Edward Malefakis is Professor of History at Columbia University (New York). This paper is based on four lectures presented at the Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences of the Juan March Institute in Madrid on December 10, 12, 17 & 19, 1991. The lectures coincided with Juan Linz’s 65th birthday and were dedicated to him, as is this paper, with deep appreciation for all he has done over the years to foster scholarly interest in Southern Europe.
Introduction

About twenty years ago, in the early 1970s, a new term entered the academic vocabulary—Southern Europe. Occasionally the term included France, and sometimes Yugoslavia, Malta, Cyprus and even Turkey as well. But for the most part it referred to four countries—Portugal, Spain, Italy & Greece. It was logical that this should be so, because of the striking similarities in their recent development. All had been economically backward, socially divided and politically unstable countries. But in the 1960s they showed important signs of change, change whose overall progressive direction was indicated by the dramatic events of 1974 and 1975, when dictatorships fell in Portugal, Greece and Spain. Further confirmation appeared in the late 70s and early 80s when, despite the many problems which accompanied them, the transitions to and consolidations of democracy in these countries proved successful enough to become models for the rest of the world. The details of Italy’s evolution are different, as its dictatorship had been shattered in World War II. However, as I will try to show later, its stages of development were roughly the same. Severe political and social crises continued up to the early 1980s. The image of a stable and prosperous Italy is very recent, and has quite shallow roots.

The events of the past two decades have thus confirmed the usefulness of the idea of “Southern Europe,” and converted it into one of the principle concepts through which we analyze the European experience of the present and future. But to what extent is it also viable in the past? This question will be my central concern in these lectures. The concept of Southern Europe has gained currency among sociologists, anthropologists and above all political scientists; does it also merit adoption by historians? The four nations have recently been moving together toward the European norm. But how and why did they diverge from that norm in the first place? And did they differ from it in similar ways?

These are difficult questions to answer. The “European norm” in itself is a shadowy, ever changing thing which defies precise definition. Even worse is that, given the extraordinary complexity of society, it is hard to determine when some group of Europeans is “different” from or “similar” to it. In the face of such difficulties, is the exercise worth undertaking? The answer seems to me affirmative for two reasons, one intellectual, the other moral. The intellectual justification
rests on the fact that, however inadequate the classifications it comes up with, the human mind is condemned to categorize experience so as to be able to deal with it. The complexities of the real world must be simplified if they are to be made comprehensible; the mind has to impose some kind of order if it is not to be overwhelmed by chaos. We do this every moment, in every aspect of our thought.

To take the idea of an “European norm” as an example, it is clear that for the past two centuries this norm has consisted of what is usually considered to be the common experience of the so-called “Western” European nations—England, the Low Countries, France, Germany and Scandinavia. But was this experience all that common, even if we leave aside the smaller countries and deal only with England, France and Germany? The first two were old states; Germany was not created until 1870. France’s population stagnated for a century, while Germany’s grew quickly and England’s soared. Overseas empire was a profound element in the English and French experience, but not in the German. The peasantry was utterly destroyed in England, remained a significant though secondary social group in Germany, and in France stayed so dominant that it set the tone of the Third Republic. England pioneered the industrial revolution but then proved unable to adapt to its changing nature, Germany came late to industrialization but subsequently never ceased playing a leading role in it, while France industrialized slowly and steadily, without great surges forward or major declines. France after 1789 had a strong democratic tradition, England grudgingly moved towards democracy through the slow evolution of its liberal tradition, while in Germany first authoritarianism, then totalitarianism predominated up to 1945.

These are major differences, and we could cite others of equal importance. On what grounds then do we group together such disparate countries as “Western Europe”? The only justification is that we must create categories of some kind if our experience is to become intelligible, and French, English and German history overlapped in enough important aspects to make grouping them together intellectually meaningful. But if the category of “Western Europe” is useful, and that of “Eastern Europe” as well, a third category, “Southern Europe,” might also help illuminate the European past. Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece differ greatly among themselves, to be sure, but
probably no more than the Western nations do, and certainly not as much as those of Eastern Europe, where contrasts are especially extreme. Even if this new category proves unsatisfying, the attempt to create it would at least serve to direct scholarly attention to each of the four countries. At present, because they do not fit comfortably into the existing West/East dichotomy, their history, except for a few dramatic episodes like Italian Fascism or the Spanish Civil War, tends to be neglected by all but indigenous scholars.

This is the intellectual rationale for our project, but it also has a moral justification. Just as the human mind must categorize if it is to understand, so too it inevitably assigns value judgements to what it considers valid. Because the French, English and Germans regarded themselves as the European norm, it was easy to look down on those who had failed to live up to it. Never mind that their own actions were sometimes the most heinous possible. Never mind that the people they deprecated were largely responsible for laying the very foundations of Europe. Although some residues of admiration remained for the Greeks, Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese, on the whole they became contemptible to the northerners who constituted the European mainstream. One can see this in many ways, among them the French saying that “Africa begins at the Pyrenees,” and British attitudes towards their Spanish allies during and after the war against Napoleon. Even so broad a man as Arnold Toynbee, a classical scholar of overarching historical imagination, dismissed the Greeks as “wogs” while living among them in 1911-1912.

Far more terrible, however, was the internalization of these negative value judgements among the Southerners, because they too shared the vision of historical truth created by the north. Their self-contempt became intense and affected many of their attitudes and actions. We can see it on all sides. Sometimes it was directed only against other sectors of the nation, by the northern Italians against the southern, or by the Catalans against the Castilians. But it usually was directed against the nation as a whole. In Spain, Cánovas del Castillo was not entirely joking when in 1876 he defined Spaniards as those “who cannot be anything else.” Greeks often referred to their homeland as psorocóstena, “the flea-ridden old hag.” The great statesman of liberal Italy, Giolitti, once answered criticism of his policies by saying “a politician is like a tailor and must cut cloth to
the measure of his customers. Italy is a hunchback, so I must make a hunchback’s suit for her.” But the Portuguese were the most pessimistic. In the late 19th century, Eza de Queiros said of his country “The only thing Portugal is good for nowadays is to put yourself across from her and throw stones at her.” And in the early 20th century another literary genius, Pessoa, defined his people thus: “The Portuguese are those who, after having discovered the Indies, were left without employment.”

There is a deep cultural despair in all this, but it is not a universalistic despair of the type that affected German intellectuals in particular. Neither humanity as a whole nor modern civilization in general are at fault; the flaw lies in ones own people. Nor are any indigenous remedies available, like the mystical values which the Panslavists thought would save Holy Mother Russia. Unamuno might say “que inventen ellos,” but neither he nor other Spaniards really believed it. Spain was too much a part of Europe to have any but European ideals, and its continued inability throughout the 19th and most of the 20th century to live up to those ideals left it emotionally defenseless. The same was true for other Southerners. Isolated and alone, each nation saw itself as especially at fault.

By establishing common patterns among the four nations, and indicating that they developed in roughly similar ways, we cannot hope to extinguish this past agony. Yet a certain degree of retrospective consolation can perhaps be found. Italy and Spain especially, but Portugal and Greece as well, have recently been regaining confidence in themselves in their common march toward closer integration with Europe. This confidence will increase to the extent that each realizes that, just as it is not alone now, so too it had company on the inauspicious paths followed during most of the past two centuries.

In order fully to address the issues raised above, one would have to analyze the history, social and economic structures, anthropological patterns and cultural tendencies in the four countries. There is not enough space to do all this in the present setting. Moreover, I have dealt with some of these aspects in another place. Here, as my subtitle suggests, I will defy the prevailing disdain for narrative history and offer an overview of the main historical patterns that characterized the four countries during the past two centuries. Did they have enough in common
Traumatic beginnings (1814 - 1870s)

I begin with the years from roughly 1814 to the 1870s. But to understand this period we must briefly discuss the impact that the preceding one had on Southern Europe. For a full quarter century, from 1789, when the French Revolution began, to 1814, when Napoleon was finally defeated, Europe as a whole passed through an unprecedentedly long and intense period of fundamental political and social change, which affected territorial and institutional structures as well as ideologies. No other set of events except the two World Wars has played so major a role in shaping contemporary Europe. Important everywhere, what special significance did it have for Southern Europe? I will limit my answer for the moment to Spain, Portugal and Italy, leaving examination of Greece for later.

The revolutionary and Napoleonic era affected the Iberian peninsula in four unique ways. First, the wars there were more savage than elsewhere. Most other conflicts of the period were limited, 18th century-style wars: brief campaigns conducted by relatively small professional armies in which the vanquished ceded some territories to the victor and the war ended. The major exceptions were in Iberia and Russia. But whereas the Russian campaign lasted for six months, the Iberian war continued for almost six years. It was especially destructive in Spain, where most of the fighting took place. Indeed, except for the Greek War of Independence a decade later, Spain’s struggle against Napoleon was the fiercest war Europe would know in the nearly three centuries that stretch from the Thirty Years War to the First World War.

Second, again more for Spain than for Portugal, the ravages of the war were compounded by having been preceded by a long period of economic, political and military dislocation. In addition to the discredit brought to the monarchy because of its long association with Godoy, Spain, as a French ally between 1796 and 1808, was almost constantly at war with
England, which among other things meant that it was often cut off from its chief economic resource, the Latin American colonies.

Third, in Spain alone of all Europe, a reasonably coherent model of government arose in which neither French collaborators nor the old royal appointees predominated. This was embodied in the Cortes of Cádiz and the Constitution of 1812, which created Europe’s first major alternative not only to the Jacobinism of the 1790s and to the militaristic Enlightened Despotism of Napoleon, but also to the traditional ancient regime.

Finally, the wars had a more negative effect on fundamental territorial and economic structures of Spain and Portugal. Every other major power emerged with added resources, especially England, Russia, Prussia and Austria. Even vanquished France was allowed to keep bits of territory it had added in the 1790s. For the Iberian nations, by contrast, the war meant the loss of their enormous colonial possessions in Latin America.

In Italy the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era was much more benign, yet also contributed to the political upheavals of the postwar period there. Again, four unique elements existed.

First, only in Italy were all previous state structures and territorial divisions replaced by new constructs. Nothing was omitted, unlike Germany where many states disappeared, but the most significant—Austria, Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria—survived. Indeed, in a moral sense, both Prussia and Austria gained importance, Prussia because of the great reform movement launched by Stein and Hardenberg after its disastrous defeats of 1806, Austria because of Metternich’s role in putting together the coalition that finally defeated Napoleon in 1813-14.

Second, despite the ill-feeling that also inevitably existed against the foreign conquerors, French rule was more universally accepted in and beneficial to Italy than elsewhere.

Third, as a result of the above two factors, the restored Italian monarchs enjoyed less legitimacy than elsewhere, both in north Italy, where French-inspired states had governed for nearly two decades, and in the south, where Napoleon’s appointee, Murat, had become especially
popular during his six-year reign. Unlike Ferdinand VII of Spain, none of the restored Italian kings were “El Deseado,” not even for a brief period.

Finally, several of the postwar political arrangements were guaranteed to foster trouble. This was especially true when Austria, by absorbing Lombardy and Venetia, greatly increasing its hold over Italy. But it was also true of Piedmont’s acquisition of Genoa, and of the attempt by the restored Bourbons in Naples to do away with Sicily’s autonomous status.

Added to these factors which affected either Iberia or Italy were three others they shared in common. Their churches had long been the only ecclesiastical establishments in Catholic Europe which had emerged unscathed from the era of the Protestant Reformation. And now, after the long ordeal of the French Revolution and Napoleon, they had become more intransigent and vindictive, as well as more powerful because of the eagerness with which the restored monarchies sought them out as allies.

Second, the position of army officers in Italy and Iberia was especially confused. In Spain, some had served with the guerrillas, others primarily under the Cádiz government’s command, still others had long been held prisoners by the French. In Italy, almost all officers had served the French satellite states, usually quite happily so. In Portugal, since the court had fled to Brazil and no indigenous government replaced it, the army had been under English control from 1808 to 1814.

Finally, two new, irregular forms of political activity arose, in stronger form in Southern Europe than elsewhere. The first, guerrilla warfare, manifested itself above all in Spain, but surfaced also in parts of Italy. The second, more puzzling, was the proliferation of secret societies—Carbonari in Italy, Masons in Spain, the Sinedrio in Portugal—during the wars and immediately after them.

The above factors combined were a sure recipe for political turmoil. This might nevertheless have been avoided had the restored monarchs followed conciliatory policies, as in France. Instead, repression was imposed by insecure rulers who lacked hegemonic authority of the kind established by the ruling circles of Prussia, Austria, Russia and Britain in the closing
in the closing phases of the wars. This was especially true in Spain, where besides crushing the constitutional movement, Ferdinand VII embarked on the nearly impossible task of trying to recover the American colonies. But it also occurred throughout Italy, above all perhaps in Piedmont, the future center of Italian unification. In Portugal, anomaly was added to repression because the king could not make up his mind to return from Brazil and the regency council which ruled in his stead was dominated by a foreigner, the English general Beresford.

The conflict between liberalism and absolutism broke into the open in March 1820, when Riego’s revolt forced Ferdinand to accept constitutional rule. Within a year, revolution also triumphed in Naples, Portugal and Piedmont. A Southern European paradigm had come into existence. Each revolt helped stimulate the next one; army officers and secret societies played a major role in all of them; clerics were prominent opponents; the great mass of the population, especially in the countryside, remained passive, strongly supporting neither side, nor taking advantage of elite dissensions to press causes of its own. All four revolts sought to convert the reigning monarchs to constitutionalism, not to overthrow them; all four—remarkably—adopted as their provisional legal framework the Cádiz constitution of 1812.

The new Southern model alarmed Metternich, who convened a Congress of the Great Powers at T罗poeau, and got it to authorize foreign intervention to restore absolutism. This principle was easily implemented in Italy, where Austria itself could provide the necessary armies, so the liberal regimes of Naples and Piedmont were crushed in 1821. The task was more difficult on the Iberian peninsula, due to its location, Spain’s large size, and overt British opposition. Nevertheless, in 1823, a French army invaded Spain and easily made its way south, driving the nearly defenseless revolutionary government before it.

The revolutions of 1820-23, the military means by which they were crushed, and the protracted repressions which followed them gave special intensity in Italy and Iberia to the European-wide struggle between liberalism and absolutism. In France, the Low Countries, the Germanies, even Austria, absolutist repression had polarized society only once, in 1814, and then had tended to be mild. In Spain and much of Italy, absolutist restorations took place twice, and the repressions of the 1820s were generally harsher because the rulers had become even more insecure organized
groups of royalists had emerged which sought to wreak vengeance on the rebels. The same was true in Portugal, although there were certain differences of detail. It was now—in the 1820s and early 1830s—that the familiar figure of the Spanish, Portuguese and Italian political exiles in London appeared.

Yet absolutism would prove less durable in Southern Europe than in the Austrian Empire or most of Germany. Paradoxically, the seeds for its demise in the Iberian peninsula lay in its triumphs of the 1820s. Not content with the victories achieved, royalist extremists tried to force the restored monarchs to adopt even more reactionary programs, and when they would not accept turned to brothers of each king—Miguel in Portugal, Carlos in Spain—as champions of their cause. In Portugal, the dynastic conflict became violent in 1828, when Miguel seized power in a coup. Spain’s turn came in 1833, when the followers of Carlos refused to accept the infant Isabel as successor to Ferdinand, and took up arms to depose her. The united absolutist front was thus broken in both countries; the less extremist monarchists were forced to turn to their former liberal enemies for support. This in turn meant accepting the principle of constitutional monarchy, as well as much of the rest of the liberal program, especially restrictions on the power of the Church and abolition of feudal property rights.

Constitutionalism was thus established in Spain and Portugal by the back door, so to speak—without enthusiasm, because part of the right had acquiesced to it rather than through an outright victory of the liberal forces. And the process of consolidating liberalism would prove far more costly than in other parts of Europe. First, it was necessary to defeat the remaining absolutists; this meant three years (1831-34) of full scale civil war in Portugal and seven years (1833-40) of fratricidal conflict in Spain. Then, the anti-absolutist coalitions which arose constantly threatened to unravel on two fronts; court circles could not stop dreaming of a return to some new form of absolutism, and many progressives felt that the compromise settlements on which the coalitions were based were too limited. As a result, open conflict occurred within the anti-absolutist alliance, and continued long after the Miguelists and Carlists had been defeated. We cannot discuss this conflict in detail here, but it was almost as destructive as the struggle against absolutism itself. In Portugal, extra-constitutional means were used to bring about political change in 1836, 1842, 1846, 1847, 1849
and 1851. Most important were the Maria da Fontes revolt of 1846, with violence throughout the north, and the Patuleia of 1847, a seven month civil war between moderate and progressive liberals.

In Spain, the dissension within the liberal camp first became acute in 1835, during the Carlist War, and continued at fairly high degrees of intensity for nearly a decade, with the progressives usually in control. The moderates under Narváez took over in 1844, however, and established a hegemony which spared Spain the terrible agony that Portugal experienced in the late 1840s, and kept it from participating in the European-wide revolutions of 1848. Neo-absolutist nostalgia in court circles helped upset the balance in 1854. But the new round of progressive rule lasted only two years, and was more conciliatory towards opponents than before. Greater toleration also characterized the next decade (1856-66) as O'Donnell tried to unite moderates and conservatives in the Liberal Union party. Thus a long period of comparative tranquility, from 1844 to 1866, followed the three decades of continuous instability that Spain had experienced from 1814 to 1844. The struggle of liberalism against absolutism had been fiercer in Spain than Portugal; but in compensation it seemed that the conflicts within the liberal camp would not be as destructive. This appeared to be confirmed by the grand coalition Prim put together between 1866 and 1868 to overthrow Isabel, whose court, besides being corrupt, was again flirting with neo-absolutist solutions.

The September 1868 revolution, dubbed “La Gloriosa,” was meant to be like England’s “Glorious Revolution” of 1688, the gateway to a peaceful and prosperous future. Instead, Spain was plunged into its sharpest conflicts since the 1830s. Some of the trouble, especially the Cuban revolt (1868-78) and the early growth of anti-systemic forces, were not related to dissension among the liberal elites who had led the revolution. But a major portion of it was. Had the elites themselves followed more closely the liberal precepts they advocated it would not have been so difficult to find a monarch to replace Isabel, the position of the one who finally accepted (Amadeo of Savoy, 1870-73) would not have been undermined to the point that he felt obliged to resign, the Federal Republicans would not been thrust into power prematurely and precipitously, and the Carlists would not have swelled into such an imposing force. The end of the experiment--from 1873 to
1876--was particularly disastrous, with full scale civil war again erupting for the second time in four decades as the military crushed Cantonalist revolts and simultaneously beat back Carlist armies. In the end, intra-liberal conflicts had ended up costing Spain almost as dearly as the struggle against absolutism.

As we have seen, the Italian pattern was similar to the Iberian in the 1810s and 20s. But it began to diverge in the 1830s. This is partly because there were no dynastic struggles of the Miguelist or Carlist kind anywhere in Italy to split the absolutist camp. Hence absolutism stayed intact there for a longer time. Evidence for its survival exists in the repressions that followed the liberal risings in Modena, Parma and the Papal States in 1831, in the crackdown carried out in Piedmont in 1832, and above all in the policies followed on a daily basis in the Bourbon kingdom of Naples and Sicily. It was also indirectly reflected in the growth of Mazzinian republicanism during the 1830s and 40s; since no Italian ruler accepted constitutional monarchy, as the Iberian monarchs at least nominally had, the idea of a republic could appeal to more Italians.

This situation would not change in Naples and Sicily; absolutism got a new lease on life after the revolutions of 1848 were crushed there. Indeed, this third great wave of repression, which inspired Gladstone’s wonderful dictum that Ferdinand II’s rule was “the negation of God erected into a system of government,” was even more brutal than its predecessors. But in Piedmont the issue of Italian nationalism gradually created a sort of modus vivendi between liberals and absolutists. The former wanted Italian unity because it was sacred to them; the latter saw that by driving the Austrians out, Piedmont could aggrandize its territory.

The decisive moment came in 1848, when revolution in Vienna, Milan and Venice briefly shattered Austrian power. The Piedmontese king, Charles Albert, cast his lot with liberalism by granting a constitution and leading his armies into Lombardy. Nationalism thus served as a functional equivalent in northern Italy to the dynastic struggle which had broken the absolutist front in Portugal and Spain. But it provided a more solid basis for reconciliation as both sides continued to need one another, especially as Austria soon reconquered Lombardy. The alliance
also had the good fortune during its first decade to be shaped by one of Europe’s greatest statesmen, Cavour. Its apotheosis came in 1859-60. Because of French help a new attempt to drive the Austrians out of Lombardy was successful, liberals seized power in the central Italian principalities and proclaimed union with Piedmont, and finally Garibaldi toppled Bourbon power in Sicily and Naples with miraculous ease. Italy had substantially been unified, and this great feat had been accomplished by moderate liberals working together with a moderate monarchy.

Thus, if Italy experienced a long and bitter struggle between absolutism and liberalism, especially in the south, it largely escaped the intra-liberal conflicts that characterized Spain and Portugal. Liberalism’s conservative and radical extremities were drained off respectively by Papal antagonism and Mazzini’s republican movement. The more moderate liberals, kept together by absolutist persecution prior to 1848, gained cohesion after that date by their acceptance of Piedmontese leadership of the nationalist cause and by the tutelage Cavour exercised over them, in domestic matters as well as foreign policy. Court circles were less tempted by neo-absolutist solutions because they had benefitted so spectacularly from the liberal alliance--the new Italy was nearly six times the size of Piedmont!

Besides, absolutism lost one of its chief defenders when the Church, angry at Italy’s incorporation of the Papal States, broke off relations with the new kingdom. Another contrast to the Iberian península was that the army had ceased being an active force in politics. The praetorian tendencies of the 1810s and 20s withered away because they were not reinforced, either by civil wars, or by factional strife among the liberals, or by crypto-absolutists striving to revise the constitutional order. Moreover, nationalism had provided the army with a sufficient focus for its energies.

In Spain and Portugal, liberalism had established itself prematurely, before most absolutists were really ready to accept it, before it had worked out internal disputes and achieved a certain degree of coherence. In Italy, these changes had happened, so liberalism was more stable and secure. But Italian liberalism had suffered costs of a different kind, especially in the realm of ideals. Like Isau, it had sold its birthright for the plate of lentils called national unification. By allying itself
too closely with the Piedmontese royal cause, by rejecting too completely the chief rival ideology, Mazzinianism, by accepting too willingly the cynical diplomatic manoeuvering and the false plebiscites by which Cavour achieved unification, liberalism had sown the seeds of its future sterility. The central defect was that its democratizing currents had atrophied; hence, Italian liberalism was always further away from the common people than was the case in Spain where democratizing tendencies kept reappearing, from the Cortes of Cádiz, to the progressive liberals of the 1830s and 40s, to the 1869 constitution.

Itself marred, liberalism did nothing to keep Italian unification from becoming deeply flawed. The dream of agrarian reform by which Garibaldi had aroused the southern peasantry was never translated into reality; indeed, the power of the local padroni was increased. The promises of regional autonomy were abandoned and there was no attempt to adjust national integration to local needs. Instead, abruptly and brutally, Piedmontese laws and structures were imposed on the new areas. This particularly hurt the south, whose backward economy was suddenly invaded by the more advanced northerners.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the first six years after unification brought great turmoil to Italy, especially in the south, where a low-grade civil war-called “brigantaggio” by the authorities to discredit it--cost more lives than all the Italian wars of liberation combined. Unification was tarnished in other ways as well. Its hero, Garibaldi, soon drew away from the policies of the new state. In foreign affairs, Italy began to acquire something of the jackal-like reputation that Mussolini later strongly reinforced, as it ineptly went about incorporating Venetia and Rome in 1866 and 1870. And by the latter year, a humiliating contrast to Italy's situation had appeared as Prussia triumphantly completed its unification of Germany.

As for Greece, it had long since discovered that achievement of independence did not guarantee entry into the promised land. But it was somewhat less responsible for its plight. To begin with, its task had been much greater than Italy's. No Greek state had existed for several centuries, and if Greek society under the still-powerful Ottoman Empire had remained surprisingly dynamic, its main centers were in Asia Minor, not in the long-impoverished peninsula that
would become home to the new Greece. The details of the epic Greek struggle for independence between 1821 and 1830 cannot be recounted here. But four points are relevant.

The Greek rebellion had mostly indigenous causes, but was also related to contemporaneous events in Italy and Iberia: its emotional roots were developed during the Napoleonic era; a secret society, the Filikí Etería, organized it; it broke out in March 1821, soon after the Iberian and Italian revolutions we discussed earlier. Second, the war was even more destructive than Spain’s struggle against the French, especially between 1824 and 1827 when Egyptian forces joined the Turks against the Greeks. Third, it could not have been won without intervention by England, France and Russia on Greece’s behalf. Fourth, having rescued Greece from defeat, its guarantors would not go on to force the Sultan to accept viable boundaries for the new state. Instead, a dwarf state, only a third of Greece’s present size, was created.

So severely truncated an entity was condemned to follow a policy of perpetual irredentism. This was dangerous, constantly threatening to bring disaster upon Greece. Its domestic consequences were also bad, as it diverted attention from domestic problems and lent strength to demagogic postures. In addition, Greece had one other source of weakness which made it unique within Southern Europe: the relative primitiveness of its society after centuries of being neglected by Constantinople as well as being cut off from the west. A physical infrastructure of cities, ports and roads had never been built; a social infrastructure of associations and legal codes scarcely existed; most arrangements were ad hoc ones; most areas lived unto themselves; there was no real middle class.

Both these factors of uniqueness conditioned the liberal-absolutist struggle in Greece. Its history went through phases similar to those of its western counterparts, but their meaning was often different because of the vast discrepancies in degrees of social development. The constitution proclaimed in 1827 could probably not have been implemented by anyone in so primitive a society. Absolutism was not necessarily retrograde; the despotic rule of Capodistrias from 1828 to 1831 and of the new king, Otto of Bavaria, from 1833 to 1843 had important modernizing functions. The civil wars of the 1831-33 interregnum involved anarchic conflict among local interest more
than principled struggle over ideological issues. The first major western-style political event was probably the army-led revolt in Athens in 1843. But the constitutional regime that was established had very shallow roots. Mavrocordatos, Greece’s most progressive liberal, was quickly pushed aside by the less idealistic Kolettes. And on Kolettes’ death in 1847, his faction also collapsed, so that court circles—making full use of the irredentist issue—easily recovered much of their earlier freedom of action.

It would not be until fifteen years later, in 1862, when a full generation of peace had permitted society to develop further, that Greece began to fit more fully into the Southern European political dynamic. Otto was overthrown by a widely based, military-led coup which had some resemblance to Spain’s Gloriosa revolution a few years later, except that its tendency to degenerate into widespread violence was checked more quickly. In 1863, a new king, George of Denmark, was found, a new constitution proclaimed, and as a crowning touch to Greece’s increasing modernization, England transferred the relatively westernized Ionian islands to it. All traces of Greek uniqueness would not disappear overnight, of course. Remnants of social backwardness and the undiminished importance of the irredentist issue continued to distinguish it from Italy and Iberia. But the gap was gradually being closed.

I have ended up devoting most of this section to political matters, but the period from 1814 to the 1870s was above all a political age, especially in its early decades. There was as yet very little working class organization. Occasional social upheavals took place in a few cities like Barcelona where industrialization was getting under way. They were more significant in rural areas where large property predominated and where new factors, like desamortization in Andalusia and the appearance of autonomist movements in Sicily, had helped upset the traditional social balance. But no secular movement could as yet exercise as much influence over the masses as religious institutions did. All the great popular upheavals of the period were essentially conservative, in part because clerics helped mobilize them. This was true of the Spanish rising against the French of 1808, of Portuguese peasant support for the Miguelist regime in 1828-34, of peasant adherence to the Carlist cause in Spain in 1833-40, as well as of peasant participation in the southern Italian brigantaggio of 1860-66. The most dramatic instance, however, occurred in Greece, where
fervent popular support for the cause of independence to a large extent was based on religious appeals.

On economic issues, the following points seem especially relevant. First, the intense political conflicts of the 1810s, 1820s and 1830s probably helped divert attention from the technological revolution emanating from England. The loss of human capital represented by the many exiles also must have contributed to the halting and limited nature of the Southern European response. Nevertheless, incipient industrialization dates from the early 1830s in Catalonia, a dense network of persons concerned with economics had arisen in northern Italy by the early 1840s, and a Portuguese minister--Fontes Pereira de Melo--distinguished himself after the early 50s by his advocacy of the need to create favorable conditions for economic growth.

Second, Southern Europe was handicapped in the new industrial age for a variety of reasons. Spain, Greece and also Portugal had suffered severe war damage in the 1810s and 20s. The so-called agricultural revolution, which helped initiate and sustain industrialization elsewhere, could not advance as rapidly because of the mountainous terrain and thin soils of much of Southern Europe, as well as because of its dry climate. Transport costs were high: there were no navigable rivers, and canals were economically inviable; moreover, the mountainous terrain made the building of roads--especially railroads--very costly. Finally, except in Spain, the basic raw materials of the new age--coal and iron--were lacking.

Third, economic development was affected in contradictory ways by the massive desamortizations of landed property which were among the unique characteristics of Southern Europe during this period. The desamortizations were especially important in Spain where huge quantities of church, communal and noble lands were disentailed, above all from 1836-43 and 1855-75. In Portugal, church and noble properties were principally affected, and the 1830s were the key period. In Italy, much had already been done during the Napoleonic era, but considerable quantities of church land remained to be disentailed, in Piedmont during the 1850s, in central and southern Italy during the 1860s. This opening up of much of the land to capitalist-style exploitation helped stimulate
agricultural production. But at the same time it diverted resources from other, possibly more useful industrial investments, and considerably aggravated rural social conflicts.

Fourth, significant beginnings were made toward the creation of a modern economic infrastructure during the 1850s and 1860s. Most important was railway building, which the mountainous terrain of much of Southern Europe made both extremely costly and especially necessary for inter-regional communication. To a considerable extent, these works were made possible by the fact that Southern Europe became the first site for large-scale foreign investment. French investment in Spain was particularly noteworthy.

Fifth, the economic uniqueness of two regions—Catalonia and northern Italy—gradually began to become discernible. In Catalonia, development was based above all on cotton textiles, which enjoyed a secure colonial market in Cuba and the Philippines. The flourishing of northern Italy had more complicated causes. The medieval and Renaissance traditions of entrepreneurship undoubtedly contributed, though they were scarcely decisive, as regions like Tuscany and Piedmont played different roles from those of earlier ages. More important was the prosperous agriculture made possible by the good soils and non-Mediterranean climatic conditions of the Po valley, the ease of communication permitted by its level terrain, the economic liberalization carried out by Cavour in Piedmont during the 1850s, and the intense concern with economic issues which had characterized Italian intellectuals since the late 18th century, and was reinforced from the late 1830s onward as economic development became linked with national unification.

In northern Italy, therefore, political factors to some extent indirectly contributed to economic growth. For most of Southern Europe, however, the correlation tended to be inverse during most of this period, as political conflicts and the lingering traces of absolutist and religiously oriented thought were added to poor physical resources as obstacles to economic development. Yet the economies of all four countries experienced significant change, and a basis was laid, especially during the 1850s and 60s, for the still more considerable transformations that would occur during the last three decades of the 19th century. In short, Southern Europe economically occupied an intermediate position in Europe as a whole. It did not develop as dramatically as
Western Europe, but was more deeply affected by the new economic trends than was most of Eastern Europe.

What was true economically, was even more so politically. We might summarize our main conclusions thus far as follows. Liberalism and constitutional monarchy represented the greatest transformation of political relationships that had occurred in Europe since the Middle Ages. In Russia and Eastern Europe absolutism was so powerful and society so backward that the issue of constitutionalism hardly ever arose, and when it did, was swiftly and decisively crushed. In the Germanies, liberal impulses were active on occasion, but in the end neo-absolutism triumphed under Bismarck. In Western Europe the political and social roots of liberalism were so strong that, although there were many difficult moments, the struggle against absolutism was won relatively easily and quickly. The European South resembled the European West in that its process of political modernization began equally early and also ended in the establishment of parliamentary regimes. But it differed from Western Europe in every other way.

The social bases on which Southern European liberalism depended were less developed, so the conflict with absolutism was more severe. It began to be won only after dynastic splits or dynastic self interest caused the moderate absolutists to join forces with their old liberal enemies against the extremists. Moreover, because of liberalism’s precocious victory, the struggle against absolutism per se was followed in Iberia, though not in Italy, by almost equally severe conflicts among the liberal forces, as well as between them and court circles which periodically tried to cut back the political compromise achieved.

Spain provided the most extreme example of protracted and severe conflict. In the sixty-three years between 1814 and 1876 it experienced several dozen important but failed insurrectionary attempts, ten successful revolutions or counter-revolutions, and eleven years of full-scale civil war. Portugal’s agony was shorter, but was almost as extreme, especially in that Portugal became the only other European country besides Spain to endure two major civil wars. In Italy, the costs were high in the peninsula as a whole from the 1810s to the late 1840s, and continued to be exacted in Naples and Sicily until 1866. In Greece, the liberal-absolutist and intra-liberal struggles took
somewhat different from and were less intense, but nevertheless characterized the entire era from
the achievement of Greek independence to 1864. The South thus stood in contrast to both of the
customarily accepted European models. Unlike Russia, Eastern Europe and the Germanies, its
fight against absolutism began very early and would eventually be crowned with liberal triumph. In
comparison to Western Europe, its struggle for parliamentarianism was longer and more bitter,
progress towards its goal fluctuated wildly, and the liberal regimes that finally emerged were
more deeply flawed and less secure. In sum, Southern Europe during the early 19th century
belonged fully to the Western European mainstream in its aspirations, but not in other ways. A
beginning had been made toward political modernization, but it was a traumatic beginning, one
that left deep wounds which would affect Southern Europe’s future evolution.

**Defective Consolidation (1870s-1914)**

The turbulent years just described were followed by a long period of domestic and
international peace. This gave the Southern nations an opportunity to make up for lost ground by
consolidating themselves, both politically and economically. To an extent, they were successful in
doing this. But once again their achievement was ambiguous, and the end of this period found them
economically somewhat better off than before, but socially much more bitterly divided and
politically quite bankrupt. As a result, our four countries were no better prepared to confront the
terrible challenges that would be posed by the twentieth century than they had been to face the
gentler ones introduced during the nineteenth century.

What were the reasons for the new tranquility which settled over Southern Europe, beginning
with Portugal in the 1850s, continuing with Italy and Greece in the 1860s, and finally reaching
Spain in the 1870s? I will leave discussion of the economic factors involved until later. Among
political factors, the most startling was the drastic change in the behavior of the leading actors of the
previous era. Court circles led the way, by finally making their peace with constitutionalism. In
Italy, this was done primarily so as to gain liberal support for the nationalist cause. In the other
three countries, exhaustion might have been the most important reason, as recurrent attempts by
the crown to move toward some sort of neo-absolutism were decisively defeated. A change of monarch was usually required: the death of Maria da Glória in Portugal, the ousters of Otto in Greece and Isabel in Spain. But once this had occurred, royal power became far less obtrusive than before, intervening in politics infrequently, and then often more to facilitate the functioning of the constitution than to sabotage it.

With court circles well-behaved and dissension among the political elites diminished, military intervention into politics also became rare, especially in support of right-wing causes. Such intervention had been frequent in all four countries from the 1810s to the 1850s; it continued in Greece up to 1864 and in Spain for a decade longer. But after 1874 not a single successful insurrection inspired by or associated with the armed forces was recorded in Southern Europe until the 1909 revolt in Greece and the 1910 Portuguese revolution, both of them leftist oriented efforts. Nor did military leaders any longer play a significant role in daily political life. Spain’s chief ministers had been drawn almost entirely from military circles between 1840 and 1870, but only one, who served in a caretaker capacity, came from the armed forces between 1875 and 1923. The same contrast is apparent in Portugal after 1870, when the generation of officers active during the civil wars of the 1830s and 1840s died out.

The role of the Church was also transformed. Its political power earlier in the century had principally been derived from two sources: the support it received in court circles and the massive following it could generate in certain rural regions. Both bases of strength had eroded. In Italy, relations with the king had been severed over the state’s incorporation of Rome and the papal territories. In the other nations, Church ties with royalty were weakened because of the fundamental reorientation which had occurred when the crown accepted liberalism. Nor could the Church any longer inspire peasant masses into action. This was partly due to the lesser isolation of rural areas from the rest of society, especially because of large-scale construction of railways and roads from the 1850s onward. But it was also because the Church had never been able to arouse the peasants on its own, but always required a secular ally—the Miguelists in Portugal, the Carlists
in Spain, the Neapolitan Bourbons in the brigantaggio of 1860-66. And such allies were now lacking.

But the most striking change was in the comportment of the political elites. Spain, the most extreme example of intra-elite conflict in the past, now became a model of cooperation. In the four decades between 1833 and 1874, sixty-seven governments headed by forty-seven individuals had succeeded one another, often via coups, insurrections or court intrigue. During the next quarter century, until 1899, two persons, Cánovas del Castillo and Sagasta, governed for almost equal amounts of time during all but a few months of caretaker cabinets. A similar peaceful alternation in power had been taking place, somewhat more irregularly, in Portugal since the 1850s, as Regeneradores and what came to be called Progresistas succeeded one another in office.

In Italy, no similar system of rotation in power existed. Indeed, at first, the two major parties seemed sharply divided. Cavour’s heirs, the Piedmontese-based Destra, governed aloofly, acting as though they had an inherent right to office because of their role in unifying Italy. Their rivals, the more regionally dispersed and loosely organized Sinistra, campaigned strongly against Destra conservatism and fiscal austerity. Tension mounted as Sinistra strength grew, but when a changeover in power finally occurred in 1876, it proved anti-climatic. The Destra did not attempt to keep office through extra-constitutional means and the Sinistra turned out not to be very leftist in practice, despite its name. Rather, it sought to “transform” former opponents into supporters via the granting of favors and by avoiding controversial initiatives. On the whole it succeeded, and thereby evolved into a huge agglomerate of diverse factions, whose tone changed depending on the shifting power of the groups within it. Thus, rather than following the Iberian model of two parties—one “liberal,” the other “conservative”—alternating in power, Italy after 1876 was governed mostly by a single diffuse association.

All three systems—Italian “trasformismo,” Portuguese “rotativismo” and Spanish “caciquismo”—helped assure peace among the ruling classes. But the cost paid was high, since such smoothly functioning systems could be kept going only through massive corruption. The corruption was in part electoral, and this aspect of it is what the Spanish term “caciquismo”
emphasizes. But corruption was also present on an everyday basis in almost every political act, since the falsified electoral results could not stand unless they were accepted by the party elites, and this in turn required that these elites establish a consensus among themselves through the trading of favors. This aspect of the question is what the Italian term “trasformismo” emphasizes.

Another prerequisite for the system's existence, of course, was a backward society, with high degrees of illiteracy and poverty but low levels of working class organization. In the places where these conditions did not exist, it was difficult to implement the electoral aspects of the system, so that what might be called the consensus of corruption among the party elites also could not function in that particular region. In Spain and Portugal for most of our period, few places were exempt from cacique control. They included the largest cities--Madrid and Barcelona from the 1890s on, and Lisbon and Oporto after 1900. Signs of breaking away from the system also occasionally appeared in entire regions, most importantly in Catalonia during the first decade of the twentieth century. But these islands of electoral freedom were generally very small. In the rest of the Iberia peninsula the cacique system predominated, and did so independently of the local social structures, as it was as much in evidence in small property owing Galicia, Castile and Minho as in latifundist Andalusia and the Alentejo.

Italy was no laggard in electoral manipulation, and at first the transformist system operated pretty much uniformly throughout the whole country. That conditions were roughly the same as in Spain is suggested by the fact that in 1895, anti-dynastic parties of the left—the Republicans in Spain, the Socialists, Radicals and Republicans in Italy—held approximately the same proportion of seats—twelve and fourteen percent—of their respective parliaments. But things changed after this date as northern Italy, already somewhat more advanced economically than other regions, separated itself from them still further by especially rapid and successful industrialization. A large and expanding island of electoral freedom was established, particularly in the Po valley, and within it political activity was relatively free and honest. The extent of the change would be apparent twenty years later, just before World War I, when a full third of the Italian parliament consisted of leftist deputies, mostly chosen in the northern provinces, whereas in Spain the Republicans and
Socialists combined had actually fallen in numbers, to less than ten percent of the Cortes seats.

But if Italy had a major island of electoral freedom it also had the greatest zone of servility within its boundaries. This extended southward from Rome, and included Sicily and Sardinia. Here a political understanding had gradually emerged between the local and national political elites. Rome would not interfere in local affairs, and would allow local notables to run them as they wished, backing up their actions with police and even military support if necessary. In return, candidates of Rome’s choosing would be elected. It was these “ascari” who enabled the dynastic forces to keep control of parliament even after the anti-systemic parties grew strong in the north. The local effects of this political understanding were even worse than the national ones. Before Italy had been unified, the Bourbon monarchy had occasionally interfered with the dominance exercised by local notables in the south, by protecting the traditional rights of the poor, for example, or in connection with sporadic modernization attempts. After unification, the central government began to neglect the south in every respect, thus leaving it at the mercy of landlords. This guaranteed that the south would not develop economically; the gap in relative levels of prosperity, already considerable at unification, kept growing larger. It also meant that local institutions like the mafia would change function. Previously, its relations with the peasants had ambivalent, often preying on them but sometimes also helping them; now its units would become sinister instruments of domination, mostly for the local notables, but sometimes also on their own account.

Italy had the largest single area of unfreedom, but Spain was probably the nation in which the cacique system was most effective and deeply rooted. The decline in the Republican vote in the 1910s and 20s suggests this, but still more convincing evidence is that in Spain the cacique system could operate even under a system of universal manhood suffrage, while its counterparts in Portugal and Italy had to keep suffrage severely limited (to between one-sixth and one-third of the adult male population, depending on the period) to achieve the same results. Spain's adoption of universal manhood suffrage is perhaps the best symbol for the hypocrisy of this entire period. In
1890, Spain became the only major parliamentary nation besides France and the United States to give the vote to all males; in consequence the electorate sextupled in size. But it made almost no difference in the electoral results; the cacique system kept functioning for the next 33 years, until Primo de Rivera finally overthrew it. The voting reform had been a meaningless gesture in what was becoming an increasingly empty liberalism.

The desire to transcend elite conflict was understandable, particularly in Spain and Portugal where it had damaged society so severely in the preceding period. But the cost paid was very high. Dishonest and corrupt, liberalism became increasingly discredited, especially during the 1890s, when each country underwent economic and foreign policy disasters (soon to be discussed) for which the liberal regimes were held responsible. This wholesale rejection of liberalism was not entirely justified, of course. In every country, liberalism had also brought positive changes, not least in the development of civic institutions, press freedom and legal reforms. Except for the Italian south, all regions of each nation had probably benefitted from the liberal regime. But these accomplishments began to seem increasingly irrelevant even to many of the elites who most benefitted from them, as their sense of justice was offended by the political corruption, and as the gap between their countries and the more advanced European powers became more evident.

Paradoxically, liberalism functioned most honestly in the most backward of our societies, Greece. This was because of the overwhelming importance of the irredentist issue there, and the genuine differences of opinion it inspired among the elites. For some, it was madness to try to use the recurrent crises in the Balkans to recover Greek lands still under Ottoman control; unless Greece was made strong beforehand by major programs of economic and military modernization, she would go down to defeat. For others, to wait so long was treasonous: fellow countrymen were being maltreated, and if Greece did not act the newly risen Slav liberation movements in Bulgaria and Serbia might take over her heritage. For two decades, from the mid-1870s to the mid-1890s, this conflict was personified by Trikoupis for the modernizers and Deliyannis for the nationalists. As an indication of his remarkable stature, Trikoupis was able to win power during most of the period. But in 1895 a major economic crisis during the preceding two years and the cumulative effects of the austerity
programs he imposed on the population brought him down for good. Deliyannis also fell, in 1897, because of the disastrous war he blundered into with Turkey. With both major alternatives at least temporarily discredited, Greek liberalism entered a phase more like that of the other countries, and elections became less bitterly contested. Electoral corruption always existed on the local level in Greece, of course, as did strong patron-client relationships which were also alien to the spirit of liberalism. But at least corruption had never become as systematized on the national level as in the rest of Southern Europe.6

With this partial Greek exception, we must conclude that the liberals, once having achieved the goal they had fought for throughout the first part of the 19th century—parliamentary government—made a mockery of it with their corruption and manipulation. The chance provided by the long period of relative domestic peace to consolidate liberalism was missed, and it would never return as a newly conflictive age opened in the 1890s. The consequences of the liberal failure proved long-lasting. In part because no true liberalism had evolved in Southern Europe in the 19th century, it would be difficult for stable democracy to emerge in the region in the 20th century.

Before we turn to these matters, however, a few words should be said on the economy, as here too initially promising prospects remained frustrated in the end. A three-stage pattern of boom (1870s and 1880s), deep economic crisis (1890s), and renewed prosperity (1900-1914) provides a rough approximation of economic developments in all four countries. It also distinguishes them from both Western and Eastern Europe, where a two-stage pattern tended to predominate, of slow growth in the 1870s and 1880s and rapid advance thereafter.

One major reason for the different course followed by Southern Europe was the phylloxera disease which began to affect French vineyards severely around 1870. For nearly two decades, until the late 1880s, French output was sharply reduced; wine had to be imported in huge quantities and at high prices from the Mediterranean countries, the only other significant producers. Additional factors contributed to the boom in each nation. In Spain, there was a spectacular increase in mining, especially of iron ore in the Basque country after 1876. The great prosperity of the Cuban sugar industry, which in turn enabled Catalan textiles to prosper, was also important.
In Portugal, the cork and canning industries came into being on a large scale. In Italy, Sicilian sulphur mining had significance, as did the building craze in Rome after it became the capital in 1874. Even more decisive was the activist role assumed by the state, which facilitated a doubling of the railway network between 1870 and 1890, as well as expansion of the steel and shipbuilding industries and considerable land reclamation works in the Po basin. In Greece, vineyards were doubly blessed, benefitting from wine exports to France, but even more from the surprisingly large currant trade which sprang up with England. Additional stimulus was given to the economy by increased capital investments from diaspora Greeks, the development projects of Trikoupis after 1875 and the addition of Thessaly, with its rich agricultural plains, in 1881.

The boom collapsed in the late 1880s and early 1890s. The factor which had helped make it possible now turned against Southern Europe as French vineyards recovered from phylloxera, wine exports dropped sharply, and the disease spread (albeit in milder form) to Iberian and Italian vineyards. Another common element (this one shared with western Europe) was the continuing decline in grain prices as railways and steamships made American and Russian wheat cheaper than domestic production. The collapse occurred first in Italy, where the crises in wine and wheat were exacerbated by the 1887-92 tariff war with France, Italy’s chief trading partner. Exports of all kinds fell precipitously, and foreign capital was withdrawn, which in turn helped bring about the great banking crisis of 1893-94, when several leading banks closed and the entire system had to be reorganized. To make matters worse, Sicily’s semi-monopoly on sulphur production was broken by Texas mines, the raw silk industry of Piedmont and Lombardy began to be seriously affected by Asian competition, and the engineering industry showed a negative growth rate. Some observers consider 1887 to 1895 to have been “the darkest years of the Italian economy.”

Greece fared little better: its economy slowed as wine prices declined in the late 1880s, and then went into a tailspin when competition appeared from California for the English currant trade. Northwestern Peloponnesus in particular became a disaster area, and in 1893 Trikoupis was forced to suspend payment on state debts as well as halt the ambitious developmental projects he had inaugurated. To complete the disaster, Greece had to pay the
Ottoman Empire a large indemnity after the 1897 war, and accept an international commission with control over its finances to ensure that the payments schedule was met.

On the Iberian península, economic calamity was even more closely related to political troubles. The Portuguese fiscal crisis of 1890-92 was precipitated by the English ultimatum of 1890, which shattered the stability of the currency as well as confidence in the economy. In Spain, revolution in Cuba and the Philippines got underway in 1895, and culminated in 1898 with the loss of both colonies after the humiliating defeat by the United States. The Catalan textile industry was seriously affected as, except for the rural regions of Spain, the colonies were its principal markets.

Thus, in the early 1890s, as Western Europe was emerging from its two-decade long “great depression” Southern Europe was falling into a depression of its own. It proved surprisingly short, however, in part because of a new common factor which affected all four countries. The same cheap transportation which damaged local grain producers enabled emigrants to go abroad in unprecedented numbers. By the beginning of the 20th century, emigration to the Americas had reached flood proportions and Southern Europe supplied more of it than any other region. This was partly because Southern Europeans--especially Italians, but also Portuguese--were unique in emigrating to both of the Americas. There was also considerable seasonal migration to France by Italians and Spaniards. Greeks went both to the United States and to more traditional centers of the Greek diaspora, especially Egypt. Whatever their destinations, the emigrants sent vast sums home. This export of human beings often proved more valuable than any of Southern Europe’s material exports. By 1910, for example, emigrant remittances covered two-thirds of Portugal’s average trade deficit and were equivalent to more than one-fourth of the annual state budget.

The timing and degree of recovery varied with each country. Italy which had plummeted earliest, recovered soonest and most spectacularly. In addition to especially large emigrant remittances, Italy developed two other major sources of invisible earnings in tourism and shipping. Because of the Alps she also became the first Southern European nation to acquire, via hydroelectricity, a reasonably adequate supply of inexpensive energy. At the same time, many of the land reclamation projects started decades earlier began to pay off. Both developments benefitted
primarily the Po valley, whose lead over the rest of the country in agriculture and industry was greatly accentuated. And for the first time in perhaps three centuries, northern Italians showed that they could pioneer in new industries with such firms as Fiat and Olivetti. By adding new activities to its earlier lead in traditional manufacturing, the “industrial triangle” of Piedmont, Lombardy and Liguria now took shape, as did the “agricultural quadrilateral” of the first two regions plus Emilia-Romagna and the Veneto. Between 1896 and 1914 Italy experienced her first “economic miracle,” and by this fact pulled far ahead of Spain for the first time.

Before congratulating Italy, however, we must remember that she also witnessed striking economic failure. The progressive north was born, but so too was the retrograde south. Differences between the regions had existed for centuries, of course, but never to this degree. Unification reinforced the north by bringing together its various parts for the first time since the Romans, but emasculated the south by shattering its autarchic existence and placing it under the control of negligent masters. The neglect was especially lamentable in the 1890s and 1900s, given that emigration, overwhelmingly southern, made possible new beginnings both by reducing population pressure at home and through the massive remittances sent from abroad. Some efforts were made to encourage southern development, to be sure, but these always had low priority. The Iberian nations and Greece might henceforth be poorer than Italy as a whole, but no region within them was as hopeless as the mezzogiorno. A bifurcation of almost schizophrenic proportions had appeared, which denied Italy entry into the ranks of the advanced nations.

Greek recovery was also impressive given the degree of collapse between 1893 and 1897. A contributing factor was the merchant fleet’s successful transition from sail to steam, and its growing role in the carrying trade, especially of Russian grains. Also significant was the rising prosperity of the Greek colony in Egypt, which maintained particularly close ties with the peninsula.

As for Spain, massive iron ore exports enabled her to ride out the crisis in viticulture. They also served as the basis for development of major metallurgical industries in the Basque country, and of a more extensive national banking system. Both these new creations were indirectly aided by
the Cuban disaster, the banks because of the capital repatriated from the island, the shipbuilding and steel industries by the need to rebuild the navy. The increase in citrus fruit exports after 1900 was also important, as was the growing availability of hydroelectric power from the Pyrenees to Barcelona, still Spain’s most important industrial region, even though it had failed to keep up with Italy’s “industrial triangle” by adding new industries to its traditional manufacturing base.

This three-stage pattern of the Southern European economies—boom conditions in the 1870s and 1880s, crisis in the 1890s, recovery and even prosperity after 1900—in turn affected the political patterns of the 1870-1914 period. Prosperity contributed to the political stability of the first two decades, while economic crisis accentuated the political crisis of the 1890s. But as a testimony to the primacy of sociopolitical over economic factors, the return of prosperity in the 1900s did not bring with it a return to stability. Indeed, the greater complexity of the Southern economies, particularly the higher degrees of urbanization and of capitalist penetration into agriculture, intensified political protest.

The 1890s constitute the turning point, both because of the humiliating disasters that befell our four countries then, and because new forces which had not previously played major political roles gained force. The disasters all related to foreign policy, once again displaying the intermediacy of the Southern nations, which could have colonial ambitions but lacked the strength to fulfill them.

Portugal’s crisis occurred in 1890, when its oldest and closest ally, Britain, forbade continued Portuguese expansion in Africa. Utterly dependent on British protection for the colonies they already possessed, the Portuguese had to swallow their pride and comply with the ultimatum. Italy’s turn to be humiliated came next, in 1896, when Crispi’s forward policies in Ethiopia led to the rout of an Italian army at Adowa, the first time African troops had been able utterly to defeat a major European force. Greece followed in 1897, marching bravely into Macedonia against the Ottoman Empire in April, and by May begging desperately for foreign intervention to prevent Turkish armies, already deep into Thessaly, from continuing south towards Athens. Disgrace also came quickly for Spain in its war with the United States in 1898: destruction of its Pacific fleet took but a week, the loss of Cuba and Puerto Rico only three months. Nothing mitigated any of these
disasters; there were no heros, no inspiring moments when the tide of battle might have been turned, just unrelieved defeat and humiliation, which seriously undermined the already weak legitimacy of the existing regimes.

This legitimacy would be further eroded over the next two decades by new forces which emerged in the 1890s. For Italy and Spain, the most important were organized worker movements, unique in Europe because they encompassed rural as well as urban labor, and included major anarchist as well as socialist components. The movements grew most rapidly and acquired greatest strength in the Po valley, which combined industry and capitalist agriculture in an unusually propitious way and so provided easy recruiting grounds. In Spain, labor growth was slower because of the organizational split between anarchism and socialism (Italian anarchism operated from within socialist unions rather than separately), and because no single region, not even Catalonia, presented as favorable conditions as the Italian north. The more constant repression in Spain (partly provoked by greater anarchist excesses) also counted, as did the fact that Spanish socialism did not attract intellectuals until the 1910s, and thus lacked the many links with the middle classes which Italian socialists enjoyed.

In Portugal, socialism and even anarchism existed, but on a modest scale given the low levels of industrialization, as well as the fact that the large landholding regions were so lightly populated that rural labor could not give an organizational lead. The most significant dissident force, therefore, was Portugal’s republican movement. This reaped most of the benefits of the 1890 humiliation, and during the next two decades became remarkably successful in being all things to all men, appealing strongly to intellectuals, businessmen and nationalists, but also developing a considerable following among urban workers.

In Greece alone it is impossible to pick a single force which was paramount in organizing opposition to the existing polity. Greek society had become more complex since independence, yet it was even less developed industrially than Portugal, its urban centers were smaller, its rural society more egalitarian. No significant working class movement could arise under these conditions, but
neither was there a republican tradition, despite the foreignness of Greece’s kings and the ineptness the royal family had often displayed, especially under Otto up to the 1860s. Resentment and disillusion thus filled the air, but lacked specific focus.

Two other new forces also contributed to the crisis of legitimacy: regionalism in Spain and the Nationalist movement in Italy. Catalan regionalism, which had grown slowly during the previous half century, was greatly accelerated by the 1898 disaster. An open and highly complex struggle between Barcelona and Madrid would henceforth characterize Spanish politics. It helped fuel other sources of discord, among them Basque nationalism, although this was as yet too modest to count for much. By acquiring great symbolic importance in military circles (which saw it as a step toward the disintegration of Spain), Catalanism also helped revive, after 1905, the tradition of army intervention into politics.

As to the Nationalist movement in Italy, this was a new creation. It sprang up abruptly about a decade after the humiliation at Adowa with a radical critique both of foreign policy and of most other aspects of the Italian state as well. The Nationalists drew support from businessmen and intellectuals while playing on the theme of Italy as a “proletarian nation” which required for its salvation fundamental reform and stern policies, both domestically and internationally. By 1911 they had developed a corrosive power perhaps unmatched by any elite organization in Europe, as the interventionist crisis of 1914-15 and their role in the rise of Fascism would soon prove.

In a sense, the Nationalists were but an extreme manifestation of a broader movement. After the turn of the century the cacique-type solutions which had seemed viable for decades had been exhausted in all four countries. A consciousness that something new had to be done permeated even the political elites, and caused the consensus among them to be replaced by confrontation. Conservatives usually advocated a “revolution from above” to be carried by strong governments relying on the “vital forces” of the nation for support; the liberals responded with demands for greater democratization.

In Spain, the Conservative party itself took the lead in the movement for “regeneration,” first under Silvela in the early 1900s, more decisively in 1907-09 under Maura.
In Portugal, the political parties were too moribund to provide a lead, so in 1906 the king, Carlos, took the initiative over their protests by allowing Joao Franco, an ex-Regenerador, to rule “dictatorially” (i.e., without need of parliamentary approval). Italy after Adowa also was moving toward some sort of royal semi-absolutism, in which the paraphernalia of liberalism would be retained, but power would ultimately reside with ministers appointed by the crown. Sonnino laid out the rationale most effectively in 1897, and it came closest to being implemented during the premiership of Pelloux (1898-1900). Only in Greece was there no swing to the right: as in Portugal the major parties were too moribund to be capable of such initiatives, and the king did not act in their stead. But the vacuum was to some extent filled by intellectuals like Dragoumis, and by a tiny group of young parliamentarians led by Gounaris who, after the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, came to be known as “the Japanese party” because of their draconian demands for renovation.

Conservative regenerationism failed wherever it was tried. Maura’s authoritarian reformism, so contrary to the spirit of deal-mongering of the earlier period, alienated first his Liberal counterparts, then most of his own Conservative party and the king as well. He was dropped from the helm in 1909, after the Semana Trágica rising in Barcelona, and never again gained political hegemony. In Portugal both major parties bitterly denounced Franco, and brought him down after his royal protector, Carlos, was assassinated in 1908. In Italy, the struggle against the emasculation of parliamentary rule benefitted from the explosion of social tension in the Milan popular rising of 1898, and won a resounding victory in 1900 when the highest court ruled against Pelloux’s decree powers, thus forcing elections which were swept by parties of the center and the left. In Greece, since conservative reformism was never applied even in embryo form, the old parties continued to govern in a confused, stumbling way.

The failure of neo-conservatism meant that power passed to other forces. In Spain and Italy, these were the democratizing sectors of the liberal parties, who tried to reinvigorate the political system by opening it. The process was most complex in Italy, where it constituted the essence of the long Giolittian era (1903-14). The complexity arose because although Giolitti sought new ends (the incorporation of previously marginalized groups into politics), he continued to use
use the corrupt practices of trasformismo to achieve them. Moreover, a broader spectrum of forces had to be integrated into politics than elsewhere, as the old system had excluded Catholics as well as the urban and rural poor. Giolitti’s flirtations with Radicals and Socialists, his tendency to allow strikes to take their course without using state power to crush them, together with his cautious foreign policy, made him the main object of Nationalist scorn. But at the same time his flirtations with the Catholics, his reliance on sinister local notables in the mezzogiorno, and his tampering with elections whenever possible, earned him the hatred of progressive intellectuals like Salvemini.

Giolitti embodied the dilemma of the democratizing liberals. Continuing to rely on the principles of the Enlightenment, lacking the mystique that apparent radicalism gave to neo-conservative doctrines, attempting to maintain a balance among all social classes rather than dismissing some as not constituting part of the “vital forces” of the nation, they could proceed only haltingly, with their every step certain to alienate one group or another. Canalejas in Spain is another case in point. The strong man of the Liberal party by 1910, he assumed office under the propitious circumstances created by Maura’s neo-conservative fiasco. But his ambitious program of political and social reform was soon undermined from both right and left, and it is doubtful that he could have matched even the ambiguous achievements of Giolitti had his career not been ended by assassination in 1912.

In Portugal, events followed a different course. Because the dynastic parties remained as paralyzed after 1908 as before, republicanism could seize the initiative. Oporto merchants, Lisbon shopkeepers, even the traditionally conservative Coimbra University students flocked to the cause, as did many army and navy officers. In 1910 these groups launched Southern Europe’s first successful revolution since 1868, ousting the monarchy with little bloodshed and proclaiming a republic. The old mold was broken; slow-moving Portugal had set a new course. Not democratizing liberals, but politicians who were presumably radical (in pre-1914 Europe, republicanism was anti-systemic and radical almost by definition; only one other republic existed, France) held the reins of power. As such, Portugal in 1910 was a harbinger of events in Italy in 1919-22, Greece in 1922-24 and Spain in 1930-31. There was no causal connection between it and the others, as had been true of the revolutions of 1820-21: the World War and other factors
provided explanation enough for developments in the other nations. Yet Portugal once again became
the first to exemplify the new Southern pattern. She had moved from great political violence to a
long period of stability under a fraudulent liberal regime in 1851, a decade before any of the others.
Now what was purportedly full democracy had come to her nearly a decade before it appeared
elsewhere.

Greece also struck out in unexpected new directions. Its situation resembled Portugal’s
in that the inertia of the old parties was legendary, but differed from it because George was less
interventionist than Carlos, and there was no equivalent of the Republican party. Nevertheless, in the
urban centers and among army officers the disgust against “old-partyism” was so intense that a more
limited, but still important, revolution took place. It started in 1909 when army units at the Goudi
base just outside Athens demanded political as well as professional reforms, and were quickly
seconded by city crowds. No violence occurred and the exact purposes of the revolt long remained
uncertain as no organization capable of defining them existed among the dissidents. Only after six
months and three governments did a solution emerge as Venizelos, called to Athens from Crete by
the military league as arbiter, convinced the king to convocate a constituent assembly.

In retrospect, the limited way in which Venizelos used his opportunity is surprising; the
constitutional changes made were relatively minor, as were the social, economic and administrative
reforms that accompanied them. Venizelos would especially come to regret the political and
military prerogatives left to the king. But at the time, his moderation seemed wildly successful.
Having reconciled king and dissidents, Venizelos created the Liberal party which, in the elections
of December 1910, won the largest majority ever recorded. His triumph became complete two
years later in the Balkan wars of 1912-13. At one blow, many of Greece’s long frustrated irredentist
ambitions were suddenly realized. Macedonia, Epirus and many Aegean islands were taken; Crete
finally could unite with Greece; Turkey and Bulgaria were badly defeated. The country almost
doubled in territory and population; it gained a major city in Salonica and rich agricultural lands in
Macedonia. A dwarf state even after its 1864 and 1881 accretions, Greece now became larger than
Servia or Bulgaria (although it remained about 25% less populous than Portugal). It would not be excessive to speak of an apotheosis of Venizelos by late 1913. Never before had anyone been so popular anywhere in Southern Europe; for the first time a leader had been able to couple the energies of nationalism to the purposes of democratizing liberalism. In contrast to Spain and Italy, the fortunes of Greece seemed promising on the eve of the Great War; with enormous popular support and a strong party behind him, Venizelos appeared likely to be able carry out that blend of democratization and modernization which eluded both Giolitti and Canalejas.

But what might be called the curse of Southern Europe would not be lifted so easily for Greece, any more than for Portugal, Italy or Spain. The new era that was dawning--the third in the model we are constructing--would prove grim for all of them, much worse than the one which preceded it, worse even than the post-1814 period. The Southern European nations had been incapable of using the relatively stable and prosperous 1870s and 1880s to make up for lost time and create stronger foundations for the future. The liberal order and capitalism were consolidated, but in defective ways which left them weak in the face of the new challenges that began to appear in the 1890s. On the eve of the First World War, Southern Europe as a whole was in sorry shape. Corrupt liberalism of the transformist type was now discredited, but no other form of liberalism, either of the neo-authoritarian nor the democratizing kind, sponsored by the ruling elites seemed capable of replacing it. A subculture of fierce conflict between capital and labor had become deeply rooted, and revolutionary working class movements continued to grow. In each country, moreover, special problems had arisen which were at least partly caused by the sterility and ineptness of the governing classes during the preceding decades--Catalan regionalism in Spain, radical rightist currents among Italian intellectuals, a narrow and fanatical republicanism in Portugal. There were few bright spots to compensate for these negative factors.
Conflict & Collapse (1915-1949)

Already quite different from either Western or Eastern Europe, the uniqueness of our four countries was accentuated further by the impact of the First World War on them. In consequence, they became the only nations on the winning side in the war to go through a full-scale social and political crisis during the interwar period. The crisis was particularly sharp in the early postwar years. In the Latin nations it took the form of strong attempts to democratize politics and society. These efforts failed and led instead, between 1922 and 1926, to the establishment of dictatorial regimes, which differed from each other in many ways, but which also had many resemblances.

It is more difficult to give coherence to the 1930s. Even though this decade was characterized by especially important interaction among the four countries, they diverged from each other more than was generally true earlier. Spain parted company with its Latin sisters when the Primo de Rivera dictatorship collapsed, the Republic rose and fell, and the Civil War ravaged society. In mid-decade, Italy also separated itself by entering on a dangerous path of foreign policy adventurism. On the other hand, Greece, which had managed to hang on to its democracy during the 1920s, fell under dictatorial rule in 1936.

The 1940s added new elements of disaster in every country except Portugal. Spain passed through terrible repression and physical privation, World War II finally fully released the evil potential latent in Mussolini’s dictatorship, and Greece suffered the horrors first of Nazi occupation and then of full-scale civil war. Right up to 1950, havoc still reigned in many corners of Southern Europe.

One significant distinguishing factor appears at the very beginning of our period—the manner in which Italy, Portugal and Greece entered the war. Since the 18th century, the main lines of conflict in European history have run east and west, not north and south. This tendency again prevailed in August 1914, as the broad belt of nations from England to Russia precipitously rushed into war. In contrast, Southern Europe was not forced to join in the combat by the immediate course of events, and could choose for itself whether and when to enter. This advantage proved a double-edged sword, as the agonizing decision over whether to take part in what soon came to
be recognized as unprecedented human slaughter polarized Southern society, not only during the agonizing months or years when the decision was being made, but long after. Even in Spain, which for various reasons never came close to becoming a belligerent, the controversy had importance.

The interventionist crisis in Italy, from August 1914 to May 1915, is best known because “radiant May” became part of fascist mythology. It was important for the future in four ways. It created fascism in embryo by bringing together for the first time Nationalists, right-wing liberals, revolutionary syndicalists and Socialist dissidents like Mussolini. It fostered irregular methods of political action, both via the local interventionist groups which arose in northern and central Italy and imposed their views on opponents, and through the intimidation of parliament on the national level. It split the liberal camp, and weakened the position of its main leader, Giolitti. Finally, it caused a decisive shift leftward in the major working class group, the Socialists, who opposed the war more passionately than any other group, including the Catholics or the Giolittians.

In Greece, the interventionist controversy began in early 1915 as a dispute between Venizelos and the king, but ended up spreading to the whole of society and being of even longer duration and greater intensity than in Italy. The Greeks themselves refer to what happened as the Dihasmós the “Schism” which split the nation into two antagonistic camps. One hated Venizelos as a warmonger and a puppet of the British and French, the other despised Constantine for denying Greece the chance to recover irredentist territories from the Ottoman Empire and modernize herself through association with the Entente. The schism took on many of the features of civil war, especially from mid-1916 onward as the Entente instituted a blockade against royalist Greece to force it to accede to the war and Venizelos set up a rival government in Salonica. The issue was not resolved until the Entente forced Constantine to abdicate in June 1917. For more than two years, civil strife had raged in Greece and left it bitterly divided.

Once in the war, no country experienced such brilliant triumphs as to heal old wounds and forge a new consensus. The reality, rather, was of miserable trench warfare, where no breakthroughs could be made despite enormous casualties. Modern combat revealed the weakness weakness
and incompetence of the Southern states, both on the battlefield and on the domestic front, where corruption abounded, taxes rose and inflation appeared. As a result, the pre-war conflicts re-emerged under new guises during the war. In Portugal, the interventionist controversy itself had been less intense than in Greece and Italy, but the divisions it helped arouse endured after war was declared in March 1916, and increased once troops actually began to be sent to France in early 1917. Anti-war sentiment was a significant factor in the civilian-military revolt that caused the overthrow of the government in December 1917 and its replacement by the Sidonio Pais dictatorship. In Italy, the hatred between the pro-war groups and the Socialists grew, especially in the spring and summer of 1917 when the Socialists were accused of sabotaging the war effort through strikes whose true cause was more likely the incompetence and insensitivity of those responsible for organizing industrial production. But the worst divisions continued to be in Greece. From 1915 to 1917 the Venizelists had usually been victimized by the royalists, so once they took charge they began to settle old scores, especially through purges of royalist state employees and army officers.

After the war, severe discord characterized many parts of Europe, but they chiefly occurred in two types of countries—those which had lost the war, like Germany and Austria, or those which were new creations, as in most of Eastern Europe. On the winning side and among the neutrals there was relatively little conflict, except in Southern Europe. With their wartime experiences undermining the already weak legitimacy of their states and adding to the accumulated grievances of their societies, the Southern nations entered into acute crisis once the war had ended. This was true even in Spain; although it had remained neutral, the indirect effects of the war had helped upset its precarious pre-war balance.

Except in Portugal, the crisis had important foreign policy components—Smyrna and Thrace for Greece, Fiume and the Dalmatian coast for Italy, Morocco for Spain. Indeed, in Greece the external factors assumed such vast significance between 1919 and 1922 that they outweighed domestic considerations; for this reason, I will leave Greece for later examination. In the three Latin nations domestic issues were paramount—greater political liberty and social equality, civil rights, agrarian reform, tax reform, even the continued existence of the capitalist system. During the
early stages of the crises, the initiative was held by the left-of-center forces, whose energies had been galvanized by the general revulsion against war, the democratic aura that emanated from the appealing new visions presented by President Wilson, and the stirring example given by the Russian Revolution. The right was usually on the defensive; only gradually would it recover its old assertiveness.

The specific mix of forces was different in each country. Paradoxically, the tension first openly erupted in Spain, precisely because it had stayed out of the war and thus had less justification to nip political dissent in the bud. The complex, many-sided conflict was initiated in July 1917 as a seeming breakdown of the command structure in the army gave hope to Reformists, Republicans, Catalans and Socialists that they might be able to force the regime to call a constituent assembly to democratize and decentralize the political system. This demand was made in an “Asamblea de Parlamentarios” in Barcelona, and was followed by a Socialist-led revolutionary general strike in August. Both these initiatives failed, but the pressure from the left was revived in new form in 1918, and continued so strongly until 1921 that these years came to be called the “bolshevik triennium” in Spain. Labor became the most active force, with the anarchosyndicalist CNT now replacing the socialist UGT as the principal actor. Union ranks swelled enormously, as CNT and UGT membership combined reached eight times its 1910-1914 average. Strikes skyrocketed in number, and also increased considerably in scale; they now sometimes involved entire provinces, or attempted to close down a huge metropolis like Barcelona. As would also occur in Italy, peasants as well as industrial workers flocked to the ranks and displayed great militancy. Democratizing pressure from the middle-class groups which had taken part in the Asamblea de Parlamentarios movement also continued, though in weaker form because both the Catalan conservatives and the Reformists reached separate understandings with the regime and no longer sought to overthrow it.

In Portugal, the first blow was struck in December 1918, with the assassination of Sidonio Pais and the disintegration of his year-old dictatorship. The struggles for the redefinition of Portuguese politics that followed were especially chaotic because the Republic lacked a solid central core of defenders. The Republican parties were bitterly divided, with the smaller groups violently
opposed to the Democratic party, but incapable of uniting among themselves to provide a viable alternative to it. The Monarchists, perhaps with Spanish aid, tried to take advantage of Republican differences with revolts in northern Portugal. In Lisbon, the National Guard created to protect the Republic from rightist threats escaped governmental control and itself became a major source of disturbances until 1921, when it was disbanded midst much bloodshed. Working class groups, mostly anarchist inspired, became larger and more active than before, partly because of the Spanish and Russian examples, partly due to the sharp postwar inflation which made it almost impossible for workers to survive on their wages.

In Italy, the chief revisionary force was the Socialist party, which had been proved right in its opposition to the war and was greatly reinforced by the myths engendered by the Bolshevik revolution. In the 1919 legislative elections, benefitting from the new system of universal male suffrage and proportionate representation that had just been put into place, it became the largest party in parliament, with one-third of the seats. In 1920 it swept local elections and won control over many hundreds of municipalities in northern and central Italy. Meanwhile, its labor unions increased sevenfold over their pre-war size. Another major new force was the Populari Party, a proto-Christian Democratic group in which socially progressive Catholics temporarily held the ascendancy. The complex nature of the Populari contributed to Italy’s crisis and to its prolongation, because they could neither ally themselves firmly with the Liberals against the Socialists, nor vice versa. Political stability was also upset by movements which were still unique to Italy within Southern Europe because they sought to combine nationalism and socialism. All of these were minuscule in 1919 and early 1920, including Mussolini’s fascist movement, which both in name and in its initially highly decentralized structure resembled the local interventionist groups of 1914-15.

For all their power, the democratizing forces could not achieve hegemony in Southern Europe. The strength of the trade unions frightened the progressive middle-class parties and prevented the formation of lasting alliances on the left. Worse still, labor excesses (in Italy, Maximalist revolutionary rhetoric on the national level and aggressive use of the new-found union power to impose “labor dictatorships” in many localities; in Spain, verbal excesses plus a strong component
of physical violence emanating from the CNT “action groups”) gave the ruling classes an excuse to institute repressive measures against them. In Spain, these usually took the form of state action, either open and direct, as when martial law was declared in Cordoba to end the rural agitation there, or covert, as when Martínez Anido unleashed his wave of police terrorism against the CNT in Barcelona. In Italy, the government was headed by democratizing liberals like Nitti and Giolitti, so repressive actions usually originated outside the regular state apparatus, even though they clearly depended on their success on the connivance of the police, army and many state officials. The classic example, of course, is what happened from the winter of 1920 onward, first in Emilia-Romagna, then in other agricultural regions of northern and central Italy, when local elites turned to the fascist squads of nearby cities and towns as extra-legal means of stopping the Socialist advance, through physical violence against labor leaders, attacks on union properties, and the intimidation or disbandment of Socialist municipal councils.

Thus, leftist ascendancy in the immediate post-war period could not transform itself into a powerful new force capable of instilling its vision upon society. But neither could the left be destroyed entirely through the limited measures which even perverted liberalism of the Southern European kind was willing to allow. Hence, long after any real possibility that the left might take power had passed, society continued in agitated condition, not able to restore the relative degree of order of the pre-war period. In each country, the instability took different form. In Portugal between 1918 and 1926 there were five presidents, thirty-three governments (one of which ended when the prime minister was assassinated), two large-scale insurrections, and many lesser revolutionary acts. In Spain, the bolshevik triennium degenerated into a multi-sided form of urban terrorism called “pistolerismo” which claimed hundreds of lives, among them a prime minister, an archbishop, and the most important CNT leader. The war against rebel forces in Morocco also was going badly; in 1921, at Annual, Spain had suffered a defeat of Adowa-like proportions, and by 1923 there were signs of mutiny among troops being sent to the Rif. In Italy, the Socialists had peaked in the fall of 1920, with the occupation of the factories and their great victory in the municipal elections; from then onward increasingly large-scale fascist depredations were the main cause of the turbulence.
The solution to the instability began to emerge from among the fascists. They had been
given a strong start in the Po valley by the acquiescence of the local authorities to their violence
against the Socialists. On a national level, the prerequisites for their success were the utter
bankruptcy of Italy’s liberal forces and the cunning of Mussolini, who blended mafia-like tactics
with traditional and fully legitimate political manoeuvres. This combination brought him to power in
October 1922, as his forces shifted the center of their operations from the countryside to the cities,
culminating their activities with the “March on Rome.” The Italian example would be followed in
Spain eleven months later, through a military coup headed by Primo de Rivera. In both Spain and
Italy, only the threat of violence was needed as victory was facilitated by the acquiescence of the
respective kings. In Portugal, where there was no king to ease the transition to authoritarian rule,
the struggle was harder, and two attempted military coups failed in 1925. But in 1926, a third
conspiracy was able to overthrow the Republic without much difficulty.

Within three and a half years, from October 1922 to May 1926, Italy, Spain and Portugal
had fallen under dictatorships. This was well before economic depression and Nazi success would
make dictatorial regimes a general European phenomenon. Just as they had taken a lead in their
acceptance of liberalism in the early 19th century, the Southern European nations were
precocious now in turning to dictatorship. The reason lay not in any inherent attraction to dictatorship
per se, but in the utter incapacity of the pre-existing liberal regimes to govern effectively, or to
reform themselves sufficiently to avoid dictatorial solutions. Put differently, liberalism could not
peacefully evolve into democracy in Southern Europe as it did in Western Europe; dictatorships
had to intervene.

There was widespread acquiescence to, even enthusiasm for the new dictatorships. Liberalism
in Spain and Italy and republicanism in Portugal had discredited themselves so thoroughly that few
mourned them. In Italy many of the old liberals actively participated in the pseudo-
parliamentarianism with which Mussolini disguised his true intentions during his first three years in
power. On the Iberian península this did not occur because parliament was immediately shut
down, but neither was there much overt resistance among the political elites. Most intellectuals
viewed the dictatorships favorably at first, seeing in them the hope of national regeneration that
the bankrupt regimes the dictatorships had replaced could no longer inspire. Nor were the worker movements much different. Except for an abortive appeal for a general strike by the minuscule Communist party of Spain, none of the labor groups actively opposed the takeovers in power. The anarcho syndicalists were disorganized and passive, while significant elements of the Socialist trade unions in both Italy and Spain sought to achieve special *modus vivendi* with the dictatorships. The effort failed in Italy, but was quite successful in Spain, where the UGT entered into a kind of corporatist collaboration with the dictatorship which enabled it to strengthen its position considerably. Paradoxically, the only truly fierce resistance to the new dictatorships arose among dissident military men in Portugal, who in 1927 and again in 1931, staged major revolts which received considerable civilian support and occasioned much bloodshed in the major cities.

The Italian dictatorship was different from the other two, of course, if only because of the existence of Mussolini and the Fascist movement. But if we stress the differences too much, we risk overlooking the similarities which existed beneath the surface. Two basic conceptual shifts are required to avoid this danger: first, although Mussolini helped coin the term “totalitarian,” his was not a totalitarian regime; second, although the Fascist movement was indispensable in bringing the regime to power and enabling it to survive the Matteotti crisis, its importance fell sharply after 1926 when Mussolini reduced it to a bureaucratic instrument used mostly for propaganda purposes. Neither the party nor Mussolini’s position within the state was omnipotent. The king, the armed forces, the large industrialists and, above all, the Catholic Church retained much of their former autonomy. So too did the local elites, who continued to dominate local government. For most of the 1920s and 1930s, Mussolini’s was one form of what Juan Linz has called an “authoritarian regime” in which “limited pluralism” of all kinds—especially social and cultural, but also political—survived. Or to use the terminology now current among some historians of modern Italy, fascism represented not so much a “revolution” (i.e., a radical break with the Italian past) as a “revelation”—an accentuating of certain features of that past.

This combination of sameness with newness was one reason why the Mussolini regime was so appealing to outsiders. For Catholic countries like Spain and Portugal, the appeal was increased
by the emphasis fascist propaganda placed on corporativism. The bringing together of employer and employee for the peaceful reconciliation of labor disputes had been at the center of Catholic social doctrine since the late 19th century, and was given new life by the fear the widespread social upheavals of the postwar period had aroused among the elites. Primo de Rivera, through his minister of labor, Eduardo Aunós, was the first to borrow the concept of corporatism and attempt to apply it in Spain. Primo also followed the Italian lead by instituting a single party (the Unión Patriótica) by giving greater rein to nationalist policies (Hispanidad), and by stressing the need for state intervention in the economy to assure faster development (José Calvo Sotelo). In Portugal, the dictatorship took longer to adapt to the new styles, partly because it lacked any leader capable of giving it the coherence that Primo provided in Spain, partly because Portugal’s grim economic situation and the resistance generated by dissident military groups caused it to survive on a day to day basis at the start.

The situation on the Iberian península would reverse itself with the rise of Antonio Oliveira Salazar and the decline of Primo de Rivera. Salazar, appointed finance minister in 1928, had emerged as the principal figure in Portuguese politics by 1930, and began to institutionalize the dictatorship utilizing several of the features of fascism. Over the course of the next three years, an official party was created, a new constitution gave the executive branch unprecedented powers, great emphasis was placed on corporativism, and an “Estado Novo” was proclaimed. On these foundations, together with the firm control he was able to establish over the military, Salazar built an authoritarian regime that would endure for more than four decades. It was very different from Mussolini’s creation in that it eschewed foreign policy adventures and the mobilization of the masses, and was more interested in economic stability than in rapid growth. As against the bombastic Mussolini, Salazar was a quiet man who created a quiet regime. Nevertheless, there were many family resemblances, especially to the Italian Fascist regime between 1926 and 1935, which should not be forgotten.

Spanish events took a radically different turn. In Italy and Portugal, the postwar struggle for democracy constituted a brief parenthesis between oligarchical liberalism and dictatorship;
in Spain, it was dictatorship that seemed destined to be transitory. For a variety of reasons (among them Primo’s maverick nature and his lack of firm support in the army) the regime declined after 1927 and collapsed in January 1930, when Primo resigned office amid mounting difficulties. The king tried to restore some semblance of the old constitutional order, but carried out the process so ineptly that by the time municipal elections were held in April 1931, support for the monarchy had disintegrated and, midst great popular jubilation, a Republic was proclaimed.

There was a miraculous quality about the ease with which the Second Spanish Republic was instituted and the enthusiasm it engendered. After all, the short-lived First Republic of 1873-74 had been a disastrous failure. And during the seven decades which had intervened, republicanism survived precariously. Nor were the electoral manipulations the cacique system used against it solely responsible. Extreme factionalism and republican inability to attract outstanding leaders were also to blame. But somehow, under the surface, both these defects were quietly being transcended during the Primo regime. In 1917-23, the democratic forces were still in such disarray that they could not take advantage of the crisis of traditional liberalism, and thus allowed dictatorship to fill the political vacuum. In 1930-31, these forces united effectively to bring the Republic into being, and remained cohesive long enough to give it an exceptionally attractive and coherent program.

I have written elsewhere about the ambitiousness of the new regime and its idealistic breadth of vision. In the form that first the provisional government, then the Azaña coalition imparted to it in 1931-33, the Republic tried to resolve all the problems Spain had accumulated over the previous two centuries, and to do so honestly and with dignity, following due process of law. Especially noteworthy was the degree of collaboration the left republicans and socialists achieved under Azaña. Rarely, if ever, before in Europe's history had middle-class and proletarian parties worked together so effectively.

All this made the Spanish Republic very different from the Portuguese. I have scarcely discussed the latter because it is so difficult to categorize. It regarded itself as more democratic than the constitutional monarchy had been, yet middle-class frustration over Portugal’s backwardness rather than a desire for greater liberty seems to have been the driving force behind it. This helps
explain the apparent paradox that the republicans reduced the proportion of the population eligible to vote from the already low figure permitted under the monarchy; the only election in which universal manhood suffrage was permitted was held during the brief dictatorship of Sidonio Pais. The narrowness and sterility of Portugal’s Republic is also indicated by the lack of interest in social reform among the middle class parties, and their poor relations with working class groups. Finally, the strong-arm tactics and other forms of unprincipled opposition that the republican parties used against each other, plus the major role military officers played in them, suggests the meanness and corruption which, despite a few idealistic individuals, predominated in the regime.

The Greek Republic of 1924-35 also lacked the nobility of the Spanish Republic, though it accomplished considerably more than did the Portuguese, and under more difficult circumstances than either of the Iberian regimes. I will speak of it shortly. For the moment, I prefer to return to the Spanish case, as the best of the three republics, and discuss not its virtues, but the several flaws it shared with its sister polities.

Four points have special relevance. As with early 19th century liberalism, extreme factionalism was the curse of early 20th century Southern European democracy. The republican forces in Spain miraculously transcended this in 1930-33, but afterwards fell out among themselves again. Too many ties had been forged during the period of unity for them to be broken completely, so some degree of collaboration among the middle and working classes survived. This in turn made possible the Popular Front victory of early 1936, as well as the Republic’s ability both to withstand the initial rebel assault and to persevere in the Civil War for so long against overwhelming odds. Yet innocence had been lost, and inter-class cooperation as well as intra-party unity was fearful and flawed after 1933. In Greece, Venizelos sometimes provided a basis for unity, but the subgroups that made up the Venizelist forces were almost as frequently divided among themselves, and usually lacked contact with the working classes. In Portugal, as we have seen, factionalism was always rife.

Second, so many unresolved problems had been inherited from the antecedent liberal regimes that the new democracies tended to be overwhelmed by them. This was true both when they
tried seriously to address them, as in Spain and to a lesser extent Greece, and when they tended to neglect them, as in Portugal.

Third, because Southern Europe’s political culture was conflictive and permeated with violence and corruption, most groups felt justified in using whatever tactics, however illegitimate, they could against their opponents. A remarkable feature of Spain’s Republic from 1931-33 was its attempt to break this vicious cycle, but it did not succeed. In Portugal and Greece, few efforts were made in this direction, even by so extraordinary a statesman as Venizelos. It was taken for granted that the law of the jungle prevailed in politics, so everyone tended to act according to it.

Finally, as had also been true for 19th century liberalism, the Southern European democracies were unfortunate in the timing of their birth. The interwar period was the most troubled in Europe’s history since the aftermath of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, because it was ideologically so conflictive and economically so unstable. The depression of the 1930s and the European wide anti-communist and anti-fascist hysterias were among the reasons why the Spanish and Greek republics collapsed.

The Spanish Civil War can be seen as a kind of metaphor for what might have happened in Southern Europe as a whole given its history of the previous two centuries. We cannot discuss it here, but a few points should be made. It was a more terrible struggle for Spain than any of the 19th century civil wars, and was equalled in destructiveness only by the war against Napoleon. It led to greater interaction than usual among the Mediterranean countries as both Salazar and Mussolini supplied large numbers of troops to the nationalist side, and many Italian anti-fascists joined the Republicans. It revived the Church’s deep involvement in absolutist politics as the rebel side turned to what would be called “national Catholicism” as its chief ideological buttress. The army won unprecedented political power, but was in turn controlled to an unprecedented degree by General Franco. The new dictatorship followed many practices of the early Mussolini regime, from its peasant settlements on reclaimed lands, to its “Charter of Labor,” to its emasculation and bureaucratization of the Falange, Spain’s fascist party, while paying it lip service. Finally, the Franco dictatorship was far harsher in its early years than Mussolini’s had been at a similar
stage, partly because it came to power through military conquest, not through political manoeuvres that required the acquiescence of the ruling classes. Only in the closing stages of World War II, when he had been reduced to being nominal head of the so-called Italian Social Republic, would Mussolini exceed the scale of repression Franco carried out between 1939 and 1943.

Mussolini’s pitiable condition as Nazi puppet in 1943-45 was a direct consequence of the radical change of direction he instituted in his regime in the mid-1930s. The pragmatism which had characterized most of his policies since taking power gave way to dangerous new initiatives, stimulated in large part by the desire to emulate or surpass what was being accomplished by Hitler in Germany after 1933. Foreign policy became his chief obsession, first with Ethiopia in 1935-36, then with the Spanish Civil War in 1936-39, and finally with using the German alliance and French and English disarray to pick up whatever fragments he could in the spring and summer of 1939. Mussolini’s sense of reality did not disappear entirely. When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, Mussolini remained neutral. But when France (and seemingly England as well) was so easily routed in June 1940, caution no longer appeared necessary. He launched his forces in Libya against the British in Egypt in September, and those in Albania against Greece in October. Both campaigns resulted in resounding defeats from which Italy had to be rescued by Germany. The defeat in Albania was especially humiliating, as Greece had only one-fifth Italy’s population and an even smaller proportion of its economic prowess. It was Adowa again, but on a truly massive scale, and in a situation in which losses could not be cut, so Italy was forced to fight on hopelessly.

If both Spain and Italy moved away from the mainstream that had developed in Southern Europe during the 1920’s, Greece was re-entering it. We last discussed Greece in 1917, when the Entente forced Constantine into exile. On one level, this ended the great Schism of 1915-17, since the Venizelists now controlled the entire country. On a deeper level, however, the Schism persisted, as much of the population of “Old Greece,” the pre-1912 territories where royalism had its deepest roots and where the Entente blockades had been especially damaging, bitterly resented the Venizelists. The resentment was heightened by the purges and harassment the new regime carried
out against royalist activists, as well as by opposition to the massive conscription through which Venizelos built up the army that fought in the last stages of the World War and was kept in being afterward to reinforce Greece’s position in Smyrna and Thrace. Venizelos had convinced the Great Powers at Versailles to grant Greece these two huge areas (Thrace encompassed the whole of European Turkey save Constantinople itself, Smyrna a major portion of Asia Minor’s Aegean coast). He assumed that this extraordinary achievement would overshadow everything else that had happened since 1915 and restore his nearly universal pre-war popularity.

When this proposition was electorally tested in November 1920, however, the Venizelists were defeated by the royalists, who quickly engineered the return of Constantine. This had consequences for Greece’s position in Smyrna, as Constantine was anathema to Britain and France because of his wartime activities. The weakening of Great Power support proved especially damaging as another major Venizelist assumption, that there would be little local resistance to Greek expansion, gradually unravelled. Since 1919 Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) had been building a national movement to replace the Ottoman state which had accepted dismemberment of Turkey. By 1921 this was harassing the Greek armies so effectively that they risked a major drive deep into Anatolia, hoping to destroy Ataturk’s forces. But their foe was elusive, so they found themselves isolated in the interior, unable to go forward because of overextended supply lines, unwilling to admit weakness by retreating to more defensible positions near the coast. For one whole agonizing year the Greek armies in Asia Minor waited, their morale disintegrating constantly. Disaster struck in mid-August 1922, when Ataturk’s forces launched a great offensive. The Greek armies crumbled almost immediately; panic seized the troops, who fled without resisting before the advancing Turks, too disorganized to make a stand even when they reached the coast.

Smyrna’s large Greek population was abandoned to its fate, which meant first pillage, then expulsion. The same fate awaited Greeks throughout Asia Minor and in Eastern Thrace, which Ataturk also reconquered. At a single blow, a heritage that dated back nearly three thousand years and had often been more important to Greek culture than peninsular Greece itself, was eradicated. About 1.5 million people passed through Greece as refugees; over 1.2 million of them stayed on
permanently. This amounted to one-fourth of the pre-existing population, the largest proportion of refugees any European country has ever been called on to absorb.

Asia Minor Hellenism was dead, as were the irredentist dreams that had sustained Greece for a century. On the home front, the economy had collapsed under the wartime pressures. It is not surprising that in the face of so great a trauma (‘The Catastrophe,’ Greeks soon named it) Constantine was overthrown by a military coup, and a Republic proclaimed. Nor does it surprise that the first years of the Republic were chaotic. Its natural leader, Venizelos (who, with the royalists in power from 1920-22, escaped blame for what had happened even though he had initiated the Asia Minor adventure) kept his distance, because of the excessive power military men exercised in it. Until 1926, the Greek Republic resembled the Portuguese, even down to giving birth to a one-year populist dictatorship, under General Pangalos. But after Pangalos was ousted, the warring factions began to cooperate more effectively, and in 1928 the Republic seemed to consolidate itself as Venizelos returned to politics. For the next four years he headed a strong reformist government which, besides carrying out an intelligent foreign policy, completed the process of resettling the refugees, sponsored major public works, fostered industry and trade, expanded rural credit and technical services, and transformed the educational system.

But this solid record of accomplishments could not save the Greek Republic, any more than would be true in Spain. Venizelos was not as idealistic, either socially or politically, as Azaña; his attempts to manipulate the electoral system in 1932-33 can be considered the first step in the disintegration of Republican legality, especially as one of his army followers tried to stage a coup when the Venizelists lost the 1933 vote. But subsequently responsibility for continuing the vicious circle shifted to the victorious Populists, a party which (like the Spanish CEDA) officially advocated “accidentalism” in politics but had many royalists in it. An assassination attempt against Venizelos in which the police were involved quickly followed. Attempts to investigate the incident were blocked, harassment of many kinds began to be used against Venizelists, state institutions in which they still predominated were sabotaged. On the whole, this stage of the rightist reaction in Greece was
stronger than what was occurring almost simultaneously in Spain’s “bienio negro.” Both reactions provoked the left-of-center republican forces into ill-considered attempts to recover power, in Spain through the Socialist-inspired October 1934 revolution, in Greece through the major military rising of March 1935. The failure of both encouraged deeper reaction, but again the process went further in Greece than in Spain, at least in the short run. After the Venizelists had been undone, a rightist general, Kondylis, ousted the Populist government and established a transitory dictatorship to restore the monarchy.

To the general surprise, the new king, George, returned from exile as a conciliator. He quickly dismissed Kondylis, and called new elections for January 1936. Their outcome was less clear than those held a month later in Spain, as Venizelists and anti-Venizelists won an almost identical number of seats, with the small refugee-based Communist party holding the rest. Both main parties as well as the king seemed inclined to compromise, but their good intentions came to naught. A bizarre coincidence intervened as four major politicians (Venizelos; Tsaldaris, the Populist head; Demertzis, George’s prime minister; and Kondylis) died in the spring, utterly unsettling political life. Communist politicians foolishly boasted about holding the balance of power in parliament, and their trade unions launched strikes which, if mild by European standards, far exceeded any Greece had seen before. Finally, the outbreak of Spain’s Civil War on July 18 must also have contributed to George’s change of attitude two weeks later when he agreed to allow his new prime minister, John Metaxas, to declare a dictatorship. The decision of the king was all-important, as Metaxas was weaker even than Mussolini and Primo had been in the early 1920s, having no independent support of his own, either political or military, with which to pressure the monarch and engineer the founding of a new regime.

The Metaxas regime fit in well with the relatively mild dictatorships that had characterized Southern Europe until the mid-1930s, before Mussolini changed course and Franco appeared on the scene. Metaxas adopted much of the fascist political paraphernalia, but allowed a limited degree of pluralism. His chief victims were the Communists, whom he disarticulated as much through clever psychological and political stratagems as through brute repression. His regime was less well received among the elites and the populace than the Latin dictatorships in 1922-26 had been,
but neither was there fierce opposition to it. And (in contrast to what would happen in Greece in 1974) the regime’s nature does not seem to have handicapped its ability to lead the nation when Mussolini’s forces invaded Greece in October 1940. Paradoxically, Metaxas would preside over what is perhaps the proudest moment in modern Greek history--the war in Albania.

And yet, as Metaxas himself died in the middle of the war and German armies rescued the Italians in April 1941, this triumph could not be converted into deeper support for the dictatorship. Always superficially based, the regime left behind as few avid supporters as had Primo de Rivera’s rule in Spain. Its chief effects were also inverse, in that it propelled the forces of the center and left against the king whose acquiescence had made the dictatorship possible. Their resentment became a factor of importance as the Allies began to win World War II in 1943. Churchill’s obstinate insistence that George be given power in post-war Greece helped rally many non-Communists to EAM-ELAS, and gave this Communist-controlled resistance movement a greater political legitimacy than it otherwise would have had. Its sense of legitimacy in turn helped inspire EAM aggressiveness toward other resistance groups in 1943-44 and, after the German withdrawal, it helped justify the bloody events of December 1944 in Athens, when EAM tried but failed to seize power.

A vicious cycle again came into existence. The Communist’s early aggressiveness justified royalist extremists and enabled many wartime collaborators to slip into their ranks. For the next year and a half leftists were persecuted mercilessly, which finally drove many of them to take up arms again. Thus in the spring of 1946, the Schism which had divided Greece in 1915-24 and again in 1933-36 reappeared. But this time all restraints were removed and the civil strife was transformed into full-scale civil war. We cannot discuss the Greek Civil War of 1946-49 here, but a few comparisons with what happened in Spain a decade earlier are worth mentioning.

Greece’s fratricidal struggle was not as bloody as Spain’s since combat occurred mostly along the northern frontiers and regular armies seldom confronted one another; guerrilla activities were much more prominent, and the weaponry used was more primitive, except perhaps in the closing phases. There was also less civilian bloodshed: the EAM-controlled areas were lightly
populated, and state repression was restrained by the monarchy’s dependence both on American aid and on political support from Greek center-left forces (these by now had abandoned the EAM). For the same reasons, ideological divisions were also not as extreme as in Spain. Yet it was an ugly war, ranking only after Spain and Russia among European civil wars of the 20th century. It left scars on the entire nation as tens of thousands were imprisoned and hundreds of thousands more were harassed for their political beliefs. And at war’s end, the proportion of exiles relative to the population was even greater than in Spain.

Thus, the whole of the 1940s were disastrous for Greece. The Axis occupation of 1941-44 was among the most severe in Europe, with especially bad consequences in the cities, where starvation occurred because of Greece’s inability to grow enough to feed itself. The civil strife of 1944-46 had also been terrible, probably worse than anywhere else in Europe in the immediate post-war period. And the decade was topped off by the Civil War. Greece in 1949 may not have been quite so prostrate as Spain in 1939, but given what had happened in 1915-1924, this was its second encounter in a generation with catastrophe.

The political and social tensions which erupted into civil war in Greece were not unique to it. Internal strife was rampant in Italy after Mussolini was ousted in July 1943, and might also have developed into civil war had circumstances been different. The danger was strong up to the spring of 1944, when conciliatory gestures on both sides (Togliatti’s “Svolta di Salerno” and Victor Emmanuel’s provisional stepping aside from the throne) eased the conflict between monarchist and anti-monarchist elites in allied-controlled Italy. The danger arose anew in the spring of 1945 as resistance groups in Nazi-occupied northern Italy demanded a preponderant role in Italy’s postwar government. Once again moderation prevailed. In contrast to Greece, huge allied armies were present in Italy and acted as a restraint on all local groups. The fact that Americans (wiser diplomatically than the English on Mediterranean Europe during this period) were the dominant allied force also helped; Churchill’s blind monarchism could not cause as much damage in Italy as it did in Greece. Finally, the old Italian predisposition to compromise (partly responsible even for Mussolini’s coming to power) manifested itself anew. The left, chastened by the consequences of
its maximalism in 1919-22, and the Christian Democrats, embarrassed by Church collaboration with
the fascist regime in the 1920s and 1930s, worked together to ease the crisis.

Yet Italy did not escape unscathed. It suffered extensive war damage from 1943 to 1945, as
allied armies pushed north from Naples. Much blood was shed in the fratricidal conflict between the
supporters of Mussolini’s rump Italian Social Republic and the resistance movements. The post-war
purge of collaborators took about 15,000 lives, primarily in the north. And although relations
between Marxists and Catholics remained conciliatory until 1947, enabling Italy to avoid Greek-
style civil war, they thereafter broke down. With the emergence of the Cold War, the Christian
Democrats took a sharp turn rightward, and filled the 1948 elections with apocalyptic denunciations of
the Communists and Socialists. Among the arguments used was that if the leftist bloc won, the
United States would withdraw its economic aid, a frightening prospect given Italy’s great
poverty.

The 1940s were also terrible for Spain. Material recovery from its Civil War was made
difficult by several factors: the shortages created by the World War; the international isolation
imposed by the United Nations after the war; one of the worst droughts in Spanish history from 1946
to 1949; incompetence in the administration of economic affairs by the new government. The
Spaniards called this entire period the “years of hunger,” and neither agricultural nor industrial
production would recover their 1931-36 levels until the early 1950s. Moral recovery from the
fratricide was also slow. During the first part of the decade the main factor hindering it were the
vindictive policies of the Franco regime, which executed perhaps 40,000 persons from 1939 to 1943,
and forced hundreds of thousands more to pass through its prisons and concentration camps. During
the decade’s second half, after Allied victory in the war had led Franco to stop executions and
massive imprisonments, repression continued in milder form, using among other justifications the
struggle against the “maquis” (guerrilla forces organized both locally and from France) which vainly
sought to overthrow Franco’s regime between 1945 and 1948.

The Southern European countries thus found themselves in terrible condition at the close of the 1940s. This was above all true for Greece, which had probably never been in worse straits since achieving independence, not even during the aftermath of the Asia Minor disaster of 1922. For Spain, the 1940s was perhaps the third worse decade of her modern history, surpassed only by the War of Independence and the Civil War. Italy was better off than either, but had also experienced several years of misery, and after 1947 was again politically polarized. Only Portugal was in good shape. The country had gone through almost continuous turmoil for two decades, from 1908 when the king had been assassinated, to 1928 when the dictatorship which had replaced the Republic began to stabilize itself under Salazar. But two decades of stability and peace had followed, during which Portugal had even managed to make herself relatively prosperous, partly because of Salazar’s careful economic management, partly because it was one of the few neutral nations in Europe during the Second World War and benefitted by trading with both sides. The contrast with Greece and Spain, and with Italy as well, could scarcely have been greater.

All this would change radically over the next four decades. Dramatic transformations occurred not only within each of the four nations but also in their positions relative to one another and to the rest of Europe. The easiest way to deal with these changes might be to divide this period into two parts—the quarter century from 1950 to 1975, and the sixteen years which have transpired since. These units make sense economically as well as politically, since the brief interval from 1973 to 1975 witnessed both the end of the dictatorial regimes in Southern Europe and the first long pause in the great European-wide economic boom that had begun during the Korean War.

In dealing with both periods, we must always keep in mind what was happening in the so-called “Western” bloc of nations to which Southern Europe belonged. The South had never been isolated from the rest of Europe, of course, as I have tried to show repeatedly. Indeed, the intimacy of its contact with England, France and Germany had long proved the absurdity of the saying that “Africa begins at the Pyrenees.” But the degree of influence that began to be exerted on almost every aspect of life in Southern Europe by its northern neighbours and the United States was so
much more intense than before as to constitute a new order of affairs. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this is to imagine how different Greece would be today had its civil war ended differently and it had fallen into the Communist camp. This outcome--by no means utterly impossible--would have wiped away many of the socioeconomic and political similarities with Southern Europe that had developed over time and pushed Greece into a very different and much less propitious orbit.

During our first period, from 1950 to 1975, three factors which characterized the wider Western world had special relevance to developments in Southern Europe. First was the unprecedented unanimity about democracy. This resulted both from the genuine discredit the Nazi horrors had brought on all radical rightist positions, and from the Cold War need to emphasize the differences between the West and its opponents. The democratic ideal was held more firmly in theory than in practice, of course. The United States in particular began to act ambivalently toward it during the 1950s, as its love of informal world empire grew. The CIA, Defense Department and other major sectors of the US government came to be notoriously disrespectful of democracy and made little effort to foster it, as their intimacy with dictators around the globe show. Europe too was not utterly pure in its devotion to the ideal. Both the Greek and Italian democracies were deeply flawed, as we shall see. And while Europe as a whole disapproved of the Greek junta when it seized power, it was not particularly energetic in trying to bring about its overthrow.

Nonetheless, the existence of the ideal was a factor of overwhelming importance, and had many practical consequences. This can be illustrated by the greater opportunities available to the Southern European democracies in the post-war period. Not only were they recipients of far more American aid of all kinds, but they were also given easy access to the new institutions that were arising in Europe-Italy was a founding member of the EEC in 1958, and Greece became the first associate member in 1962. The dictatorships were more isolated. Portugal’s isolation was softened by the statesman-like image Salazar managed to project, by the importance of the Azores to NATO, and by Britain’s loyalty to its “oldest ally.” In Spain, the dictatorship was a great handicap, because of widespread Western guilt feelings over the non-interventionist policies followed during the
Civil War, and due to Franco’s justified reputation for great brutality. Antipathy toward the regime affected relations with both public and private institutions abroad, making it difficult for Spain to secure international loans, for example. It also adversely affected non-institutional matters like tourism, which got off to a considerably slower start than in Italy or Greece because of the reluctance of many to travel to Franco’s Spain. In short, if the international climate had been decidedly hostile to democracy during the interwar period, it became favorable to it within non-Communist Europe after 1945. During the 1930s dictatorship seemed to constitute the wave of the future; from the late 1940s on, it became increasingly difficult to maintain.

Second, the Western world experienced an unprecedentedly long and dynamic economic boom. Its closest rival in duration was the boom which occurred a century earlier, in the 1850s and 1860s, which also had a major impact on Southern Europe. But the new boom went far deeper, partly because capitalist economies had become so much more developed during the intervening century, partly because it was more uninterrupted—during the roughly two decades during which it continued, from the early 1950s to the “oil shock” of 1973, there was only one more or less serious recession, in 1966-67. The boom was also more internationally oriented than any which had preceded it, and involved the movement across national borders of enormous amounts of capital and unprecedented numbers of people.

Foreign capital investment was significant for Southern Europe, but even more so was the movement of people. This took two major forms, tourism and migrant labor. More than any other area of the world, Southern Europe benefitted from both. It became the greatest of all tourist centers, as first millions, then tens of millions of people entered it. The extent of the change was most dramatically illustrated in Spain which, if it got off to a slow start in tourism during the 1950s, made up for it in the 1960s as the number of foreigners (most of them tourists) entering the country equalled one-third of its population by 1963, exceeded half that population by 1966, and surpassed the entire population by 1972. The South was also the chief source of the migrant labor which became so important a feature of Europe’s advanced economies. Italy pioneered in the 1950s,
followed by Greece in the early 1960s, and by Spain and especially Portugal from the mid-1960s onward. A new feature of the new migration was the exceedingly close contact the emigrants maintained with their home countries because of their proximity to them; it was an emigration which separated people much less than the earlier, primarily overseas migration had.

Third, this was an era of unprecedented cultural change throughout the Western world. The most obvious cause was the development of the mass media, at first slowly via radio, films and photojournalism, then more rapidly with television. But there were other causes as well, ranging from the shocks that the two World Wars had administered to traditional European values, to the shifts in outlook that resulted from consumerism and the youth revolt against authority. Every attitudinal shift that occurred reached Southern Europe relatively quickly. Tourists and migrant workers were among the principal agents; although most of them were ghettoized and had little contact with the other culture, some served as transmitters of ideas from north to south. The same might be said for the mass media: even though most of what they presented was either trash or propaganda in favor of the status quo, Southern Europe was no longer cut off mentally from the rest of the world as much as before.

Also fundamental was that the economic boom brought with it the first truly rapid urbanization in Southern European history. At the close of World War II, well over half the population lived in essentially rural settings in Portugal, Greece and Spain, and somewhat more than half in Italy. The balance had changed in Italy by the early 1950s, and in the rest a decade later. Urban dwellers can remain very provincial, of course, especially while the first generation of migrants predominates, and many of the influences to which they are exposed have little political or social relevance. Yet their mere presence in cities necessarily exposed them to positive influences as well, certainly to a greater degree than was true of the isolated rural dwellers of the past. The especially rapid growth of Southern educational systems had a similar impact. Illiteracy, still considerable in 1950, had been nearly eradicated by the 1970s. And at about the same time, the proportion of young people going on to higher education in the South reached Western European levels.
Between the mass media and the many indirect effects of the economic boom a cultural revolution of major proportions took place. In a very short time, attitudes towards all aspects of life were transformed more deeply than ever before. And on the whole the change was politically and socially liberating, emphasizing democratic values such as pluralism, tolerance and individual rights, including the right of all to a reasonably adequate standard of living. Between the material and mental transformation that occurred, the bases for the development of a strong civil society were being created for the first time in Southern European history.

These structural changes were especially important in Spain, as I will show later. But societies are obviously not merely passive objects that can be shaped solely by the environments in which they find themselves. Politics has its own spheres of autonomy. Hence, if Spain after 1950 developed in a more or less unilineal direction which corresponds fairly closely to what might have been expected on the basis of the structural factors mentioned, this was less true in Italy, and especially in Greece and Portugal, where many things happened that a structural approach alone cannot explain. It is to developments in each of the four countries between 1950 and roughly 1975 that I now turn.

Let me start with Greece. As mentioned earlier, its situation in 1950 was worse even than that of Spain because it had been triply cursed during the 1940s—first by the Nazi occupation, then by intense civic strife in 1944-46, and finally by the Civil War of 1946-49. The country was in shambles, both materially and in the quality of its social and political life. The effects of the decade-long trauma could not be eliminated overnight. One way in which they manifested themselves was in the flawed democracy that governed Greece. Its flaws were partly institutional, of what might be called the Imperial German type. Neither king nor army truly accepted the supremacy of parliament; both thought they had the right to intervene in politics in case of what they regarded as need. There were also flaws of the parliamentary type, with corruption and electoral manipulation reappearing, though to a lesser extent than in Italy or Iberia during the late 19th century. Discrimination against all those suspected of sympathizing with the losing side in the civil war was common. This usually expressed itself in non-violent ways (bureaucratic
harassment, denial of licenses, exclusion from governmental jobs), but sometimes it took the form of beatings and unjustified arrests. Finally, there was an external flaw—the extraordinary dependency Greece had developed on the United States during its civil war.

Despite these many defects, Greece nevertheless was a democracy. Paradoxically, it had become so in large part because of the United States. The US had not only helped win the civil war and given huge amounts of economic aid, but also used its political influence to good effect on two occasions: in 1952 to bring Papagos to power, and in 1955 to tilt the succession to Karamanlis. Papagos, hero of the Italian war as well as the victorious general of the civil war, styled himself Greece’s De Gaulle. He was not in fact of the same stature, but was able to end the political miasma caused by the short-lived coalition cabinets which governed Greece from 1949 to 1952. In its place, he brought together a government of talented young men capable of confronting Greece’s overwhelming problems. The most able of these was Karamanlis, who succeeded Papagos on his death in 1955 and ruled for the next eight years, until 1963.

Rapid Greek economic growth occurred during this period. Several factors were responsible: continuation of American aid for considerably longer than anywhere else in Europe, Markezinis’ economic reforms of 1953, and the spectacular rise of the Greek shipping industry in the 1950s and 1960s. Greece’s early entry into the tourist industry also contributed, as did the early and large-scale Greek emigration, not only to Europe but also to the United States, Canada and above all to Australia. Finally, there were major improvements in agricultural production, bauxite exports became important, and the cement industry flourished. The boom occurred so rapidly that many mistakes were made, especially in the haphazard growth of Athens, which was converted into an ugly megalopolis, far too big for the country it headed. Yet since the economic boom was accompanied by a great cultural flourishing, the late 1950s and early 1960s seemed a kind of golden age for Greece. Its economic progress was symbolized by the world-wide fame of such figures as Onassis and Niarchos, its cultural achievements by persons like Callas, Kazantzakis and Sepheris. Another indicator of success was Greece’s relative international standing. In the late 1940s, Greek per capita income was much below Portuguese and roughly on a par with Spanish. By the mid-
1960s, it had become considerably higher than that of Portugal, and was somewhat ahead of Spain as well.

But economic growth could not by itself create favorable conditions for democracy. It could not set off a “beneficent cycle” as would later occur in Spain. Two factors counteracted it, one external, the other internal.

The external factor, Cyprus, emerged as an issue in 1955, soon after the start of economic recovery. The crisis was unexpected, as one of Venizelos’ last great services had been to establish good relations with Turkey in 1930, and these had remained excellent during the quarter century which intervened. Moreover, on the basis of statements made by their British allies during both World Wars, Greeks had long assumed that Cyprus would be united with Greece once Britain left it. This assumption fell apart in 1955, as Greek nationalists organized terrorist groups to drive the British out immediately, and the British responded by inviting Turkey to assert its residual rights in the island, thus compromising the Greek claim. The crisis escalated sharply in September, when Turkish mobs carried out a pogrom in Istanbul which turned out to be a first step in Turkey’s forcing into exile the roughly 100,000 Greeks who still lived there. After two extremely tense years, the situation gradually improved and resulted in an agreement via which Cyprus became independent in 1960. The island’s new status was unsatisfactory, however, both to those who wanted enosis (Cypriot union with Greece), and to those willing to accept independence but resentful of the extensive privileges given Cyprus’ Turkish minority.

The Cyprus issue undermined the position of Karamanlis, seen as a compromiser because he was too rational a man to be a fervid nationalist. Unfortunately, the damage was not restricted to his person or party. Irredentism had dominated and distorted Greek life throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. The Asia Minor catastrophe of 1922 seemed to have ended this obsession forever, especially given the good Greco-Turkish relations from 1930 to 1955. Now, due to British perfidy, the intransigence of Greek nationalists, and Turkish brutality in Istanbul, foreign issues again began to interfere with domestic. Greece became hostage to Cyprus, with every fluctuation in that unstable polity having an immediate impact in Athens. A structural defect thus appeared which handicapped
further economic growth, in ways as simple as condemning Greece to an arms policy which consumed three times as much of its budget as in Spain or Italy. Its political effects were also bad: they reinforced the position of the army and of demagogic politicians, as both could now invoke Cyprus and the Turkish danger at will to achieve their ends.

Domestic factors also weakened Karamanlis’ government. The austerity program that accompanied economic revival generated resentment among the populace, as did the temporary rootlessness of the many persons who migrated from their villages to Athens or Salonica. The old Venizelists, long disoriented by the acute dilemmas the civil war raised for them, and by the way in which the former royalist camp had taken over power under Papagos, began to regroup and make their presence felt. The same was true for the leftists who had sympathized with the EAM to the end, and had been especially subject to state persecution since then. There were also many legitimate grounds on which to object to Karamanlis. His style of government was imperious, impatient with niceties, contemptuous of other viewpoints. And his parliamentary majorities were based on an extremely biased system of weighted representation which enabled his party to win as many 57% of the seats with as few as 41% of the votes; there was also occasional tampering with the ballot in lesser ways.

All these factors came together in 1958, when a new leftist coalition unexpectedly won more than 25 percent of the vote. From then on the political situation deteriorated constantly. Karamanlis’ uninspired handling of the Cyprus issue contributed to the deterioration. So did his attempt to juggle the 1961 elections, which in turn gave an old Venizelist leader, George Papandreou, the justification to launch an “unrelenting struggle” to bring down the corrupt government. Papandreou’s vision of sinister forces operating behind Karamanlis seemed to be borne out in May 1963, when the Lambrakis assassination (immortalized in the movie “Z”) occurred. Karamanlis’ position collapsed two months later, in a 19th century style conflict with the royal family. Papandreou was called on to head the government instead.

But having helped Papandreou gain office, the royal family was soon at loggerheads with him. The sweeping victory of his Center Union party in the 1964 elections was accompanied by
an upsurge of leftism in Greece, both of the old kind linked with the civil war and, more importantly, of the new leftism being propagated by Papandreou’s son, Andreas, who had abruptly appeared on the Greek political scene after more than two decades of self-exile in the United States. Open conflict burst forth in 1965, when Andreas was accused of plotting a leftist revolt in the army, which in turn led the new king, Constantine, to oust his father. But the Papandreous had galvanized too many social forces for the ouster to be accepted without protest. For nearly two years the king tried to gain legitimacy for the cabinets he appointed by granting favors to Center Union deputies who would support him. He failed utterly as the Papandreous, brilliant demagogues both, tarnished his appointees as “apostates.” Meanwhile, street protests periodically swept the big cities.

Most parties to the dispute, including Constantine and the elder Papandreou, finally agreed to clarify the situation by holding new elections in the spring of 1967. Whether the king and the uppermost echelons of the army would have respected the outcome of those elections, particularly if Andreas’ radical faction had done well, is uncertain. But they were never held because the week before, at the height of the Easter celebrations, a conspiracy of lesser officers, mostly from the intelligence services, seized power. Lacking the courage to refuse to cooperate with them at the start, the king eight months later tried to redeem himself by staging a coup against them. But this was as ineptly organized as everything else Constantine had done during the preceding two years, and its failure merely strengthened the colonel’s junta.

Military dictatorship had returned to Southern Europe. But the profound transformation which had taken place in Greece over the previous decade was by no means entirely wasted. Because of the emphasis on democracy and Greece’s deeper interaction with Western Europe the dictatorship could not take root. With one exception, all important politicians—whether of the right, left or center—refused to work with it. So did most technical experts who were asked to occupy government posts. The colonels had imposed a dictatorship on Greek society, but they could never make it penetrate deeply into that society. Despite increasing elaborate pseudo-democratic facades with which they experimented, their regime could not acquire legitimacy. Finally, in
November 1973, the fraud was exposed when students occupied the Polytechnic University campus in Athens, and tanks were sent in to oust them, killing several dozen in the process. Now all pretense at acquiring legitimacy was abandoned. For the next few months, until the first major crisis upset the precarious balance on which they rested, a small group of army officers ruled Greece on the basis of force alone.

Nothing so dramatic occurred in Italy, yet in some ways it followed a pattern similar to the Greek as early progress gave way to retrogression. A fundamental reason for the parallelism was that Italian democracy was also flawed, although to a lesser degree than in Greece. Three flaws were especially noteworthy.

First, transformismo had smothered the Risorgimento, so that except for the old trinity of Mazzini, Garibaldi and Cavour, an idealistic political tradition was lacking among Italy’s elites. Its greatest politician since unification had been Giolitti, of very mixed reputation. From 1945 to 1953, De Gasperi, the Christian Democratic (DC) head, also accomplished a great deal; but ultimately he too remained only an exceptionally able party leader, unable to instill a new vision in society as a whole.

Second, despite the hunting down of the most obvious collaborators as each region of the country was liberated, there was no general purge of fascists in 1945. Thus, many anti-democrats remained in positions of power, particularly in the army and police forces. Moreover, the permanent exclusion of Communists from any role in the national government once the Cold War got under way, and the lack of any other serious rival to the DC party gave Christian Democracy a dangerous monopoly on power.

Third, the south continued to handicap Italian democracy. Because it had fallen to the Allies early in the war it had no experience either with the Nazi occupation or resistance movements, and almost no purge whatever of local former fascists had been undertaken. In addition, the mafia tradition in the mezzogiorno was reborn, perhaps stronger than before, due to mistakes made by the Allied occupation forces and to the new autonomous status accorded to Sicily. The south thus remained the chief bastion of political retrogression and corruption. The small neo-fascist parties
of postwar Italy were all based there. More important, the easily manipulated southern vote was indispensable to the permanent DC hold on government.

In a certain sense, Italy was witnessing a revival of the old transformist system, with the Christian Democrats as the new amorphous governing bloc. The parallel is exaggerated, of course: DC control over the south was weaker than Giolitti’s had once been and Communists and Socialists were much stronger throughout the entire country. The DC also proved somewhat more reformist than the old Sinistra had been. This was especially evident in the small-scale agrarian reform DC governments carried out in the early 1950s, and in the much larger-scale “Development Fund for the Mezzogiorno,” which got under way at the same time. The Fund sought to encourage investment in the south and build up its infrastructure. It did not thereby succeed in eradicating southern backwardness, nor was it able to break the malevolent political subculture that had prevailed since Bourbon times (in part because of the contradictory effects of the political corruption the DC was simultaneously fostering). But during the roughly three decades during which it functioned, the Fund at least kept the south from falling further behind the center and north than it otherwise would have.

The DC government presided over two other noteworthy achievements during the 1950s and 1960s: the building of an impressive network of superhighways despite often difficult terrain and the rapid development of newly-discovered natural gas deposits in the Po valley. Other factors also contributed to Italy’s fast growth. The parastatal economic agencies inherited from Mussolini or created anew were surprisingly effective during this period. The combination of the natural gas finds, further development of its hydroelectric resources, and low-cost oil from the Middle East, allowed Italy as a whole to enjoy cheap energy for the first time. Industrial investment was also encouraged by exceptionally low labor costs, held down by the abundant manpower provided by southerners coming north and by rural dwellers moving to the cities. Remittances from abroad were important to the boom: the prewar tradition of large-scale overseas migration revived; in addition Italian workers not only pioneered the “Gastarbeiter” phenomenon during the 1950s, but
remained far more numerous than any rival national group in northern Europe subsequently. Tourism became a bigger industry than ever before; Italian shipping enterprises enjoyed one last golden era. And since Italy, unlike Greece, was starting its rapid growth from an already reasonably high level, an Italian “economic miracle” began to be talked of by the early 1960s, the second in postwar Europe after Germany’s.

But, as in Greece, economic growth did not mean that Italy had thereby entered on a smooth path toward a harmonious future. Social conflict and political instability slowly re-emerged, and in 1969 two events marked an important turning point in Italy’s postwar history. One was the “otoño caldo” when Italian workers, long passive because of weak and fragmented unions, exploded with what would become the most continuous and intense wave of strike activity in Europe; for more than a decade, their militancy was matched only by English labor. More sinister was the appearance of urban terrorism. This was initially instigated by rightist groups which probably enjoyed tacit support in some police circles. A dialectic of violence would engulf Italy for the next thirteen years. The leftist Red Brigades seized the initiative after 1975, but the greatest crime of the rightist groups, the 1980 massacre in Bologna’s railway station, was even more terrible than the better known leftist kidnapping and slaying of Aldo Moro in 1978. Also disturbing was the discovery in 1981 of the P-2, an elite secret society that seemed to be plotting anti-democratic measures on a larger scale. This turned out to be only the first of several revelations (the Solo plan, “operazione Gladio”) of right-wing conspiracies involving elements of the DC. Meanwhile, the mafia kept expanding its operations and in 1981, for the first time, became confident enough to assassinate a national-level police official. What disturbed the political establishment most, however, was not any of these violent developments, but the rising Communist vote of 1968-76. For all the moderation it had displayed for decades, the prospect of the PCI gaining power through elections terrified many.

The pessimism of the 1970s and early 1980s was very deep. Even the economy seemed threatened, as attempts to understand new phenomena like “lavoro nero” produced gloomy prognostications. And most contemporary observers were troubled by the thought that Italy was a “society without government,” in danger of running aground amidst the corruption, inefficiency
and indifference that characterized its ruling classes. Clearly, despite the economic miracle and full institutional integration into the new Europe, as of about 1983 neither Italians nor outsiders believed that Italy had transcended its old weaknesses. Nor was it absurd to think that Italy too still needed to consolidate its democracy, just as was true in the rest of Southern Europe, where dictatorships had recently fallen.

The Portuguese pattern differed from the Italian and Greek in that no beneficent cycle got underway in the 1950s. To a considerable degree this was due to Salazar’s lack of sympathy with the new capitalist world order that was emerging. A nation of devout people who behaved decorously and lived in whitewashed houses that gleamed in the sun was his ideal, not the increasing frenzy and confusion of modern life. This image was a luxury he could afford to maintain for several years as Portugal’s relative prosperity after the World War masked its fundamental economic debilities. Consequently, aside from some roads, few attempts were made to build up the nation’s infrastructure. Irrigation projects were especially neglected, with the result that Portugal became more and more unable to feed itself. There were also few attempts to attract investment from abroad, and tourism was left to develop on its own. Hence, Portugal stood still during the 1950s, and by so doing saw the advantages it had briefly enjoyed over its Southern European neighbors disappear.

This stagnation, however graceful, was an important factor in the extraordinary popularity Humberto Delgado achieved in 1958, when he openly challenged Salazar in the phony elections that were periodically allowed as a facade for the dictatorship. The political turmoil stirred up then continued for the next four years with episodes like the seizure of the transatlantic liner Santa Maria, the coup attempt led by General Botelho Muniz, an equally unsuccessful military rising in Beja, and massive student demonstrations in Lisbon. But the truly profound difficulties of the regime arose from the colonial revolts that began in Angola in 1961 and had spread to Portugal’s other African possessions by 1964. Unimaginative at home, Salazar was equally unable to grasp the new realities emerging abroad; with a fraction of the resources of England, France and Belgium, he persevered in a policy these countries had abandoned as futile—the maintenance by force of colonial rule. The cost to Portugal was enormous, as almost half the government budget went to war operations and males
became subject to four years military service. Youth began to vote with its feet, by clandestinely leaving for France. When this migration was added to that of workers seeking economic opportunity abroad, the drain became so great that, perhaps for the first time since the disappearance of plagues and famines, a European country actually lost population over the course of a decade. Paradoxically, these disasters forced the dictatorship to abandon its antiquated policies at home, and after 1966 it belatedly began to interest itself in economic development. The progress made (especially after 1968, when Salazar was incapacitated and replaced by Caetano) was not inconsiderable, but it did not suffice to counteract the effects of the colonial wars. To return to the metaphor I used earlier, a beneficent cycle of socioeconomic change got underway but its effects were less obvious in Portugal than in the other countries because it started so late and was eclipsed by the political costs engendered by the wars in Africa.

Turning to Spain, it is often forgotten that its relatively smooth transition to and consolidation of democracy was preceded by an almost equally orderly process of change during the closing phases of the Franco dictatorship. There were many crises to be sure, but none had the importance of those of 1963-65, 1967 or 1973 in Greece, or of 1958-62 and the colonial wars in Portugal. In a sense politics, which had so dominated the early years of Franco’s regime, causing the massive repression of 1939-43 and the lesser ones of 1944-56, ceased to occupy center stage. As I once wrote in another context:¹³

“Ironically, the most useful analytical tools for understanding the final two decades of the Franco regime are those provided by its chief ideological enemy, Karl Marx. Spain after about 1957 offers one of the best examples on record of the interpretive efficacy of the concepts of historical materialism and dialectical development. Economic factors, not political, were the principal determinants of the most significant changes that occurred. Although some of their effects were foreseen and regulated by the government, their deeper impact was unexpected and could not be controlled. What began as a program of economic reform that was to be accompanied at most by a modest degree of political liberalization ended by transforming Spain so completely that full democratization had
become almost inevitable by 1975. The “cunning” of capitalism had brought about subtly and by peaceful means the destruction of the dictatorial regime that had sponsored it precisely so as to preserve itself and avoid democracy.”

We cannot go into the details of Spain’s “economic miracle” here. Suffice it to say that it started later than the Italian and Greek booms, but that once under way proceeded more rapidly and continuously than either. Tourism played a greater role in it, contributing heavily to the attitudinal changes that occurred. It also forced the Franco regime to exercise political restraint; by far Spain’s largest single source of foreign earnings during the entire period of development, tourism could not be endangered by repressive policies. Worker emigration to northern Europe had fewer political ramifications, but was important in reducing the labor pool available, thus creating labor scarcity in Spain which in turn made possible the rise of the Workers Commissions movement. Still officially prohibited, trade unions reappeared on an ad hoc basis and had become so active by the late 1960s that Spanish strike rates usually exceeded those of any European nations except Britain and Italy. Real income, pushed upward by labor scarcity, was raised still further by direct worker action. Consequently, the boom tended to be especially beneficial to the working classes, with salary and wage earners receiving, per capita, about twelve percent more of the national income in 1975 than they had in 1962.

Frequent strikes and pay hikes would earlier have caused Spanish employers to plead for state intervention against the workers. This did not occur now, in part because under boom conditions it was easier to accede to union demands than risk interruption of production, in part due to the new liberal capitalist attitudes that were being introduced to Spain from abroad. No longer dependent on the dictatorship in labor relations, the economic elite started to realize that it was becoming a handicap to further growth. Its “social fascist” remnants (such as the protection of jobholders against dismissal) made the rationalization of production more difficult, and the dictatorship’s very existence prevented serious negotiations for Spanish entry into the EEC. Other elite groups also drew away from the regime for other reasons. This was especially true within the post-Vatican Council Church, but it also characterized much of the bureaucracy, sectors of the army, and many high-level administrators, for whom the regime was becoming increasingly
anachronistic, given the prevailing trends in the Western world of which Spain more and more formed part.

The dialectical processes of the 1960s and early 1970s profoundly affected not only the dictatorship but also its opponents. Able to participate in consumerism for the first time, a kind of embourgeoisement of the masses occurred. Its moderating effects were reinforced by the greater political sophistication being bred among the working classes by the massive demographic shift to urban areas, the partial erosion of class barriers, higher educational levels, and the increasing influence of the media. The extent of the transformation would become evident after Franco’s death, when extremist movements like the CNT proved unable to revive themselves and the workers played a moderating role in several moments of potential crisis.

To this dialectical process on the national level there was a regional exception. The Basque country had enjoyed in full measure the prosperity brought by the boom but in 1969, with the appearance of the ETA, its history began to diverge dramatically from that of the rest of Spain. As ETA terrorism was very small-scale at first, the regime's overreaction was primarily responsible for the change; it was as though Franco found in the Basque country a release for the authoritarian inclinations he could only rarely and momentarily express elsewhere. An inverse dialectic to the one operating in the main body of Spain was set in motion, as states of emergency were declared and the region began to resemble a conquered country ruled by an alien army of occupation. The result was that nationalist sentiment mounted, and the terrorists were converted into popular heros. The economy began to disintegrate as political chaos discouraged investment. Between 1969 and 1975, for example, per capita income in Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, although still high, fell by ten percent relative to the national average.

By their counterexample, the Basque provinces prove that Spain’s process of transformation was not inevitable. The regime might also have reacted differently in specific crises on the national level and thus set in motion a Basque-style involution for Spain as a whole. But this did not happen because of the invisible web of constraints spun by the economic, social, and attitudinal changes of the preceding two decades. Even Carrero Blanco’s assassination in
December 1973, the greatest blow struck at the regime since its foundation, produced not repression but its opposite, further liberalization. This proved too much for the regime intransigents, who banded together to force a return to the past. For a brief moment in September 1975, when five terrorists were executed, they seemed to have won an increasingly senile Franco over to their side. Franco died two months later, but even had he lived, a policy of repression could not long have been sustained, as it was so diametrically opposed to what the beneficent cycle of change begun in the late 1950s had converted into the chief interests and values of the bulk of society and of its elites. A subtle process of protodemocratization had taken place in Spain during the previous two decades which greatly facilitated the democratic transition now about to begin. Spanish civil society, factious and polarized since the late 18th century, would finally prove to have recovered its health.

An extensive literature exists on the nearly simultaneous fall of the Portuguese, Greek and Spanish dictatorships in 1974-75, so I will content myself with the following observations. There were many differences in the actual events. In Greece and Portugal the dictatorships collapsed dramatically, within a few hours, whereas in Spain there was no abrupt change. The regime was dismantled piecemeal during the first twenty months after Franco’s death by the very individuals who had been entrusted with its preservation, hence no power vacuum ever appeared in Spain. In Greece the junta, always shallowly rooted, discredited itself completely in July 1974 by first provoking a crisis in Cyprus and then proving incapable of defending Greek interests there against Turkish partition of the island. Thus Karamanlis, called back from exile, was also able to avoid a power vacuum and put together a viable government almost overnight. In Portugal, by contrast, a power vacuum of extreme proportions developed. The military rebels who overthrew the dictatorship had no clear idea of what kind of regime should replace it. The great popular explosion set off by the army revolt further confused the issue, and created a revolutionary situation on a scale not seen in Europe since 1917-19. For eighteen months, from April 1974 to November 1975, Portugal would be in turmoil. Two great issues were fought out: the extent to which the military would continue to intervene in politics and Portugal’s future as a capitalist country. The left, especially the MFA military association but also the Communist party, was in the ascendancy
for most of the period but was never quite able either to define or to impose its vision of the future on the nation.

Other differences also existed. If in Portugal the military was primarily leftist, in Spain and Greece its continued rightist orientation constituted a major threat to the new democracies. Spain’s king Juan Carlos played an indispensable role in assuring a smooth transition to democracy; in Greece Constantine (Juan Carlos’ brother-in-law) was repudiated in a popular referendum and a republic was created. Foreign policy issues had no impact whatever on domestic developments in Spain; disagreement over decolonization in Africa intensified Portuguese divisiveness during the first year; in Greece the Turkish threat added cohesiveness to the support for Karamanlis. The Spanish constitution of 1978 was achieved through consensus and was immediately accepted by almost all political and social groups. Portugal’s constitution of 1976 also involved extensive negotiations, but they were of an unusual kind in which the center and right parties accepted radical provisions (a permanent political role for the military, widespread nationalizations) less because they believed in them than for tactical reasons, so as to appease the leftist forces which had come so close to seizing power earlier. The Greek constitution of 1975, by contrast, was rammed through parliament by Karamanlis on the basis of his party’s absolute majority, with no regard for consensus, thus lessening the document’s binding qualities.

More relevant for our purposes, however, are the common characteristics of the three transitions to democracy. The most important was their moderation. In antithesis to what had happened during its First Republic, and despite the great turmoil it experienced in 1974-75, there was almost no bloodshed in Portugal. Less surprisingly, the same was true in Greece. Only in Spain was there significant violence: on a few occasions police shot strikers and right-wing action groups assassinated leftists; more importantly, the ETA intensified the terrorist activities it had begun under Franco. But because Spain was otherwise so relatively stable, and the transition so well managed by Adolfo Suárez, these violent acts could not disrupt the process of reconciliation. There was also little revanchism against those associated with the dictatorships. In Spain this was to be expected, as the transition was carried out by leaders who had themselves formed part of the Francoist
elite. But in Portugal too, where revolution had occurred, the purge of ex-Salazarists was not thorough, and few were actually jailed. Only in Greece did it seem that vengeance might be exacted, as the three top junta leaders were sentenced to death in 1975; but the government quickly commuted the sentences to life imprisonment.

Moderation was possible because most people supported it. A notable phenomenon in all three countries was the consistency with which the population rejected, electorally and in every other way, extremist solutions. This was true even in Portugal, where despite tacit government support and its predominance in the field of propaganda, the Communists were not able to win much of the vote or establish local dominance anywhere except a few districts of Lisbon and the Alentejo. In Spain, the Suárez solution of “reforma pactada” rather than the leftist alternative of “ruptura democrática” prevailed in 1976 because the people so clearly favored Suárez. In Greece, Karamanlis received an absolute majority because many who normally voted for the center and left prudently cast ballots for him in 1974. Moderation also usually characterized the political elites. For the three years between 1976 and 1979, Suárez was a master of domestic diplomacy, inducing the Francoist Cortes to disband itself and slowly winning over the democratic opposition. But he could not have succeeded had not the opposition (above all Spain’s Communists, who with Italy’s PCI took the lead in promoting Eurocommunism) also become infected, in 1977-78, with his enthusiasm for consensus politics. In Portugal, the conflicts of 1974-75 were very real, but they were usually conducted in a conciliatory language in which “social pacts” figured prominently. Moreover, as mentioned, conciliation set the tone of the constitutional discussions in 1976. Only in Greece did old-style politics of the rhetorically extreme kind reappear, due partly to the populist demagogy of Andreas Papandreou (now returned from exile as head of a new “socialist” party, the PASOK) and partly to Karamanlis’ heavy-handed manner of governing.

What caused this new moderation, so uncharacteristic of Southern Europe in the past? The reasons, I think, lie primarily in the broad processes of social and cultural change discussed earlier. The whole Western world had become politically more moderate, sophisticated and tolerant; as increasingly integral parts of it, Spain, Greece and Portugal followed course. This benign “ecological” influence was not merely intangible and indirect. The German and French socialist parties, for example, played an important role in reviving and sustaining socialism in Spain and
Portugal during the early years. And in 1981 Greece would be granted full EEC membership more for political reasons, to reinforce Greek democracy, than for economic.

The consolidation of democracy was not without its problems, of course, and all four nations passed through difficult times in the early 1980s. Economic troubles abounded, as Europe as a whole, which had never entirely recovered from the oil shock of 1973, went into a new downturn of serious proportions after the second oil shock of 1979. This plunged Portugal’s economy, already badly damaged because of the squandering of resources and divestment of capital during the revolutionary period, into a state of semi-collapse. For Spain it meant accelerated decline of the old heavy industries of the Basque country and Asturias, plus a huge rise in unemployment. For Greece, aside from high inflation, the downturn meant that its full membership in the EEC began under unfavorable economic circumstances. Italy’s economy was also affected, especially by inflation.

The economic difficulties were accompanied by political. One manifestation was the major shifts of power that occurred in each country. The years 1979-83 saw first the rise of Sa Carneiro and his PSD party in Portugal, then the electoral triumph of PASOK in Greece, then the equally spectacular triumph of Felipe González and the Socialists (PSOE) in Spain, and finally the increasingly important role played by the Radical, Republican and Socialist parties within the coalition dominated by the DC in Italy. But democracy had taken sufficient hold that it was not a time of general political crisis. The greatest troubles, paradoxically, appeared in Spain, whose evolutionary path was usually smoother than that of the others. Two events were especially important. One was the decline of Suárez and the disintegration of his UCD; brilliantly effective during the transition period, neither leader nor party could adapt themselves to governing Spain on an everyday basis. The other was the attempted military coup of 23 February 1981, which managed to take Spain’s entire cabinet and parliament captive, but failed after a few hours both due to royal opposition and to the coup’s inability to arouse support either in most military units or in the population at large.

As the 1980s advanced, optimism returned to all of our countries except Greece. For Spain and Portugal, this was the period in which democracy was truly consolidated. In Spain, the
process was again orderly, as Felipe González and the PSOE proved as capable in completing the task of democratization as Suárez and the UCD had been in initiating it. On a couple of occasions, especially in connection with NATO membership, the government seemed in danger of stumbling. But on the whole, never had Spain enjoyed so effective a government over so long a period. Ideology was quickly abandoned, and pragmatism shaped most decisions. The PSOE’s chief achievements were economic—overhauling the economy in a more fully capitalist direction, and negotiating Spanish entry into the EEC in 1986. Since both more or less coincided with the reappearance of a European-wide boom (the first major upswing since 1973) they served to attract unprecedented foreign investment in Spain, and to release a great wave of local capital investment. A new Spanish economic miracle seemed under way, with production soaring, and with the government toward the end of the 1980s once again undertaking massive programs of road-building and other infrastructural development. A major difference with the first economic miracle, ironically, was that the working classes fared less well economically under the Socialists than in the latter stages of Francoism. This was certainly true in terms of the proportion of the national income they received in wages and in the frequency of unemployment. But if they did not share in the boom as much as the middle and upper classes, neither did the workers suffer an actual fall in real income. And since all indicators suggest that they recognized that democracy provided a kind of political compensation for economic grievances, they never became alienated from the regime as they had been from Francoism.

The Portuguese upswing was more dramatic since Portugal alone was both a post-dictatorial and post-revolutionary society, and had experienced graver difficulties of every type after 1974. The initiatives Sa Carneiro introduced in 1979-80 were aborted by his death and by the extended disarray into which this plunged his party. An important step was taken in 1982, when the constitutional provisions guaranteeing a revolutionary military council veto powers over legislation were revised. But it was not until 1985-86 that several factors combined to end Portugal’s long crisis. These included the new European wide boom, the re-emergence of a strong PSD under Cavaco Silva, the moderating influence Mario Soares exercised as president, the austerity measures of earlier years which had gradually sanitized the economy, and finally, Portugal’s admission to the EEC. The long
economic decline that had continued more or less without interruption since 1974 was finally reversed, and the growth that had characterized the 1966-73 period in Portugal was resumed. As in Spain, the massive inflow of foreign capital played a major role. The process was consecrated in 1989 when a second major set of constitutional revisions removed most of the remaining restrictions on a market economy and fully restored capitalism. Because the working classes had been so much worse off in Portugal than in Spain, the boom improved their condition, both absolutely and relatively. This is part of the reason why Cavaco Silva and the PSD continued on an upward course even into the 1990s, with their support growing in each election.

In Italy, the long string of troubles that began in 1969 seemed to come to an end in 1983-84. Terrorism disappeared, the Communist vote declined, and worker militancy receded. The economic preoccupations of the previous few years were thrust aside as the underground economy and the relatively small scale of Italian industry came to be regarded as sources of vitality and flexibility rather than as handicaps. The same happened with some major political preoccupations: politics began to appear somewhat less sclerotic as the DC had to concede greater power to its coalition partners; the weakness and corruption of Italy’s government seemed less important because Italian society was now thought to be strong enough to advance without state help. Even the mafia seemed to be in retreat, as several hundred members were arrested and brought to trial in 1987. Because of all this, a surprisingly strong wave of self-satisfaction swept Italy in the mid-1980s. For perhaps the first time in its modern history, confidence rather than self-doubt predominated. The new mood reached its peak in the late 1980s, when indicators suggested that Italy had passed England--the economic magnet of yore, the historic measure of progress--in per capita income.

But the shallowness of the new mood was revealed at decade’s end, when it receded almost as quickly as it had appeared. The sources of concern were mostly political. The 1987 mass-trial of mafiosi proved meaningless; in the 1991 municipal elections fourteen candidates for city council posts in the south were assassinated, and many observers began to warn about the spread of the mafia to central and northern Italy. In the north, above all in Lombardy, new regional parties
arose which relied heavily on the politics of resentment, especially resentment against southern immigrants and the use of state funds on behalf of the mezzogiorno. With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and Russia, the PCI lost force and became less able to fulfill its former role as a moral alternative to the DC. Craxi’s socialists continued incapable of emerging from their sterility. The DC showed signs of disarticulation: Palermo’s popular mayor, Orlando, led a revolt against it in Sicily; the President of the Republic, Cossiga, began a feud first against other members of the government and then against the party itself. The general confusion made impossible any progress on constitutional reform, an issue raised in the balmy days of the late 1980s when achievement of a new political consensus had not seemed impossible. There were also major economic preoccupations. The budget deficits accumulated over the previous two decades (due to irresponsible taxing and spending policies, and to huge losses run up by the parastatal sector from the early 1970s onward) threatened to overwhelm state finances. This endangered Italy’s ability to meet the conditions necessary to join the proposed European monetary union, which in turn meant that Italy might not be able to remain in the first level of the two-track European Community that many saw emerging after 1992.

Italy’s shift in mood may prove as fleeting as its earlier wave of self-satisfaction, especially given the solid economic foundations laid since 1945 and the special alchemy which seems to characterize the Italian people and cause them to confound outside observers. This is unlikely to be the case in Greece, where the 1980s were basically a lost decade. In its transition to democracy in the 1970s, Greece had done far better than Portugal and almost as well as Spain. It would fall behind in the 1980s less as a result of problems in the consolidation of democracy per se than because of specific government policies. Greece was seriously handicapped by its foreign affairs, of course. Democratic Portugal could escape the quagmire of the African wars through decolonization, while democratic Greece could not abandon Cyprus nor rest easy in the face of the Turkish menace. But by being admitted to the EC nearly six years earlier and under more favorable terms, Greece also enjoyed advantages over the Iberian nations.
In retrospect it is clear that Greece’s relative decline began with the sweeping victory of Andreas Papandreou in October 1981. Like the French and Spanish socialist parties which gained power in the same period, the PASOK destroyed the long-lasting conservative dominance over state and society via secularizing measures, educational reforms and expansion of civil rights; women and former EAM partisans had special reason to be grateful. In economic policy, Papandreou followed Mitterrand’s early course by generous increases in social welfare payments and widespread nationalization. But unlike the French PS (and the PSOE, which entered office a year later, so could learn from the mistakes of others) when socialization provoked economic crisis, the PASOK would not reverse policy. The refusal to change course was especially strong rhetorically; Papandreou continued his verbal slaps at big business and the United States, thus isolating Greece ever more from the capitalist dialogue that was gaining strength in Europe. It should have been no surprise that both Greeks and foreigners became increasingly reluctant to invest, that tourism stagnated, and that Greece became the EC’s least popular member. The deterioration became particularly pronounced in 1985-89, during Papandreou’s second term when, in addition to continued economic reversals, some of its best people abandoned the PASOK and political corruption appeared on an unprecedented scale. To complete the degradation, personal scandals surrounded Papandreou himself and he revived the old Greek practice of changing the electoral system to his party’s advantage. By so doing, he condemned Greece to three elections in 1989-90 before the opposition New Democracy party could win a precarious majority. And subsequently (above all in the conflicts of 1990-91 over school reforms) he provoked his followers to street violence of a kind that had disappeared in the rest of the EC. Papandreou was effective partly because of the dense organizational network the PASOK established throughout the country; never before had this combination of personal charisma and organizational strength existed in Greece. Also important was the huge number of political clients created by the parcelling out of government jobs to supporters. But Andreas’ demagogy also obviously aroused deeply felt popular sentiments. One was the lingering distrust of the Greek right for its harshness during the 1940s-1960s and its heavy-handedness of the 1970s. Another was the peculiar status resentments that many common people felt, both in the provinces and among the lower middle classes of the cities, against their social superiors. Finally
there were widespread foreign policy resentments. These were especially strong against the United States, which was made the scapegoat for most ills, from the rise of the colonel's junta to the Greek plight in Cyprus; but Europe, which Greeks regarded as being too neutral in their disputes with Turkey, did not entirely escape either. Put differently, Greek mentalities had not been thoroughly cleansed of old myths and hatreds. Unlike Portugal, they had not recently gone through the trauma of nearly successful left wing revolution; unlike Spain, their socioeconomic and political development was not so spectacular as to enable them to forget all else; unlike both, Greeks were forcibly tied to the past by critical foreign policy issues which dominated their attention and from which they could not escape. An interesting reflection of this difference was the lesser frequency with which the term “Europeanization” was used in Greek than in Portuguese or Spanish political dialogue. Was this due primarily to long standing causes, such as Greece’s greater physical distance from Western Europe and the profound imprint that Byzantine civilization left on it? Or was a more important reason the tilt Papandreou gave Greece between 1981 and 1989? Having for many years opposed entry, he came to power just after Greece joined the EC; too pragmatic to try to withdraw, he nevertheless regarded membership opportunistically, as an easy source of regional development funds, while in his heart he yearned after quixotic causes like Greek autarchy or a leading role in the Third World. And under his misdirection Greece rapidly fell behind. Ahead of both Spain and Portugal in per capita income from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, still considerably ahead of Portugal in the early 1980s, Greece moved into last place within the EC by this measure in September 1989.

The turnabout in Greece raises two questions: can the trend again be reversed there, and--frightening thought--can a similar turnabout occur in the other Southern European countries? The unexpected ways in which the world has been transformed since the mid-1980s should remind us of how precarious all predictions are, but on balance I think both questions can be answered positively. The Mitsotakis government in Athens has been slow and bumbling, and a major new weight was added to Greece’s already heavy foreign burdens when Communism crumbled in the Balkans, disrupting land links with Europe and opening the way for perhaps hundreds of thousands of refugees (especially from among the large Greek minority in southern Albania) to cross Greek
borders. But the quality of its human capital, and the safety network provided by the EC should enable Greece to resume an upward course again within the next decade, especially once the aged leadership which has held the country in thrall for the past dozen years disappears from the scene, releasing new energies.

One can be even more confident that the rest of Southern Europe has crossed the threshold that long eluded it and is no longer likely to suffer the kinds of disastrous involutions that characterized it in the past. Problems abound, to be sure, both those mentioned in Italy and an equally great array in Portugal and Spain. The Iberian nations are still seriously deficient in their infrastructures and the quality of their entrepreneurial traditions. Their international competitiveness is precarious because of the rise of lower cost production and investment centers, not only in Asia but now also in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Their citizens still endure inadequate social security, health and educational systems. Their political structures are potentially unhealthy, especially perhaps in Spain where the PSOE monopoly on power seems unchallenged. And, given the volatility of nationalist sentiments, it is not impossible that regional conflict might again flare up in Spain despite the recent weakening of the ETA and the balanced way in which Catalonia reacted to developments in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

In spite of all this, a qualitative change has occurred, I think. Southern Europe is still distinctive, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Many old cultural traits and social attitudes persist, notwithstanding the mental revolution that has taken place. The geographical factors which helped shape the past are still important. And Southerners are now more conscious of their common identity than before, as is shown by the greater frequency with which their governments adopt similar policy stances, and by the greater attention which journalists and intellectuals devote to Mediterranean issues. Nevertheless, Southern Europe is no longer quite as much the anomaly it was during the past two centuries. It no longer falls between the two worlds of Western and Eastern Europe, but has become a much more integral part of the West. Its long-standing social and political polarization has to a large extent been superseded, despite Greece’s experience in the past decade.
The deep sense of frustration and incompetence which once was so characteristic is also being transcended. Remnants of past debilities survive, of course, but the future sorrows and joys of the region will no longer be so especially its own, but will be shared with most of the rest of Europe.

2. The chief exception was Hungary where (as in Italy) liberalism was reinforced in the 1840s through its connection with the nationalist struggle against Austria, and where a conservative liberal regime came into being after 1867. A similar, though socially less securely based, pattern emerged in the 1850s and 1860s in Rumania as it won its freedom from the Ottoman Empire. Also, Serbia displayed some parallels with Greece, especially during the 1860s.

3. The united Germany Bismarck created in 1871 combined an advanced electoral system with a legislature whose powers were so restricted that, on balance (especially before 1900), one must speak of a neo-authoritarian rather than a parliamentary regime.

4. France was a partial exception. Its 1848 revolutionary cycle included two violent phases (June 1848 & December 1851) and ended in a new kind of authoritarianism, Napoleon III's Second Empire; but in comparison to Southern Europe the violence was limited and brief, and from 1860 on the neo-authoritarian regime steadily evolved into a liberal one. As for the Paris Commune of 1871, the tensions which exploded were unquestionably reflected deep societal fissures, but they were sparked less by domestic factors than by defeat in the war against Prussia, and the radical challenge of the Communards was quickly and decisively defeated by the Versailles forces.

5. The word derived from Italy's East African colonies, and referred to the native troops hired to supplement Italian forces there. The term "cacique" also had colonial origins, meaning a local native chieftain through whom Spanish rule was exercised.

6. The achievement is all the more remarkable given that universal male suffrage had existed since 1843, one of several egalitarian features that characterized 19th century Greece. These in turn derived from the homogenizing effects on Greek society of Ottoman domination from the 1450s to the 1820s, from widespread popular participation in the struggle for independence (in sharp contrast with the highly elite nature of Italy's Risorgimento), and from the relatively equitable distribution of landed property after 1830 as squatters rather than large owners took over the lands abandoned by the Turks.


8. As many Eastern as Southern Europeans may have arrived in the USA, but when emigration to both the Americas is taken into account: (not to mention emigration to France, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt) Southern European migrants were considerably more numerous, both absolutely and relative to the total population.

10. Both phrases were frequently employed by Spain's Antonio Maura, though the concept of a conservative revolution from above itself was essentially Bismarckian, of course.


12. Greeks living in what was then still Constantinople had not been expelled in 1922-23 because that city was still under Entente control. Turkey had accepted their special status in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, in return for a similar special status for Turks living under Greek control in Western Thrace.