Party Change and Cleavage Formation: The Effects of Value Change on the Spanish Party System

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Since the mid-1920s, party systems in Western democracies have developed around the cleavages generated by the modern secular state and industrial society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). When the initial impact of these forces subsided, Western Europe saw a period of political stability which was reflected in the basic continuity in electoral results from the 1940s until the beginning of the 1970s (Rose and Urwin 1970). The electoral volatility that many scholars have seen since then has, however, challenged this pattern of stability (Maguire 1983; Pedersen 1983; Crewe and Denver 1985). The literature on «new politics», for instance, takes the value change hypothesis as the point of departure for the explanation of electoral instability (Dalton et al. 1984). The supporters of this approach maintain that the traditional structure of cleavages which characterized Western politics has lost some of its significance in favour of a new value-based cleavage along the materialist/postmaterialist dimension. As a result, they go on to argue, the traditional left-right schema that lies behind the structure of cleavages has also been affected (Knutsen 1989a; Inglehart 1977, 1984 and 1990a). They also assert that the rise and success of Green parties and the proliferation of alternative electoral lists can be attributed to the increasing prevalence of these new values (Müller-Rommel 1989 and 1990). Spain, like most advanced industrial societies, is undergoing a cultural change (Torcal 1989 and 1992; Scarbrough 1995). Younger generations of Spaniards have substantially different value systems, in which maximum priority is no longer given to physical sustenance and safety, but rather to sentiments of belonging, self-expression, and quality of life. As in other Western societies, the unprecedented levels of economic prosperity, physical security, and education that have existed over the last few decades are responsible for this shift. How value change has affected Spanish party politics?

Much of our interpretation of mass politics in Western Europe is derived from Rokkan’s and Lipset’s freezing hypothesis. Although widely accepted and influential, this approach suffers from two problems. First, it pays scant attention to the underlying values, as opposed to issues, which inform class and religious conflicts (Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995, 43). Second, its treatment of the relationship between social divisions and party politics is too deterministic, leaving little room for human agency, that is, political leadership (Chhibber and Torcal 1997). More recently, Bartolini and Mair (1990, 212-220) have reformulated the concept of cleavage, drawing a distinction between its three constituent elements: social structure, values and beliefs, and institutional and organizational arrangements. A cleavage, therefore, must not only have social and cultural bases, but must also be institutionalized, developing its own «autonomous strength» and acting «as an influence on social, cultural and political life» (1990,
In accordance with this definition of a cleavage, Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995) have suggested that value change may be generating value voting at the expense of cleavage voting precisely because of its lack of an institutional or organizational dimension. Independently of the excessively strict interpretation of the «institutional element» of the cleavage, this argument shows that the process of cleavage formation and its consequences for the party system are still seen from the «bottom-up», allowing little room for the role of the elites in the formation of the institutional element of the cleavage. In contrast to this approach, we argue here that elites and party strategies play an important role in the process of cleavage formation. Thus, we maintain that value change is an emerging new cleavage with potentially profound consequences for the party system, but it can only be perceived if we consider two intervening factors: firstly, the generation that individuals belong to; and secondly, the electoral strategies adopted by the elites to capture the vote of postmaterialists.

In this paper, therefore, we will consider the extent to which value change is affecting the Spanish cleavage structure. According to the traditional formulation of cleavage theory, value change should lead to some modifications in the party system. This is, for instance, the interpretation defended by Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995). However, we contend that the link between these two levels of a cleavage is mediated by the crafting of the political elites. In Spain, some existing party elites are reacting to the presence of this new value conflict and winning the electoral support of postmaterialists; as a result, no significant change is occurring in the party system, nor are new parties emerging. Cultural change, therefore, is not resulting in party system change, but is rather fuelling party change, i.e., it is altering the character of some existing parties². Hence, the «autonomous strength» of the institutional dimension of a cleavage depends on political crafting, and its consequences are not as self-evident as the traditional interpretation of cleavages would tend to suggest. Furthermore, the effects of value change on party politics are more noticeable if we take the existence of different political generations into account since, according to Inglehart's hypothesis, value change is mostly affecting young generations. Thus, its impact on party politics is more conspicuous among these generations than at the aggregate level.

We begin by analysing the relationship between cultural change and generational replacement in Spain, showing that replacement is the driving force behind value change. In the rest of the article, we will try to relate the materialist/postmaterialist dimension to some facets of Spanish politics. We will consider the effects of value change on the structure of political cleavages, examining how
value change might be altering the ideological spectrum of some Spanish voters, and conclude with an assessment of the effects cultural change has on the Spanish party system. We will show that the effects of value change on both become more visible if we take the intervening influence of generational replacement and leadership into account.

MATERIALISTS AND POSTMATERIALISTS IN SPAIN

To what degree are postmaterialist values implanted in Spanish society? To answer this question we have analyzed the data of six surveys carried out in Spain in 1980, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994\(^3\). From the data for the last fourteen years shown in Table 1, it is evident that the percentage of postmaterialists has increased slightly (with the exception of 1993), while the decline in the percentage of materialists has been remarkable (from 62 per cent in 1980 to 43 per cent in 1993 and 45 per cent in 1994)\(^4\). In Spain, therefore, relatively high rates of economic growth did in time lead to relatively high rates of decline in the proportion of materialists, but not a corresponding increase in postmaterialist values, as Inglehart and Abramson (1994) maintain. These affirmations, however, should be made with some caution in the light of the short period of time studied.

On the other hand, the proportion of postmaterialists in Spain is very similar to the average for ten European Union countries (excluding Spain and Portugal), confirming that relatively high levels of GNP per capita predict relatively high levels of postmaterialists (Inglehart and Abramson 1994, 346-350). The data included in Table 1, however, also highlight some comparative differences. In Spain, the percentage of materialists is higher than in other EU countries, while the percentage of mixed individuals is lower. It seems, therefore that the relatively high levels of GNP per capita resulting from very rapid economic growth have given rise to a value change that is rather different from that found in other European countries (Scarbrough 1995, 134): a significant proportion of postmaterialists exists alongside the still majoritarian materialist presence\(^5\).

We argue that these peculiar characteristics of value change in Spain are the result of the particular nature of the profound economic and social transformation experienced in the country since the 1960’s\(^6\). The pace of economic growth has produced levels of wealth comparable to other European countries, but also distinct levels of access to this economic prosperity (security) among Spaniards, due to the combination of still notable social inequalities and a
welfare state which was essentially constructed during the 1980s. These conditions have given rise to a relatively high proportion of postmaterialists in comparison to other EU countries, but also to the peculiar coexistence of these postmaterialists with a wide plurality of materialists, even though the latter have been declining in relative terms over the last fifteen years.

In Spain, as in other advanced industrial societies (Abramson and Inglehart 1986, 1987, 1992 and 1995; Knutsen 1989b; Scarbrough 1995), generational replacement is contributing to the spread of postmaterialism. In this respect, we have used the percentage difference index (PDI) between materialists and postmaterialists by cohorts in 1980, 1989, 1992, and 1993. As can be seen in Figure 1, the younger cohorts account for a large proportion of the postmaterialists, a tendency which is confirmed as each cohort comes of age. Hence the PDIs between younger cohorts are generally lower than those between older cohorts. Figure 1 supports the hypothesis of cultural change and generational replacement in Spain, and confirms the results of previous studies (Orizo 1991; Montero and Torcal 1990 and 1992). Despite the overall persistence of differences between cohorts, the data also suggest the presence of period effects, as well as some instability in cohort differences, two tendencies which are at odds with the generational replacement hypothesis.

The variations in the PDIs shown in Figure 1 can be attributed to three kinds of effects. Those produced by influences associated with aging are age effects; those produced by influences associated with birth cohort membership are cohort effects; and those produced by influences associated with each period of time are period effects. In order to distinguish between these three effects, we have used a longitudinal research design. Our conclusion is that, although the data reflect some period effects, the variability of postmaterialists is largely a product of cohort effects, confirming the generational replacement hypothesis. As can be seen in Table 2, different longitudinal models were used to study separately the period, cohort, and age effects on the variations in a postmaterialism index between 1989 and 1993. In the first Model in Table 2, we regressed a postmaterialist index (factor scoring) on twenty dummy independent variables, representing the nine different cohorts, nine age groups, and two periods included in this design. The coefficients of this partial regression indicate that cohort effects explain most of the variability in the postmaterialist index. Compared with the cohorts effects, the period and age effects were negligible. The sign and magnitude of these coefficients show that the younger the cohort, the higher the postmaterialist index. But none of the coefficients
generated by this model are statistically significant, a result which is due to the high multicollinearity between these variables\textsuperscript{12}.

After confirming the effect of multicollinearity on the absence of observable statistical significance of cohort effects\textsuperscript{13}, we attempted to resolve this problem by transforming the age variable (quadratic and age minus the average age)\textsuperscript{14}. The influence of cohort effects on the dependent variable, the postmaterialist index, is evident from the results of Model 2 in Table 2, providing further support for the generational replacement hypothesis. The partial regression coefficients of the younger cohorts were indeed both very high and statistically significant. Although the partial regression coefficient of Period 2 is not very important (.126 from 0 to 1), it too is statistically significant, so showing the relative importance, defended by some scholars (Shively 1991; Scarbrough 1995), of period effects in the variability of postmaterialism.

We have further confirmed the significance of cohort effects by substituting the nine cohort dummy variables with one variable representing the average education of each cohort\textsuperscript{15}. The results are included in Model 3 in Table 2. The partial regression coefficients of average education by cohort were statistically significant and in the expected direction (in accordance with the cultural change hypothesis). No other regression coefficient was statistically significant. Indeed, cohort replacement seems to be the major force driving value change in Spain. Duch and Taylor (1993) have seen the relative importance of education over GNP per capita on postmaterialism as the principal counter argument against the scarcity hypothesis, which is one of the theoretical cornerstones of Inglehart’s theory\textsuperscript{16}. According to Dutch and Taylor, value change is the result of higher levels of education, rather than different levels of economic prosperity. The Spanish data also seemed to point to the centrality of education. The results of Model 4 in Table 2, which includes the average GNP per capita by cohort, highlights the importance of education as one of the principal factors behind cultural change in Spain: the partial regression coefficient of average education by cohort was the only significant one. In contrast, GNP per capita was not statistically significant.

Despite this, however, we disagree with Duch’s and Taylor’s interpretation. As Scarbrough (1995) argues, GNP per capita is only a very imperfect measure of economic security\textsuperscript{17}. This indicator only refers to the overall level of economic prosperity at some point in the past, but does not capture other very important factors shaping economic security, such as the degree to which a nation’s social welfare system has developed. We contend that GNP per capita does not capture
economic security in Spain either. As argued above, rapid economic growth in Spain has produced new social inequalities, whilst a fully-fledged welfare system capable of compensating for these is still not in place, resulting in a notable proportion of postmaterialists along with a wide plurality of materialists. In Spain, as in other Western European societies (Scarborough 1995, 154-6), education better captures the different levels of economic security enjoyed by wide sections of society; this is why education appears in Model 4 in Table 2 as the only significant variable in defining value change. It should also be noted that Spain has the highest unemployment rate among Western countries, only confirming that rapid economic growth has not benefited all sectors of Spanish society equally. In this respect, Clarke and Dutt (1991) have argued that the rising levels of unemployment during the 1980s have been producing, contrary to what the cultural change hypothesis suggests, an increase in postmaterialism. Recently, Inglehart and Abramson (1994 and 1995) have demonstrated that unemployment has only fuelled a temporary increase in the number of materialists (period effects). The Spanish case may contribute to this debate by showing that consistently high levels of unemployment together with rapid economic growth have produced coexistence of significant number of postmaterialists with a majority of materialists. Abramson’s and Inglehart’s (1993) argument that the effects of economic growth are different from the effects of economic security in terms of value change are therefore correct. Economic growth alone cannot produce fully-fledged value change. For this to take place, it must provide economic security for the majority of the society and should be accompanied by high levels of education. The distinctive features of value change in Spain are the result of a combination of rising levels of education and the economic security enjoyed by some sectors of Spanish society.

THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND VALUE CHANGE IN SPAIN

In most Western Europe countries, the left-right schema summarizes the universe of political conflicts and issues for people, making these more understandable, meaningful, and manageable. More importantly, the meaning of this schema is defined by the basic structure of conflicts in a given social system (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990, 223). In Spain too, and in contrast to party identification, the images of left and right are firmly anchored, and reflect the basic structure of political and social conflicts. The classical cleavages of Spanish society are mostly represented on this ideological continuum, they have a major influence on political attitudes and behaviour, and constitute the most important
frame of reference for evaluations of political parties, political leaders, and some political institutions (Linz et al. 1981; Sani and Montero 1986).

Spaniards’ self-placement on the left-right scale has been very stable over time (Montero 1994). But, as other scholars have noticed, the apparent underlying stability of the scale may conceal an important change in its meaning (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990). How important is the materialist/postmaterialist conflict in defining the current meaning of the left-right continuum in Spain? To answer this question, we have adopted two of the main approaches to the study of political cleavages (Knutsen 1989a, 495). One approach has used statistical techniques such as regression analysis to identify the different social characteristics that may explain political preferences and behaviour. The other has sought to identify empirical cleavages using dimensional analysis. In the next two sections we will present the results obtained when these two approaches were used to examine the effect of value change on the structure of political cleavages in Spain.

Postmaterialism and the Structure of Political Cleavages

In order to assess the importance of the materialist/postmaterialist conflict in defining the meaning of the ideological continuum, we regressed a postmaterialist index (factor scores) on the left-right scale. We included in the model two independent variables representing traditional cleavages in Spanish society: materialist class conflict20 and the religious cleavage21. We also added income level to the model in order to provide an objective measure of class. Finally, since gender has been shown to have some effects on the ideology of Spaniards (Díez Medrano et al. 1989), this variable was also incorporated. Analysis of the 1993 data produces some interesting results. Table 3 immediately suggests that class-consciousness and religious cleavages are still remarkably important for the social definition of the left-right schema. Compared with the impact of these variables, the postmaterialist and gender coefficients appeared to be irrelevant. Do these results provide definitive evidence that value change has had no significant impact on the left-right continuum? In order to answer this question we must consider the distinct distribution of materialists and postmaterialists in the different generations of Spaniards. As we have noted above, rapid economic growth and social modernization in Spain has given rise to a situation in which a relatively large number of postmaterialists coexist with the plurality-holding materialists. Therefore, it could be expected that some traditional cleavages would remain the dominant force defining the general structure of
political conflicts. But, as we have also seen here, the proportion of postmaterialists is much higher among younger cohorts, and it is precisely these generations which constitute the main source of changes in the structure of political cleavages (Knutsen 1995, 181-182). Cohort differences, therefore, must be introduced in order to ascertain the extent to which the generational factor affects both the structure of political cleavages and their impact on the left-right continuum. Table 4 confirms our expectations. We repeated the regression model performed in Table 3 with the 1993 data, but this time including in the model a new set of variables which represent the interaction of political cleavages and cohort effects. The resulting picture shows that subjective social class and religiosity continue to appear significant despite the generation effects. But it also shows the importance of the materialist/postmaterialist dimension in defining the left-right schema when cohort interaction effects are specifically considered.

We contend that these results, together with the generational replacement observed in the previous section, clearly indicate that traditional materialist cleavages are giving way to new values in the constellation of meanings which define political conflicts. Of the traditional cleavages, religiosity still exerts a dominant influence, but it becomes significant only among older generations, confirming the depolarizing effects of secularization in Spanish politics. Class conflict also remains important. Therefore, it seems that in Spain, as in many other Western European countries (Knutsen 1988; Inglehart 1990b and 1990c, Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995), more value-oriented or ideological cleavages, including new cultural and religious values, are increasingly those which shape the left-right schema.

The changing meaning of the left-right schema and the increasing importance of the materialist/postmaterialist conflict may be seen more clearly by examining the relationship between the scale and various issues. A postelectoral survey carried out in 1993 included ten questions referring to a selection of socially and politically significant issue attitudes. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a 1 to 10 scale according to their opinion on two contrasting statements related to basic issues. A factor analysis of these ten scales (not shown here) revealed the existence of four different dimensions. The first is the religious/secular dimension, which is defined by the abortion issue and the authoritarian/libertarian conflict. The second dimension points to the conflict between increasing social services and reducing taxes, and also includes the issue of European economic integration. The third refers to the debate about the privatization of public corporations and competition in the workplace. Finally, the materialist/postmaterialist dimension encompasses the conflicting issues of
economic growth versus protection of the environment, and of citizen participation versus rapid government decision-making. We have, therefore, created four variables representing the individual scores on each factor obtained in the analysis, and have regressed these four variables on the left-right scale. The results show that all the dimensions (independent variables) are statistically significant with the exception of the materialist/postmaterialist one. However, if we again take generational replacement into account, the picture is rather different. We repeated the regression analysis including the interaction effects of age and these four issue dimensions as independent variables. Although working with pure interaction effects is always problematic, the results, which can be found in Table 5, are nonetheless illuminating. The interaction of age and the materialist/postmaterialist conflict now becomes one of the most important variables defining the meaning of the left-right schema. The other issue dimension that shows even more statistically significant interactions with age is the religious/secular conflict, confirming once again the generational character of the intense secularization process seen in Spanish society over the last twenty years (Montero 1997). The meaning of the left-right schema in Spain is changing, and generational replacement is one of the main forces behind this change.

**Spatial Definition of Political Conflicts**

What is the spatial configuration of the political conflicts produced by the emergence of the materialist/postmaterialist dimension? The answer to this question may be sought through recourse to the second analytical approach mentioned above, which has attempted to identify empirical cleavages using dimensional analysis. Figures 2 and 3 present the results for 1989 and 1993 of non-metric multidimensional scaling analyses with the twelve items of value change and the different positions on the left-right scale. In 1989, the spatial representation of the ideological scale on the horizontal axis almost exactly reproduced the expected order from left to right; only the variables measuring the centre-right and right positions deviated from the expected order (the right is more to the left than the centre-right). This unusual exchange of positions seems to be related to the presence of the authoritarian/libertarian value components within the materialist/postmaterialist dimension (i.e., the presence of items such as «fight crime» and «maintain order»). This is even more evident at the other end of the ideological spectrum. Although the left and centre-left maintain a sequential order in the horizontal dimension, they are quite distant in the vertical dimension. The left variable is part of the libertarian cluster of items («freedom of speech», «more say in job» and «in government»), while the centre-left is closer to other social concerns. As we have argued elsewhere (Montero and Torcal, 1994), as a
result of the major presence of the materialist/ postmaterialist value conflict, Spanish materialists seem to be divided between pro-authoritarian and materialists *stricto sensu*, while Spanish postmaterialists are apparently split between pro-libertarians and those who have *sociotropic* concerns. Indeed, it can be seen that the interaction of these two conflicts of cultural change cuts across the traditional cleavages in Spanish society, altering and redefining, as a result, the spatial order of the ideological scale.

This finding is confirmed in Figure 3, even though we grouped the ideological scale differently. The counter-intuitive order of the ideological categories is even more evident in the structure of the 1993 data. The left occupies a more extreme position than the extreme left. On this postmaterialist side, the extreme left is closer than the left to some materialist concerns (such as «increase social programs»), while the left seems more concerned with environmental protection. At the other end of the ideological spectrum, the right also occupies a more extreme position than the extreme right. The right is closer to items such as «fight unemployment» and «fight inflation», whereas the extreme-right seems less orientated towards material goals. The resulting paradox is that the extreme right and the extreme left are closer to each other on the spectrum than the right and left.

We are tempted to conclude, therefore, that the new dimensions emerging as a result of value change are cutting across the traditional cleavages in Spanish society and so altering, at least partially, the meaning of the ideological left-right continuum and the spatial definition of political conflicts. Moreover, as new generations enter the political system, their new values could gradually accentuate the transformation of existing political conflicts. But we, of course, reject any kind of determinism. We are not suggesting here that all political conflicts will eventually be based on the materialist/postmaterialist dimension. There is already sufficient empirical evidence to show the complexity of the interplay between new and traditional cleavages (Inglehart 1990a; Van Deth 1995). And this is particularly so in countries, such as Spain, which have experienced almost simultaneously the consequences of rapid economic growth and entrenched social inequalities in the context of a newly consolidated democracy and a still recent welfare system. The survival of some of the more enduring traditional cleavages, and the more remarkable persistence of materialist demands resulting from varying levels of economic insecurity, will be sources of potential conflict, as will the disputes over the strategies the political elites design to deal with these conflicts.
THE EFFECTS ON THE SPANISH PARTY SYSTEM

Has this value change redefined the boundaries of political competition between parties in Spain? To what extent has it affected the party system? From one perspective, the Spanish party system changed remarkably little between the electoral realignment which took place in 1982, and the 1993 and 1996 general elections. This predominant-party system was dominated by the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE), whose strong electoral support remained essentially stable until the slow recovery of the second party (the conservative Partido Popular, PP) and its very narrow victory in March 1996. The PSOE and the PP were the main competitors in the party system, winning a combined average of three out of four votes, and obtaining eight out of ten seats in the Congress of Deputies over the last fifteen years. At the national level, the party system includes a third significant party, Izquierda Unida (the United Left, IU, a leftist coalition of small political groups dominated by the Communist party), as well as various regionalist or nationalist parties (the most important of which are the Catalan coalition Convergència i Unió (CiU) and the Basque Nationalist Party (the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV).

During the late eighties and early nineties, value change seemed to be defining new spaces of party competition as well as redefining old ones. Non-metric multidimensional analysis with parties and value change items have been used here to map this new spatial party competition. In 1989, the materialist side of the dimension appears to have been dominated by the conservative party. As can be seen in Figure 4, the PP is the closest party to the authoritarian items. It should also be noted that the PP and the small and now defunct centre-liberal party (Centro Democrático y Social, CDS) are the two parties furthest away from each other. They seem to compete for different electoral spaces even though they are supposed to be ideologically close. It may be argued, once again, that this reflects the significance of the authoritarian/libertarian value conflict. Figure 4 also clearly shows that, even though the supporters of these two parties are prone to choose materialist values, PP voters tend to be more concerned about authoritarian issues which are also important in defining the materialist/postmaterialist dimension in Spain (Montero and Torcal 1994). At the other extreme, IU seems to be closer to the postmaterialist/ libertarian items. The Socialist party appears to be more distant from these items, especially with respect to the most libertarian ones. This pattern confirms, as has been found in many other countries, that traditional Communist and Socialist parties are successfully adopting strategies to address left-libertarian and ecological issues.
in their programmes, and are also to some extent capturing the electoral support of those citizens concerned about these issues. In their competition with Green and other libertarian parties, the success of these traditional parties in attracting «new citizens» explains the basic continuity of their aggregate electoral support (Kitschelt 1989 and 1990)35.

IU’s proximity to the postmaterialist items is particularly noteworthy. A coalition of small little-known groups, some of which call themselves new social movements, IU is in fact dominated by the Communist party. IU was formed in 1986 as a political alliance campaigning in favour of a negative vote in Spain’s referendum on NATO in 1986. But the Socialists government’s decision to call an early general election that same year served to consolidate IU as an electoral coalition with a broader issue platform which included many postmaterialist concerns besides its pacifist and anti-NATO positions. This explains the striking change in the profiles of the electorates of the PCE and IU, even though their similarly minority electoral support. After the transition to democracy and during the early eighties the PCE followed a catch-all strategy, but was considered to be a traditional left-wing party with a social base composed essentially of male industrial workers, with low levels of education and a relatively high average age (Linz et al. 1981). However, IU’s electoral consolidation in the early nineties was based on the electoral support of typically communist voters, but also of much younger voters, often university students or graduates, of both sexes, living in big cities, and largely employed in the tertiary sector (Bosco 1995). In fact, IU has not only has the most modern electorate of all the communist organizations of Southern Europe, but is also the Spanish party with the largest proportion of postmaterialist voters: in the early nineties, 39 per cent of its voters were postmaterialists, compared with 19 per cent of those who voted for the PSOE, and 13 per cent for the PP (Montero y Torcal 1992, 87).

The growing importance of postmaterialism in IU’s electoral support can be seen from the data in Table 6, which shows the results of a logistic regression in which electoral support for the coalition is the dependent variable. The materialist/postmaterialist dimension is obviously important for predicting the vote for this coalition, as are religiosity and sympathy for Comisiones Obreras (CC OO), the union formerly linked with the Communist party and still ideologically closer to IU than to the PSOE. The regression coefficients for all of these variables were statistically significant, with the exception of subjective class position. It seems, therefore, that at least since 1989 this «old party» has been very successful in winning the electoral support of postmaterialists. Its success (together with the fact that IU has never obtained more than 11 per cent of the vote) helps to explain
why value change has not had a major impact on the Spanish party system as a whole. Certainly, no new political party has emerged to challenge IU’s strategy. We argue, in common with many other scholars (Kistchelt 1990; Müller-Rommel 1990), that the appearance of «new parties» (more specifically, Green and Left-libertarian parties), their electoral strength, and their distinct effect on the party system, all primarily depend on the strategies the «old parties» devise to respond to new issues.

The leaders of IU quickly developed an appropriate strategy. Postmaterialist issues have increasingly become the core of the coalition’s manifestos. This can clearly be seen, for example, with respect to ecological and environmental issues. The evolution of the three PCE (1977, 1979, and 1982) and four IU manifestos (1986, 1989, 1993, and 1996) shows major quantitative and qualitative changes with respect to ecological and environmental questions. There has been a notable increase in the number of lines dedicated to these issues in the various manifestos: the PCE devoted only two lines to these questions in 1977, 31 in 1979, and 63 in 1982, accounting, respectively, for 1, 3, and 4 per cent of the total in each case. Indicating its change of strategy, IU has intensified its postmaterialist appeal both formally and substantially: the number of lines on these issues rose to 7 per cent in 1986, 8 per cent in 1989, 6 per cent in 1993 and 10 per cent in 1996. The 1993 decrease was due to the great length the IU manifesto itself, which included a wide range of postmaterialist issues, as well as to its greater complexity, which crystallized in a large number of references to ecological and environmental issues in other sections of the manifesto which were not counted for the purposes of this analysis. This change, therefore, can be observed in both the number of lines and the increasing importance assigned to postmaterialist issues. Since 1986, ecology and the environment have occupied at least one full section of the IU manifesto, and since 1993, an entire chapter, comprising a large number of sections. Moreover, a substantial change can also be seen in the contents of the coalition’s policy proposals. The two lines included in the PCE’s 1977 manifesto, focusing on the need for more parks and gardens, reflected a very traditional and superficial approach. In 1986, IU’s manifesto contained a complete section on «policies for a more ecological environment», although the approach was still rather traditional. In 1993, a full chapter was devoted to ecology and the environment, which included a number of different sections with radical proposals on the economy, energy, environmental pollution, employment, global warming, tourism, education, health, and many other issues. In 1996, the very first chapter of the IU manifesto was devoted to «Ecologically Sustainable Economic and Social Development»:
the argument embodied in this title was at the heart of most of the policy proposals presented by IU in the last general election\textsuperscript{37}.

To what extent has IU’s electoral strategy been successful? Figure 5, which shows the results of a non-metric multidimensional analysis of selected materialist/postmaterialist items and Spanish parties in 1992, shows that it has been\textsuperscript{38}. Green parties are closer to the postmaterialist items, but IU is also competing for these «new citizens»\textsuperscript{39}. The different spatial positions of IU and the Green parties should also be noted. Although both are equidistant from the item «protect the environment», the still dominant social concerns of IU voters mean that the coalition is closer to the item «fight social inequalities», located above it, and to the item «economic growth», placed below it. These social concerns do not seem to be as significant as environmental issues for the supporters of the Green parties.

In order to test this result, we carried out a further logistic regression, on this occasion taking first IU and then the Green parties as the dependent variable. The results in Table 7 show that two main cleavages (religiosity and materialism/postmaterialism) influence the decision to vote for IU, but only one (materialism/postmaterialism) the choice of the Green parties. It is safe to assume, therefore, that the different definition of the spatial competition between these two electoral forces is related to value change, and that generational replacement should have a different impact on both. When the logistic regression was repeated with the same variables but controlling by cohorts, the results clearly confirmed the distinct character of their respective supporters (Table 8). In the case of IU, they are young postmaterialists \textit{and} old materialists, as the different signs of the statistically significant logistic regression coefficients show for the postmaterialist index for the youngest (0.4448) and oldest cohorts (-2.1559). The same is true in terms of class: younger IU voters tend to identify themselves with the upper classes, whereas older IU voters appear to belong to the working class. In an illuminating contrast, no generational effect can be observed with respect to religiosity, showing again the effects of secularization. In the case of the Green parties, however, the same analysis does not produce any statistically significant coefficients. Regardless of the cohort which their supporters belong to, the materialist/postmaterialist dimension is the \textit{only} relevant one for predicting the vote for these parties.

Hence, we argue that value change produced by generational replacement has had three effects on Spanish party politics. In the first place, it has resulted in an increase in electoral support for both IU and the Green parties, as well as in
the competition between them on the postmaterialist dimension. Nevertheless, until now this competition has proved extremely one-sided. IU has successfully managed to transform itself from a typical communist party of the old left into the main electoral option advancing the characteristic postmaterialist issues of the new left. Thanks to this change, the Green parties appear to have lost their electoral battle with IU. The moment of greatest support for the Green parties came in the 1989 general elections, when the six different electoral lists won 1.7 per cent of the vote, and in the European elections held that year, when four Green lists obtained 2.9 per cent of the vote, although in neither case did they win any seats (Baras 1992). Since then, however, the relative growth of IU has contrasted with the virtual disappearance of the Green parties: they won only 0.86 of the vote in the 1993 general elections, and 0.28 in 1996. Part of IU’s success may be attributed to the errors made by the Green parties themselves. The Green parties in Spain are among the most divided, and weakest, of all their Western European counterparts. Their internal history of fragmentation and splits in a context of electoral failures has reproduced the tendency seen in some other Western Green parties. Their external strategy illustrates the hypothesis that factors other than a pure logic of electoral competition sometimes shape the dynamics of parties (Kitschelt 1989).

A second effect of value change on Spanish politics can be seen in the heterogeneity of IU’s voters. Their very distinct profiles not only reflect the habitual heterogeneity resulting from catch-all strategies, but above all the differences between their voter’s basic preferences. For IU, value change has created a potential basis for intra-party conflict between its blue-collar, staunchly communist voters, its traditionally leftist lower-middle class electorate, and its younger upper-middle class postmaterialists. In any event, the case of IU is rather unique, even in Southern Europe (Bosco 1995): the PCE, through *Izquierda Unida*, is the only Communist party which, whilst remaining so, has successfully been able to channel a significant degree of support of postmaterialist voters; support which until now has condemned the Green parties to being completely marginal groups within the party system. In short, cultural change in Spain is producing changes in a party rather than changes in the party system as a whole; that is, value change is producing *party change* rather than *party system change*.

Moreover, and in the third place, value change in Spain is redefining to some extent the spatial competition between parties on the left. In striking contrast to many European party systems, in which Green parties compete electorally with larger socialist parties (Müller-Rommel 1989 and 1994), competition in Spain continues to be between IU and the PSOE. But this
competition is open, and still far from crystallized. In the early 1990s, the Socialist Party’s long period in power explained the relatively scant presence of postmaterialists among its electorate: only 19 per cent of PSOE voters, compared with 39 per cent of those of IU, were postmaterialists in 1989 (Montero and Torcal 1992). It will be remembered that Figure 5 provided eloquent graphic confirmation of the position occupied by the PSOE. However, with its return to the opposition in 1996 the competition between the two main parties on the left has restarted. The outcome of this competition will hinge on how the major parties address new issues emerging from value change, at the same as they deal with the demands of their traditional electorates. More particularly, it will depend on how successful IU is in processing simultaneously the demands of its potentially conflicting groups of voters. It will also depend on how successful the Socialist Party is in modernizing and renewing its electoral appeal from its place in the parliamentary opposition, and hence in competing with IU for postmaterialist voters on new grounds. Finally, it will also be influenced by the extent to which the Spanish Green parties are able to overcome their “natural tendency” (Kistchelt 1990) to division, and so move, if only a little, up the league table of electoral support for Green parties in Europe. In this way, as in many other Western European party systems, the distinct effects of value change on party politics are conditioned by several political and institutional factors, as well as by the different strategies adopted by political leaders. The effects of value change, combined with these intervening factors, may lead to either party change or party system change, or both. In Spain, value change is only producing the former, and is mainly restricted to the established left-wing parties, and above all to the Communist-dominated coalition, IU.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we have examined in some detail the formation of a new cleavage as an empirical illustration of its impact on party politics. We began by analyzing the magnitude of value change in Spain, and how recent economic, social and political events contribute to a better understanding of the particular character of change. The last three decades have seen enormous economic growth, social modernization, and political change in Spain. Rapid economic growth has generated comparable levels of wealth to most Western societies, but also different levels of general economic security. The persistence of some major social inequalities, combined with a still comparatively limited welfare state, has created distinct levels of perception of economic goals and priorities among
Spaniards. This has produced a relatively large number of postmaterialists who coexist with a majority of materialists.

As in many other Western countries, in Spain too generational replacement or cohort effects seem to be one of the main driving forces behind cultural change. Younger «new citizens» are slowly but surely replacing older materialist generations. Postmaterialism, therefore, is relatively widespread among younger cohorts, and it is precisely these citizens who are the source of changes in the structure of political cleavages. As they enter the political arena, they are also the potential source of change in the ideological definitions of parties which embrace new values, and consequently of the party system. Thus, they play an extremely important role in the formation of the new cleavage which results from value change. In this paper we hope to have demonstrated that the political consequences of value change can only be perceived if we take into account generational replacement and the corresponding cohort effects.

But Spain also provides a useful opportunity to analyse the impact of value change on the party system. In strong contrast to the axiomatic assumptions frequently made with respect to the relationships between the three elements of a cleavage (a social division, a common set of values, and an organization which institutionalizes it), the Spanish case highlights the levels of autonomy existing in the organizational element. The leaders of the main left-wing parties were able to prevent the emergence of new parties which expressed the political priorities of these «new citizens». The leaders of the existing parties managed to attract these postmaterialist voters and incorporate the postmaterialist dimension into the established framework of electoral competition, whilst the Green parties, paralysed by their leaders’ strategies of division and fragmentation, have been unable to enter the party system. It is clear that the (few) voters of these new parties are mostly postmaterialists, regardless of the cohort they belong to; but these organizations have only obtained remarkably poor electoral results. Their competitors on the left, IU and PSOE, have managed to capture the postmaterialist vote, but they have also experienced a number of changes as result of values change. Generational replacement is having particularly important consequences for the composition of the electorate of IU, the coalition which has proved most successful in capturing the support of «new citizens». This process is increasing the heterogeneity of IU, and hence, the potential for intra-party conflict between the younger and older generations, as well as between its sometimes rather incompatible policy aims. Thus, the effects of value change are largely fuelling a process of party change, rather than party system change.
Can this trend be expected to continue as the number of postmaterialists rises in Spain? The change observed, unusual as it may be if one remembers that the successful competitor of the Green parties is an electoral coalition dominated by the Spanish Communist party, has not modified the position of IU within the party system. The PSOE still enjoys a large number of competitive advantages with respect to IU - in terms of its leaders, voters, resources, and institutional presence. Despite the significant proportion of postmaterialists in Spanish society, and the intensity of generational replacement in value change, the strategies developed by the leaders of IU and the PSOE have reinforced the relative autonomy of the party elites insofar as they have been able to prevent the emergence of an autonomous organization from the postmaterialist cleavage. Up to now at least, this margin of manoeuvre for interparty competition has been translated into some changes within the parties, but the party system itself has not been modified by the entry of new parties or more significant changes in any of the existing parties.
## Table 1


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>EU*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Materialists</td>
<td>62 47 52 47 43 45</td>
<td>44 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>26 36 31 38 35 37</td>
<td>47 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist</td>
<td>12 17 17 15 22 17</td>
<td>9 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td>100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(3.193) (3.346) (1.200) (1.200) (1.200) (1.200)</td>
<td>(9.014) (9.667)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Represents the mean of ten countries of the EU, excluding Spain and Portugal*

**Sources:** For 1980 and 1989, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS); for 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994, Centro de Investigaciones sobre la Realidad Social (CIRES); for EU countries, Eurobarometer, 13 (June 1980) and 31 (June 1989)
### Table 2

Postmaterialism and Generational replacement: Different Regression Models with Dummy and Transformed Variables to Distinguish Cohort, Age, and Period Effects between 1989 and 1993 (Regression Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youngest cohort</td>
<td>.704</td>
<td>Youngest cohort</td>
<td>.542**</td>
<td>Average education</td>
<td>-.225**</td>
<td>-.195**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 2</td>
<td>.461</td>
<td>Cohort 2</td>
<td>.390**</td>
<td>by cohorts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 3</td>
<td>.451</td>
<td>Cohort 3</td>
<td>.380**</td>
<td>Average GNP per</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 4</td>
<td>.307</td>
<td>Cohort 4</td>
<td>.206</td>
<td>capita by cohorts</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 5</td>
<td>.417</td>
<td>Cohort 5</td>
<td>.294</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>-.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 6</td>
<td>.297</td>
<td>Cohort 6</td>
<td>.154</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 7</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>Cohort 7</td>
<td>-.074</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>.244</td>
<td>.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 8</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Cohort 8</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td>R squared</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldest cohort</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Oldest cohort</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>F value</td>
<td>32.61**</td>
<td>23.39**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest age</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Period 1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 2</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Period 2</td>
<td>.128**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 3</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>QTA</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 4</td>
<td>-.081</td>
<td>AMAA</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 5</td>
<td>-.175</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-.302</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 6</td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>R squared</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 7</td>
<td>-.129</td>
<td>F value</td>
<td>8.02**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 8</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldest age</td>
<td>-.095</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 2</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-.324**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R squared</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>18.27**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excluded from the model (reference variables)

** Statistically significant at 0.01
### Table 3

**Political Cleavages and Left-Right Continuum in Spain, 1993**  
*(Ordinary Least Square Estimators)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Regression coefficients</th>
<th>Standard coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.0043</td>
<td>.0048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class self-consciousness</td>
<td>-.2305*</td>
<td>-.1126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>postmaterialist index</td>
<td>.0127</td>
<td>.0087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.3553*</td>
<td>.3461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.0581</td>
<td>-.1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.3164*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R squared</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F value</td>
<td>22.14*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(1,131)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistically significant at 0.01

Source: CIRES survey
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Regression coefficients</th>
<th>Standard coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class self-consciousness</td>
<td>-.1811**</td>
<td>-.0875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class self-consciousness by youngest cohorts(a)</td>
<td>-.0796</td>
<td>-.0941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class self-consciousness by oldest cohorts(b)</td>
<td>-.1251***</td>
<td>-.1570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.2569*</td>
<td>.2505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity by youngest cohorts(a)</td>
<td>.0214</td>
<td>.0190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity by oldest cohorts(b)</td>
<td>.1404**</td>
<td>.1404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist index</td>
<td>.1352</td>
<td>.0953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist index by youngest cohorts(a)</td>
<td>-.1813***</td>
<td>-.0863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist index by oldest cohorts(b)</td>
<td>-.0909</td>
<td>-.0360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.4969*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R squared</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Value</td>
<td>16.29*</td>
<td>(1.131)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistically significant at 0.01
** Statistically significant at 0.05
*** Statistically significant at 0.10

(a) This variable represents the original variable multiplied by a variable that groups the two younger cohorts of Figure 1
(b) This variable represents the original variable multiplied by a variable that groups the two older cohorts of Figure 1

Source: 1993 CRES survey
### Table 5

**Issue Attitudes, Age, and the Left-Right Continuum in Spain, 1993**
*(Ordinary Least Square Estimators)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Regression coefficients</th>
<th>Standard coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious/secular values</td>
<td>-.482*</td>
<td>.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services/cut taxes</td>
<td>.245</td>
<td>.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private/public corporations</td>
<td>-.589*</td>
<td>.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialist/postmaterialist</td>
<td>.580*</td>
<td>.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.072*</td>
<td>.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious/secular values*age</td>
<td>-1.38*</td>
<td>.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services/cut taxes*age</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private/public corporations*age</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialist/postmaterialist*age</td>
<td>-.128</td>
<td>-.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>4863*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R squared</td>
<td>34025*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(1.246)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistically significant at 0.05

Source: 1993 DATA survey
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Regression coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class self-consciousness</td>
<td>.3733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist index</td>
<td>-.6726*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religiosity</td>
<td>-.3518*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathy for Communist trade unions</td>
<td>.3239*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-3.003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(1.337)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-squared of model log likelihood improvement</td>
<td>168.78*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model degrees of freedom</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistically significant at 0.01

Source: 1989 CIS survey
**Table 7**

Political Cleavages and Vote for United Left (IU) and Green Parties in Spain, 1992
(Logistic Regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>United Left (IU)</th>
<th>Green Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class self-consciousness</td>
<td>.1719</td>
<td>-.5713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist index</td>
<td>.3713*</td>
<td>.3327**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-.6129*</td>
<td>-.2962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.364</td>
<td>-.9597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-squared of model log likelihood improvement</td>
<td>50.46</td>
<td>7.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model degrees of freedom</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(627)</td>
<td>(627)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistically significant at 0.01
** Statistically significant at 0.1

Source: 1992 CIS survey
### Table 8

**Political Cleavages, Generational Replacement, and Vote for United left (IU) and the Green parties Spain, 1992 (Logistic Regression)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>United Left (IU)</th>
<th>Green parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class self-consciousness</td>
<td>.1562</td>
<td>-1.428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class self-consciousness by youngest cohorts(a)</td>
<td>.3415***</td>
<td>1.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class self-consciousness by oldest cohorts(b)</td>
<td>-.5752***</td>
<td>-.8030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist index</td>
<td>.1071</td>
<td>1.894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist index by youngest cohorts(a)</td>
<td>.4888***</td>
<td>-1.754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist index by oldest cohorts(b)</td>
<td>-.2155**</td>
<td>2.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-.4523**</td>
<td>-.4907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity by youngest cohorts(a)</td>
<td>-.0797</td>
<td>.5422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity by oldest cohorts(b)</td>
<td>-.2482</td>
<td>-.3871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.0266</td>
<td>.0018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-3.0931</td>
<td>-1.5997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-squared of model log likelihood improvement</td>
<td>83.54*</td>
<td>31.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model degrees of freedom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(627)</td>
<td>(627)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistically significant at 0.01
** Statistically significant at 0.05
*** Statistically significant at 0.10

(a) This variable represents the original variable multiplied by a variable that groups the two younger cohorts of Figure 1
(b) This variable represents the original variable multiplied by a variable that groups the two older cohorts of Figure 1

Source: 1993 CIRES survey
Figure 1

Longitudinal cohort differences in value preferences in Spain, 1980-1993*

* Lines represent the percentage difference indices (PDIs) between the proportion of postmaterialist and materialist within each cohort

Sources: see Table 1
Figure 2

Postmaterialism and Ideology: Monotonic Multidimensional Scaling with 12 Materialist/Postmaterialist Items and Left-Right, 1989 (Kruskal stress in 2 dimensions)

Stress of final configuration is .21169
Proportion of variance (RSQ) is .72531

LABELS OF ITEMS
L. Left
CL. Centre-left
C. Centre
CR. Centre-right
R. Right

Crime. Fight crime
Cities. More beautiful cities
Order. Maintain order
Unemp. Fight unemployment
Educ. Improve education and public health
Prices. Fight rising prices

IMPERS. Less impersonal society
SPEECH. Freedom of speech
INEQU. Fight social inequalities
JOB. More say in job
GOVER. More say in government
IDEAS. Ideas count

Source: 1989 CIS survey
Figure 3

Postmaterialism and Ideology: Monotonic Multidimensional Scaling with 12 Materialist/Postmaterialist Items and Left-Right, 1993 (Kruskal stress in 2 Dimensions)

Stress of final configuration is .27048
Proportion of variance (RSQ) is .52168

LABELS OF ITEMS
- EL. Extreme left
- L. Left and Centre-left
- C. Centre
- R. Right and Centre-right
- ER. Extreme right

Unemp. Fight unemployment
Crime. Fight crime
Prices. Fight rising prices
Forces. Strong Armed Forces
Growth. Economic growth
Terror. Fight terrorism
Drug. Fight drug traffic

RIGHTS. Protect civil rights.
INEQU. Fight social inequalities.
ENVIR. Protect environment.
CORRUPT. Fight corruption.
PROGRAMS. Increase social programs

Source: 1993 CIRES survey
Figure 4

Postmaterialism and Parties: Monotonic Multidimensional Scaling with 12 Materialist/PostMaterialist Items and Nation-wide Political Parties, 1989 (Kruskal stress in 2 dimensions)

Stress of final configuration is .20125
Proportion of variance (RSQ) is .74866

LABELS OF ITEMS
PP. Partido Popular (Conservative party)
IU. Izquierda Unida (Leftist coalition with the Communist party)
CDS. Centro Democrático y Social (Centre-liberal party)
PSOE. Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Socialist party)

Crime. Fight crime
Cities. More beautiful cities
Order. Maintain order
Unemp. Fight unemployment
Educ. Improve education and public health
Prices. Fight rising prices
Source: 1989 CIS survey

IMPERS. Less impersonal society
SPEECH. Freedom of speech.
INEQU. Fight social inequalities
JOB. More say in job
GOVER. More say in government
IDEAS. Ideas count
Figure 5

Postmaterialism and Parties: Monotonic Multidimensional Scaling with 12 Materialists’ Postmaterialist Items and Nation-wide Political Parties, 1992 (Kruskal Stress in 2 Dimensions)

Stress of final configuration is .24644
Proportion of variance (RSQ) is .60757

LABELS OF ITEMS
PP. Partido Popular (Conservative party)
CDS. Centro Democrático y Social (Centre-liberal party)
IU. Izquierda Unida (Leftist coalition with the Communist party)
PSOE. Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Socialist party)
GREEN. Green Parties
Unemp. Fight unemployment
Crime. Fight crime
Prices. Fight rising prices
Forces. Strong armed forces
Growth. Economic growth
Terror. Fight terrorism
Source: 1992 CIRES survey
NOTES

Two previous drafts of this paper were presented at the ECPR Workshop on «Quantitative and Comparative Research on Values and Ideology» (Oslo, March-April, 1996), and at a seminar held at the Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (Barcelona, February, 1997). Gabriel Colomé, Oddbjorn Knutsen, Wolfgang Jagodzinski, Ferran Requejo, and Elinor Scarbrough made very insightful comments. We also want to thank Justin Byrne, Pradeep Chhibber, Scott Menard, Brian Pollins and Shannon Sullivan for their invaluable help, and to acknowledge the financial support of the Spanish Comisión Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnología (CICYT) and the facilities provided by the Instituto Juan March. Additionally, M. Torcal would like to express his gratitude to the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan.

1. The electoral instability of the 1970s has been disputed by some scholars. Ersson and Lane (1982) and Shamir (1984), for example, have found that the aggregate electoral results since the beginning of the century show remarkable patterns of stability as well as instability. Nevertheless, in a more comprehensive study, Bartolini and Mair (1990) have supported the stability hypothesis with data from the period since 1885.

2. Whereas party change alludes to changes occurring in one or various parties in a given system, party system change refers to changes taking place in the party system itself (Mair 1989 and 1990; Bartolini and Mair 1990). For other definitions of party change and party system change see Laver (1989), Smith (1989), and Harmel and Janda (1994).

3. The 1980 and 1989 surveys were conducted by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). The 1980 survey was undertaken in November, and 1989 survey in January. The surveys for 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994 were carried out in June of those years by the Centro de Investigaciones sobre la Realidad Social (CIRES).

4. In Table 1 we have defined individuals in accordance with their factor scores on the materialist/postmaterialist dimension (first principal component); we have used the regression method to create and save the factor scores.

5. Studies carried out in 1990 (Orizo 1991, 43-46) confirm the constant increase in postmaterialists (20 percent) and mixed individuals (58 percent), and the consequent decline in materialists (22 percent). This distribution seems to dilute the peculiar importance of materialists in Spain, apparently indicating that the significant increase in the proportion of mixed individuals has taken place at the expense of the materialists. Although the results of Orizo’s study also confirm the cultural change hypothesis, he used a rather different method to ours when assigning respondents to the categories of materialist, mixed, and postmaterialist (Montero and Torcal 1992, 71).

6. The Spanish economy grew by an average of 7.3 per cent per year in real terms between 1961 and 1970. This growth led to the profound modernization of Spanish society. In 1960, for example, 41.5 per cent of the active population was employed in the primary, 23.3 per cent in the secondary, and 28.1 per cent in the tertiary sector. In 1991, the distribution of the active population was 10.3, 21.3, and 51.9 per cent respectively (see Cuadrado Roura 1990). For comparative data on economic growth for this period, see Van Deth (1995, 51-60).

7. A cohort is defined as «those people within a geographically or otherwise delineated population who experienced the same significant life event within a given period of time» (Glenn 1977, 8). Cohort boundaries can be arbitrarily defined in terms of «any standard period of time», or can be based on some historical events. In this study we have set the cohort boundaries in reference to a number of historical, social, and economic events in recent Spanish history. For a more detailed explanation, see Torcal (1989).

8. Torcal (1992) has stressed the significance of cohorts for the definition of the materialist/postmaterialist dimension, and has demonstrated that value change in Spain follows a clear time developmental model or circular dimensionality, in which the younger the cohort, the closer its position to the most postmaterialist and libertarian items. For the concept of circular dimensionality, see also Weisberg (1974).

9. Unfortunately, a linear relationship between cohort, period and age effects leads each to be confused with the other. Thus, these effects cannot be clearly distinguished from Figure 1 alone. The influence of these three effects is difficult to discern for two additional reasons. As noted by Glenn (1977, 12), first, because in survey data «much of the variation in percentages (or other values) among cells of a cohort table reflects sampling variability», and second, because «as a birth cohort grows older, it suffers attrition due to the death of some of its members».

10. Some authors use the adjective longitudinal to refer to both cohort trend studies with repeated cross-sectional studies and panel studies (Glenn 1977; Menard 1991), whereas other terminological purists only apply this adjective to panel studies (Campbell and Stanley 1963).
11. These dummy variables were created from a cohort table using only two years (1989 and 1993). The intervals of age and cohort have to correspond exactly with the interval of time between the surveys. Therefore, age and cohort were grouped in five-year intervals, which correspond to the five years between these two surveys (1989-1993). We obtained nine five-year intervals of cohort and age, excluding, for theoretical reasons, those individuals over sixty. This is also the reason why we could not include more periods in the model. The interval of time between the other surveys was different, making it impossible to include them in the model. For a detailed discussion of this model, see Mason et al. (1973).

12. Tolerance among all these variables was very low, and the variance-inflation factor (VIF) very high, indicating high collinearity among the variables. Linear relationships between the independent variables make the least-squares regression coefficients unstable. Coefficient standard errors are inflated, leading to the possibility that the null hypothesis might not be rejected when it is in fact not true (error type II). Small changes in the data may substantially modify the regression coefficients, whilst scarcely raising the sum of squared residuals (SME). See Fox (1991, 10-21).

13. To confirm the statistical significance of some of the cohort variables, we performed a Joint Hypothesis Testing for Collinearity, finding a significant F statistic. Multicollinearity among these variables was, therefore, causing us to fail to reject the null hypothesis.

14. These are standard procedures in many longitudinal studies attempting to evaluate period, cohort, and age effects. For a detailed discussion of these questions, including some applications, see Menard (1992).

15. Graaf and Evans (1996, 612) state that the “advantages of so doing are twofold. First, the identification problem can be solved, and second the predictions become more informative because the characteristics that should impact on a given dependent variable are clearly specified”.

16. Graaf and Evans (1996, 627) also maintain that the severity of war experiences and education are the most important predictors of postmaterial values.

17. In a more detailed analysis, Graaf and Evans (1996, 627) reach the same conclusion, although the preferential relation between education and postmaterialism could have more implications than those considered by Inglehart (1990a and 1995).

18. The Spanish unemployment rate was 5.7 per cent in 1977, reached a maximum of 24.1 per cent in 1994, and stood at 22.4 per cent in 1996.

19. Party identification in Spain is only a secondary variable for the analysis of political conflicts and electoral behavior. Regardless of the measure used, the levels of party identification observed among Spaniards are extremely low (Gunther and Montero 1994).

20. We had to use the subjective dimension of class, as reflected in survey answers to the question “What social class do you think you belong to?” We would have like to have had some other variables to measure objective social class, but unfortunately they were not included in this survey. Income was, however, included in the CIRES surveys, but it was not found to be statistically significant.

21. The variable used here is the frequency of church attendance. Because of the small number of cases, we have not included any variable measuring regional conflicts, which are obviously extremely relevant in Catalonia and the Basque Country.

22. We grouped the six cohorts of Figure 1 into three cohorts, creating dichotomous variables with each. We multiplied the two youngest and oldest cohorts by each variable measuring some political cleavage. Finally, we regressed the left-right scale on those new variables representing the interaction of political cleavages with older and younger cohorts.

23. The survey, codirected by Richard Gunther, Francisco Llera, José María Maravall, José Ramón Montero, and Francesc Pallarés, was carried out by DATA, and financed by the CICYT (SEC95-1007), as part of the Comparative National Election Project (CNEP).

24. The ten issue scales, ranging from 1 to 10, were as follows: (1) “Defend our traditional religious and moral values” vs. “Defend the individual right to be and believe whatever he or she wants”; (2) “Protect the environment to make our cities and countryside more habitable and beautiful” vs. “Promote economic growth without environmental restrictions on corporations”; (3) “Improve social and public services” vs. “Cut taxes”; (4) “Distribute income more evenly” vs. “Create more incentives for individual improvement”; (5) “Nurture the European Union” vs. “Maintain Spain’s national independence”; (6) “Maintain order” vs. “Defend individual
rights»; (7) «Privatize public corporations» vs. «Maintain the existing public corporations»; (8) «Declare abortion illegal» vs. «Declare abortion legal»; (9) «Work hard and compete for individual improvement» vs. «Maintain solidarity, and not competition, with workmates and a good atmosphere in the workplace»; and (10) «Increase citizens’ participation in important governmental decisions» vs. «Allow the government to make rapid decisions based on its expertise».

25. For a detailed analysis of the strength of this authoritarian/libertarian dimension as a component of the materialist/postmaterialist conflict see Torcal (1992).

26. The regression obtained was the following: 
   \[ Y = 4.646 - 0.983X_1 + 0.270X_2 - 0.564X_3 + 0.000X_4 \]  
   All the coefficients were statically significant for \( p < 0.05 \) with the exception of \( b_4 \).

27. It would have been better to treat these interactions as dummy variables, but in this 1993 survey age has already been grouped into seven categories, making it impossible to repeat the cohort analysis performed above.

28. The different positions on the scale were measured through dichotomous variables.

29. This fact explains the position of issues, such as «fight social inequalities», close to the postmaterialist items. For a detailed discussion of the interactions between the two conflicts see Torcal (1992). For the concept of sociotropic interest, see Kinder and Kiewiet (1979).

30. In the 1993 survey a 1-7 ideological scale was used. In this way we grouped these values as follows: (position 1) extreme-left; (2 and 3) left and centre-left; (4) centre; (5 and 6) right and centre-right; and (7) extreme-right.

31. In the four general elections held between 1982 and 1993, the Socialist Party won between of 48.4 and 38.8 per cent of the vote (between 58 and 45 per cent of the seats), which allowed it to form single-party governments. Support for the conservative party rose from 26 per cent of the vote in the eighties to 34.8 per cent (40 per cent of the seats) in 1993. In the 1996 elections, the PP won power with 38.8 per cent of the vote (45 per cent of the seats), whilst the Socialist Party returned to the opposition with 37.5 per cent of the vote (40 per cent of the seats).

32. During the eighties, the Communist Party (Partido Comunista de España, PCE) and later IU won between 4 and 9 per cent of the vote. In the 1996 elections IU obtained 10.6 per cent of the vote and 6 per cent of parliamentary seats.

33. In the last elections, their combined share of votes and seats was some 6 percent, but their strategic position has enabled them to play a decisive role in supporting the minority governments of the PSOE and then the PP.

34. We had to exclude the regional (and most significantly the Catalan and Basque) parties from this multidimensional analysis due to the small number of cases, and in spite of the prominent role they play within the Spanish party system.

35. In the Spanish case, the success of the traditional parties has been favoured by the persistent organizational and electoral failure of the Green parties. Since the mid-eighties, their leaders have proved incapable of implementing strategies of fusion of the numerous groups existing, of reducing the excessive number of lists presented in elections, or avoiding highly divisive ideological disputes. See Baras (1992).

36. Klingemann, Hofferbert, Budge et al. (1994, 272) use sentences as quantitative units for their analyses of election manifestos. Although their system seems more reliable, for the purpose of this paper we have relied in the simpler technique of counting lines rather than sentences.

37. We should also mention that IU has adopted different names in some Spanish regions, some of which refer to the Verdes (Greens). For instance, according to the Fourth Federal Assembly hold in 1994, IU’s official name in Andalusia is Izquierda Unida Los Verdes-Convocatoria por Andalucía; and in Catalonia, Iniciativa per Catalunya-Els Verds.

38. The postelectoral 1993 survey reflects some short-term effects produced by the election campaign. For this reason, we have opted to use the 1992 survey in this part of the paper.

39. It should be noted that the Green parties were not included in the questionnaire in 1989, and therefore we could not take them into account in Figure 5.
For a more detailed discussion of the sources of change and constraints in party politics, see Rohrchnieder (1993).

REFERENCES


