CND (Gleeson & Munnelly 2004, 4).

Internal economic reforms in the late 1980s combined with inward investment from the European Union resulted in Ireland experiencing one of the world’s highest economic growth rates in the late 1990s, a phenomenon which became known as the Celtic Tiger. Real estate prices rose by a factor of between four and ten between 1993 and 2006, in part fuelling the boom. Irish society adopted relatively liberal social policies during this period with the legalisation of divorce, the decriminalisation of homosexuality and the permission of abortion in particular cases. In addition, a series of tribunals investigated alleged malpractices by politicians, the Catholic clergy, judges, hospitals and the police (Gardai).

It was during this period, in 1993, that the National Council for Curriculum and Assessment introduced a pilot programme on Civic, Social and Political Education (CSPE) to Junior Certificate, sat at approximately age 16 in Ireland. CSPE was then introduced as a mandatory subject in the junior cycle in 1997, its first and primary stated aim as stated in the official syllabus (CSPE 2012, 2) is as follows:

1.1 Civic, Social and Political Education aims to prepare students for active participatory citizenship. This is achieved through comprehensive explora-tion of the civic, social and political dimensions of their lives at a time when pupils are developing from dependent children into independent young adults. It should produce knowledgeable pupils who can explore, analyse and evaluate, who are skilled and practised in moral and critical appraisal, and capable of making decisions and judgements through a reflective citizenship, based on human rights and social responsibilities. Such pupils should be better prepared for living in a world where traditional structures and values are being challenged, and where pupils are being confronted with conflicting interests, imperma-nent structures and constant questioning.

Civic education is not currently taught as an independent subject to senior cycle in Ireland something which is currently at the development phase, however, as part of the National Council for Curriculum and Assessment’s review of senior cycle post primary education in Ireland.

3 Attitudes towards socio-political transformation, and approaches to the teaching of civic education in eastern Germany and the Republic of Ireland:

In the introduction to this paper, it was posited that a narrower form of civic education resulting in a more passive, compliant and accepting citizen in political terms which is sometimes associated with post-communist states such as eastern Germany may also find resonance in states with very different backgrounds such as the Republic of Ireland. In this section, attitudinal data from the European/World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Social Survey (ESS) is used in conjunction with relevant reports on teaching practice in civic education to further explore this possibility.
In terms of sourcing relevant attitudinal data, a range of international datasets were considered for this purpose. They include the Civic Education Study of The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, the European/WORLD VALUES SURVEY WVS [www.worldvaluessurvey.org] the European Social Survey ESS (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/), the Eurobarometer studies (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm) and the PISA studies (http://www.oecd.org/pisa). It was decided to focus on the WVS and the ESS for four particular reasons:

Of particular significance was the fact that the two surveys selected contain items directly relevant to the issues at the heart of this paper. As discussed in the introduction, in terms of citizenship, a narrow form of civic education is associated with the concept of “good citizenship” suggesting passivity, acceptance of the status quo and compliance. In contrast, a broader form is linked to the concept of “active citizenship” focusing on the notion of citizens’ individual responsibility and the potential for societal transformation. These attitudinal dispositions were assessed on the basis of the following two items from the World Values Survey:

WVS (1999): If you had to choose, which one of the following would you say is the most important: maintaining order in the nation or giving people more say?

WVS (1999) Would greater respect for authority be a good thing, a bad thing or don’t you mind?

And the following single item from the European Social Survey:

ESS (2002): The importance of doing what you are told and following rules.

Viewed as a whole, these items can be viewed as addressing the opposing notions underlying the potential outcomes of the broader and narrower forms of civic education.

In addition, both of these surveys allow the data from Germany to be analysed separately for eastern and western Germany2. They also allow the findings to be broken down by age with the focus here on the category containing those aged between 15 and 29. In 1999, the majority of those within this age category, i.e. those between the ages of 16 and 23, in eastern Germany would have experienced at least some of the post-1990 programme of civic education when they participated in the survey while in Ireland, those aged between 19 and 24 would have had experience of Civics or CSPE (Section 2). In 2002, 12 years after German reunification and 9 years after the introduction of civic education into Irish schools, all of the respondents aged between 15 and 29 would have had experience of (reformed) civic education within their respective school systems.

Finally, the WVS surveys are conducted by a prestigious network of social scientists who are members of the non-profit World Values Survey Association based at the Institute for Futures Studies (http://www.iffs.se/eng/) in Stockholm in Sweden. The surveys demonstrate a considerable methodological rigour as verified by a research report of the European Commission (De Weerd, Gemmecke, Rigter, van Rij, Coen 2005) which compliments “the extensive procedures that were taken with regard to sampling, the development of instruments and translation, and response rates”. More than 256,000 one-hour face to face interviews have been conducted to date under the auspices of the WVS in 87 different societies with a representative sample of at least 1,000 participants in each country. The ESS is also a multicountry survey, which consistently pursues high standards of academic rigour (Jowell, Roberts, Fitzgerald, Eva 2007) and covers more than 20 countries with the dual purpose of monitoring and interpreting public attitudes and values within Europe and investigating how they interact with European institutions and, secondly, advancing research methodologies associated with crossnational survey research in Europe and beyond.

The responses for the items selected can be summarised as follows (with the percentages in the tables rounded to the nearest decimal place):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/item</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintain order in the nation or giving people more say</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for authority</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table indicates that the majority of those living in eastern Germany prioritise the maintenance of order over giving people more say while the opposite is the case in the Republic of Ireland with the majority prioritising giving more say to the people. The differences here are relatively small however if we consider that in the same survey conducted in the western part of Germany 41.3% of respondents aged between 15 and 29 prioritised giving people more say while 26.8% felt that the maintenance of order in the nation was of greater importance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/item</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater respect for authority would be a good thing</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The responses for the items selected can be summarised as follows (with the percentages in the tables rounded to the nearest decimal place):
The Republic of Ireland tends more strongly away from transformation according to the data presented above (Table 2). At almost 69%, more than two thirds of those questioned feel that “greater respect for authority would be a good thing” compared with just over 44% of respondents aged between 15 and 29 in the five new states of eastern Germany, i.e. the former GDR.

Table 3: Importance of doing what you are told and following rules (ESS 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Eastern Germany (%)</th>
<th>Republic of Ireland (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very much like me</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Like me</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat like me</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A little like me</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not like me</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not like me at all</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can see from this table that a greater number of the respondents in the Republic of Ireland felt that “doing what you are told and following the rules” was a good description of their attitudes to a greater extent than reported by the same age-group in eastern Germany. For example, if you conflate the scale into “for” and “against”, with three levels of agreement/disagreement per category, 45% of eastern Germans feel this description applies to them while 56% of the Irish respondents reported feeling this way.

Thus, the information contained in the above tables suggest that the participants in eastern Germany and the Republic of Ireland are relatively evenly split regarding the prioritisation of the maintenance of order in their nations and the giving of more say to their people with eastern Germans tending to favour slightly the maintenance of order and the Irish favouring the giving of greater say to the population. Respondents aged between 15 and 29 in the Republic of Ireland, however, displayed considerably more support for increased respect for authority than did eastern Germans and for the related concept of obedience and respect for rules.

Experience of civic education within the school system is of course only one of many factors which could potentially influence attitudes towards politics and society, in general, and position on the compliance-transformation spectrum in particular, although it has been argued that it is potentially a key influence (Torney-Purta et al., 1999) if not the most important factor (Simon & Merrill, 1998 in Wiseman et al., 2011, 564). In addition, trends and comparisons concerning such attitudes can at least be used to consider the extent to which civic education is achieving its own objectives. As we saw in Section 2, these objectives are similar in Ireland and eastern Germany with a focus the facilitation of “active, participatory citizenship” and the education of critical, mature, autonomous citizens who are aware of and capable of fulfilling their obligations towards society. Thus, the data presented here could be interpreted as indicating that a narrower form of civic education may be continuing to play a role in both eastern Germany and the Republic of Ireland.

This interpretation of the attitudinal data is supported by several studies which have investigated classroom practice in civic education both in Ireland and eastern Germany. For example, Bruen (forthcoming) in a study of the aims, content, teaching methodologies and assessment criteria employed for civic education in second level schools in two of the five new eastern German states in 1995 concluded that the focus in terms of teaching methodology and assessment criteria continued to be on the transmission of declarative knowledge and factual information. Similarly, Kötters-König (2001) reporting on a study conducted in the eastern German state of Sachsen-Anhalt involving 1,400 pupils concluded that classroom practice in civic education was dominated by teacher-centred approaches and a focus on the delivery of factual material by the teacher (for similar findings, see also Shiele, 1998).

In Ireland, a recent study conducted by the Institute for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), the International Civic and Citizenship Study (ICCS) reports that Irish teachers of civic education made relatively little use of learner-centred teaching. In addition, the ICCS findings for Ireland also report that examination questions for civic education focus to a greater extent on the recall of knowledge than on reasoning or analytic processes (Cosgrove et al., 2011, xv). Similarly, Bryan and Bracken (2011, 39) report that active learning methods are “likely to be avoided or watered down” in the civic education classroom in Ireland while Phelan (2001, 584) expressed the view that teachers of civic education in Ireland are not equipped with the requisite knowledge and pedagogical tools which would enable them to resist rather than comply with “existing patterns and structures of teaching, schooling and society”.

4 Concluding remarks

In conclusion, the attitudinal items from the WVS and the ESS presented in Section 3 indicate a similar tendency towards the compliance end of the compliance-transformation spectrum in both Ireland and eastern Germany, a finding which studies indicate may point to a narrower form of civic education in schools. This assertion is supported by studies on civic education in schools in both regions/states which suggest a tendency towards narrower forms of civic education on the civic education spectrum.

The existence of a narrower form of civic education in schools in the Republic of Ireland and eastern Germany appears in spite of the fact that, as Section 2 indicates, the Republic of Ireland and eastern Germany would not appear to share many commonalities in terms of the recent political history that are likely to impact on the nature of civic education in schools and its outcomes.

Thus, it would appear that a narrower form of civic education is not necessarily the remit of the post-communist region considered by this paper, i.e. eastern Germany. It is also to be found in the Republic of Ireland. Therefore, the suggestion that ‘post-communist’ equates with a narrower form of
civic education resulting in passive, compliant citizens while “established” democracy automatically equate with a broader form of civic education resulting in more politically engaged citizens is not supported. In reality, the situation is considerably more complex and attempts to classify states and regions, for example, as “emerging” and “established” democracies and to draw conclusions, for example, concerning civic education in the school system and its outcomes in these states and regions must be made with considerable caution.

Finally, if we assume that a movement in the direction of the broader end of the civic education continuum referred to in the introduction to this paper is desirable in order to ensure greater participation in and engagement with political processes, it would appear that there is a need for further reform of civic education in schools in both Ireland and eastern Germany and in all likelihood and, as indicated by the larger scale studies referred to in the previous section, more generally. In particular, there would appear to be a need for the support and facilitation of broader forms of civic education in schools with a concomitant move in the direction of more learner centred, process-led approaches to teaching and learning in this subject. This has undoubtedly far reaching implications particularly in the area of curriculum design, materials development, approaches to assessment, as well as initial teacher education and continuing professional development, areas beyond the scope of this paper but which could fruitfully and in all likelihood will form the basis for much future research.

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Endnotes

1 The terms East Germany and West Germany are used in this paper 
to refer to the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic 
of Germany prior to German Unification in 1990. The terms eastern 
Germany and western Germany refer to these two regions respectively 
prior 1990.

2 This is not facilitated in the WVS online analysis for its later 
waves. In addition, the 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 versions of the ESS 
do not permit the responses for the item of interest here to be broken 
down by age.
Stanisław Konopacki
Postcommunist Citizens in Integrated Europe

Keywords
European citizenship, European identity, enlargement, Central and Eastern Europe, free movement of persons

The main aim of this paper is to demonstrate the limits of European citizenship and European collective identity in the context of the latest enlargements of the EU, i.e. the accession of postcommunist countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 and 2007. The introduction of transitional periods for the free movement of persons with regard to the 'new European citizens', as well as the deportation of Roma from France in 2010, demonstrate that something is amiss with the concept of EU citizenship and the 'European identity' which would permit such practices. It is a fear of the Other as an essential element of European identity. The paper concludes by drawing on the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, examining the prospects that they open up for thinking differently about European identity.

1 "Good Citizenship" acquired through state education

The concept of citizenship and the means of its implementation and realization provide interesting and important insights into the very nature of any political community. How an individual is treated by the community she/he belongs to, and what his/her rights and obligations are, reveal a lot about the character of the society in question. Therefore, citizenship is a useful hallmark and instrument of assessment of a particular political community, because the quality of a community depends on how it treats its weakest part – an individual. Furthermore, at least according to the Western political tradition, with its roots in Aristotelian thought, individuals constitute the essence of a community. The author of Politics argued that the "prosperity and happiness of a state is equal to the happiness of each individual..." (Aristotle 1980, 230, 243). This explains why the meaning of the proper name Athens was in fact used to denote Athenians as a group name for the individuals comprising the foundations of a community (Manville 1990, 7). Individuals, conceived in a political context, formed a specific type of a community/polity.

Another crucial feature of democratic citizenship, rooted in the Greek tradition, is the rule of isonomy – equality of rights for all citizens. Not all the inhabitants of the Greek polis were equal, as women, children, foreigners etc. were excluded from citizenship. However, if you were a citizen you were entitled to equal rights. In this light, a fundamental attribute of the Greek polis was the freedom of all citizens. According to Hannah Arendt, the Greek freedom included: status of a free man, personal inviolability, freedom of economic activity, right of unrestricted movement (Arendt 1988, 12).

Thus, citizenship is an expression of the collective identity of the polity it encapsulates in political terms. In other words, the conditions necessary for the acquirement of citizenship, and the rights and duties associated with it, are derivative of the identity of the community the citizens belong to. In this context, our European Union citizenship is in a sense an expression of the European collective identity which has developed throughout history. At the abstract level the interrelationship between citizenship and collective identity is an even more complex issue. Some scholars convincingly argue that in fact we face a three-tiered link between collective identity and citizenship (Karolewski 2010, 21). Firstly, collective identity enables the construction of citizenship and the non-face-to-face interactions governed by citizenship. Secondly, collective identity is a function of the adopted model of citizenship, and thirdly, the notion of citizenship as belonging to a political community implicates a normative claim of collective identity (ibidem, 22).

In order to simplify and elucidate the complex phenomenon we might argue that in our context Union citizenship results from European identity and is to create and shape a European Union identity. As Dora Kostakopoulou points it out

“European citizenship constituted a unique experiment for stretching social and political bonds beyond national boundaries and for creating a political community in which diverse peoples become associates in a collective experience and institutional designers” (Kostakopoulou 2007, 623).

Seen in this light, Union citizenship is to provide conditions for greater political participation in various normative systems beyond the nation state, conditions that are to limit marginalization and discrimination (Lister & Pia 2008, 163). In this paper however we focus on the link between European Union citizenship and European identity.

The departure point of our considerations comes from a conviction that the victory of Solidarity and collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989 had a crucial significance for all of Europe, and especially for the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe (CEECs). In the new situation they could launch the realisation of their everlasting dream involving liberalisation and a “return to Europe”. In other words, the other words the inhabitants of the former communist countries hoped to become equal citizens of the integrated Europe.

There is a significant coincidence in the fact that the CEECs began their accession process to the EU at the very moment when the idea of European Union citizenship was introduced into European law by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. It also should be emphasised that one of most important chapters of the accession negotiations with the EU included the free movement of persons, which – by the way – was mentioned as the very first right envisaged within EU citizenship. Indeed, the right to move freely is a fundamental freedom of the internal market and an essential political element of the rights linked to the status of EU citizenship. Sergio Carrera is right in arguing that

“If free movement was first conceived as a purely economic phenomenon, the TEU provided a brand new political and social meaning to the whole debate. It also extended in Art. 12 the rights of exit, entry and residence to all nationals of the member states without any discrimination on grounds of nationality” (Carrera 2004, 2).

Furthermore, the right to free movement and residence within the territory of the Union is a precondition for the exercise of the other basic rights conferred by European Community (EC) law, including the right to participate in local and European elections in one’s place of residence, consular and diplomatic assistance while being in third countries, etc. The exercise of these rights is only possible when the person involved moves across borders.

2 New citizens of the European Union

According to the Accession Treaty, signed between the European Union and the ten new member states that joined the Community in 2004, a transitional period with a maximum of seven years (using a 2+3+2 system) was imposed, during which Community law relating to the free movement of persons, which – by the way – was mentioned as the very first right envisaged within EU citizenship. Indeed, the right to move freely is a fundamental freedom of the internal market and an essential political element of the rights linked to the status of EU citizenship. Sergio Carrera is right in arguing that

“This was proven two years later by the European Commission Report (Report on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements set out in 2003, 2006), which showed that, contrary to expectations, workers’ mobility from the new member states to the EU-15 had mostly positive effects and was, in most countries, less significant than foreseen. Moreover, workers from the CEECs contributed to relieving labour shortages and to better economic performance of the EU as a whole. The UK, Ireland and Sweden, which did not introduce restrictions, identified high economic growth, a decrease in unemployment, and a rise of employment as a result of the opening of their labour markets. For the EU as a whole, the flows of workers were rather limited.

Thus, the introduction of transitional periods was neither legitimate nor rationally founded. Moreover, the restrictions imposed on the new members were in contradiction to the very foundations of the internal market, which is based on the free movement of goods, capital, services and people. Additionally, they were contrary to the goals of the European Union adopted by the European Council during IGC 1996, which declared its intention to build a more democratic and “ever closer Union of citizens”. It would be difficult to justify these restrictions with the stated programme of bringing the Union closer to its citizens. And finally, the exclusion of the new members from the labour markets of the majority of the EU-15 states was against the fundamental European values. According to Vaclav Havel: “there are some values which can be subjected neither to the interest of a state nor to the economy. Among them are: equality and dignity of all citizens” (Havel 1996, 2). In other words, human and citizen rights come first, not be subordinated to interests of economy and community.

When Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in January 2007, a similar period of work restrictions up to seven years was also included in their Accession Treaty. While the majority of EU countries have since lifted the restrictions, the UK in this case is among the eight countries that still require Bulgarian and Romanian citizens to have a work permit, the others being Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and the Netherlands.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that the right of free movement of persons (Art. 21 TFEU) is also subject to limitations and conditions which, while not mentioned in the Treaty, are contained in the secondary legislation which was adopted to give effect to the Treaty. The introduction of European citizenship was associated with the adoption of specific secondary legislation which referred to it. Therefore the existing community legislation governs the realisation of the right of free movement. In particular, reference should be made to three directives, adopted by the Council in 1980 and 1993. These directives, providing rights of residence for retired persons (Directive 90/364); students (Directive 93/96); and persons who have...
ceased economic activity (Directive 90/365) state that these groups of EU citizens, in order to enjoy freedom of movement, have to possess sufficient subsistence resources and proper health insurance. These regulations are meant to ensure that these groups of people and their families will not become a financial burden on the social system of the host member state. The ‘sufficient resources’ may be higher than the level at which the host member state grants social assistance to its own nationals, or higher than the level of minimum pension. As a result, those member states which offer more generous social assistance in comparison to others ‘will be able to exclude nationals who, although above the subsistence minimum in their country of origin, still possess fewer resources than the social assistance minimum in the state in which they wish to apply for residence’. These three documents have been dubbed the ‘playboys’ directives’. Thus contrary to the reasoning of the Court of Justice given below, each member state ultimately determines the scope of EU citizens eligibility to the free movement provisions. These practices are the result of a policy aimed at protecting public funds and preventing citizens of another member state from being a burden on a member state’s national welfare system.

The conditions envisaged in the Directive 93/96 are not legitimate in the light of the case-law referring to the free movement of students. According to the Court of Justice, equal treatment concerning access to vocational training applies not only to the conditions imposed by educational institutions, but to any regulation affecting exercise of the right of free movement. The Court held that denial of a student’s a right to reside in a particular member state would have the effect of denying them a right to vocational training on equal basis, which is in violation of EC law. As the Raulin case shows, a citizen of a member state accepted for enrolment in a vocational training programme in another member state automatically enjoys the right to reside in that member state for the period of the programme.

While the conditions delineated with respect to ‘sufficient resources and medical insurance’ protect the interests of the member states, in practice they violate the principle of equal treatment of European citizens. The content of the directives is thus contrary to the Commission’s claims that the introduction of European citizenship was aimed at improving the right of residence. In practice, without sufficient subsistence resources and proper medical insurance there is no right of residence, and without a right of residence there is no access to vocational training. An EU citizen without sufficient resources one still be an EU citizen, but he/she will not be able to go to another member state and enjoy the other rights resulting from Union citizenship.

3 Modern exclusion in Europe

The situations described above, concerning the accession conditions of the citizens of the new member states, not to mention economically inactive EU citizens and Third Country Nationals (TCN), lead us to the conclusion that there is something amiss in the theory and practice of a European Union citizenship which allows for such discrimination.

The key argument of this paper is the statement that the exclusion of some groups of Union citizens from enjoyment of the very basic right envisaged within Union citizenship is an expression of a crisis of European identity. If we examine the situations very carefully, we can observe that Europe has a serious problem with encounters with the ‘Other’, which constitutes one of the main challenges Europe faces at the turn of the 21st century. In other words, the old continent is not so open to Otherwise, and this Western enclosure is a very fundamental feature of European modern political identity. Western rationality, as well as Western social practice, have been developing in the direction of exclusion, fear, limitation, egoism, and drawing a borderline between itself and the ‘Other’.

This attitude towards otherwise is manifested in acts of mass internment - that is, in the application of a series of measures which impose the duty of work on all those who are unable to earn their living. According to Foucault, internment – i.e. enclosure of otherwise - derives from the imperative of work (Foucault 1993, 68). The aim is to solve the problems of ‘beggary and laziness as the sources of confusion’. Hence it can be seen that the establishment of shelters, asylum houses, hospitals or reformatories as a means of elimination - exclusion of the ‘inconvenient’ and the ‘non-conforming’ - has been clearly based on an economic rationale. This practice has provided the tools for controlling wages in the event of demands for wage increases, and it additionally has enabled the ‘liquidation’ of unemployment and/or concealment of its negative consequences. According to Foucault:

"The economic and moral postulate of internment was formulated as a result of certain working experience. In the classical world, the demarcation line between work and idleness was running along the great exclusion of lepers. Instead of leper colonies shelters were built (...) Reference was made to the old rite of excommunication but in the field of production and trade." (ibidem, 76).

By means of segregation the modern world has tried to eliminate all those deemed to be “asocial”, in one way or another, in relation to the entire social order. The author of ‘Discipline and punish’ notes that there is a similarity between the eighteenth-century internees and the today's mass internment of non-conforming individuals - both the former and the latter were created in the original act of segregation. Since the mid-seventeenth century any person banished from society becomes a prime candidate for a future dweller and inmate in all kinds of prisons, hospitals, shelters and asylums. He or she is the object of the same gesture of dismissal which was once used to get rid of lepers. Moreover, that gesture has created the ‘asocial’ and the ‘non-conforming’ categories - it ‘produced the Stranger where he could hardly be sensed; tore the thread apart, broke the familiarity link (...) In one word, that gesture was the cause of alienation’ (ibidem, 85).
The big closure - as defined by Foucault - has played not only a negative and excluding role, but first and foremost it has had a profound impact on mobilisation and organisation. Thanks to the exclusion of others, dismissed as the 'unreasonable', the world becomes more rational, orderly and uniform. However, it is overlooked that the presence of the 'asocial, the useless', actually allows for organising the entire society in a more functional way. Just as for Descartes the presence of the unreasonable sphere of madness, dreams, delusions allowed for reinforcing the clarity of Truth itself, similarly the existence of the Other, strangers in the social sphere, constitutes an excellent reservoir of sense. The implications of this truth were already perceived in nineteenth century capitalism, for which the armies of the unemployed - thrown outside the margins of the society - were one of the sources of coherence and efficiency of the production process. The presence of the unemployed was a perfect motivating factor that mobilised all those who did not want to find themselves in a similar situation with respect to work.

Foucault's philosophy attempts to unveil the history of reason, which in modern times assumes the shape of scientific knowledge, technology, production, and political organisation (Foucault 1988, 25). The rationality, its logos, involves the unceasing act of self-confirmation through exclusion, self-limitation, and drawing a borderline between oneself and the other.

According to Zygmunt Bauman, at a certain point in history the Other meant Jews, whose exclusion was a part of the Christian identity. 'The concept of a Jew,' says the author of Modernity and the Holocaust, 'provided an important lesson that the alternative to the existing order was not another order but only chaos and destruction.' (Bauman 1992, 69). At the end of the seventeenth century the segregation of Jews was a manifestation of fear of contamination of Europe; repressions against them and against other minorities became a major factor of European modern times. In Delanty's opinion, it is likely that the Reformation-driven split within Christianity's bosom was planned in order to find scapegoats - with Jews and women constituting a perfect fit. The author of Inventing Europe claims that this could 'explain the great exodus of Jews from Central Europe and the increasing witch-hunts which accompanied the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Following the ultimate retreat of the Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula, Europe was liberated from its external enemy, therefore the role of the victim - the European "Other" - was assigned to an internal enemy: Jews.' (Delanty 1999, 61).

The East, brought to life by Western reason, was perceived as both the borderline and baseline of the West, and hence it also became the 'Other'. According to Foucault 'the East constitutes one of the divisions within the universality of the Western ratio: The East, thought to be the origin, the bewildering source of nostalgias and promises of return. The East, given away to the colonizing reason of the West and at the same time somehow forbidding - as it will always be the borderline, the nights of beginnings that gave rise to the West - the West which drew a demarcation line within it. The East will be everything which the West is not, although it still has to search for its primary truth there.' (Foucault 1993, 137).

Also, Delanty argues that the 'historical awareness' of Western Europe was shaped under the influence of three sources of threats: Muslims, Jews and Slavs. Similarly as in the case of Muslims and Jews, Slavs were considered by Western Europeans to be Asians or semi-Asians. They formed an important bargaining chip in trade with the Islamic world. Europe was selling Slavs as slaves, hence the origin of the name Slavs, as noted by Lewis (Lewis 1993, 23).

At the outset of modern times, the grain trade led to a split between the West and the East. In consequence Europe witnessed two independent stages of feudalism: in Western Europe between the ninth and fourteenth centuries, and in the East between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. With the development of the Western Europe its eastern part was becoming slavishly subjected to the West. Consequently, the concept of 'Europe' was associated with the institution of West European nation-states, and adopted somewhat a normative character. It was not perceived as an alternative to a nation-state, but to the contrary, the concept of 'Europe' became subjected to national interests. Contrary to the United States, in Europe the idea of statehood and the national idea were placed ahead of, and instrumental in defining, international norms and institutions. During the Enlightenment era the term 'Europe', being the alternative to the nation-state, was present only among intellectual elites, having no meaning to ordinary people, since the conflicts between the nation-states were too severe. According to de Rougement, the idea of Europe was essentially devised by France for purposes of expansion, by pleading the 'superiority of the European religion, the white race and the French language'. At the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, one of the early concepts of European political governance was 'the great project of Henry IV, prepared by Prince Sully, for whom Europe was supposed to be in fact the extension of France. Establishing an alliance of the Western states against Turks was to be an essential element of that plan.' (de Rougement 1996, 157)

Thus the identity of Europe was being constituted in opposition to and out of fear of what was different, other. Here, the Orient also played a crucial role. The Orient, being the 'substitute of the otherness of others', was at the same time a distorting mirror of the West. Europe needed the other in opposition, against whom it could build its own identity. Therefore the European nature was being established around the antagonism between the West on the one side, and Orient and the East on the other. The previous opposition of Christianity against Islam was substituted by the opposition of civilisation against barbarism. The nineteenth century carried a conviction that Europe represented the civilisation ideal, and that its mission was to civilize
the world. The non-European world was perceived as a reflection of what Europe used to be, and 'Europe' was deemed to have become the embodiment of Western values, treated as universal principles.

The category of race, rather than language or religion, became the unifying factor for nineteenth-century Europe. It was a period which witnessed the development of anthropology - the study of 'primitive people', which was supposed to provide the scientific explanation for Europe's spiritual and intellectual superiority over extra-European communities. (Delanty 129) After the fall of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, the role of Islam was taken over by Communism. The October Revolution transformed the final stage of Wold War One into a battle between capitalist and communist countries.

The Cold War was in a sense a continuation of that process, in which Europe's identity was formed in opposition to the Soviet bloc. In this light the Berlin wall, erected in 1961, became a symbol of the Europe's internal division and an incarnation of the age-old conflict between the West and the East. Delanty notes that 'this profound division was visible even in the attitude of Western Jews towards Jews from the East, whom they often disregarded and discriminated against. (...) The mutual hostility between the East and the West would always focus on certain groups that were compelled to carry the historical burden. It should be strongly emphasised that the cultural representations of the reality crystallised in the form of regressive identities based on the category of race, xenophobic concepts of nationalism and on obscure irrationalism' (ibidem).

It should be pointed out that the term "cold war", rooted in the medieval conflict between Christianity and Islam - was rediscovered by Walter Lipmann just after the Second World War. It was to provide the ideological foundation for Europe's defence against the potential danger emanating from the Soviet Union, as well as against any potential rebirth of the Third Reich. During the cold war, the Western mentality and the framework of political discussion was shaped by the conflict between liberal democracy and Communism. The European identity built during this time was personified by the establishment of West Germany as the Federal Republic of Germany, rooted in the West, and of East Germany i.e. the German Democratic Republic - set up in the Soviet occupation zone.

In this sense, the Europe's integration was a continuation of the history of Western rationality, and therefore the very embodiment of the logic of exclusion - bringing to life yet another Other - the mad, the sick, the offender, the woman, the Jew, the Slav or finally - the non-European, who, where necessary, could be used as the evidence of Western rationality, fitness, righteousness, purity, superiority, etc. The continent's integration was somewhat a materialisation of Europe's heritage to date, a Europe which, according to Waldenfels, considered itself 'the incarnation and warden of the real faith, the right reason, true advancement, civilised humanity, universal discussion... The name 'Europe' allows to speak "in the name of..." , and the speaker becomes a self-declared spokesman. One does not judge some civilisation anymore, one makes judgements "in the name of civilisation." (ibidem)

Europe's post-war unification process was materialised at the outset as an integration against "non-Europeans", including all those who found themselves on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Yalta was both a complementary element and concurrently the beginning of a history that - driven by its own logic - split Europe in two and established its own Other, against whom the West could successfully unite. The Cold War era, and especially the fifties and the sixties, are in principle the best years of the unification process, the period of its greatest success. The fear of the Soviet threat - the Other - functioned perfectly as one of the driving forces of the integration machine. We have to keep in mind that the post-war integration process resulted not only from the need to solve the German problem and to ensure the economic development and political stability of 'Europe'; it was also caused by the threat of communism and the Soviet Union. This is why the integration itself was actively supported by the pope and the Catholic Church, treating the unification of Europe as the best remedy against the ideology of evil (i.e. communism). It was no accident that the founding fathers of European integration, including Monnet, Schumann, and de Gasperi, came from the Christian democratic party.

Thus, ironically, the collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold War in 1989 turned out to be a big ‘shock’ to the West, and a source of chaos and destabilisation. Its world almost fell apart, depriving Europe of the foundations that had been so vital for its development. While the victory of 'Solidarity', followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall, initially aroused hopes for permanent abolition of the barriers that divided the Old Continent, after a short period of euphoria the Western states started fencing off their Eastern neighbours with a new, less visible wall – that of fear. The liberation of the Central and Eastern European countries offered huge opportunities, but also presented a danger to the Western part of the continent. Jerzy Łukasiewski notes that 'one of the major integration catalysts, i.e. the threat from the East, disappeared.' (Łukasiewski 1998, 91)

After the 2005 referenda and in the context of the present financial and institutional crisis, there remains a fear of immigrants in Europe. The former French minister for Foreign Affairs, Dominique de Villepin, expressed an opinion that vividly reflected the nature of the problem. He said that "there is a fear of the other in the heart of Europe, of the other culture, of the neighbouring state" (de Villepin, 2002). In this sense Europe has always been sick because of the Other, and that illness is still present on the old continent.

4 Future of European citizenship

In order to meet the challenge of its encounter with the Other, Europe must overcome its limitations
and develop a new identity able to deal and communicate with that same Other. According to Theodora Kostakopoulou, putting an excessive emphasis on the Greek, Roman or Christian heritage may become the sprouting seed of European racism and xenophobia. Europe must overcome its previous limitations and start building its identity towards the Other, rather than against the Other. (Kostakopoulou 2001, 26)

The intellectual premises for a new approach to the problem of the ‘Other’ have been expressed most comprehensively in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas and the so-called ‘philosophy of dialogue’, having also such prominent representatives as Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, and Gabriel Marcel. According to Levinas, meeting the Other is a ‘fundamental event’ in a human being’s contact with the world. The Other is the only one and unique being in the philosophy of dialogue, and is considered to be of the highest value, as being a concept which can protect the individual against the danger posed to human identity by the masses and the great totalitarian systems of the twentieth century. It has been proven that indifference towards the Other can, under specific circumstances, lead to Auschwitz.

In his philosophy, Levinas leads us to the pre-community sources of morality, seeing the meeting with the Other as the original experience. Such a meeting is the greatest experience and basis for all later relations between people, and also a way of approaching God. Keeping good relations with Others, as the basic attribute of human existence, above all means taking responsibility. According to Levinas, if the Other is looking at me, I am responsible for him. My responsibility for the Other is unconditional; it is not dependent on any previous knowledge about the Other but is rather ahead of that knowledge. The author of ‘Totality and Infinity’ says: ‘I analyse human inner-relations which - in the nearness of the Other - apart from the impression which I myself make on another human - his face, expression of the Other, is decisive for me to serve him (...) The face is commanding and deciding. Its meaning involves command. Precisely speaking, if the face means command in my imagination, it is not the way an ordinary sign manifests its meaning; this command makes up the entire meaning of the face.’ (cited after Bauman, op. cit., 252) In other words, in Levinas’s opinion the responsibility for the Other is the original element of subjectivity. It is not stimulated by any primary force, ethical or legal code, or fear of penalty. Only when I become responsible, do I become a subject. It is sufficient to break through the curtain of everyday life to be able to arrive at the source of our existence.

In this sense this is a postulating philosophy, and also ethical to the core - a philosophy that requires a certain heroism and going beyond our ordinary experience and habits in our relations with the Other people. Today more than ever Europe needs this heroism and needs to go beyond its traditional approach to Otherness.

This ‘new thinking’ about the European problem found its specific continuation in the thought of Jacques Derrida. In his ‘The Other Heading’ Derrida discloses a somewhat different, more political face of deconstructionism, of which he was the most well-known representative. The ambiguous title of his book, which could be understood as ‘the other headland, direction, course’, is an indication of the specific intellectual journey of its author. It is a manifestation of the search for a new definition of European identity, or rather a different way of looking and thinking about the identity itself. According to Derrida, the traditional understanding of Europe’s identity is a closure in ‘our own’, leaving the ‘foreign’ and ‘other’ behind. However, ‘it is a culture’s attribute not to be identical with itself. To think about Europe in a different way means to think about the European identity in terms of “otherness”, “difference”, “pluralism”, “apory”.’ Therefore, the other course (the Other Heading) is not so much a suggestion of a new ‘goal’ or ‘vision’, but rather a transformation of thinking. Europe must begin to think of itself in terms of the ‘other’. As Derrida writes, ‘We need to become guards of a certain idea of Europe, a certain otherness of Europe - yet Europe that is not closing the door of its own identity and which is exemplifying the striving for what it is not, towards the opposite side or towards the other. We need to devise and imagine the new style of thinking in which the identity comes from the otherness and not vice versa.’ (Derrida 1992, 29). It will be difficult to do without paradox here, with responsibility being its ethical and political dimension. If responsibility is to be free from Eurocentrism - in other words, from equating Europe’s integration with West European integration - Europe must be reflected upon in a new way. This new way means that Europe will not only be responsible for the ‘other’ but its own identity will be constituted by the ‘other’. Moreover, that responsibility should be realised - according to the French philosopher - through respect for diversity, otherness, but at the same time for common values. Thus rejecting the easy and alluring solution of either a full unification or a total dispersion, Derrida speaks of the necessary action to be taken within the framework of the enlightenment values of liberal democracy, emphasising at the same time that those values are not sufficient in and of themselves to ensure respect for the ‘other’. What we need is a definition of the European identity, or a way of thinking about it, which would combine the universalism of its values with its ‘diversity’. For Europe ‘must not get dispersed into a thousand provinces, separate views, idiosyncrasies or small nationalisms, but on the other hand it must not submit to the tyranny of centralised power.’ (Ibidem)

At this critical juncture in the integration process, when a more adequate ‘vision of unification’ seems necessary, the reflections represented by Jacques Derrida may provide the answer to the urgent challenge of our contemporary times. For one thing is certain, Europe - facing qualitatively new problems in its encounters with the Other - is in need of a thorough revision (deconstruction) of the fundamental categories on which its identity is built. It should be emphasised however that Derrida does not offer ready solutions, plans, or overall projects.
He only indicates the direction (the Other Heading) where answers and solutions should be sought to the ever new problems and challenges. The signs on that road include the new identity determined by the ‘other’ and by responsibility for the ‘other’. Whether the proposals of these philosophers are realistic is a completely different question...

References


Endnotes

1 In 2006, after the first phase of the transitional period, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Portugal decided to open their labour markets.
2 It is often argued that transitional periods for accession to labour markets of the EU were also introduced when Spain and Portugal joined the EU in 1986. However, it should be noted that at that time these restrictions were not a violation of Union citizens’ rights, because the concept of European citizenship was introduced to the European legislation within the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Thus it was a different legal context.
Review of the Book:
Pak-sang Lai and Michael Byram, Re-Shaping Education for Citizenship: Democratic National Citizenship in Hong Kong


"Re-Shaping Education for Citizenship: Democratic National Citizenship in Hong Kong" summarizes the development of citizenship education in Hong Kong, as experienced in post-colonial and post-industrial times. In addition, it studies the ongoing changes that are impacted by democratization, re-nationalization, and globalization. Given that Hong Kong is a special administrative region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC), its citizenship education is not national or nationalized but territorial and territorialized. In particular, a "one country two systems" notion of citizenship education is implemented in Hong Kong.

As a whole, the book successfully identifies significant characteristics for nation formation and citizenship construction in Hong Kong. Simultaneously and indeed interestingly, the authors describe a critical feature of "one country two systems" citizenship, i.e. its multi-layered or multi-leveled nature (Hughes & Stone 1999; Wang 1996). It also elaborates on differences between the centralized guidelines to citizenship education in Hong Kong and Mainland China. In fact, the territorialized national identity of Hong Kong quite different from the national identity advocated on the mainland and convergence of the two national citizenships seems unlikely in the near future. In order to provide evidence of the differences between the two forms of citizenship taught, Pak-sang Lai and Michael Byram discuss in more detail localized and territorialized citizenship education and its implementation in a Hong Kong's secondary school. The case-study is clearly based on the assumption that schools enjoy the freedom to interpret the centralized guidelines associated with "one country two systems" citizenship as they see fit. The authors also provide valuable insights into various features of citizenship education in Hong Kong.

The book consists of nine parts. Firstly, after a general introduction and overview, the following two chapters briefly contextualize citizenship education in Hong Kong with a focus on the period after the change in sovereignty in 1997 and the post-colonial era. The authors then examine current studies of citizenship education and cases in other cities and countries like Australia, the U.S.A., Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia. Analysis of different approaches to nation formation and state-building through citizenship education in different contexts provides valuable insights and points of comparison when looking at the situation in Hong Kong. After reviewing the development of citizenship in Hong Kong in chapters four, five and six, the authors then focus on a case-study of a particular school as an example of citizenship development in Hong Kong with teachers' roles and students' attitudes both having significant roles to play in the context of centralized civic education. Of key importance in this book is the identification of distinctive characteristics of Hong Kong students' nationalism as territorialized citizenship, which is a composite identity of nationalism and democracy with a loyalty towards both Hong Kong and China.

The next chapter compares Hong Kong and Singapore in terms of the impact of centralized governance on citizenship education. Compared with the collective and centralized nature of Singapore, Hong Kong experiences more liberalized and democratic guidelines in the context of national ideology and citizenship education. Finally, the book concludes by considering the notion of "one country two systems" from a number of perspectives and particular in terms of how this approach is interpreted and implemented in schools in Hong Kong.

The book is based on an impressive case study of a school in Hong Kong which uses ethnographic methods over a period of 14 months from late 2002 to mid-2004. In addition, the fieldwork included participant observation, classroom observation, interview, and documentary analysis. However, the ethnographical methodology of data collection only focused on the impact of school's civic program at the beginning of 21st Century and may therefore not accurately represent the current situation. For validity and authenticity of study, the book records the transcriptations of students' interviews in different aspects of students' life. Through making the field notes and field journals in relation to the fieldwork and the post-fieldwork, the writing-up procedure of collecting data attempts to clarify that the school's civic education in Hong Kong is the localized national education based on the individuality and ethnicity. Nonetheless, some of the methods adopted are not entirely transparent in places. The authors present the school at the heart of this study as engaging with a civic education programme that is a result of collaborative effort on the part of governments, parents, media, past students, outside bodies and students themselves. The findings suggest that a national educational program routed in ethno-cultural context and an understanding of the regional distinctiveness of Hong Kong appears optimum. Furthermore, the case of Hong Kong represents democratic national education that could be a new step in China's national citizenship education, which could develop a national program of cultural diversity and divergence or homogeneity and convergence. Thus the study offers some insights for further development of western citizenship education.
Additional findings with regard to characteristics of Hong Kong’s citizenship education include the fact that its civil education seems to reflect more the effects of school than the influence of the government in comparison with its Asian counterparts. Secondly, its citizenship education is “education for democratic national citizenship” which differs from democratic citizenship education in Western countries. Last but not least, citizenship education in Hong Kong is localized and territorialized, which is also different from the socialist collective citizenship education of the Mainland of China. Thus, the argument assumes that the educational policy provides a liberal atmosphere for learning a liberal democratic citizenship which is more individualist-oriented, democracy-laden within the context of Hong Kong, rather than a variant of centralized citizenship or citizenship of homogeneity which is more collectivist-oriented, socially-laden in a Chinese context.

All in all, the book deals effectively with the holistic development of citizenship education in Hong Kong and impressively identifies elements of democratic national citizenship which are intertwined with de-contextualized ethno-cultural Chinese nationalism. It provides inspiration for citizenship education for national citizenship. Thus, it comes highly recommended and is certain to contribute to the development of research in this field.

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Call for Papers:
JSSE 2014 - 3: Revolution and Memories

The special issue will be edited by Manuel Loff, University of Porto, Portugal, and Isabel Menezes, University of Porto, Portugal.

During the mid-1970's Europe lived the second wave of democratisation since the WWII, with democratic transitions in Portugal (1974-76), Greece (1974) and Spain (1976-78). Despite the different nature of these transitions – a breakdown of a 48-year long dictatorship through a military coup, opening the gates to a social revolution, in Portugal; the stepping down of the Greek military junta after military debacle and a 7-year long authoritarian experience; a complex, and never quite completed, negotiation for a transition from one of the most repressive regimes of the 20th century into a democratic regime, in Spain - all three Southern European 1970s democratisation processes have produced similar phenomena in collective memory. This means that many European citizens “have lived through (…) oppression, and name it so, others feel its legacy as a part of their own personal memory, and others still, having lived it or not, do not recall their experience or the memory they have inherited as oppressive” (Loff 2010:55). This diversity of historical memories co-exist in public space, even if its conflicting nature is many times denied and seldom assumed as a potential basis for citizenship education (Ferreira et al., 2013) - the role of remembrance is, as Hannah Arendt would put it, to “save human deeds from the futility that comes from oblivion” (p. 42). But these narratives of the past are an essential part of how we define ourselves as citizens (Haste, 2004) and, whether acknowledged or not, play a central role in the on-going debate regarding the nature and quality of democracies today.

This issue celebrates the 40th anniversary of the Portuguese “carnation revolution” but expands beyond this event and welcomes papers that deal with the relationship between Memories and Revolution and political change in various continents and historical periods.

The editors welcome papers from a variety of disciplines (e.g. Education, History, Political Science, Sociology, Psychology…); a range of countries within and beyond Europe; and that consider, and eventually contrast, the visions of different generations, including those who have lived through oppression andthose who have confronted with past “dark times”. Papers that address how memories of the past are integrated into the citizenship education of younger generations are also relevant.

The following schedule will be used:

First submission by authors to editors: 15 April 2014
Response to authors by editors: 15 June 2014
Final submission from authors: 20 August 2014
Final reviewing: 15 September 2014
Copy editing completed by authors and editors: October 2014
Journal ready for publication: November 2014

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